We are quite used to speak of the many choices we always have to - - PDF document

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Intellectual skills serving the expanding horizon of knowledge

Prof D F M Strauss dfms@cknet.co.za (Keynote presentation at the International Physiotherapy Conference on: ” Expanding the horizon of knowledge” UP, Pretoria, Monday, October 6, 2008) Intellectual challenges Many people are intrigued by puzzles and stories with an apparent logical ring to them. Consider the story of the Greek philosopher, Protagoras, who had a student that studied law with him, but upon completing his studies did not have the money to pay his tutor. He promised to pay once he has won his first case. However, since no one approached him in this regard, Protagoras decided to sue him. He confronted the student informing him that he will take the case to court and that he will get his money, for if he wins the case in court the student has to pay on behalf of the court decision, and if the student wins the case he has won his first court case and therefore will have to pay. The student replied by stating that he will not have to pay, for if he wins the court case it implies that the court found that he does not have to pay, and if he looses the case he has not won his first court case and therefore also does not have to pay! Another fascinating reasoning from ancient Greece is found in the school of Parmenides where Zeno argued against multiplicity and movement by assuming an absolutely static

• being. The well-known reasoning regarding the flying arrow, Achilles and the tortoise as

well as what is known as the dichotomy paradox is reported by Aristotle in his Physics (239 b 5 ff.). The account of the paradox of the flying arrow seems to allow for movement to begin with and then “freezes” it into distinct “moments” of time – as if something moving from “moment” to “moment” has a definitive place in space. The fourth B Fragment (Diels-Kranz edition) of Zeno phrases this situation succinctly: “Whatever moves neither moves in the space it occupies, nor moves in the space it does not occupy.”1 From Don Quichotte, written by Miguel de Servantes (1605), we have a story concerning a man who was given the possibility of escaping from death on condition that he had to say something – if what he says is true he will be hanged and if what he says is false he will be drowned. In order to live he therefore said: “You are going to drown me.” If he is drowned then what he said was true, in which case he had to be hanged; and if he is hanged, what he said is false, in which case he had to be drowned – implying that he could neither be hanged nor drowned!

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If “being at one place” means “being at rest,” and if this is “every moment” the case with the “flying arrow,” then the arrow is actually only “at rest” – i.e., it is not moving at all. Of course, modern kinematics holds that “rest” is a (relative) state of motion. But without reference to some

• r other system one cannot speak about the motion of a specific kinematic subject (see Stafleu,

1980:81, 83-84).

2 We are quite used to speak of the many choices we always have to make, without realizing that actually, in each instance, we always only have one choice amidst many

• ptions to choose from.

We are equally familiar with the logical fallacy of equivocation, i.e. instances where we draw invalid conclusions based upon the fact that the term employed obtained different meanings in different parts of the argument. By using this fallacy, for example, owing to the ambiguity of the word nothing, one can easily “prove” that a Volkswagen is better than a Mercedes: There is nothing better than a Mercedes; A Volkswagen is better than nothing; therefore a Volkswagen is better than a Mercedes. Likewise, the principle of the excluded middle, stating that any statement is either true or false (see Copi, 1994:372), may become a “victim” of equivocation in the following “proof” that the moon is made out of cheese: The moon is either made out of cheese or it is not made out of cheese, we all know that the moon is not made out of cheese; therefore the moon is made out of cheese. Quite some time ago a philosopher attended a conference of the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa (PSSA). Someone asked him about his research. He replied that he writes a book with the title: “You never mean what you say.” About a decade later he

• nce again attended a PSSA conference and one of the philosophers who remembered his

earlier remark asked him about the book he was writing at the time. He replied with a smile, asking: which book? Critical thinking One of the popular slogans of contemporary academic institutions is found in the idea that scholars – lecturers and students – ought to be critical. This ideal of critical thinking is uncritically repeated in many contexts – uncritically because one is never informed about the criteria that are to be applied while engaging in “critical thinking”! Considering critical thinking may prompt us to think of formal logic. However, some of the apparently most ‘innocent’ statements used in intellectual communication may conceal multiple informal fallacies. Suppose, for example, that an academic concerned about crime and the legal system in South Africa makes the following statement in a class: “You are all too bright to reject capital punishment!” This statement first of all appeals to the intelligence (being ‘bright’) of the students without advancing an argument in favour of or against capital punishment (informal logic calls this an argument ad hominem). In the second place it refers to a widely held

3 negative attitude towards not applying capital punishment without justifying this negative attitude (argumentum ad invidiam). The third fallacy is seen in the attempt to persuade the students on the basis of flattery – crediting them with the quality of being ‘bright’,

• nce again without advancing any argument pro or con capital punishment (argumentum

ad captandum). Finally we discern in the statement a variant of an ad populum fallacy (directed towards a general sentiment, empathy or fear), in this case specifically directed towards the personal fear of students who may be afraid to be seen as non-intelligent by their lecturer or fellow students (argumentum ad baculum). Thinking about thinking Although we are all talking of concepts it is not that easy to define a concept. It appears as if most of us do not have a concept of a concept! Concept formation highlights the fact that distinctively human traits display what one may call ontic normatvity. It means that human thinking is guided (normed) by logical principles directing all thought activities. The most basic feature of logical thinking is found in the unique human analytical ability to identify and to distinguish. As such it provides the foundation for humor and laughing, for we not only find it illogical but sometimes also comical when improper identification and distinguishing occurs. Young children are sensitive to this, for they laugh spontaneously when gender switching occurs (“uncle Elizabeth” and “aunt George”). More subtle instances may require a moment's reflection before equally spontaneous laughter ensues. Consider the story of a man walking down the street with a chicken in his

• arms. A youngster sitting on the pavement asks: “Where are you going

with that pig?” The man answers: “This is not a pig, it is a chicken” – upon which the boy says: “Yes, I know, I am talking to the chicken!” This peculiar human ability to identification and distinguishing is geared both towards the dimension of the “how” and that of the concrete “what” of our experience. Once something has been identified as this or that, one can proceed by asking how questions, such as: how many?; how big?; how strong?; how expensive?; how reliable?; and so on. In other words, through thinking we are always involved in distinguishing between different kinds of entities (contemplating their types), and in considering the different modes of being (aspects) in which they function.2 Every aspect of reality, when lifted out in order to serve as the specific angle of approach

• f a particular scholarly discipline – such as the physical aspect (physics), the biotical

aspect (biology) the historical aspect (the science of history), the jural aspect (the science

• f law) – at once serves as a mode of explanation of reality as well. Therefore, the most

basic and fundamental challenge to thinking is to acknowledge the various modes of explanation for what they are without attempting to elevate anyone of them to become the sole (and all-encompassing) mode of explanation. As soon as this is done we meet the well-known isms found in the history of philosophy and the disciplines, such as arithmeticism, physicalism, vitalism, psychologism, logicism, historicism, and moralism.

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See the Appendix for an overview of the various aspects and entities within reality.

4 Putting yourself in the shoes of your conversation partner Although every scholar is entitled to subscribe to a particular view within her discipline this right does not facilitate meaningful scholarly communication between clashing

• rientations. Merely stating what we believe to be the case often terminates in the

proverbial “I say this and you say that, so what?” When two alternative approaches contradict each other the logical principle of non- contradiction simply states that both cannot be true at the same time and within the same context.3 Yet, when a specific orientation is found to be intrinsically contradictory it is clear that it attempts to defend an untenable position. Therefore one of the most powerful and effective ways in which diverging and radically contradicting points of view within scholarship can interact is by means of immanent criticism, laying bare internal

• inconsistencies. Oftentimes it is accompanied by other crucial elements of meaningful

scientific communication, such as factual criticism, showing that an argument begs the question (that it is circular or assumes what it wants to argue for – a petitio principii), and so on. Let us illustrate the value of these ways of scholarly communication with reference to some widely known popular views. Under the spell of modern physics we often hear references to our “space-time world” embedded in a widespread practice found in North America and Britain in terms of which it is customary to restrict the term “science” to the domain of (mathematics and) physics. What is normally not realized is that this mode of speech by and large is the outcome of a very particular philosophical tradition, known as positivism, although its roots go back to the Renaissance and the rise of the modern era. According to positivism, genuine science is based upon so-called empirical observation, and experimentation. What positivism means by empirical observation is that true science has to start from what could be experienced through the senses, i.e. it must proceed on the basis of sensory perception and sense data. From sense data, science is supposed to construe its concepts and derive its laws. Exercising immanent criticism immediately prompts questions susch as: Has anyone ever perceived time in a sensory way? If so, then it should be specified which are the senses employed in perceiving it. It is possible to sense the colour of time, to smell it, to tell how hard it is and to measure its weight!? The mere fact that these remarks are obviously nonsensical in an immanent critical way demonstrates that elevating sensory perception to the all-encompassing mode of explanation runs into serious difficulties.

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Immanuel Kant, the influential Enlightenment philosopher, already had a clear understanding of this limitation: “Therefore the purely logical criterion of truth, namely, the agreement of knowledge with the general and formal laws of the understanding and reason, is no doubt a condition sine qua non, or a negative condition of all truth. But logic can go no further, and it has no test for discovering error with regard to the contents, and not the form, of a proposition” (Kant, 1787-B:84). Establishing which one is justified requires a reference to grounds (reasons) exceeding the scope of the principle of non-contradiction. We shall return to this below.

5 Multiplicity and wholeness – the complexity of an apparently simple distinction reflected in various disciplines Our acquaintance with the many and wholeness may tempt us to think that not much can go wrong within various academic disciplines when these concepts are put in service of understanding reality. Unfortunately the history of the special sciences tells a different story! Mathematics From our childhood we are exposed to the two most basic and fundamental modes of experience and modes of explanation, namely number and space. When one opens the Yearbook of a state what is normally first found is information regarding the population (how many citizens are there) and the size of the state – thus exploring in a specific way

• ur awareness of multiplicity and space. A combination of these two modes of

explanation provides us with the basic idea of the universe – in Afrikaans “heelal” (the whole of everything). The succession of number, one, another one and so on, not only gives access to various number systems (natural number, integers and fractions) but also underlies our most basic understanding of infinity because any succession of numbers can be extended indefinitely, without and end, “infinitely.” For this reason one may call this kind of infinity the successive infinite. Aristotle referred to it as the potential infinite and opposed it to the so-called actual infinite. What is actually meant by the latter phrase is that a given (successively infinite) sequence of numbers may also be viewed as being given at

• nce, as an infinite totality or whole.4 Simply imagine a decreasing sequence of fractions,

such as 1/1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4 … mapped onto the corresponding points on a straight line between 0 and 1. Although the sequence of fractions are successively infinite the mapping

• nto the line provides us with a deepened perspective, for now one can envisage that all

fractions contained in the succession are given at once, as an infinite totality, because the line (and all its points) are given at once and not in succession. Implicit in this account is the appeal to the meaning of space, as determined by the spatial order of simultaneity (at

• nce) – and as soon as the numerical meaning of succession is directed towards our

awareness of wholeness (totality, at once) the spatially deepened meaning of infinity appears in what I prefer to designate as the at once infinite.5 One can therefore simply correlate succession and the connection between succession and wholeness (totality) with the nature and difference between the successive infinite and the at once infinite. The remarkable fact is that anyone not willing to contemplate the possibility of the deepened meaning of infinity, given in the idea of the at once infinite, has to reject some

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Note that the uniqueness of space is expressed in being continuously extended. Whatever is continuously extended allows for endless divisions. The other side of the coin of infinite divisibility is given in the fact that when all the (divided) parts are taken together we have the whole of totality of them, showing that the whole-parts relation is merely synonymous with the core meaning of continuous extension.

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During the later middle ages and early modernity (the first half of the 14th century) theologians speculated about the infinity of God and generated the appropriate accompanying terminology. Compare the expressions infinitum successivum and infinitum simultaneum (see Maier, 1964:77- 79).

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• f the most spectacular developments in modern mathematics, in particular the truly

incredible theory of a transfinite arithmetic as it was articulated by Georg Cantor between 1874 and 1899. The basis of his theory is given in an apparently straight-forward combination of multiplicity and wholeness, for he defines a set as the bringing together (Zuammenfassung) of definite, properly distinct (wohlunterschiedenen) elements of our intuition or thought into a whole (zu einem Ganzen) (see Cantor 1895:481). Bertrand Russell and Ernst Zermelo independently of each other discovered the intrinsic problematic nature of this notion of a set and its elements (see Husserl, 1979:xxii, 399 ff.). Consider a set C which has a certain kind of sets as its elements, namely those sets A that do not contain themselves as elements.6 We may now contemplate two options, the

• ne supposing that C is an element of C and the other supposing that C is not an element
• f C, keeping in mind that the condition for any set to be an element of C is that it cannot

contain itself as an element. (i) If C is and element of C it must conform to this condition, i.e. that it does not contain itself as an element: If C is an element of C then C is not an element of C (ii) If C is not an element of C then it does meet the condition for being an element of C If C is not an element of C then C is an element of C (iii) Therefore, C is an element of C if and only if it is not an element of C! Thus the apparently innocent combination of multiplicity and wholeness caused havoc within the discipline of mathematics, giving rise to conflicting schools of thought within this discipline, where the intuitionist orientation opposed the axiomatic formalism that emerged in reaction to what Russell and Zermelo discovered: The intuitionists have created a whole new mathematics, including a theory of the continuum and a set theory. This mathematics employs concepts and makes distinctions not found in the classical mathematics (Kleene, 1952:52).7

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The set of 120 people in this room is not a person but a set and therefore does not contain itself as an element. By contrast, the set of all imaginable thoughts can be imagined and therefore does contain itself as an element.

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On the basis of Cantor's set theory modern axiomatic formalism believes to have arithmetized mathematics completely. I have unveiled the circularity in this pretension elsewhere (see Strauss, 2005 – Chapter 2). If the core meaning of space (continuous extension) entails the idea of wholeness and totality, the idea of an infinite totality (required in employing the at once infinite) presupposes the irreducibility of space. Yet, only when the at once infinite is used does one “succeed” in “reducing” space to number – resulting in the realization that space can be reduced to number if and only if it cannot be reduced to number! Paul Bernays, the co-worker of the foremost mathematician of the 20th century, is therefore fully justified in stating emphatically that it is the totality-character of spatial continuity that will resist a perfect arithmetization of mathematics (see Bernays, 1976:74).

7 Positivistic materialism: a self-defeating position The materialistic variant of positivism holds that matter is all there is (i.e. atoms, molecules, and macro-molecules in interaction). If there is nothing beyond matter, then what about the statement making this claim? Is it true? If so, then there indeed is something immaterial, namely truth. In addition one may ask: what is the status of the natural laws holding for material things? They condition being material but they are not material themselves. Thus both with respect to the truth-value and the universal validity

• f natural laws the basic claim of positivistic materialism is self-defeating!

The response of atomism and holism We may expand our assessment of multiplicity and wholeness to encompass all the academic disciplines by focusing on two of the most dominant philosophical orientations

• perative in the history of the disciplines in this regard. When the numerical aspect is

elevated to an exclusive (and all-encompassing) mode of explanation we meet the response of atomism and when space acquires the same status we encounter the reaction

• f holism.8

This opposition of atomism and holism are contradicting responses to the relation between multiplicity and wholeness. They are found within every single discipline (including the natural sciences and humanities) – and in every instance both these isms distorts the true meaning of what they attempt to account for. Briefly looking at a number of academic disciplines will broaden the scope of our discussion of immanent and factual critique, before we proceed with specific examples. An alternative understanding of the world, aiming at avoiding every effort to reduce what is irreducible will be inclined to affirm both the uniqueness and irreducibility of diverse aspects of reality (that may serve as modes of explanation). In other words, atomism and holism ought to be opposed by a non-reductionist ontology. In general an atomistic thinker will employ the meaning of the one and the many, i.e. of a discrete multiplicity in the quantitative sense of the term (or analogical usages of this quantitative meaning within the context of other modes of explanation), in order to comprehend all of reality. Applied to human society, every social collectivity is simply reduced to its simplest ‘elements,’ the individuals (the atoms of society). All variants of holism (universalism), on the other hand, proceed from the employment of the concept of a whole (totality) with its parts. Thus the whole-parts relation (or analogies of this relation) serves as the guiding star, dictating that reality ought to be understood in terms

• f wholes and their parts (sometimes referred to as systems and subsystems). Even social

relations among human beings have to be captured by this schema. Atom and molecule: limitations of the whole parts relation The classical mechanistic world view in an atomistic way reduced the universe to the notion of particles in motion. Van Melsen says that, in “most forms of atomism, it is a

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Particularly within the discipline of sociology atomism is also designated as individualism and holism as universalism. What is frequently presented as a “holistic” approach actually simply aims at an innocent attempt to give an account that takes into consideration all aspects of a situation or problem.

8 matter of principle that any combination of atoms into a greater unity can only be an aggregate of these atoms.” By contrast, he refers to holistic tendencies within the discipline of physics: “In modern theories atomic and molecular structures are characterized as associations of many interacting entities that lose their own identity. The resulting aggregate originates from the converging contributions of all its components. Yet, it forms a new entity, which in its turn controls the behavior of its components” (Van Melsen, 1975:349). With regard to the infinite divisibility of a spatial whole, there are important limits in the unqualified use of the spatial whole-parts relation. The interweaving which exists, for example, between the sodium and chlorine atoms which are found in table salt cannot be accounted for merely the aid of a whole-parts perspective. Every division of table salt must – that is if we still want to be working with real parts of salt – still possess the same chemical structure (NaCl). Once we have reached the last NaCl molecule the next step will be to separate Na and Cl. However, the critical question now is if sodium on its own and if chlorine on its own have a salt structure? Are sodium and chlorine true parts of salt? The answer is obvious: No, because on their own neither of them has a NaCl- structure! This simple example already uproots the unqualified way in which, especially in modern system theory, literally everything in reality is spoken of in terms of a whole and its parts (systems and subsystems). This critique at once employed immanent criticism and factual criticism. The fact that the atom nucleus remains structurally unchanged in the chemical bonding, guarantees the internal sphere of operation of the atom. Because the electrons cannot be disengaged from the atom nucleus, the atoms function as a whole in the water molecule. Note that we cannot say that the atoms function in a chemical bond. The bonding does not encompass the atomic nuclei. Nonetheless the atoms (with their nuclei, electron shells and bonding electrons) are present as a whole in the water molecule which encompasses them enkaptically. The indication: enkaptically encompassed, shows that the atoms, retaining their internal nature, are externally serving the water molecule as a whole. The enkaptic interweaving of the atoms in the molecule does not make them intrinsical parts

• f the molecule, since this would abrogate the internal sphere of action of the atoms.

The external enkaptic function of the sodium and chlorine atoms in the salt molecule indicates the functioning of the atoms in the molecule as totality via the chemical bond. This presents us with three facts: (i) First of all, we must distinguish the internal sphere of action of the atom. (ii) Secondly, we find the chemical bond which leaves the atom nucleus unchanged because it only reaches the outer electron shells, so that the atom nuclei can in no way be part of the chemical bonding. (iii) Thirdly, we find the enkaptic structural whole of the salt molecule which enkaptically encompasses the atomic nuclei and bonds and ascribes to each its typical structural place.9

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Enkapsis accounts for the internal sphere of operation in spite of external intertwinements.

9 This theory of enkaptic interlacement therefore enables us to side-step the one-sidedness present both in atomistic and holistic theories of chemical bonding within a molecule – and it also naturally reconciles apparently contradictory experimental data, since it accounts both for the continued actual existence of atoms in molecules (the point of

• rientation of atomism) and for the typical unitary (or: totality) character of the molecule

(the emphasis of holism) as a new totality enkaptically founded in the structural nature of atoms. Mechanistic and vitalistic biology Similarly, the mechanistic theories in modern biology proceed from atomistic assumptions – up to neo-Darwinism. According to Smith, such an atomistic view – regarding genes and what they ‘code’ – is indeed a “problematic component of the neo- Darwinian outlook” (Smith, 1992:439). Process structuralists, such as Lambert and Hughes are critical of the fact that neo-Darwinians “invariably treat organisms as loose collections of discrete parts” (Smith , 1992:439). Eventually atomism was opposed by the holistic orientation of vitalism and neo-Vitalism. The holistic biology of Smuts (1926) and Meyer-Abich (1964) explicitly operates with the whole-parts scheme in the way they have framed their basic concepts. The same applies to the organismic biology of Von Bertalanffy, for in this approach the concept of wholeness also acquired a central role, as

• pposed to all forms of atomistic understanding. Von Bertalanffy considers the
• rganismic world view to be a step beyond the mathematical more geometrico ideal and

also beyond the mechanistic world view (see Von Bertalanffy, 1968:66). The traditional idealistic morphology in biology is also intimately attached to a holistic

• rientation. What is considered an “ideal” plant or an “ideal” leaf is understood in a

Platonic sense as a-temporal static forms of being (see the extensive botany text book by Troll, 1973, Chapter 1). Even in respect of the assessment of what constitutes a species, the difference between an additive (atomistic) approach and a whole-parts (holistic) view, still causes divergent views. Grene points out that Ghiselin and Hull propose “that species taxa be considered, not as classes with members, but as individuals (wholes) with parts (see Grene, 1986:440 and also Sober, 1987). Yet living entities cannot be understood merely in terms of an atomistic or holistic perspective, because the complexity of the interlacement of the “building blocks” of living entities (namely atoms, molecules and macro-molecules) requires a theory of encapsulation recognizing at least three intertwined structures, analogous to what he said about a molecule as an enkaptic structural whole.10 Association psychology versus Gestalt-psychology Within the discipline of psychology, the dilemma of atomistic and holistic theories is also

• discernable. The legacy of an atomistic association psychology prevailed in the 19th

century during the rise of psychology as a distinct academic discipline. However, holistic

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(i) The internal sphere of operation of the physical substructure; (ii) the biotically directed (enkaptic) functions of the physical substructure, and (iii) the biotically qualifed enkaptic totality- structure of the living entity.

10 theories soon entered the scene, particularly in the Gestalt-school (the Berlin school, Krüger; and the Leipzig school, Köhler and Koffka). More recently, the influence of general systems theory – which operates in a holistic way with the whole-parts relation (in the shape of the idea of systems and subsystems) – also had its effect on this discipline. Logic divided Modern logic also did not escape the ‘fate’ of atomism and holism. Whether or not one is willing to accept the existence of an infinite totality is decisive for the scope-of-validity

• f the logical principle of the excluded middle (also known as the tertium non datur).11

Conflicting semantic theories Within the discipline of linguistics an example from the sub-discipline of semantics illustrates the dilemma between atomism and holism. Antal considers a word to be the primary “sign-unit” in language. He actually dismisses the idea of multiple meaning nuances of a word by transferring them to what is denotated (Antal, 1963:53, 54, 58). This atomistic approach was left behind in the development of semantic field theory that has already been initiated by Trier during the first half of the 20th

• century. This trend

asserts that the multiplicity of meaning-nuances of a word are bound together in order to form an authentic whole (Ganzheit). A word is a genuine totality, embracing its parts fully, while in turn it can only signify because opposing words within its environment act in a meaning-delimiting way (see Trier, 1973:1, 5 ff., 15, and also Geckeler, 1971). Once again the theory of enkaptic interlacements mediates an alternative understanding

• f the semantic field of a word, because every sentence disclosing a different meaning-

nuance of a word still presupposes the intrinsic semantic domain of that word. Whenever the semantic field of a world embraces more than one meaning-nuance any instantiation

• f that word can never at once exhaust the full scope of its domain of meaning.

Sociological atomism versus sociological holism Anther example is found in the field of sociology. Initially this relatively modern discipline pursued a so-called organicistic paradigm, for its founder, Comte, viewed society as an organism in a holistic sense. Although the British sociologist, Herbert Spencer, continued this organicistic line of thought, his own orientation reverted to an atomistic (individualistic) approach: So far from alleging, as M. Comte does, that society is to be re-organized by philosophy; it alleges that society is to be re-organized only by the accumulated effects of habit on character. Its aim is not the increase of authoritative control over citizens, but the decrease of it. A more pronounced individualism, instead of a more pronounced nationalism, is its ideal (Spencer, 1968:22).

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In this context we can leave aside explaining an alternative explanation of the meaning of the principle of the excluded middle. Such an analysis is found in Strauss, 1991.

11 The remarkable situation here is that, although both thinkers advocated organicism, Spencer did it in an atomistic manner and Comte in a holistic way! Alexander casts this

• pposition in the following terms: rational-individualistic versus rational-collectivist

(Alexander, 1987:12). For the logical positivist, Ayer, “the English state, for example … [is] a logical construction out of individual people” (Ayer, 1967:63). Karl Popper designates his own approach as “methodological individualism”: It rightly insists that the ‘behavior’ and ‘actions’ of collectives, such as states or social groups, must be reduced to the behavior and to the action

• f human individuals (Popper, 1966-II:91).

Max Weber also explicitly denounces the idea that societal collectivities could be genuine wholes or totalities. In terms of his atomistic conviction, he states: Concepts such as ‘state’, ‘club’ ... signify specific kinds of communal human actions ..., that could be reduced to ‘understandable’ (verständ- liches) actions, and that means that they can, without an exception, be reduced to the actions of the individual human beings (Einzelmenschen) concerned (Weber, 1973:439). Modern political theories reflect the same dilemma. The initial social contract theories (Pufendorff, Thomasius, and Locke) all departed from an atomistic perspective, attempting to arrive at a hypothetical account of an ordered society, constructing human society from its atoms, namely individuals. Rousseau anticipated post-Kantian freedom idealism (found in the thought of Schelling, Hegel and Fichte) by introducing a moral collective body as the outcome of the social contract (equated with his understanding of the general will), embracing the previously autonomous individuals as indivisible parts of a new whole – in a typical holistic fashion (see Rousseau, 1975:244). The extremes caused by atomism and holism within political theory never succeeded in arriving at a proper delimitation of the authority of government, for it fluctuated between the extreme of Lockian state nihilism (laissez faire, laissez passer) – the classical liberal idea of non-state interference, and the totalitarian and absolutistic implications of the “general will” (to which Rousseau assigned an absolute power over all its members).12 Atomism and holism do not succeed in providing the basis of a theory of the just state (regstaat). In the preceding analysis the application of immanent criticism and factual criticism guided our critical remarks. In what follows some more clear-cut examples of immanent and factual criticism will be given.

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“Just as nature gives to every human being an absolute power over all its members, so the social

contract endows the body politic with an absolute power over all its members; and it is this power which, directed by the general will, as I have said, bears the name of sovereignty” (Rousseau, 1975:253).

12 Specific examples of immanent criticism As pointed out above, the first and most basic meaning of immanent criticism is given in the task to put yourself, so to speak, “in the shoes” of your conversation partner or

• pponent and then attempt to highlight the inconsistency or inconsistencies of that

position. It frequently happens that intellectual communication derails on the basis of what is known as transcendent criticism. It amounts to critique formulated in terms of one's own perspective without an attempt to involve the perspective of one's conversation partner in the argument. Example 1: Descartes' proof for the existence of God In his Meditations III Descartes posits as general rule, that all that is very clearly and distinctly apprehended (conceived) is true. To the question what guarantees the truth of clear and distinct thought? Descartes answers that God will not deceive us and he then proceeds to argue that of all the ideas in the human mind the idea of God is the clearest and most distinct (see Descartes, 1965:95-96; 100) This results in begging the question (circular reasoning), for the existence of God is dependent upon the truth of clear and distinct thinking, while the truth of clear and distinct thinking depends upon (the existence of) the non-deceiving God. This kind of argument, where the conclusion is presupposed in one of its premises, is also known as a petitio principii. Example 2: The attempt of (biological) vitalism to negate the physical basis of living entities Since ancient Greece biological thought explored a vitalistic mode of thought, claiming that there is an immaterial “life-principle” (designated by Aristotle as entelecheia)

• perative in all living entities. The German biologist Hans Driesch continued this

tradition in his neo-Vitalist biology that dominated the scene by the end of the 19th century and during the first couple of decades of the 20th century – supported by the experimental study of regenerative phenomena.13 It caused him to believe that the entelechie can ‘suspend’ physical laws (such as the second law of non-decreasing entropy).14 Yet the mere fact that this immaterial factor is also described as a vital force shows that the physical substrate of living activities supposed to be transcended is still present in the term ‘force’. Example 3: Postmodernism The motive of logical creation was dominant in nominalistic trends of thought since Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant explored its rationalistic implications.15

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He did research on phenomena of regeneration and discovered that animals are capable, when divided at an early stage of their development, to regenerate the entire living entity. Later on it was shown that in the case of certain animals even a part as tiny as 1/280th can regenerate the entire

• animal. In general the mere occurrence of growth seems to contradict the second main law of

thermodynamics, stating that within a closed system the most probable condition would be an increase in chaos, i.e. disorder.

Early

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We shall show below, in the context of factual critique, why this neo-Vitalist view is mistaken.

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Thomas Hobbes is particularly known for his totalitarian view of the state as it is developed in his book Leviathan (1651). Immanuel Kant, the giant of the 18th century, is best known for his

13 modern philosophy elevated human reason to become the (formal) law-giver of the

• world. Impressed by Galileo's ability to derive the law of inertia from a thought-

experiment – concerning a body in motion that will continue its motion endlessly if the path is extended into infinity – Immanuel Kant drew the radical conclusion: if, from the spontaneous subjectivity of human thought, one can derive the law of inertia and apply it to the moving ‘objects’ in nature, then the laws of nature must be present in human thought a priori (i.e. before all experience). Kant explicitly states: “Understanding creates its laws (a priori) not out of nature, but prescribes them to nature” (Kant, 1783, II:320; § 36). The irrationalistic side of nominalism, emphasizing the unique individuality of events, inspired the idea of the “social construction of reality” – a line moving from Kant and Husserl to Schutz, Berger and Luckmann.16 Consequently, the contemporary “postmodern” idea that we create the world we live in (either through thought or through language) merely continues core elements of (early) modern philosophy! This entire development hinges on the ambivalent nature of modern nominalism – outside the human mind it rejects all universality – universality is only immanent to human consciousness, either as universal concepts or as universal words. Outside the human mind things and events in their unique contingency and individuality are found. The following immanent criticism can be raised against the stance of nominalism. In

• rder to make its claim nominalism implicitly had to hang on to one element of

universality outside the human mind – the being individual of everything! Being individual is a universal property applying to every individual.17 Example 4: Relativism and Historicism The relativist statement: “There is no truth” is famous for its self-defeating nature. Ernst Gellner underscores it with his remark: “Notoriously there is no room for the assertion of relativism itself in a world in which relativism is true” (Gellner, 1985:85). The position of relativism is reinforced by modern historicism in its claim that everything is caught up in the never-ceasing process of (historical) change, including legal practices , moral convictions, aesthetic standards, and economic principles. However, immanent criticism points out that only that which is not intrinsically historical in nature can have a history. Therefore, if everything is history, nothing is left that can have a history and thus historicism achieves the opposite as that for which it has aimed. Instead of historicizing everything nothing historical is left.18

influential Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 17872). We take rationalism to be an over-estimation of universal conceptual knowledge.

16

In Husserl this idea of construction was still conceived of in a rationalistic way. Existential phenomenology, on the other hand, transformed Husserl's rationalism into an irrationalistic perspective.

17

When historicism mounted its intellectual forces at the beginning of the 19th century it also claimed that all historical events are unique, individual and irrepeatable, without realizing that these three features are universal because they apply to all historical events!

18

A comprehensive critique of historicism and pragmatism is found in Clouser 2005. His closing statement reads: “Therefore I find that Rorty has failed to rescue historicism from the incohe- rencies native to it. Its central claims are still self-referentially, self-assumptively, and self- performatively incoherent, and Rorty’s additions to them only compound the difficulties by being mutually inconsistent” (Clouser, 2005:19).

14 Example 4: Moral commandments and natural law Within modern Roman Catholic moral philosophy the conviction is found that from the moral law (the “decalogue”) rules of “natural law” could be derived. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) holds that derivations such as these could be made by using commandments like “You shall not murder,” “You shall not commit adultery,” and “You shall not steal.” What he did not realize is that the concepts murder, adultery and steal presuppose unlawfulness in a jural sense. The prohibition of murder requires that one ought not to show such a lack of love and care towards one's neighbour that the desire to intentionally slay such a person arises. But when it is attempted to reduce the moral meaning of this commandment to the jural an antinomy appears,19 since the meaning of morality presupposes the jural sense of unlawfulness. In order to side-step this antinomy. Victor Cathrein suggested that it is forbidden to murder unlawfully (Cathrein, 1909:223). However, since the concept ‘murder’ presupposes the jural element of unlawfulness (murder = unlawful killing), this escape-route continues to be antinomic. The possibility

• f an unlawful ‘murder’ entails that its opposite is also possible: “lawful murdering.” But

since murder = unlawful killing the construction of “lawful murdering” boils down to the following entailed logical contradiction: “lawful-unlawful killing.” The last example introduced a new term, the term antinomy, to our discussion. It is not meant to be synonymous with a contradiction. As an example of a contradiction Cassirer refers to a “rundes Viereck” (a “round square”) (Cassirer, 1910:16), thus slightly altering the original example given by Kant in 1783.20 Confusing two spatial figures is merely contradictory, because circles, squares and triangles are all appearing within one aspect of

• ur experience – the spatial aspect. An antinomy results from confusing different aspects

(such as the aspects of space and movement in the argument of Zeno regarding the flying arrow, and Achilles and the tortoise). In the case of an antinomy we meet a clash of laws. For that reason the attempt to reduce one aspect to a different one inevitably results in an antinomy (anti = against; nomos = law). An antinomy necessarily expresses itself in contradictions, but not all contradictions presuppose an antinomy. The above-mentioned classical example of an antinomy, found in the arguments of Zeno, attempted to define motion in purely spatial terms. However, instead of defining motion in static spatial terms, as if a moving thing from moment to moment occupies a definite (static) place in space, movement has been reduced to space. The antinomy involved attempts to reduce the kinematic aspect of uniform motion to the spatial aspect of static

• simultaneity. Since we can refer to the aspects of our experiential world as modes of

being or as modalities it is clear that whereas a contradiction is intra-modal in nature, an antinomy is always inter-modal. Moreover, recognizing an antinomy presupposes an insight into unique (and irreducible) modal aspects – without denying their mutual

19

Note that whereas a logical contradiction results from confusing configurations within a specific aspect )for example a square and a circle in the illogical concept of a square circle), an antinomy results from confusing different aspects (such as the aspects of space and movement in the argument of Zeno regarding the flying arrow, and Achilles and the tortoise). An extensive discussion of the distinction between contradiction and antinomy is found in Strauss, 2007.

20

Immanuel Kant mentions the illogical concept of a “square circle” (Kant, 1783:341; § 52b). Con- traries like logical – illogical, polite – impolite, legal – illegal, etc. are all founded on the logical principle of non-contradiction.

15

• coherence. These considerations transcend the scope of the first three logical principles

for they make an appeal to the ontological principle of the excluded antinomy. By introducing this principle we have already moved towards one instance of the nature

• f factual criticism.

Factual criticism It frequently appears that a position is assumed on the basis of allegedly sound ‘facts’ but that closer scrutiny reveals the opposite. Example 1: ‘Soul’ and ‘body’ Since Plato advanced his ‘proofs’ for the immortality of the soul in his dialogue Phaido medieval scholasticism continued the idea that the human “rational soul” can operate in independence from the human “material body.”21 Thomas Aquinas writes: “Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained within itself the nature of any body, it would be unable to know all bodies” (see Pegis, 1945-I:685). However, in terms of factual critique, it should be pointed out that in all thought activities of humans physical-chemical processes take place in the fore-brain. Although the total mass of an adult brain is a mere 2% of its total mass, 25% of the total metabolism occurring within the human body is found in the brain (cf. Plamenac, 1970:444). Example 2: Suspending physical laws We noted above that the neovitalism of Driesch believed that the “immaterial vital force” (entelechie) can ‘suspend’ physical laws, such as the law of non-decreasing entropy (because apparently a living entity builds up more and more order, thus seemingly “side- stepping” the increase in disorder prescribed by this law – see Driesch, 1921:434 ff.). By providing his generalization of the second main law of thermodynamics, Von Bertalanffy abandoned this notion of the “suspension” of physical laws by an assumed immaterial entelechie. The implicit assumption in Driesch's argument was that one can view a living entity as a physically closed system. Through his generalization Von Bertalanffy accounted for open systems – such as a glacier, fire or living entities viewed from their physical aspect – which means that a living entity solely builds up more and more order by extracting it from its environment (Schrödinger calls it negentropy – see Schrödinger 1955). The current factual state of affairs therefore uprooted the neo-Vitalist idea of a suspension of physical laws.22 Example 3: Marx's view of the substructure and superstructure of society

21

Plato believed that when the soul investigates without the mediation of the body, it is directed at the world of the pure and eternal, immortal and unchanging, constant and equally natured things (Phaido 79 d). The soul exhibits the greatest similarity to the divine, immortal, conceivable, simple indissoluble, constant and ‘self-identical’, while the body bears the greatest similarity to the human, mortal, multifarious, non-conceivable, dissoluble and never-constant (Phaido 80 b 1- 6).

22

After Von Bertalanffy generalized the second law for open systems (see Von Bertalanffy, 1973) the followers of Driesch accepted it but continued their altered Neovitalism (see Sinnott, 1963 and 1972, Haas, 1968, Heitler, 1976 and Overhage 1977).

16 Karl Marx advanced the view that the historical-economical substructure of society provides the basis for (in the sense of one-sidedly determining) the ideological superstructure of law, morality and religion. However, factually it turned out that within societies with practically the same historical-economic substructure large differences in law, morality and religion are present, thus making the causal connection suggested by Marx invalid. Critical solidarity Picking up a book and finding something you do not agree with within the first couple of pages is not all that difficult. However, in order to be able really to benefit from the exercise of a critical spirit, one has to observe something more fundamental than critique, namely showing solidarity for it is indeed much more difficult to highlight what is worthwhile in the thought of a specific thinker, particularly if we accept the challenge subsequently to account for it in terms of our own (different) perspective. In other words, if I want to criticize Plato, Aristotle, Kant, or Marx, I have to be able to appreciate positively what they have unveiled before it is meaningful to criticize the way in which they have accounted for their constructive discoveries. During the hey-day of Apartheid first year students all knew what is wrong with Marxism – such as that Marxism has a totalitarian idea of the state, that it sacrifices human freedom to economic determinism, and so on. However, asking what did Marx see that was worthwhile and that we still have to account for suddenly caused severe difficulties for our “critical” students! They were simply not able to show any sense of solidarity with Marx or with his concerns regarding the increasing exploitation of workers during and after the industrial revolution, caused by a political and economic theory (Locke and the classical school of Adam Smith in economics) that resulted in an extension of the working day beyond human limits. One should positively appreciate the concern that Marx has shown for the exploitation of the ‘proletariat’, as he called it, without necessarily agreeing with his dialectical materialist ‘solution’ of the problem. The impact of these considerations is clear – without a sense of solidarity the exercise of criticism is ‘cheap’. For that matter, a much larger effort is required if one really wants to understand a thinker good enough to be able to appreciate positively what is worthwhile in the thought of such a person. In other words, critique is only meaningful when it is embedded in solidarity. Therefore the popular motto of critical thinking ought to be altered into the requirement of critical solidarity. Transcendental critique The preceding discussion highlighted the importance of immanent criticism and factual criticism for meaningful and constructive scholarly communication. But it remained enclosed within the realm of theoretical views of reality, such as that of (neo-)vitalism or

• historicism. The positive outcome of what has been discussed is that the undeniable

presence of alternative and sometimes even conflicting standpoints in various academic disciplines invalidates the idea of an “objective and neutral reason” flowing from positivism.

17 Competent scholars in the domain of philosophy of science acknowledge that the traditional appreciation of human thought and of the power of reason are rooted in deeper

• convictions. The prevailing implicit trust in reason did not realize that such a trust or faith

in reason is not itself rational! The well-known philosopher of science, Sir Karl Popper, radically attacks an uncritical or comprehensive rationalism which is based upon “the principle that any assumption which cannot be supported either by argument or by experience is to be discarded” (Popper, 1966-II:230). He argues that this kind of rationalism is demonstrably inconsistent, i.e. in terms of its own criteria: since “all arguments must proceed from assumptions, it is plainly impossible to demand that all assumptions should be based on argument” (Popper, 1966-II:230). Popper is aware of the fact that behind the idea of an “assumptionless” approach a huge assumption hides itself – something eventually also criticized by the prominent hermeneutical philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, in his mocking of the prejudice of Enlightenment against prejudices (cf. Gadamer, 1989:276). Popper's own position unequivocally demonstrates his insight into the self-insufficiency

• f “rationality.” He knows that the rationalistic trust in reason is not rational itself and he

explicitly speaks of “an irrational faith in reason” – which means that according to him “rationalism is necessarily far from comprehensive or self-contained” (Popper, 1966- II:231). Stegmüller, an equally formidable philosopher of science from the second half of the 20th century, holds a similar conviction. He says that there is no single domain in which a self- guarantee of human thinking exists – one already has to believe in something in order to justify something else (Stegmüller, 1969:314).23 From an anthropological perspective this implies that one has to understand that it is not ‘thinking’ that thinks, but the concrete human being who is more than thinking. Scholarly thinking is made possible by a supra-theoretical commitment that gives direction to scientific thought. The word transcendental is employed in this sense – it intends to capture those conditions (both theoretical and supra-theoretical) that make theoretical thinking possible. When transcendental critique is exercised an account is required of the theoretical view of reality of a thinker and of the deepest, direction-giving commitment lying at the root a particular theoretical view of reality. Theoretical orientations such as (neo-)Vitalism, historicism, dialectical Marxism, arithmeticism, and so on are all instances of theoretical views of reality in which a specific account is given of the unity and diversity found in reality. Applying the principle of the excluded antinomy opens up the possibility to show that such ismic

• rientations are untenable because they harbour insoluble antinomies.

23

This position is reminiscent of a remark made by Max Planck, the famous physicist who disco- vered the quantum of energy h (6.62 x 10-34 joule sec), in his rectoral oration of 1913: “One should not believe that it is possible, even in the most exact of all the natural sciences, to make progress totally without a world view, that is to say, completely without improvable hypotheses. Also for physics the statement is true that one cannot attain salvation without faith, at least faith in a certain reality outside ourselves” (Planck, 1913:78).

18 Yet there is more to scientific paradigms (theoretical views of reality) since the (supra- theoretic) root-commitment of a scholar ultimately reveals the deepest basic motive (ground-motive) operative in such paradigms. We will give merely a brief indication of what this entails – by looking at some of the issues discussed above in terms of transcendental criticism. Although Greek thought by and large was characterized by a realistic orientation it did know nominalist thinkers as well – such as Callicles and the Sophist Protagoras. Both philosophers thought within the context of the deepest motivation of Greek thought and culture, expressed in the concern for immutability within a world of change. Aristotle eventually captured this tension by using the terms form and matter. The view of the human person found in the thought of Callicles and Protagoras is in the grip of the matter motive, for human subjectivity is seen as constantly changing and it cannot be grasped in any fixed form or measure. Only the polis, the Greek city state, as bearer of the Greek form motive, is capable of supplying the human being with a cultural garb through education and obedience to positive laws – thus demonstrating the primacy of the form motive in the thought of Protagoras. This explains why he holds that human beings, coming from a condition in nature where the state is absent, have those properties that are necessary for the formation of a state – but not on the basis of (the modern idea of) a “social contract” (see Menzel 1929 and 1936). Modern nominalism, since the Renaissance, emerged within a different context. It was inspired by the urge to be liberated from the medieval unified ecclesiastical culture – humankind wanted to establish its own freedom and autonomy and it found in the rising successes of the new natural sciences the required control instrument. This implied that the ideal of a free and autonomous personality gave birth to the Renaissance natural science ideal, aimed that the reduction of all of reality to the determinism of mathematical-physical categories. Yet, as soon as all of reality is reduced to such a determined mathematical-physical condition, the assumed free and autonomous human personality falls prey to its own creation, the natural science-ideal, that now reveals its Frankenstein-effect: in a world fully determined by the law of causality there is no room left for the freedom of the human person. Nature and freedom turned out to be a different basic motive (ground-motive), not only giving direction to modern nominalism but to modern post-Renaissance thought in general.24 The view of Kant mentioned above, regarding human understanding as the a priori (formal) law-giver of nature, represents his restriction of the natural science ideal to the world of phenomena (sense impressions), for behind appearances the freedom of the human soul is concealed (as a “thing-in-itself” – see Kant, 1787-B:XXVII-XXVIII). Kant indeed simply used the age-old distinction between “essences” and “appearance” in order

24

Dooyeweerd's analysis of the dialectical development of modern philosophy, alternating between giving primacy either to the nature pole (Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume)

• r to the freedom pole (Rousseau as transitional figure, Kant and post-Kantian freedom idealism:

Schelling, Fichte and Hegel) provides an unparalleled understanding of modern philosophy (see Dooyeweerd, 1997-I:216-495).

19 to safe-guard a supra-sensory domain of moral freedom where the human being could be appreciated as an ethical aim-in-itself (Selbstzweck).25 Kant explains: “For if appearances are things in themselves, freedom cannot be upheld” (Kant, 1787-B,564).26 The understanding of causality in the biology of Driesch actually attempted to apply he classical science-ideal to biotic phenomena as well. But his negative view of entelechie, circumscribed as non-spatial, non-mechanical, indivisible and non-energetic provided a starting-point for Arnold Gehlen – with a appeal to the freedom-idealism of Schelling and Hegel – to explore freedom. In order to achieve this Gehlen had once more to restrict causality to mechanical causality. “Because causality is only thinkable as mechanic causality, entelechie is free in a negative sense, that is it is spontaneous and primary in a sense that is incapable of closer determination” (Gehlen, 1965:60). This dialectical relation between nature and freedom is further elaborated in Max Scheler's work on the place of the human being within the cosmos (see Scheler, 1962:38, 40) and the freedom motive is also embodied in the idea of Weltoffenheit, developed in the thought of Gehlen, Portmann (a biologist) and Pannenberg (a theologian). In his PhD on the thought of Portmann this legacy is summarized by R. Kugler: “The innermost essence of the human being is freedom, …” (Kugler, 1965:81). Finally, Karl Jaspers, who is well-known within the circles of the discipline of communication, expressed his own indebtedness to the motive of nature and freedom as follows: “Because freedom is merely through and in opposition to nature, it must fail as

• freedom. – Freedom is only when nature is” (Jaspers, 1948:871).

Physiotherapy in service of being human transcending the dualism of body and soul The human person stands in relation to creation in its entire temporal reality. For that reason being human means to participate in all the dimensions of creation. Consequently

• ne can indeed find multiple similarities between human beings and everything else

within creation. While material things – atoms, molecules, macro-molecules and macro-systems – clearly belong to the realm of physically-qualified things, human existence is by no means excluded from this sphere. Surely our physical existence is bound to the presence of those physical entities necessary for our bodily functioning – from the four “organic” elements (hydrogen, oxygen, carbon and nitrogen) up to the variety of inorganic substances that make an equally necessary contribution to our existence. Yet this does not tell the full story, since human beings also display similarities with the realm of living creatures. Like all living entities, the human body is also constituted by living cells, while the latter are differentiated according to the nature of the many vital organs found within the human body (organs such as the heart, lungs, brain, skin and so on). This organic

25

The following words of Kant explicitly reveal his awareness of nature and freedom as the deepest motivating power of the critique of pure reason: “My purpose has only been to point out that since the thoroughgoing connection of all appearances, in a context of nature, is an inexorable law, the inevitable consequence of obstinately insisting on the reality of appearances is to destroy all

• freedom. Those who thus follow the common view have never been able to reconcile nature and

freedom” (my italics – DFMS, Kant, 1781-A,537, 1787-B,565).

26

“Denn, sind Erscheinungen Dinge an sich selbst, so ist Freiheit nicht zu retten.”

20 dimension of human existence is one-sidedly founded in the physical-chemical building blocks of living things, since the human body cannot be healthy without constantly

• btaining the necessary foodstuffs.

Both these basic layers are in turn foundational for the sensitive-psychic substructure of the human body, encompassing a person's complex sensory equipment and equally complicated emotional life – which are both closely interwoven with the sensory and motoric nervous systems. On this level, human beings are obviously similar to animals as sentient creatures. The physical, biotic and sensitive substructures retain their internal sphere of operation and at the same time they are enkaptically bound in the higher structures.27 From the overview captured in the Appendix it is clear that functioning within the logical and post-logical aspects is indeed distinctively human. Animals do not have active (or: subject) functions within these aspects, at most they can be objectified within them. In comparison with animals, human beings lack a bio-psychic specialization. Therefore, when human beings act under the guidance of normative vistas, they transcend animal

• abilities. Normatively correct or incorrect behaviour is only found amongst human
• beings. No animal can think logically or illogically, shape historically or un-historically,

act politely or impolitely, be thrifty or spendthrift, just or unjust. The lack of specialization of the three foundational structures (the physical, biotical and the sensitive) goes hand-in-hand with their directedness at the normative nature of a person's bodily

• existence. Therefore one may designate this qualifying (but in itself unqualified) structure

as the normative structure of being human. When we want to refer to all four of these structures (factual configurations), the best term would be personality. This term encompasses the particular nature of each partial structure of the human bodily configuration, i.e., it encompasses the typical human tempo (bound to the physical substructure/configuration), the inclinations of a person (known as biotic dispositions – bound to the biotic substructure/configuration), the temperament (bound to the emotional-psychic substructure/configuration) and the character (bound to the qualifying normative structure/configuration of being human). The diversity of human functions and bodily structures are concentrated in the human selfhood, the human heart, i.e. in the central religious dimension of reality. Therefore we can succinctly describe a human being as a religious personality. In the bodily form we find the nodal point of the four (enkaptically) interlaced structures present in the human body. No single organ can therefore be identified with any particular substructure (see Dooyeweerd, R&S-III:138). The immensely significant

27

The term ‘structure’ is ambiguous. Its most commonly employed connotation captures the configuration of a concretely existing entity (or process). In this sense, this term refers to the factual side of reality and it justifies the employment of the expression “structure of” as an embodiment of the universal side of (factual) creaturely existence (the lawfulness of reality). However, one may also use the term ‘structure’ in order to speak of the law for (order for) whatever is factually subjected to that law – as in the expression “structure for.”

21 service rendered by the discipline and practice of physiotherapy is a witness of this complex intertwinement because its effective application enhances the many-sided functioning of the human body and through that makes an invaluable contribution to the quality of human life. Concluding remark This brings us to the end of an ever expanding perspective on the nature of intellectual

• skills. Against the interdisciplinary significance of the reductionistic effects of atomism

and holism, an acknowledgement of the human ability to identify and distinguish opens the way to a non-reductionist ontology – thus expanding the horizon of knowledge instead of reducing it. The logical principles of identity and non-contradiction make possible immanent criticism and factual criticism and these forms of critique open the way to a depth perspective in which ultimate commitments are related to the basic motives or ground motives operative in Western culture.28

Appendix

S O C I A L L I F E F O R M S & C U L T U R A L T H I N G S H U M A N B E I N G S A N I M A L S P L A N T S T H I N G S Law-Spheres (Aspects) Meaning-nuclei

Certitudinal Logical Cultural-historical Sign-mode Social Economical Aesthetical Juridical Ethical certainty (to be sure) love/troth retribution beautiful harmony frugality/avoid excesses symbolical signification social intercourse analysis sensitivity/feeling

• rganic life

energy-operation Uniform motion/constancy Continuous extension discrete quantity formative power/control Biotical Physical Kinematic Spatial Numerical Sensitive-psychical

Aspects, Entities and Societal Institutions CREATURES SUBJECTED TO CREATIONAL LAWS

State Business Church Family

Foundational function of church, state and business Qualifying function 28

An analysis of the historical unfolding of the four ground-motives of Western culture is found in Dooyeweerd 2003.

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