Vegetarianism: Moving Beyond the Standard Case James Christensen, - - PDF document

Moral Philosophy Seminar, University of Oxford, February 5th 2018 1

Vegetarianism: Moving Beyond the Standard Case

James Christensen, University of Essex Tom Parr, University of Essex (1) Many vegetarians endorse the following: The Standard Case for Vegetarianism: Purchasing and eating meat is wrong, when it is, because doing so contributes, or risks contributing, to the wrongful future killing and torture of animals. On this view, the wrongness of purchasing and eating meat is explained not by referring to the animals from whom the products in question have been derived, but rather by referring to those that will be harmed in the future in order to satisfy the demand that the purchase creates. (2) The Standard Case is strikingly permissive, as reflections on these cases reveals: Natural Death: A wild horse that lives in the fields behind Anne’s house dies of

• ld age. Anne cooks the horse and eats it.

Deferred Vegetarianism: Ben purchases the body of a chicken. Before eating it, he watches a documentary about factory farming and commits to converting to

• vegetarianism. But he decides that he may as well eat the chicken, as doing so

will not inflict any further harm. The damage has already been done. Leftovers: Claire’s housemate Daniel orders a large pepperoni pizza. Unable to finish it himself, Daniel offers Claire the final slice. Knowing that Daniel will throw the pizza away if she refuses, Claire accepts the offer. Cheeseburger: While out shopping, Emma receives a phone call from Frank, who asks her to buy him a cheeseburger. Knowing that Frank will go out and make the purchase himself if she refuses, Emma decides to buy the cheeseburger. It seems that The Standard Case does not condemn the conduct in any of the first three cases, and arguably the fourth as well. (3) Let’s note the following distinction: Primary Consumption: Consumption of a purchased good is primary if and only if the prospect of consumption played a role in motivating the purchase (as in Deferred Vegetarianism). Secondary Consumption: Consumption of a purchased good is secondary if and

• nly if the prospect of consumption did not play a role in motivating the

purchase (as in Leftovers). The Standard Case does not condemn even primary consumption. On this view, while it is (often) wrongful to purchase the flesh of a wrongfully killed animal, eating the flesh that one has purchased does not constitute an additional wrong. (4) Those of us who endorse The Standard Case can respond in one of three ways:

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(1) Accept that The Standard Case does not condemn the behaviour described in these cases, and conclude that the conduct is not wrongful. (2) Argue that, contrary to initial impressions, when it is correctly interpreted, The Standard Case actually does condemn the behaviour described. (3) Accept that The Standard Case does not condemn the behaviour described, but argue that it should be supplemented with additional moral principles by which the conduct is condemned. Our aim is to explore the prospects for (3). We do this by exploring the relevance and appeal of three additional moral principles to which vegetarians might appeal. (5) The first option is as follows: The Disrespect Principle: Purchasing and eating meat is wrong, when it is, because it is disrespectful to an animal to purchase or eat its body after its death. Unlike The Standard Case, this principle focuses (i) the interests of the animal whose body lies on the supermarket shelf, and (ii) the interests of the animals in what happens to their bodies after they die. (6) To illustrate the intuitive appeal of this principle, let’s consider the following case: Cannibal: Tom dies, and his cadaver is then eaten by Jeff. It is uncontroversial that Jeff wrongs Tom, either because he (posthumously) harms him or because he sets back some other of Tom’s interests. Broadly, we can say that Jeff’s conduct is wrong because it’s disrespectful. (7) The Disrespect Principle promises to explain the wrongness of carnivorism in a wide range

• f cases, including both the primary and secondary consumption of animals. It condemns

Anne’s decision to eat a horse in Natural Death, Ben’s choice to consume the body of a chicken in Deferred Vegetarianism, and Claire’s decision to finish the final slice of pepperoni pizza in Leftovers. In each of these cases, the carnivore consumes the flesh of an animal, after its death, thereby disrespecting it in much the same way that Jeff disrespects Tom. (8) The Disrespect Principle also condemns Emma’s conduct in Cheeseburger. This is because (i) if it can be disrespectful to eat an animal’s body, then it can be disrespectful to purchase an animal’s body; and (ii) though buying the burger has no overall effect, the action still has some effect that needs justifying. (9) However, there is a serious problem with The Disrespect Principle. In Cannibal, when Jeff eats Tom’s cadaver, this is disrespectful partly because it frustrates Tom’s preference over what happens to his body after his death. To see this, let’s consider the following case: Revised Cannibal: Same as Cannibal except Tom has no preference about what happens to his body after he dies and, on this basis, he consents to allowing Jeff to consume his cadaver. Jeff does not wrong Tom in Revised Cannibal. This result is important because it more closely resembles the set of cases with which we are concerned. This is because animals do not have preferences about what happens to their bodies after they die.

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(10) Let’s now turn to our second option, which is as follows: The Benefiting from Wrongdoing Principle: Purchasing and eating meat is wrong, when it is, because it involves benefiting from wrongdoing. This principle provides the theoretical resources with which to take issue with the fact that carnivores enjoy goods whose availability depends upon wrongdoing. (11) One version of this principle emphasizes that there is something especially

• bjectionable about others benefiting from wrongdoing. To see this, let’s contrast the

following two cases: Inefficient Sweatshop: A wealthy company sets up a sweatshop but, because of managerial inefficiency, the company does not profit from the sweatshop. Efficient Sweatshop: A wealthy company sets up a sweatshop from which it makes a considerable profit. The fate of the employees in Efficient Sweatshop is worse than the fate of the employees in Inefficient Sweatshop. We can account of this verdict by appeal to the fact that, in Efficient Sweatshop, the company benefits from the wrong that the employees suffer. We might flesh

• ut the significance of this in terms of exploitation.

(12) The implications of The Benefiting from Wrongdoing Principle are as follows: In Natural Death: the principle does not condemn Anne’s decision to eat a horse, as the horse is not a victim of wrongdoing. In Deferred Vegetarianism: since Ben benefits from the torture and killing of the chicken, he acts wrongly. In Leftovers: since Claire benefits from the torture and killing of the pigs and cows whose bodies were used to create the pepperoni, she acts wrongly. In Cheeseburger: though Emma does not benefit from wrongdoing, she enables Frank to benefit from wrongdoing, and so we can condemn her conduct on this

• basis. (True, buying the burger has no overall effect, the action still has some

effect that needs justifying (see point 8).) (13) However, these conclusions are too hasty. This is because it is not always wrong to enjoy goods whose availability depends upon wrongdoing. After all, this is true for too wide a range of goods (including jobs in moral philosophy). (14) In the light of this, let’s now turn to our third option, which emerges from objections to The Benefiting from Wrongdoing Principle: The Immoral Plans Principle: Purchasing and eating meat is wrong, when it is, because it completes, or contributes to the completion of, immoral plans. Unlike The Standard Case, this principle focuses on what vegetarians can do to frustrate the immoral plans of those who torture and kill animals and who consume parts of their bodies after they’ve been killed.

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(15) To illustrate the intuitive appeal of this principle, let’s consider the following case: Publish: Jeff kills Tom in order to prevent Tom from publishing a book. Tom’s wife, Dimple, publishes the book on Tom’s behalf, after his death. When Dimple publishes Tom’s book, she frustrates Jeff’s immoral plans. This can be good for a host of reasons, including because it can serve as a deterrent; and because doing so may benefit Tom by furthering his valuable projects. Each of these reasons is contingent. (16) There is also a more fundamental explanation of this case, namely that Dimple should frustrate Jeff’s immoral plans so that they he does not enjoy the power that he wrongly tries to take for himself. When immoral plans succeed, this is (i) bad for the wrongdoer (e.g. Jeff); (ii) bad for the victim (e.g. Tom); and (iii) impersonally bad. (17) The implications of The Immoral Plans Principle are as follows: In Natural Death: since there is no immoral plan involved, the principle does not condemn Anne’s decision to eat a horse. In Deferred Vegetarianism: since Ben completes his immoral plan to consume the body of a chicken, he acts wrongly. In Leftovers: Claire acts wrongly if the farmers and vendors in question intend for their produce to be consumed (and not merely purchased). Often, this condition is satisfied. In Cheeseburger: since Emma furthers the farmers’ and vendors’ immoral plans by purchasing the burger, she acts wrongly. (True, buying the burger has no

• verall effect, the action still has some effect that needs justifying (see point 8).)

(18) Importantly, The Immoral Plans Principle sheds light not only on these cases, but also on more familiar cases of carnivorism. Here, The Immoral Plans Principle complements The Standard Case for Vegetarianism by providing us with additional reasons to refrain from purchasing and eating meat. (19) In reply, critics appeal to the following objection to The Immoral Plans Principle: The Spare Wheel Objection: It is a mistake to focus on frustrating immoral plans rather to focus directly on whatever it is that makes those plans immoral. Proponents of this objection maintain that our reasons to prevent murder derive wholly from what makes murder wrong, and that any appeal to the importance of frustrating immoral plans is entirely superfluous. For this reason, they maintain, we should reject The Immoral Plans Principle. (20) The Spare Wheel Objection misses the mark: even if it makes sense to focus directly on what makes murder wrong in simple cases, this is not true of other cases that involve more complex plans. What is distinctive about our cases is that the wrongdoing is committed in the service of a grander plan. For example, in Publish, Jeff kills Tom in order to prevent Tom from publishing a book.