Use of Force Legal Review Paul Sullivan FLETC Legal Division - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Use of Force Legal Review

Paul Sullivan FLETC Legal Division paul.sullivan@fletc.dhs.gov

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• ther personnel who do not have a valid 'need-to-know'

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Use of Force

 Begins with the U.S. Constitution

• 4th Amendment Application
• “seizures” and their
• “reasonableness”

The 4th Amendment

 “The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated….”

 The 4th Amendment leaves open reasonable

seizures!

 What constitutes a Seizure?

4

Seizure Defined:

• A Seizure occurs when there is a

governmental termination of movement by a means intentionally applied.

• Brower v. Co. of Inyo (1989).
• Two ways this happens:
• LEO’s application of force (however slight), or,
• Submission to the LEO’s show of authority

Agency Policy

• Policy Is Often More Restrictive Than The

Law

• You can violate agency policy but still

comply with Graham v. Connor

Agency Policy

• What if you violate agency policy but

still comply with Graham?

• Administrative discipline may result from

policy

• But they do not automatically make you

civilly liable.

• Lawsuits are based on 4th Amendment

violations

• Your actions while violating policy, may be

“reasonable” under the 4th Amendment

Distinguish law from policy…

 UOF Policies impose certain per se rules

when using force. Examples:

– You can’t use warning shots; – You can’t use back-up weapons; – You can’t shoot at moving vehicles; and, – You must use minimal force necessary.

 Know your policy and follow it!

– Policy violations may result in administrative sanctions.

 Courts use the objective reasonableness

standard, not agency policy!

Policy is not the law

8

Qualified Immunity

• “Qualified immunity balances two important

interests:

• the need to hold public officials accountable

when they exercise power irresponsibly, and,

• the need to shield officials from harassment,

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)

Qualified Immunity

• Protects all but the “plainly incompetent” and

those who knowingly violate the law

• Protects officers who make “Objectively

Reasonable” Mistakes

• Not a question of “Good Faith”
• Lost when violating a clearly established

Constitutional right

Qualified Immunity

 Addresses Civil Lawsuits against LEO for

claims of excessive force

 Qualified Immunity is a defense to trial

– Must be raised by defendant (LEO) before trial

 If granted, the plaintiff’s claim of

excessive force (lawsuit) is dismissed

 Dismissal is qualified by the officer’s use

• f force being objectively reasonable

 Plaintiff’s version of facts is considered

11

Lawsuits Against LEOs (Non-Federal)

 42 USC §1983

– Every person who, under color of any statute,

• rdinance, regulation, custom, or usage,

– of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, – subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, – shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law

Lawsuits Against LEOs (Federal)

 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents

• f Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403

U.S. 388 (1971)

 Allows for lawsuits against federal

• fficers and officials in the same

manner as 42 USC §1983

Qualified Immunity

Two Part Analysis:

• Did a Constitutional violation occur?
• Usually, the Plaintiff alleges that he/she was

subject to an objectively unreasonable seizure by the officer

• Some type of “excessive force” that was

unreasonable under the circumstances

• The court assume the facts as alleged by the

plaintiff

Qualified Immunity

Two Part Analysis:

• Was the right violated “clearly

established?”

• Would it be clear to a reasonable officer that the

conduct was unlawful in the based on the facts of the situation?

• Did the state of the law give the officers fair

warning that their treatment of the plaintiff was unconstitutional?

• The unlawfulness must be apparent.

Plaintiff v. Defendant Seized?

Qualified Immunity?

Constitutional?

Law Clearly

Established?

Trial Case Dismissed

Yes

No Yes

Yes No

16

CASES RELATING TO USE OF FORCE

1.

Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

2.

Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

3.

Brower v. County of Inyo 489 U.S. 593 (1989)

4.

Buckner v. Kilgore 36 F.3d 536 (1994)

5.

Seekamp v. Michuad 109 F.3d 802 (1997)

6.

Scott v. Harris 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007)

7.

Plumhoff v. Rickard 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)

8.

Mullenix v. Luna 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015)

17

CASES RELATING TO USE OF FORCE

1.

Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

2.

Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

3.

Brower v. County of Inyo 489 U.S. 593 (1989)

4.

Buckner v. Kilgore 36 F.3d 536 (1994)

5.

Seekamp v. Michuad 109 F.3d 802 (1997)

6.

Scott v. Harris 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007)

7.

Plumhoff v. Rickard 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)

8.

Mullenix v. Luna 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015)

18

Tennessee v. Garner (1985)

• Memphis Police Officer shoots an unarmed

burglary suspect to prevent escape

• Officer cited Tennessee state law as authority

(fleeing felon rule)

• SCOTUS rules that use of deadly force to prevent

the escape of an unarmed, non-dangerous fleeing suspect is unconstitutional.

Tennessee v. Garner

 An example as to when deadly force is

reasonable:

– There’s probable cause; – The suspect poses; – A significant threat; – Of death or serious bodily harm; – To you or others; and, … – You give a warning … if it’s feasible.

20

TENNESSEE v. GARNER:

 An unarmed fleeing suspect has a

constitutional right not to be apprehended by deadly force

 Provides an example of when deadly force

is reasonable under the Constitution

21

CASES RELATING TO USE OF FORCE

1.

Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

2.

Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

3.

Brower v. County of Inyo 489 U.S. 593 (1989)

4.

Buckner v. Kilgore 36 F.3d 536 (1994)

5.

Seekamp v. Michuad 109 F.3d 802 (1997)

6.

Scott v. Harris 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007)

7.

Plumhoff v. Rickard 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)

8.

Mullenix v. Luna 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015)

22

Graham v. Conner

• “the right to make an arrest or

investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”

• Any use of force must be “objectively

reasonable”

• Requires careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case.

Graham v. Connor

 Proper application of force requires careful

attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including:

– Severity of the crime – Whether the suspect is an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others. – Whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest – Whether the suspect is attempting to evade arrest by flight

24

Legal standards outlined in Graham…

 A seizure must be Objectively Reasonable.

– What were the facts?

 The facts are viewed through the lens of a

reasonable officer.

 No 20/20 hindsight.

– Look backwards, not forwards.

 No perfect answers

– Only reasonable ones.

 Officers are often forced to make split

second decisions……

25

Objectively Reasonable?

• Whether force is “reasonable” is determined

by the “Totality of the Circumstances”

• Perspective of reasonable officer on the scene
• Without regard to underlying intent or motivation
• All the facts and circumstances of which the

LEO is aware at the time

• Can’t justify force with what you find out afterward
• Aren’t judged on what you find out afterward

Other Factors Used to Determine Reasonableness in a Use of Force Situation

• The number of suspects vs officers involved
• Size, age and condition of suspect
• Duration of the action
• Violent history of suspect known by officer
• Alcohol / Drug use by suspect
• Suspect’s known psychiatric history

Reasonableness

“the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application”

 FACTS make force reasonable

Reasonableness

• No perfect answer
• Forced to make split-second judgments
• Under circumstances that are:
• Tense
• Uncertain
• Rapidly evolving

CASES RELATING TO USE OF FORCE

1.

Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

2.

Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

3.

Brower v. County of Inyo 489 U.S. 593 (1989)

4.

Buckner v. Kilgore 36 F.3d 536 (1994)

5.

Seekamp v. Michuad 109 F.3d 802 (1997)

6.

Scott v. Harris 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007)

7.

Plumhoff v. Rickard 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)

8.

Mullenix v. Luna 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015)

30

Scott v. Harris



This case involved a pursuit for speeding



During the pursuit Harris’ reckless driving was endangering other motorists



Officer Scott applied his push bumper to the rear of suspects vehicle. As a result, Harris lost control of his vehicle and crashed. He was badly injured and was rendered a quadriplegic.



Victor Harris sued Officer Scott for excessive force under the 4th Amendment

31

Scott v. Harris

Reasonableness of LEO “seizure” determined by balancing:

Nature and quality of the intrusion on the person’s 4th Amendment interests (what did the officer do?) vs The importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion (why did he do it?)

Objective Reasonableness Test

 Victor Harris tried to argue that deadly force

was unreasonable to stop his flight because he did not fall under the fleeing felon rule. Tennesee v. Garner.

 Use the objective test. (FACTS) Harris was

• speeding. An officer activated his lights and Harris
• fled. Officer Scott joined the chase. Harris raced down

narrow, 2-lane roads at night at speeds in excess of 85

• mph. Swerved around a dozen cars, crossed the

double yellow line, and forced cars to the shoulder.

 Scott used force to stop Harris. He applied the

push-bumper of his cruiser to Harris’ rear bumper at a very high speed. Harris crashed, and is now a quadriplegic.

 Could a reasonable officer believe that was

• bjectively reasonable?

33

Use of Deadly Force and Objective Reasonableness

• Ramming Harris’ car was a “seizure”
• It was reasonable to terminate a high-speed

car chase that threatened the lives of bystanders

• Regardless of the risk to Harris
• Relative culpability of Harris

Scott v. Harris



Scott’s attempt to terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the road was reasonable

– Even though it was a ramming situation that most would consider deadly force and not trained in any ramming technique



Should the officers have been required to call off the pursuit? The Supreme Court says “NO.” “we are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other people's lives in

• danger. It is obvious the perverse incentives such a

rule would create: Every fleeing motorist would know that escape is within his grasp”



Harris responsible for his own demise

35

Was the “seizure” reasonable?

In the end we must still slosh our way through the fact bound morass of “reasonableness.” Whether

• r not Officer Scott’s actions constituted

application of “deadly force,” all that matters is whether Officer Scott’s actions were reasonable.

The rule laid down by the USSC:

“Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death”

Significance of Scott v Harris

• Objective Reasonableness is the standard

for all use of force situations, deadly or

• therwise.
• Based on the totality of the circumstances

the officer’s actions were “objectively reasonable” in the application of force

Scott v. Harris

• Tennessee v. Garner not overruled
• It was just an application of the 4th

Amendment’s “reasonableness” test regarding the use of a particular type of force in a particular situation

• It was meant to be an example, not to establish

a test to determine when deadly force is authorized

Scott v. Harris Impact on LEOs

 Graham v. Connor sets the standard for all

use of force cases!

 Scott v. Harris confirms that Graham is

the test for all use of force cases regardless

• f whether a vehicle pursuit is involved.

Objective Reasonableness: No Preset Conditions regarding use of force

• Not required before using deadly force:
• Fear for your life
• A felony offense
• A verbal warning
• Exhausting all lesser forms of force
• Retreat
• Also, warning shots are not explicitly

prohibited

CASES RELATING TO USE OF FORCE

1.

Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

2.

Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

3.

Brower v. County of Inyo 489 U.S. 593 (1989)

4.

Buckner v. Kilgore 36 F.3d 536 (1994)

5.

Seekamp v. Michuad 109 F.3d 802 (1997)

6.

Scott v. Harris 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007)

7.

Plumhoff v. Rickard 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)

8.

Mullenix v. Luna 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015)

42

Pursuit Termination Techniques

Brower vs. County of Inyo,

489 US 593 (1989)

The use of roadblocks by Police

43

Brower v. County of Inyo (1989)

 Petitioners brought suit claiming that police

violated Brower's Fourth Amendment rights by effecting an unreasonable seizure using excessive force.

 Brower was killed when the stolen car he

was driving at high speeds to elude pursuing police crashed into a police roadblock.

Brower v. County of Inyo (1989)

 Specifically LEOs placed an 18-wheel

semi-truck across the highway in the path

• f Brower's flight, behind a curve, with a

police cruiser's headlights aimed in such fashion as to blind Brower on his approach.

 The plaintiffs alleged that the fatal

collision was a "proximate result" of this police conduct.

Police Car Brower’s Car Tractor Trailer

A Suspect is seized under the Fourth Amendment when police seek to stop suspect by roadblock and succeed in doing so

SCOTUS Holding in Brower:

Brower’s Car

46

Brower Holding:

 A seizure under the Fourth Amendment

• ccurs only when there is a governmental

termination of movement by a means intentionally applied

 Seizure alone is not enough for §1983

liability; the seizure must be “unreasonable” in its nature

CASES RELATING TO USE OF FORCE

1.

Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

2.

Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

3.

Brower v. County of Inyo 489 U.S. 593 (1989)

4.

Buckner v. Kilgore 36 F.3d 536 (1994)

5.

Seekamp v. Michuad 109 F.3d 802 (1997)

6.

Scott v. Harris 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007)

7.

Plumhoff v. Rickard 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)

8.

Mullenix v. Luna 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015)

48

SEEKAMP v. MICHAUD

109 F.3d 802 (1st Cir. 1997)

 Seekamp is observed speeding & fails

to yield to local officers in Maine causing a pursuit.

 Maine State Police join the pursuit due

to the felony violation of eluding a police officer

 The Maine State Police attempt a

“rolling roadblock” but it fails to work

SEEKAMP v. MICHAUD

 Seekamp continues to drive erratically & is

clocked at speeds up to 97 mph

 The Maine State Police set up a roadblock at a

toll plaza

 The roadblock is well lit, visible from about 1500’

and has a 50’ gap to allow traffic through

 Seekamp’s brakes fail and he is injured after

striking the rear axle of a semi truck covered in white plastic that has been pulled across the road as part of the roadblock.

SEEKAMP v. MICHAUD

109 F.3d 802 (1st Cir. 1997)

Tractor Trailer Police Car Suspect’s Car 1500 FEET

51

Results:

 The Maine State Police argued that their

roadblock did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment because it allowed traffic through a 50’ gap

 Held: Under Brower the Maine State Police

roadblock did constitute a seizure because it was a governmental termination of movement by a means intentionally applied, however……

Results: (continued)

 The issue remained as to whether or not the

seizure unreasonable under the analysis of Graham v. Connor

 Answer: the steps taken by the Maine State

Police in regard to the roadblock were not unreasonable and therefore all defendants were entitled to received Qualified Immunity

Supervisor Liability (Seekamp)

 Also alleged in this case was the issue of

Supervisor Liability for the LEOs actions

 Supervisor Liability under §1983 must be

“deliberate, reckless, or callous”

 LEO Supervisors (and officers) actions in this

case were found to be reasonable

 They followed the guidelines of their pursuit

policy and received refresher training on high speed pursuits within the year proceeding the incident

Roadblocks: A Tale of Two Cases

Brower v. County of Inyo (Unreasonable)

 “Deadman’s roadblock  Tractor-trailer across all

traffic lanes

 Concealed behind curve

in road & unilluminated

 Approaching cars

blinded by lights from police car positioned toward oncoming traffic

Seekamp v. Michaud (Reasonable)

 Located at end of long

straightaway at toll plaza

 Allowed traffic to bypass

via a 50’ gap on one side

 Brightly illuminated  Tractor-trailer covered in

white plastic sheeting

 Visible from 1500 feet

CASES RELATING TO USE OF FORCE

1.

Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

2.

Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

3.

Brower v. County of Inyo 489 U.S. 593 (1989)

4.

Buckner v. Kilgore 36 F.3d 536 (1994)

5.

Seekamp v. Michuad 109 F.3d 802 (1997)

6.

Scott v. Harris 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007)

7.

Plumhoff v. Rickard 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)

8.

Mullenix v. Luna 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015)

56

Buckner v. Kilgore

36 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 1994)

57

Buckner v. Kilgore

 Juveniles N.L. Buckner, Jr., and George Silver

sued Greeneville, Tennessee Police Officer Stewart Kilgore after they sustained injuries when the motorcycle they were riding on collided with his police car

 The two youths were observed on a motorcycle,

intoxicated, and without helmets at a convenience store, an officer attempted to conduct a traffic stop

• f the motorcycle but it failed to yield

 A chase ensued with the motorcycle reaching

speeds of about 100 mph

Buckner v. Kilgore

 In an effort to stop the fleeing subjects, Officer

Kilgore pulled his 17’ long patrol vehicle on to the road in front of the speeding motorcycle without emergency lights, approximately two seconds prior to the motorcycle hitting his police vehicle

 Both riders suffered severe permanent injuries  Kilgore was denied Qualified Immunity at the

District Court and appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Buckner v. Kilgore

 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the

request for Qualified Immunity and asked if the seizure of the fleeing juveniles was Constitutional

 Held- In Tennessee v. Garner, the USSC

determined an unarmed fleeing suspect has a constitutional right not to be apprehended by the use of deadly force unless there is probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical injury to the officer or others.

Buckner v. Kilgore

 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals then asked if

the law was clearly established in regard to this matter.

 Held- Officer Kilgore’s actions in pulling his

squad car onto the highway knowing the approaching motorcyclist will not have time to stop or safely avoid collision with police car violates the law that was clearly established in Brower v. County of Inyo

Buckner v. Kilgore Officer Kilgore was denied Qualified Immunity after the Sixth Circuit Court

• f Appeals applied the two question

test for Qualified Immunity!

62

CASES RELATING TO USE OF FORCE

1.

Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

2.

Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

3.

Brower v. County of Inyo 489 U.S. 593 (1989)

4.

Buckner v. Kilgore 36 F.3d 536 (1994)

5.

Seekamp v. Michuad 109 F.3d 802 (1997)

6.

Scott v. Harris 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007)

7.

Plumhoff v. Rickard 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)

8.

Mullenix v. Luna 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015)

63

Plumhoff v. Rickard

 Traffic stop of vehicle driven by Rickard for driving with an

inoperable headlight.

 Rickard failed to produce a DL and sped away when LEO

asked him to step out of his car.

 LEOs pursued Rickard.  Rickard swerved through traffic on interstate highway, at

speeds over 100 mph.

Plumhoff v. Rickard

 Rickard exited the highway and entered a parking

lot.

 Rickard collided with Officer Plumhoff’s police car.  Rickard appeared to be boxed, in so LEOs

approached Rickard’s car on foot.

 Rickard spun his tires even though he was pinned

against a police car.

Plumhoff v. Rickard

 Officer Plumhoff fired 3 shots into Rickard’s car.  Rickard reversed his car 180 degrees, almost

striking another officer.

 Rickard accelerated down the street as two other

• fficers fired 12 more shots at Rickard’s car.

Plumhoff v. Rickard

 Rickard lost control and crashed into a building.  Rickard and his passenger, Kelly Allen died from a

combination of gunshot wounds and injuries suffered in the crash.

Plumhoff v. Rickard

 Rickard’s daughter sued Plumhoff and five other officers

claiming the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force to stop Rickard.

 The district court and 6th Circuit Court of Appeals held

the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.

 Issue before the U.S. Supreme Court:

– Whether the Sixth Circuit improperly denied the

• fficers qualified immunity by finding the officers use
• f force was not reasonable as a matter of law.

Plumhoff v. Rickard

 Yes: The officers were entitled to qualified immunity.  Rickard’s outrageously reckless driving posed a grave public

safety risk.

 A reasonable officer could have concluded Rickard intended

to resume his flight, when he reversed his car.

 If Rickard were allowed to resume his flight, he would once

again pose a deadly threat to others on the road.

 The officers acted reasonably when they fired at Rickard to

end that risk.

Plumhoff v. Rickard

 Also, the officers were justified in firing 15 shots at Rickard.

“If police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the threat has ended.”

 In the ten-second span when the officers fired their shots,

Rickard continued to flee until he crashed.

 Allen’s presence in the car had no bearing in the analysis on

whether the officers acted reasonably by firing at Rickard.

– Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be asserted by another. – USSC did not consider Allen’s presence in the car when determining the reasonableness of the officers’ actions.

CASES RELATING TO USE OF FORCE

1.

Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

2.

Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

3.

Brower v. County of Inyo 489 U.S. 593 (1989)

4.

Buckner v. Kilgore 36 F.3d 536 (1994)

5.

Seekamp v. Michuad 109 F.3d 802 (1997)

6.

Scott v. Harris 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007)

7.

Plumhoff v. Rickard 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)

8.

Mullenix v. Luna 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015)

71

Mullenix v. Luna

 Officer tried to arrest Leija on outstanding

misdemeanor arrest warrant.

 Leija fled in his vehicle, officers pursued,

speeds reached 85-110 mph.

 Leijia called dispatcher twice, said he had a

gun, and for police to stop chasing him or he would shoot at them.

Mullenix v. Luna

 Dispatcher relayed Leija’s threats to pursuing

• fficers and other officers up the road.

 18 minutes into the pursuit, Leija approached

an overpass manned by several LEOs.

 An officer below the overpass prepared to

deployed spike strips in the roadway.

 In addition, Trooper Mullenix positioned himself

• n top of the overpass with an M-4 rifle. He

stated his intention to disable the fleeing car by shooting the engine block.

Mullenix v. Luna

 Leija’s car approached the overpass & Trooper

Mullenix fired several rounds at the car trying to stop it by disabling the engine.

 Instead of the engine, the rounds hit Leija, the car

goes

• ut
• f

control and crashes. Leija is pronounced dead at the scene.

 Leija’s estate sued, arguing Mullenix’s use of force

was unreasonable.

 5th Circuit denied Mullenix qualified immunity.

– Mullenix’s actions were objectively unreasonable. – No innocent bystanders, – Leija’s driving was relatively controlled – Mullenix did not give the spike strips a chance to work.

Mullenix v. Luna

 USSC – per curiam opinion / no oral argument  Reversed the 5th Circuit  Leija posed a threat to officers under the

• verpass,

 Leijia claimed to have a gun and threatened to

use it – officer knew this.

 25 mile

chase at high speeds / possibly intoxicated

 Not clearly established that what Mullenix did

was a constitutional violation.

Mullenix v. Luna

 USSC warned the lower courts not to interpret

the issue of “clearly established” law and the second prong of the Qualified Immunity test on an overly generalized basis.

• Who is responsible for the decisions made

during a pursuit? – The officers – The supervisors

– The agency, by it’s policy

77

Summary

 Identify legal responsibilities  Identify considerations and suggested

procedures before executing a pursuit termination technique.

 Identify and demonstrate common

pursuit termination techniques.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

78

Questions ?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

79

Use of Force Legal Review

Paul Sullivan FLETC Legal Division paul.sullivan@fletc.dhs.gov

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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