The Terre-en-vue Mouvement a case study P aleis der - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Collectively Constructing The Commons:

The Terre-en-vue Mouvement

a case study

Paleis der Academiën_20120309

Maarten Roels

• Dept. Geography | Ugent

maarten.roels@ugent.be

• bjective conditions in which the movement acts

high fragmentation between urban and rural activities low interaction between (potential) providers and (potential) appropriators

=> citizen lack of awareness about trends in agriculture, soil and biodiversity quality, lack of empowerment

longer food supply chains lower incomes for primary producers (farmers)

=> decrease of economic profitability, attractiveness and willingness to experiment

increased benefit seeking in economies of scale

=> increasing demand for land and rising prices

agriculture in Belgium, the tragedy of the commons 2.0

41

common sense and the genealogy of the Terre-en-vue Mouvement

• 2010

creation of a NGO network (formerly called platform)

• feb. 2011

constitution of a peer group called dynamo

• feb. 2011

start-up local project in Wavreille

• may 2011

constitution of a citizen arena called forum

• ct. 2011

consolidation of the dynamo-forum collaboration in the NGO called Terre-en-vue (dynamo > board, forum > GA, task force > commission)

• feb. 2012

constitution of a land trust task force (Groupe de travail Foncière)

• march '12

constitution of cooperative company called Terre-en-vue

• march '12

first rendering of land into common resource by co-op Terre-en-vue

• april 2012

constitution of communication task force

• june 2012

Completion of the Terre-en-vue mouvement with a fondation

basic questions What resource are we talking about Who are the owners Who are the users What rules are needed Who sets the rules How are the rules set and changed Who checks compliance to the rules, monitors

what resource are we talking about

who are the owners – land providers Co-op Terre-en-vue Share A Share B Foundation Terre-en-vue Donors

Partner NGOs

Citizens

Terre-en-vue NGO Local Teams

who are the users – land appropriators / farmers

• existing farmers who seek continuity
• nly 30 % of our farmers own their land

the majority of our farmers is aged between 50 and 60 years

• potential farmers who seek land to start their projects on

basic average start up capital between 25.000 and 50.000 agriculture is high risk economic sector if not well embedded in local needs

what rules are needed

• access rules

for Terre-en-vue Co-op investors to CO-OP rights: statutes for Terre-en-vue NGO and local team members to the NGO rights: statutes, by laws and charter for farmers to land use rights: statutes, by-laws, charter, contract

• rganisational rules

participative instruments and dynamics created in NGO Terre-en-vue: General Assembly (arena), Task Forces (Commissions) & Board (Dynamo) + mutual follow up and refinement rules participative instruments and dynamics, and guarantee architecture created in CO-OP Terre-en-vue: General Assembly (arena), Task Forces & Supervisory Team (Commissions) & Board + mutual follow up and refinement + balance between NGO and CO-OP

who sets the rules - NGO Dynamo (Board) Arena (General Assembly) Task Forces (Commissions) Local Teams Local Teams Local Teams

who sets the rules - CO-OP Board Commissions Local Teams

NGOs (Terre-en-vue and others)

General Assembly Share A Share B Citizens (non farmers and farmers)

Full decisive power Limited decisive power

how are the rules set and changed LEGAL FRAMEWORK: STATUTES PROCESS DYNAMICS: “SOCIOCRATY” participation, respect, the power of silence, inclusion

who checks compliance to the rules and monitors & how

Terre-en-vue & Ostrom's rule levels (Ostrom 1990) Constitutional Rules Collective Choice Rules Operational Rules Formulation Governance Adjudication Policy Making Management Adjudication Appropriation Provision Monitoring Enforcement

Terre-en-vue & Ostrom's design principles (Ostrom 1990)

Clearly define bouderies (user rights and CPR)

strong

Congruence between appropriation & provision rules and local conditions

strong

Collective Choice Arrangements Participation of those affected by operational rules in change of these rules

strong

Monitoring Monitors are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators

n

Graduated Sanctions

n

Conflict resolution mechanisms

n

Minimal recognition of rights to organise External governmental agencies do not create

• bstacles to th appropriators to device their own

institutions

n

Nested Enterprises Organisation of appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and governance activities in multiple layers

strong

n = no data yet