the risk sensitive switching problem under knightian
play

The Risk-Sensitive Switching Problem Under Knightian Uncertainty - PDF document

The Risk-Sensitive Switching Problem Under Knightian Uncertainty S.Hamad` ene & H.Wang University of Le Mans, Fr. New Advances in BSDEs for financial engineering applications, Tamerza, Oct.25-28, 2010 Let B := ( B t ) t T a BM on a


  1. The Risk-Sensitive Switching Problem Under Knightian Uncertainty S.Hamad` ene & H.Wang University of Le Mans, Fr. New Advances in BSDEs for financial engineering applications, Tamerza, Oct.25-28, 2010

  2. Let B := ( B t ) t ≤ T a BM on a probability space (Ω , F , P ) ; ( F t ) t ≤ T the completed natural fil- tration of B . A switching problem is a stochastic control where the decision maker moves among m states or modes when she decides according to the best profitability. There are several works on the switching prob- lem (H.-Jeanblanc, Djehiche-H.-Popier, H.-Zhang, Hu-Tang, Zervos (s.p.), Ly Vath-Pham, Ly Vath-Pham-XYZ , Zervos, Porchet-Touzi, Carmona-Ludkowski,...). Examples of a switching problems • In financial markets when a trader invests his/her money between several assets (economies) according their profitability

  3. • In the energy market when a manager of a power plant puts it in the mode which occurs the best profitability. in assets investor puts his money in in the case A strategy of switching has two components (when m ≥ 3): - ( τ n ) n ≥ 0 an increasing sequence of stopping times: they are the times when the decision maker decides to switch. - a sequence ( ξ n ) n ≥ 0 ) of r.v. with values in J := { 1 , ..., m } (the different states) such that ξ n is F τ n -measurable which stands for the state to which the system is switched at τ n from its current one. Remark: When m = 2, a strategy has only one component, i.e., stopping times.

  4. With a strategy ( δ, ξ ) = (( τ n ) n ≥ 0 , ( ξ n ) n ≥ 0 ) is associated an indicator of the state of the sys- tem which is ( u t ) t ≤ T given by: u 0 = 1 and u t = ξ n if t ∈ ] τ n , τ n +1 ] ( n ≥ 0) . When a strategy ( δ, ξ ) is implemented usually the yield is given by: J ( δ, ξ ) := ∫ T ∑ E [ 0 ψ u s ( s ) ds − ℓ u τn − 1 ,u τn ( τ n )1 1 [ τ n <T ] ] n ≥ 1 where • ψ k ( t, ω ) is the instantaneous profit in the state k • ℓ kl ( t, ω ) ≥ c > 0 is the switching cost from state k to state l at t .

  5. The problem is to focus on J ∗ := sup J ( δ, ξ ) . ( δ,ξ ) This problem is linked to systems of Reflected BSDEs with inter-connected obstacles or oblique reflection of the following type: for i ∈ J := { 1 , ...., m } , ∫ T ∫ T  Z i u dB u + K i T − K i Y i t = ψ i ( u ) du −   t   t t   t ≥ max j ∈J − i {− ℓ ij ( t ) + Y j Y i  t } , ∫ T   0 ( Y i j ∈J − i {− ℓ ij ( u ) + Y j u } ) dK i  u − max u = 0 .     (1) where K i are continuous and non-decreasing and J − i := J − { i } .

  6. The solution of (6) provides the optimal strat- egy ( δ ∗ , ξ ∗ ) and J ∗ 1 = Y 1 0 (Djehiche, H., Popier, 07). Knightian uncertainty: means that the proba- bility of the future is not fixed and a family of probabilities P u are likewise. Risk-sensitiveness: means that the criterion is of type E [ e θζ ] where θ is related to risk attitude of the con- troller. So let us set: J ( δ, ξ ; u ) := ∫ T 0 ( ψ u s ( s, X s ) + h ( s, X s , u s )) ds − A δ E u [exp { T } ] where

  7. • X verifies dX t = ϱ ( t, X t ) dt + σ ( t, X t ) dB t , t ≤ T are factors which determine prices in the mar- ket and ∀ λ > 0 , E [ e λ sup t ≤ T | X t | ] < ∞ . • u := ( u t ) t ≤ T is a stochastic process valued in U (not bounded) • P u is a probability such that: ∫ . dP u dP = E T ( 0 b ( t, X t ) dB t ) • A δ T := ∑ n ≥ 1 ℓ u τn − 1 ,u τn ( τ n , X τ n )1 1 [ τ n <T ] • h is a premium which satisfies: l ( u ) ≤ h ( t, x, u ) ≤ C (1 + | x | + l ( u )) with l ( u ) → ∞ as | u | → ∞ .

  8. Problem: Characterization, properties and com- putation of J ∗ = sup inf u J ( δ, ξ ; u ) . δ Does an optimal strategy ( δ ∗ , u ∗ ) exist? So let H be the hamiltonian of the problem, H ( t, x, z, u ) := zb ( t, x, u ) + h ( t, x, u ) and H ∗ ( t, x, z ) := inf u ∈ U H ( t, x, z, u ) . Assume hereafter m = 2. The system of reflected BSDEs associated with the problem is:

  9. ∫ T  t [ ψ 1 ( s, X s ) + H ∗ ( s, X s , Z 1 • Y 1 t = s )+      ∫ T 1  2 | Z 1 s | 2 ] ds − t Z 1 s dB s + K 1 T − K 1  t ;        ∫ T    t [ ψ 2 ( s, X s ) + H ∗ ( s, X s , Z 2  • Y 2 t = s )+      ∫ T  1 2 | Z 2 s | 2 ] ds − t Z 2 s dB s + K 2 T − K 2  t ;     • Y 1 t ≥ Y 2  t − ℓ 12 ( t, X t );     [ Y 1 t − Y 2 t + ℓ 12 ( t, X t )] dK 1 t = 0;          • Y 2 t ≥ Y 1  t − ℓ 21 ( t, X t );     [ Y 2 t − Y 1 t + ℓ 21 ( t, X t )] dK 2  t = 0 .  (2) Verification theorem: If there exist two triplets of processes ( Y i , Z i , K i ), i = 1 , 2 which satisfy (2) then we have: exp { Y 1 0 } = sup u ∈U J ( δ, u ) inf δ ∈D and the optimal strategy ( δ ∗ , u ∗ ) is given by

  10. τ ∗ 0 := 0 and for n = 0 , · · · , τ ∗ inf { t ≥ τ ∗ 2 n : Y 1 t = Y 2 := t − ℓ 12 ( t, X t ) } 2 n +1 τ ∗ inf { t ≥ τ ∗ 2 n +1 : Y 2 t = Y 1 := t − ℓ 21 ( t, X t ) } . 2 n +2 and u ∗ [ u ∗ ( t, X t , Z 1 ∑ t := t )1 [ τ ∗ 2 n +1 ) ( t ) + 2 n ,τ ∗ n ≥ 0 u ∗ ( t, X t , Z 2 t )1 [ τ ∗ 2 n +2 ) ( t )] . 2 n +1 ,τ ∗ Sketch of the proof: the problems are related to the lack of integrability and of regularity of the data of the problem. Step 1: Expression of the payoffs via BSDEs Let ( δ, u ) admissible. Then there exists a unique pair of P -measurable processes ( Y δ,u , Z δ,u ) such ∫ T 0 | Z δ,u | 2 ds < ∞ , the process that P -a.s, s + ∫ t t e Y δ,u 0 h ( s,X s ,u s ) ds ) t ≤ T is of class [D] and ( L u t

  11. for any t ≤ T , ∫ T Y δ,u t ( ψ δ ( s, X s ) + H ( s, X s , u s , Z δ,u = − A δ T + ) s t ∫ T 2 | Z δ,u t Z δ,u + 1 | 2 ) ds − dB s . s s (3) Moreover, we have: ∫ T exp { Y δ,u = E u [exp { 0 ( ψ δ ( s, X s ) } 0 + h ( s, X s , u s )) ds − A δ (4) T } ] = J ( δ, u ) . Step 2: Let δ ∈ D , then there exists a unique pair of P -measurable processes ( Y δ, ∗ , Z δ, ∗ ) such that ( e Y δ, ∗ p ≥ 1 S p , ) t ≤ T ∈ E := ∩ t ( e Y δ, ∗ Z δ, ∗ ) t ≤ T ∈ H 2 ,d and for any t ≤ T , t t ∫ T Y δ, ∗ t ( ψ δ ( s, X s ) + H ∗ ( s, X s , Z δ, ∗ = − A δ T + s ) t ∫ T 2 | Z δ, ∗ t Z δ, ∗ + 1 s | 2 ) ds − s dB s . (5)

  12. Moreover, ∀ t ≤ T , ∀ δ ∈ D , Y δ, ∗ = essinf u ∈U Y δ,u . t t Step 3: Reduction of the problem sup u ∈U J ( δ, u ) = sup inf u ∈U J ( δ, u ) . inf δ ∈D δ ∈B where B := { δ := ( τ n ) n ≥ 0 ∈ D , ∃ K δ , such that τ n = T, for any n ≥ K δ } . Step 4: end of the proof by induction. Let δ ∈ B then by a backward induction we have: 0 ≥ Y δ, ∗ Y 1 . 0 As (in using the system of reflected BSDEs) we have: 0 = Y δ ∗ , ∗ Y 1 0

  13. therefore Y δ, ∗ u ∈U Y δ,u Y 1 0 = sup = sup inf 0 0 δ ∈D δ ∈D which implies that exp( Y 1 u ∈U J ( δ, u ) = J ( δ ∗ , u ∗ ) . 0 ) = sup inf δ ∈D Therefore the problem turns into solving the system (2). Theorem: The system of reflected BSDEs with inter-connected obstacles (2) has a unique so- lution. Sketch of the proof: Step 1: Let us consider the following system:

  14. For i = 1 , ..., m , ∫ T  f i ( u, Y 1 u , ..., Y m u , Z i Y i t = ξ i + u ) du     t ∫ T    Z i u dB u + K i T − K i  −   t  (6) t t ≥ max j ∈J − i h ij ( ω, t, Y j Y i t )    ∫ T    0 ( Y i j ∈J − i h ij ( ω, u, Y j u )) dK i  u − max u = 0 .     We first extend the result by H.-Zhang (07) to the case of continuous coefficients f j with lin- ear growth in using inf-convolution techniques. Step 2: We use an exponential transform for (2) and we obtain:

  15. ∫ T Y 1 Y 1 s ) + [ ψ 1 ( s, X s )+ • ¯ t (¯ t = 1 + Z 1 ∫ T ¯ H ∗ ( s, X s , Z 1 K 1 K 1 ¯ s dB s + ¯ T − ¯ s s ) + )] ds − t ; t ¯ ( Y 1 ∫ T Y 2 Y 2 s ) + [ ψ 2 ( s, X s )+ • ¯ t (¯ t = 1 + Z 2 ∫ T ¯ H ∗ ( s, X s , Z 2 K 2 K 2 ¯ s dB s + ¯ T − ¯ s ) + )] ds − s t ; t ¯ ( Y 2 Y 1 t ≥ e − g 12 ( t,X t ) ¯ Y 2 Y 2 t ≥ e − g 21 ( t,X t ) ¯ Y 1 • ¯ t ; ¯ t Y 1 t − e − g 12 ( t,X t ) ¯ Y 2 K 1 • (¯ t ) d ¯ t = 0 and Y 2 t − e − g 21 ( t,X t ) ¯ Y 1 K 2 (¯ t ) d ¯ t = 0 (7) Finally we show that this system has a solution and we go back to (2). Dynamic Programming Principle: Y 1 and Y 2 satisty the following DPP:

  16. ∫ τ n Φ u s ( s, X s , Z u s Y 1 t = esssup δ =( τ n ) n ≥ 0 ∈D 1 t E [ s ) ds t k =1 ,n ℓ u τk − 1 ,uτk 1 [ τ k <T ] + Y u τn − ∑ τ n 1 [ τ n <T ] | F t ] where • D 1 is the set of admissible strategies such t that τ 1 ≥ t and u 0 = 1 • Φ i ( t, x, z ) = ψ i ( t, x ) + H ∗ ( t, x, z ) + 1 2 | z | 2 . The same is true for Y 2 . With the help of this DPP we show that: Theorem: Assume that: ( i ) U is compact and h is bounded

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend