the law and economics of collusion overview
play

THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION Overview Context: At an - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION Overview Context: At an industry convention, a competitor complains that competition is much too tough. How should you reply? Concepts: antitrust, competition policy, price fixing, civil and


  1. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION

  2. Overview • Context: At an industry convention, a competitor complains that “competition is much too tough.” How should you reply? • Concepts: antitrust, competition policy, price fixing, civil and criminal offense, leniency • Economic principle: crime does not pay

  3. Outline • Collusion: US and EU law • Leniency programs • Facilitating practices • Allowed horizontal agreements • Cases

  4. Outline • Collusion: US and EU law • Leniency programs • Facilitating practices • Allowed horizontal agreements • Cases

  5. Motivating example: lysine • How the cartel worked • How the DoJ found out about it • Economic, legal, and personal ramifications • Watch video from Fair Fight in the Marketplace

  6. Price fixing and related illegal practices • Price fixing is illegal − Criminal offense in U.S. (Sherman Act) − Civil offense in Europe (Articles 101, 102 of Treaty of the EU) • There may be exceptions and exemptions, e.g.: − Some sports leagues − European airlines until early 1990s • Related forms of collusion − Territorial or no-customer-poaching agreements − Capacity reduction

  7. History of anti-price-fixing law: US • US, late 1800s: price instability led to formation of cartels • In addition to price stability, this also brought about high prices • Sherman Act, 1890. Sections 1 and 2 prohibit such contracts. Felony (prison sentences). • Some practices per-se illegal. Otherwise, rule of reason is applied. • Important precedents: GE and Westinghouse , Airline tariff publishing (non-explicit collusion)

  8. Top recent DOJ fines Sherman Act Violations Yielding a Corporate Fine of $10 Million or More Defendant (FY) Product Fine ($ M) Country F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. (1999) Vitamins $500 Switzerland LG Display Co., Ltd LCD panels $400 Korea LG Display America (2009) Soci´ et´ e Air France and Koninklijke Air Transportation $350 France (SAF) Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N.V. (2008) (Cargo) Netherlands (KLM) Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. (2007) Air Transportation $300 Korea (Cargo & Passenger) British Airways PLC (2007) Air Transportation $300 UK (Cargo & Passenger) Samsung Electronics Company, Ltd. DRAM $300 Korea Samsung Semiconductor, Inc. (2006) BASF AG (1999) Vitamins $225 Germany CHI MEI Optoelectronics Corporation LCD panels $220 Taiwan (2010) Hynix Semiconductor Inc. (2005) DRAM $185 Korea Infineon Technologies AG (2004) DRAM $160 Germany Source: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/sherman10.html

  9. History of anti-price-fixing law: EU • EU Treaty Article 101 (formerly Article 81, formerly Article 85 of Treaty of Rome). Initial precursor: Treaty of Paris (1951). • Important precedent: Wood pulp (jurisdiction) • National regulations, esp. UK (civil and criminal offense)

  10. Public and private litigation • Almost 90% of antitrust enforcement in U.S. through private civil suits; almost none in the European Union. • Clayton Act: treble damages (private litigation quite attractive) • Example: Sun Microsystems 2002 private federal antitrust lawsuit against Microsoft: using monopoly in PC operating systems market to undermine the success of Sun’s Java technology. • Later Sun also filed a complaint with the European Commission • Former EC Commissioner Mario Monti: Europe should consider allowing U.S.-style private lawsuits

  11. Outline • Collusion: US and EU law • Leniency programs • Facilitating practices • Allowed horizontal agreements • Cases

  12. Leniency programs • First introduced by DOJ in 1978 • Major revision in 1993 − Less legal uncertainty − Automatic amnesty (still discretionary if report received after an investigation under way) − Significant increase in activity: from 1/year to 2/month reports • Similar programs in UK, EU, Japan, etc

  13. What determines fines? • Study by Connor based on US plea bargains. • Average fine discount w.r.t. maximum fine: 70% • Fine discounts lower for 2nd, 3rd, etc. plea bargain in each case • No relation between fine and harm produced by firm • Fines depend greatly on cartel characteristics: higher fines for international cartels, bid-rigging schemes • Leniency higher during Bush II than during Clinton

  14. Evaluating leniency programs • Performance measures − Fines − Number of cases • Fairness − Example: Diana Brooks and Christopher Davidge • Over-enforcement − Private suits − No double jeopardy (why so few in Portugal?)

  15. Mini-case: BA and VA • Why did BA call VA? • Are fuel surcharges illegal? Is it illegal for both airlines to set the same surcharge? • How would you structure a leniency program? • Is it fair that two firms are treated differently for the same crime? • Are you in favor or against leniency programs?

  16. Outline • Collusion: US and EU law • Leniency programs • Facilitating practices • Allowed horizontal agreements • Cases

  17. Facilitating practices Def: institutional features that make collusion easier • Price transparency (published prices) • Most favored customer clause • Meet the competition clauses • Examples: − GE and Westinghouse and DuPont and Ethyl − Ready-mixed concrete in Denmark − Federal Election Campaign Act and Medicaid reimbursement rules

  18. Ready-mixed concrete in Denmark Average 10-MPa Concrete Prices in ˚ Arhus 550 500 450 400 350 Time 300 Jan-94 Apr Jul Oct Mar-95 Jun Nov

  19. Mini-case: GE and Westinghouse • What was GE thinking in 1963? How did Westinghouse react and why? • What was the DOJ case in 1974? How would they have fared in court? • How does the current legal doctrine treat facilitating practices?

  20. Outline • Collusion: US and EU law • Leniency programs • Facilitating practices • Allowed horizontal agreements • Cases

  21. Non-price agreements • Research related agreements − Common standards − Joint R&D − Patent pools • Information exchange − Industry associations − Demand and cost data

  22. Exemptions and exceptions • Major League Baseball; other sports in US • English Premier League • European airlines until 1990s • Export cartels • Joint marketing programs

  23. Outline • Collusion: US and EU law • Leniency programs • Facilitating practices • Allowed horizontal agreements • Cases

  24. Wood pulp • Wood pulp prices are announced at regular intervals; competitor prices tend to move in tandem. • European Economic Community (EEC) initiates investigation (1977) • Non-EEC defendants (Finland, US and Canada) challenge to jurisdiction • European Courts side with Commission on jurisdiction: effects doctrine (1988) • Courts strike down collusion case: price parallelism can be viewed as the result of collusion only if there is no other explanation for it

  25. Sotheby’s and Christie’s • The companies: both founded in England, offices in many countries. Close to 100% art auction market − Sotheby’s: based in NY; $3bn turnover − Christie’s: based in London; private since 1999 • Revenue sources: fees over “hammer” price − Seller’s (or vendor’s) commission − Buyer’s premium − Vary by amount, type of auction; special deals

  26. Sotheby’s and Christie’s • After late 1980s boom, market collapsed in early 1990s (Japan economic crisis → drop in demand) • Fierce competition, low profits • November 1992: Sotheby’s announces increase in commissions; Christie’s does the same one month later • March 1995: Christie’s announces increase in sellers’ fees; Sotheby’s does the same one month later • June 1996: UK OFT initiates informal inquiries • June 1997: DoJ subpoenas files from the two houses

  27. Investigation, leniency, conviction • 1998: Fran¸ cois Pinault buys Christie’s for $1.2 billion. Christopher Davidge replaced as CEO • Late 1999: Christie’s lawyers prepare for government investigation, uncover evidence of conspiracy • January 2000: Christie’s agrees to amnesty conditional on Davidge cooperating with DOJ. Davidge paid large sum for doing so • Early 2000: Ms. Brooks receives permission from Sotheby’s to do the same but is too late • September 2001: Ms. Brooks and Sotheby’s plead guilty (on seller’s commissions)

  28. Court findings • Mr. Taubman and Sir Anthony met on 12 occasions at Taubman’s London flat, New York residence • Ms. Brooks and Mr. Davidge met repeatedly, reporting to Taubman and Tennant. JFK meeting • Agreement was established on common fees, no customer poaching, no special deals to customers (with exceptions)

  29. Court sentences • April 22, 2002: Mr. Taubman sentenced to a year and a day in prison and fined $7.5 million • April 29, 2002: Diana Brooks sentenced to three years of probation, including six months of house arrest; fined $350,000 and ordered to perform 1,000 hours of community service • Mr. Davidge marries former Chritie’s employee in India. Guests paid first-class tickets • Sir Anthony Tennant refused to testify in US, could not be extradited from UK. Died in 2011 • Also: civil suit

  30. Sotheby’s and Christie’s: takeaways • Price fixing is not limited to commodities • Top management liability conditional on awareness • Communication isn’t always necessary to maintain high price equilibrium

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend