THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR: U.S. v. JAPAN, 1940-1945 1 October 2020: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR: U.S. v. JAPAN, 1940-1945 1 October 2020: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Nov 05, 2022 440 likes •808 views

THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR: U.S. v. JAPAN, 1940-1945 1 October 2020: FACTORS OF WAR Dr. Joe Fitzharris Professor Emeritus of History The University of St. Thomas OVERVIEW DISTANCE LOGISTICS KNOWLEDGE & TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIC

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SLIDE 1

THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR: U.S. v. JAPAN, 1940-1945

1 October 2020: FACTORS OF WAR

  • Dr. Joe Fitzharris

Professor Emeritus of History The University of St. Thomas

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SLIDE 2

OVERVIEW

  • DISTANCE
  • LOGISTICS
  • KNOWLEDGE & TECHNOLOGY
  • STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
  • TACTICAL INTELLIGENCDE
  • CULTURE
  • WILL TO FIGHT
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SLIDE 3

DISTANCE

  • Physical Distance
  • Distance Matters
  • Modified by Technology
  • Impact on War Fighting
  • Speed and range of movement
  • Surprise and “Fog of War”
  • Command, control,

communications

  • Conceptual Distance
  • Continental v. Insular Society

POA Nimitz SWPA MacArthur SWAsia Mountbatten

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SLIDE 4

SOME RELEVANT DETAILS

  • For the US, we have to GO to the enemy
  • US & UK armies mechanized
  • Despite interchangeable parts, the truck, plane, gun must

be made in North America

  • For the UK, and our forces abroad, food, etc. have to

COME to them

  • The wise enemy interdicts Lines of Supply - IJN submarine

warfare doctrine

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SLIDE 5

DISTANCE

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SLIDE 6
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SLIDE 7
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SLIDE 8

Global Shipping Lanes

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SLIDE 9

Sea Lines of Supply

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SLIDE 10
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SLIDE 11

World Airway Routes

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SLIDE 12

“Halsey’sTyphoon” Cobra, 14-19 Dec. 1944

  • TF 38 sailed directly into eye of typhoon - court of inquiry

ruled Halsey made “error of judgment” (no sanctions)

  • 3 DD capsized & sank - 790 men
  • 9 warships damaged 146 aircraft lost - communications

and radar antennae damaged or destroyed

  • Meteorology an art trying to become a science and the

met people got it wrong, but “Bull” made the decision

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SLIDE 13

Warships in Typhoon Cobra, Dec. 1944

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SLIDE 14

Oil was not the most critical item

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SLIDE 15

Every vehicle, every gasket, every hose

Rubber was more critically short than oil

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SLIDE 16

DISTANCE IMPACTS OPERATIONS

  • Both IJN and USN developed fleet oilers, USN also added

underway replenishment of food, ammunition, and other stores.

  • Cargo ships, oilers, and transports were developed to

move, land, and supply troops. Hospital ships too.

  • Massive supply depots, repair bases, and hospital

complexes were build all over the Pacific Area of Operations to reduce the need to return to either Pearl Harbor or the mainland for repairs or medical care.

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SLIDE 17

DISTANCE

  • Physical Distance
  • Distance Matters
  • Modified by Technology
  • Impact on War Fighting
  • Speed and range of movement
  • Surprise and “Fog of War”
  • Command, control,

communications

  • Conceptual Distance
  • Continental v. Insular Society

POA Nimitz SWPA MacArthur SWAsia Mountbatten

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SLIDE 18

MATERIEL OF WAR

  • DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION
  • CONSTRUCTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE
  • MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND REPLACEMENT
  • MANPOWER: RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING
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SLIDE 19

Production

  • 1940 maneuvers: trucks as tanks, flour sacks as

bombs, broomstick rifles

  • ~8.9 mil unemployed, factories - 40 hr/wk av

utilization

  • 1944 - added 18.7 mil workers, factories at 90

hrs wk utilization

  • 1944- US produced 18k tanks, 16.3 mil ton ships

(av tons ~12k - 2.5x 1940), 96k aircraft

  • Liberty Ship and T10 tanker - 3 mo av build time,

launch 3/day

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SLIDE 20
  • Agriculture - fed allies too
  • US on rationing - higher food standard

than during 1939!

  • Natl 35 mph speed limit and gas rationing
  • to save tires (rubber)
  • Standardized, pre-assembled, modular

components, welded not riveted

  • Assembly line, not craftsman
  • Germ productivity 50%, Jpn 20% of US
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SLIDE 21

I-40 Submersible Aircraft Carrier (3 planes)

Mar 1945 - Planned attack on Panama Canal in late ‘45

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SLIDE 22

KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY

  • Quality of Secondary and

Higher Education - rote learning or thinking

  • Scientific and engineering

proficiency

  • Mechanical aptitude &

“tinkering”

  • Does Technology supplement

(hand-craft) or replace labor

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SLIDE 23

Pre-war American Science was Provincial

  • the best minds were trained in

Europe

  • Research was poorly funded
  • After 1938 (Krystallnacht) many

German (especially Jewish) scholars fled, and many came to the US

  • 1939 Einstein’s letter to FDR

about nuclear weapons led by 1942 to the “Manhattan Project”

  • We were really good at applied

and developmental work and became good at basic research

Einstein & Szilard Oppenheimer & Groves

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SLIDE 24

Science Goes to War

  • K- and C-rations
  • Winter gear
  • Improved vehicles
  • Jet aircraft
  • Radar, etc
  • Synthetic rubber and

POL

  • efficiency
  • Practical Psychology -

PTSD

  • Sulfa drugs
  • dried blood & plasma
  • Surgical techniques

(metal plates)

  • board certified MDs

got higher rank

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SLIDE 25

INFRASTRUCTURE

IN A MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

74th USN CB

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SLIDE 26

Consider what the 74th CB needed to do its job

ALL finished goods had to come from the mainland US

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SLIDE 27

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

  • Essential to developing national grand strategy and the

component strategies (economic, military, diplomatic,…)

  • Need to know values and goals: yours and theirs
  • Need to know political structure, economic strengths &

weaknesses, social problems, etc. resources, of enemy and your own

  • Identify your “Center of Gravity” (the source(S) of national

strength [your weakness(es) are often mirror images]

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SLIDE 28

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

  • Supporting the Planning and Execution of Operations

(Campaigns)

  • Supporting Battle Planning and Execution
  • Denial of tactical intelligence to the enemy is essential

and you ideally want to know what the enemy does not know about you

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SLIDE 29

CODE BREAKING

  • All codes are culturally

referenced analysts must understand culture

  • ULTRRA - UK led against

Germans - overall name too

  • MAGIC in the Pacific - Japanese

codes: Midway, assassination of Yamamoto

  • Navy Cryptography group kept

together by William Parker - in warehouse in St. Paul his company formerly used to build CG4 gliders

  • Engineering Research

Associates - basis for MN TECH

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SLIDE 30

Military Intelligence Language School - Camp Savage and Fort Snelling, 1942-1946.

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SLIDE 31

CULTURE

  • Population: Size, Composition, Unity

— RACISM?

  • Moral and Religious Values
  • Defer to authority/seniority?

Hierarchical?

  • Inventive, Innovative, or Imaginative
  • Individualistic, Family, Group
  • Competitive v. Co-operative
  • Tolerance for Ambiguity and Risk
  • Planning horizon: long v. short term
  • Views of “the other” - stereotypes
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SLIDE 32

US Cartoons

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SLIDE 33

Japanese Cartoons

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SLIDE 34

WILL-TO-FIGHT

  • National
  • Type of government and

Responsiveness to public

  • pinion
  • Ideological unity - Bushido
  • Group/Family and Individual
  • Identification w. society,

Tolerance of Risk

  • Minority status
  • Dissenter status