The early ontogeny of collective intentionality and normativity - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Lecture Series on Culture and Cognition, LSE, June 2010

The early ontogeny of collective intentionality and normativity

Hannes Rakoczy

Institute of Psychology, University of Göttingen

• 1. Simple forms of intentionality 1st order

perception of an objective world & instrumental intentional action

• 2. Simple intentionality 2nd order

understanding perception & action

• 3. Shared/collective WE-intentionality

joint attention (triangulation), communication, cooperation …

• 4. Cognitive-cultural dialectics

Individual intentionality (1st & 2nd order) Entry into collective intentionality & culture

• Language
• Conventional practices

enables transforms Common primate heritage (partly) common primate heritage uniquely human Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005. BBS; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003. Mind & Language

Iintentionality versus WEintentionality

Collective intentionality: some conceptual distinctions

„In such cases [collective actions] one does act individually, but one‘s individual action – playing the violin part, for example, or passing the ball to another player- are done as part of the collective berhavior. [...] When I am engaged in collective action, I am doing what I am doing as part of our doing what we are doing. In all of the cases, an agent is acting, and doing what he or she does, only as part of a collective action“ (Searle, 2005, p.6)

Iintentionality versus WEintentionality (Ir)reducibilty of WEintentionality Actor – attitude (content) − !" − #$ % $ & − ' $ Collective intentionality & normativity

Collective intentionality: some conceptual distinctions

Intentionality Individual intentionality

(I do X)

Collective intentionality (= social facts)

(We do Y)

Hierarchical Taxonomy of Facts (Searle, 1995)

Cooperation

(without function assignment)

Individual 2nd order

(I know (you do X))

simple !( )*() complex $! )*() 2nd year + Communication + Collaborative activities

Cooperation in the second year

• Collaboration: division of labour and role structure

coordination of roles & relevant communication

,% -.

spontaneous

' -& ' & ,% -.

Intentionality Individual intentionality

(I do X)

Collective intentionality (= social facts)

(We do Y)

Assignment of Functions Causal usage functions * /0 Status Functions * )

Hierarchical Taxonomy of Facts (Searle, 1995)

Cooperation

(without function assignment)

X counts as Y in context C

• Institutional facts

Individual 2nd order

(I know (you do X))

simple !( )*() complex $! )*()

£

„Human beings have a capacity which, as far as I can tell, is not possessed by any other animal species, to assign functions to objects where the objects cannot perform the function in virtue of their physical structure alone, but only in virtue of the collective assignment or acceptance of the object as having a certain status and with that status a function. Obvious examples are money, private property and positions of political leadership“ (Searle, 2005, p. 7/8)

Ontogenetic cradle

• Pretend play :

„this piece of wood counts as an apple in our pretense“ (Walton, 1990)

• Other games

„this piece of wood counts as queen in chess“

king

Pretend play: developmental and comparative aspects

• Ontogeny:

Emergence in second year

• Comparatively:

(most likely) uniquely human

Logical structure:

• assignment of status functions:

“This cup counts as ‘full‘ in our game“

• normative inferential structure:

“If the cup counts as ‘full‘ in the game, then it is to be treated accordingly“

• e.g. drink from it etc.

Status functions in pretend play

(a) Early understanding & sharing of pretense (b) Status functions & contextspecificity in pretend play (c) Grasping the normative structure of pretense

• 1 $ $) 2!$!*02-

(a) Early understanding & sharing of pretense )( 3 4( 3

Rakoczy et al. (2004). Developmental Psychology; Rakoczy et al. (2006). Br.J.Dev.Psy; Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2006. Developmental Science

*0(!!$456789 )( 4(

CHILD perceives both ”, respectively

M O D E L A C T I O N

+ ) :) + $

• (-
• +

+ $

• (- %

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2

Pretense model Trying model Pretense model Trying model Pretense model Trying model

Number of responses

Inferential pretense Inferential trying 26-month-olds 36-month-olds

* * * *

22-month-olds

p = .08.

*

(i) Action competence from 2 years (ii) Explicit linguistic competence years later only

(b) status functions & context specificity

Context 1 Context 2

X counts as Y in context C

• X

Y1 Y2

,)7%;) -

Studies 1a/1b Studies 2a/2b

counts as counts as

(c) grasping the normative structure of joint pretending

7%;)-

sandwich soap

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2

Experimental Control Experimental Control 2-year-olds 3-year-olds

mean sum of trials (0-2)

implicit protest other implicit negative protest explicit protest

* *

Status functions in

king

Intentionality Individual intentionality

(I do X)

Collective intentionality (= social facts)

(We do Y)

Assignment of Functions Causal usage functions * /0 Status Functions * ) Cooperation

(without function assignment)

X counts as Y in context C

• Institutional facts

Individual 2nd order

(I know (you do X))

simple !( )*() complex $! )*()

Grasping the normative structure of simple

Game phase: E1 and child play a game Test phase: Third party (puppet) comes and performs act A Experimental condition: = mistake Control condition: ≠ mistake

7%;),% -

Normative condition Control condition

A Target act: „This is “ Neutral: „Look! I can do this“ B Accident: „Oops, that‘s not “ Neutral: „Look! And I can do that“ Puppet: „I‘m gonna DAX as well“

• performs B

Puppet: „My turn now“

• performs B

DEMO TEST

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 Experimental Control Experimental Control 2-year-olds 3-year-olds

mean sum score (0-2)

imperative protest normative protest

n.s.

*

p < .11

*

How sophisticated is such normative awareness?

1. Selectivity some models are better than others 2. Differentiation of mistakes there are different kinds of mistakes pertaining to different actors 3. Context-relativity Normative considerations apply context- specifically

• 1. Selective learning

(a) as a function of agent reliability children by age 3-4 selectively learn games in normative ways from reliable over unreliable agents

• imitation
• verbal questions
• spontaneous protest

(b) as a function of age children by age 3-4 selectively learn games in normative ways from adults over peers

• imitation
• spontaneous protest

Rakoczy, Warneken & Tomasello (2009). Cognitive Development Rakoczy, Hamann, Warneken & Tomasello (in press). BJDP.

• 2. Kinds of mistakes

Directions of fit

mind-to-world world-to-mind Paradigmatic intentional state belief desire Paradigmatic speech act assertion imperative Non-fulfillment mistakes on part of... speaker recipient

A B A B A B

Imperative

• action mistake

Assertion

• linguistic mistake

…p…

p p!

assertion imperative

actor speaker

actor is taking X X Y actor, take X!

actor speaker

X Y

Rakoczy & Tomasello (2009). Cognition

assertion imperative

actor speaker

actor is taking X X Y actor, take X!

actor speaker

X Y

0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3

assertion imperative assertion imperative 2-year-olds 3-year-olds

# trials (0-3)

protest against SPEAKER protest against ACTOR

* * *

Rakoczy & Tomasello (2009). Cognition

• 2. Context specificity

Context 1 Context 2

X counts as Y in context C

In C: normative consequences Outside of C: no normative consequences

Normative condition:

Puppet: „I‘m gonna BUFF as well“

cleans <% DEMO TEST

Known object (e.g. sponge)

(1) Normal use

• clean

(2) Use it in a game („“): counts as a dice

Control condition:

Puppet: „I‘m not gonna BUFF. I‘ll clean“

• cleans ≠ %

Context C

• utside of context C

7%;),% -

Normative condition

Normative condition

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2

Experimental Control Experimental Control 2-year-olds 3-year-olds mean sum score (0-2) imperative protest normative protest

* * *

Context 1 Context 2

X counts as Y in context C

• X

Y1 Y2

Wyman, Rakoczy & Tomasello (2009b). Cognitive Development

Context-specific normativity in pretence games

• Context-relativity of different kinds of norms
• 2. Context specificity (continued)

From a conventional sports- point of view context-relative From a moral point of view Less context-relative

• Third party

− Same group − Different group

• Kind of norm violation

− Instrumental − Conventional − Moral

Context-relativity as a function of scope of the group & normative domain

Schmidt, Rakoczy & Tomasello (in preparation).

*

Pretence & other games as cradle for entering into institutional life?

(Rakoczy, 2006; 2007; Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2007; Walton, 1990)

• action-based
• transient contexts

(context C = “here and now in the game“)

• “non-serious“: less holistically dependent upon other practices

“This (wooden block) is now our apple“ as the first performative speech act

“Objectivity, control, the possibility of joint participation, spontaneity, all on top of a certain freedom from the cares of the real world: it looks as though make-believe has everything. [....] The magic of make-believe is an extraordinarily promising basis on which to explain the representational arts – their power, their complexity and diversity, their capacity to enrich our lives.”

(Kendall Walton, 1990, pp. 68/69)

Relation to status in serious areas?

„Human beings have a capacity which, as far as I can tell, is not possessed by any other animal species, to assign functions to objects where the objects cannot perform the function in virtue of their physical structure alone, but only in virtue of the collective assignment or acceptance of the object as having a certain status and with that status a function. Obvious examples are money, private property and positions of political leadership“ (Searle, 2005, p. 7/8)

(Rossano, Rakoczy & Tomasello, submitted)

Intentionality Individual intentionality

(I do X)

Collective intentionality (= social facts)

(We do Y)

Assignment of Functions Causal usage functions * /0 Status Functions * )

Hierarchical Taxonomy of Facts (Searle, 1995)

Cooperation

(without function assignment)

X counts as Y in context C

• Institutional facts

Individual 2nd order

(I know (you do X))

simple !( )*() complex $! )*()

£

king

Mike Tomasello Marco Schmidt Federico Rossano Felix Warneken Emily Wyman Katharina Hamann Nina Brosche Claudia Salomo Manja Teich Antonia Misch

Thanks to

Funding: Volkswagen Foundation & Fritz Thyssen Foundation