The Current State of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices Medmarcs - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
The Current State of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices Medmarcs - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
The Current State of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices Medmarcs Webinar Series August 22, 2019 Vulnerable Devices Pacemakers / implantable defibrillators Insulin pumps Infusion pumps Mobile health technologies (mHealth
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Vulnerable Devices
- Pacemakers / implantable defibrillators
- Insulin pumps
- Infusion pumps
- Mobile health technologies (mHealth Technology)
- Patient monitors
- Patient portals
- Telemedicine
- Ventilators / Life supporting devices
- Imaging modalities
- Hearing aids
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Potential Loss Scenarios
- Malware attacks
- Software vulnerabilities
- Faulty networks
- Computer technology (IT services)
- Hacking
- Steal patient data
- Commandeer medical devices for denial of service
- Distributed denial of service
- Cyber Extortion
- Medical device vulnerabilities
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Fundamental challenges
- New features take priority over security
- More commoditized hardware/software
- Remote interface
- Regulators are always playing catch up
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Cyber security is
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
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Medical device risks
- Software defect
- Incorrect network configuration
- Security and privacy issues
- Lack of data protection
- Disposal or loss of the device
- Malware, criminals
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Cyber related design considerations
- System testing
- Secure IT systems
- Regulatory compliance
- Account for upgrades and unknowns
- Design security into the product
- -Make products as updatable and adaptable
as the internet itself.
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Malicious tampering What: Add or remove cancers from CT and MRI Why: Ransom in exchange for correction Create chaos and mistrust Missed diagnosis, failure to treat Insurance fraud
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How is this possible?
- PACS not encrypted
- Health care industry focused on privacy
rather than security
- Physical or network access
- Direct connection to internet or to hospital
network
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Prevention
- End to end encryption
- Digital signatures
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Medtronic Implantable Cardiac Devices
- FDA safety communication re wireless
telemetry technology
- Conexus uses wireless RF without
encryption
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Safety features as designed
- Can only be activated by a health care
provider at a clinic
- Activation times vary
- Hacker would have to be nearby when
active
- Replacement is not recommended at
this time.
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Review the data lifecycle
- Where is the data stored?
- How is the data protected?
- Who processes the data?
- Who is responsible?
- Who can access?
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California Consumer Privacy Act
Who?
- Doing business in CA; revenue over $25
million; buy, sell, receive personal information of 50,000 or more devices or consumers or 50% plus revenue selling personal information What?
- Right to access data, have data deleted,
prevent data from being sold
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California IoT Statute
Reasonable security features appropriate to the nature and function of the device and information it collects, stores,
- r transmits.
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Man anufac acturer O Obli ligatio ions
Premarket and Postmarket Reporting
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Manufacturers: Premarket Reporting
- FDA Guidance – Guidance for the Content of Premarket
Submissions for Software Contained in Medical Devices
- http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/u cm089543.htm
- FDA Guidance to Industry - Cybersecurity for Networked Medical
Devices Containing Off-the-Shelf (OTS) Software
- http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/u cm077812.htm
- FDA Guidance for Industry and Food & Drug Administration Staff –
Content of Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices
- http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInform
ation/default.htm
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Manufacturers – Premarket Reporting
- Effective cybersecurity management in premarket submissions
- To reduce risk to patients
- From compromise of device functionality by inadequate
cybersecurity
- Guidance covers premarket submissions for devices that contain
software (including firmware) or programmable logic as well as software that is a medical device
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Manufacturers – Premarket Obligations
- Manufacturers should:
- develop a set of cybersecurity controls to assure medical
device cybersecurity and maintain medical device functionality and safety.
- address cybersecurity during the design and development of
the medical device, as this can result in more robust and efficient mitigation of patient risks.
- establish design inputs for their device related to
cybersecurity, and establish a cybersecurity vulnerability and management approach as part of the software validation and risk analysis that is required by 21 CFR 820.30(g).
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Manufacturers – Premarket Obligations
- Identify
- Protect
- Detect
- Respond
- Recover
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Manufacturers – Postmarket Obligations
- Formal and informal reporting obligations
- 21 CFR § 806.1: requires manufacturers to report to FDA
certain product corrections and removals
- Risk-based framework for determining when a reportable
change to a medical device for cybersecurity vulnerability has occurred
- Routine updates and patches
versus
- Correction of cybersecurity vulnerability that poses risk to
health
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Manufacturers – Postmarket Obligations
- Reporting requirements (continued)
- 21 CFR § 803.10
(1) Reports of individual adverse events – 30 calendar days after becoming aware of a reportable death, serious injury, or malfunction (2) Reports of individual adverse events - 5 work days after becoming aware of: (i) Reportable event that requires remedial action to prevent an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health, or (ii) A reportable event for which FDA made a written request.
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Manufacturers – Postmarket Obligations
- FDA encourages:
- The use and adoption of
“Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity”
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurit y-framework021214.pdf
- Information Sharing
Executive Order 13691 – Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing
- Information Sharing Analysis Organizations
- EO 13691; https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-
promoting 7 - private-sector-cybersecurity-information-sharing)
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FDA’s Role
- Works with DHS, manufacturers, health care
providers, and end users
- QSRs
- Pre- and post-market cybersecurity
guidance
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MEDICAL DEVICE CYBERSECURITY Regional Incident Preparedness and Response Playbook
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Playbook - Stakeholders
- FDA
- Medical Device Manufacturers
- Health Delivery Organizations (HDO’s)
- Large and small hospitals, hospital systems, providers
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Purpose of Medical Device Cybersecurity Playbook
- Provide baseline medical device cybersecurity information that can
be incorporated into an HDO’s emergency preparedness and response framework;
- Outline roles and responsibilities for responders internal and external
to the HDO to clarify lines of communication and concept of
- perations (CONOPs) across HDOs, medical device manufacturers
(MDMs), state and local governments, and the federal government;
- Describe a standardized approach to response efforts that would
enable a unified response within HDOs and across regions as appropriate;
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Purpose of Medical Device Cybersecurity Playbook
- Serve as a basis for enhanced coordination activities among medical
device cybersecurity stakeholders, including mutual aid across HDOs;
- Inform decision making and the need to escalate response;
- Identify resources HDOs may leverage as a part of preparedness and
response activities; and
- Serve as a customizable regional preparedness and response tool for
medical device cyber resiliency that could be broadly implemented.
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Focus of Playbook
- THREATS OR VULNERABILITIES THAT ARE:
- Large scale
- Multi-patient impact
- Raise patient safety concerns
- CYBER SECURITY IS A “TEAM SPORT”
- Encourage information sharing
- Regions: geographic and/or organizational
- Mitigate emerging cyber risks
- PROVIDE TOOLS
- For HDO’s to respond to device cybersecurity incidents
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Preparedness
Assess and bolster cyber defensive measures Develop incident handling procedures
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Identify that an incident has occurred Validate - Is it real? Prioritize Report (if required) Document
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Halt the incident Fix the damage Restore services Monitor and record suspected criminal activity
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Assess lessons learned Forensic examination Update plan
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*In the absence of incident information, HDOs may contact FDA for support at CyberMed@fda.hhs.gov.
Notification of aberrant device behavior; request for device help/info
Manufacturer
Device advisories, alerts, mitigations
- Incident notification
- Device adverse event reporting (when
applicable)
- Voluntary recalls
- Information gathering
- Benefit-risk analysis of MDM
proposed mitigations
HDO* FDA
Incident communication
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Manufacturers
- Collaborate in cybersecurity exercises
- Point of contact
- Monitor and assess
- Proactively disclose vulnerabilities and
mitigation
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FDA w worksh shop, J January 2 2019: Content ent o
- f P
Prem emarket et S Submissions ns f for Mana nagem ement ent o
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Cyber ersec ecur urity i in M Medi dical D Devices es
Handouts, presentations, and webcast recordings available:
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/workshops-conferences- medical-devices/public-workshop-content-premarket-submissions- management-cybersecurity-medical-devices-january-29-30
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Questions?
Robert G. Smith, Jr. Lorance Thompson PC 2900 North Loop West, Suite 500 Houston, Texas 77092 Office: 713.868.5560 Mobile: 713.857.8281 rgs@lorancethompson.com Sharon Stuart Christian & Small LLP 505 North 20th Street Financial Center, Suite 1800 Birmingham, AL 35203 Office: 205.795.6588 sdstuart@csattorneys.com