Terrorism and the Changing Character of Contemporary Warfare - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Terrorism and the Changing Character of Contemporary Warfare - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Trends in International Terrorism and the Changing Character of Contemporary Warfare Timothy D. Hoyt Professor of Strategy and Policy U.S. Naval War College The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the


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Trends in International Terrorism and the Changing Character of Contemporary Warfare

Timothy D. Hoyt Professor of Strategy and Policy U.S. Naval War College

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 2

What is terrorism?

  • “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to

intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” (FBI)

  • “…the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful

violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” (Department of Defense)

  • “…premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against

non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents…” (Department of State)

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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How has terrorism changed?

  • Four waves of terrorism
  • Late 19th century: Radical transnational social movements
  • Early 20th century: Radical nationalist movements
  • Mid-20th century: Communist and other ideological movements
  • Late 20th century: Religious and apocalyptic groups
  • Lethality has increased exponentially
  • Widespread availability of powerful commercial explosives and high-powered

firearms

  • Possibility of terrorist acquisition of more lethal weapons
  • Aum Shirikyu (Japan)
  • Recent claims regarding ISIS
  • Mass communications – transportation, social media
  • Facilitates transnational mobilization and horizontal escalation

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 4

The US and the war on terror

  • Problems of definition and
  • bjective
  • Eliminate terrorism?
  • Eliminate all terrorist groups?
  • Eliminate specific terrorist groups?
  • Eliminate root causes of

terrorism?

  • Eliminate violent extremism?
  • Protect the U.S.?
  • Protect the U.S. and specific

partners?

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 5

Macro-level trends

  • Terrorism rose from 2001-2008, and then declined abruptly for a

couple of years.

  • From 2010-2014, the number of global deaths from terrorism

increased by 80%; deaths declined by 10% in 2015, and appear to continue to be declining. Declines were particularly marked in Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan.

  • Over seventy percent of the deaths from terrorism in 2014 and 2015
  • ccur in five countries: Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria.
  • Four groups are responsible for almost 75% of terrorist deaths: the

Islamic State/ISIS, Boko Haram, Taliban, and Al Qaeda.

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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Terrorism’s regional focus: Middle East, South Asia, Africa

  • 93% of terrorist deaths since 1989 occur in states where governments

practice political terror and repression.

  • 90% of terrorist deaths occur in states that are already engaged in some

form of internal or international conflict. The major victims of terrorism are states with intense sectarian, ideological, ethnic, or social conflicts. The majority of victims are civilians in those countries.

  • 57% of all deaths from terrorism since 2000 occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan,

Nigeria, and Pakistan. In each country, internal conflicts with the regime

  • verlap with sectarian and ethnic conflicts.
  • 274 known groups carried out attacks in 2015.
  • Of these 103 failed to kill anyone.

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 7

Drivers of Global Terrorism

  • U.S. military intervention in the Middle East and elsewhere
  • Regional civil war between Sunni and Shi’a religious elements (especially in Iraq,

Syria, and Yemen, but also present in Afghanistan and Pakistan)

  • Collapse of Arab governance
  • Erosion of governance elsewhere
  • Escalating cycles of corruption and repression
  • Immigration from the Muslim world to Europe; marginalization and non-

integration of Muslim populations within European political communities

  • Continued adherence to extremist apocalyptic ideologies, particularly in the

Sunni religious communities.

  • HOWEVER: these drivers are not exclusive to the Muslim world. We see

extremism emerging in other faiths, ethnic groups, and communities from similar causes and perceptions, as well as population pressures.

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 8

Terrorism in the West

  • Since 2002, only 0.5% of terrorist deaths have occurred in the developed

world.

  • BUT… In 2015, the number of deaths in Western countries increased by

650% - from 77 to 577. ISIS was responsible for roughly half of them. 21 of 34 members of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) suffered terrorist attacks in 2015

  • There have only been about a dozen lethal jihadist attacks in the US since

2001

  • In each case, the perpetrator was a US citizen or legal resident; they worked alone or

in pairs; and there has been no evidence of a formal connection with or training from Al Qaeda or ISIS (although there may have been radicalization through social media)

  • According to some reports, there have been more deaths in the U.S. from

domestic ultra-right wing terrorism than from jihadists

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 9

What explains changes in terrorist activity??

  • 2001-2004: Al Qaeda capabilities declined due to a ruthless international

campaign against them after 9/11

  • 2004-2007: terrorism spikes in Iraq, reaching 2500 civilian deaths per

month in 2007.

  • 2008-2011: Terrorism declines in Iraq, but accelerates elsewhere due to

increased Al Qaeda franchising and revitalization of Taliban

  • 2011-2015: US withdrawal from Iraq and drawdown in Afghanistan,

collapse of Libya, rise and fall of Boko Haram and ISIS

  • 2016: trends appear to be that overall terrorism deaths are decreasing, but

it is becoming geographically more widespread. Afghanistan is a prominent exception – terrorism deaths were up almost 30% in 2015, and battlefield deaths were up 34%.

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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The changing character of warfare

  • Warfare between states changed significantly in the 20th century
  • Increasing lethality of technology
  • Increased effectiveness of personnel (training and technical skills)
  • Increased impact of organization for mobilization and military operations
  • Critical issue of noncombatant immunity
  • Most wars since 1945, however, are within states
  • Fought by irregular combatants as well as regular forces
  • Insurgents may have aid from states opposed to existing regimes
  • Insurgents may have help from other like-minded groups
  • Insurgents have learned the value of protracting conflicts

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 11

Late 20th and early 21st century warfare

  • Because of these changes, internal warfare has become markedly more brutal –

and effective

  • Terrorism increasingly becoming a routine tactic in internal conflicts
  • Terrorism is more lethal than previously
  • Terrorism is used as part of a new and different approach to protracted war
  • Coerce public support (or non-compliance), rather than win affection
  • Delegitimize regime and its security policies
  • Create cycles violence leading to overreaction and repression
  • Fight in highly populated areas
  • End results:
  • Transnational forces can destabilize conflicts that are settling
  • Demonstration effect and shared ideological outlooks can accelerate transnational support
  • Terrorism is increasing as a common tactic in internal wars
  • Non-combatant immunity will be threatened on a regular basis
  • Path to victory may be more Lenin (fear and intimidation) than Mao (winning support)

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 12

ISIS January 2015 – October 2016: a truly terrorist state

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 13

Why ISIS was winning

  • Both Iraq and Syria were unwilling to arm Sunni tribes against ISIS, and the

tribes did not trust the (Shi’a and Allawi – dominated) local regimes.

  • Key actors had conflicts of interest – Baghdad, Damascus, Istanbul,

Moscow, Riyadh – and the US was unwilling to commit major ground units.

  • Assad focused his efforts on groups threatening his power base near the

coast – leaving ISIS a free hand in the east.

  • Thousands of foreigners joined ISIS. Members of other Syrian Sunni groups

joined as well, as did former Ba’athists and Saddam loyalists.

  • Basically – all the major players in the region left it alone!

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 14

Reversing the trend

  • After a series of public atrocities in late 2014, a very loose coalition

was formed to isolate and roll back ISIS. It included:

  • US special forces and air power
  • Jordanian and GCC air power
  • Iranian Shi’a militias and Revolutionary Guards (in Iraq)
  • Kurdish militias (in both Iraq and Syria)
  • Turkish forces (especially after the July 2016 bomb attack on Istanbul airport)
  • Russian intervention
  • Syrian forces under Assad
  • Some Syrian militias

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 15

The limits of military force

  • ISIS can be deprived of soldiers,

revenue, and territory

  • It is not clear whether Assad will

cooperate fully in any coalition effort

  • However – ISIS has a powerful

ideology and adherents all over the globe

  • The number of groups swearing

allegiance to ISIS grew from 13 in 2014 to 28 in 2015 to 43 in 2016.

  • It is still able to radicalize from a

distance, so the terrorist threat will not disappear even if the “Islamic state” collapses.

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 16

What else is necessary?

  • Key elements of success in internal warfare:
  • Security
  • Legitimacy
  • Stability
  • Prosperity
  • Governance remains a critical element
  • Control over the armed forces is another critical element
  • Legitimacy comes, in part, from being less extreme than the insurgents
  • Provoking over-reaction is a key tactic for the insurgent
  • Partnerships can be key force multipliers
  • But they have to conform to regional realities…

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 17

BACKUP SLIDES

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 18

The Iraq story: the rise and decline of ISIS

  • 2006: after the death of Abu Zarqawi (head of Al Qaeda in Iraq), new

leadership declares an “Islamic state” (against the wishes of Bin Laden and Zawahiri) but swears fealty to Al Qaeda

  • 2007: ISIS radically ramps up attacks on Shi’a targets and on Sunnis

who do not support their claim to leadership. Many Sunni tribes seek support from the Iraqi government and the U.S. Civilian deaths from terrorism decline from 2500/month (2007) to 500/month (2008)

  • May 2010: ISIS leadership killed by Coalition forces Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi takes control.

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 19

Rebirth and staggering success

  • 2011: U.S. and Iraq fail to agree on a Status of Forces Agreement that

would provide US troops with immunity from prosecution in Iraqi

  • courts. U.S. begins full withdrawal from Iraq.
  • 2011-2012: Syria begins to crumble due to internal stresses. ISIS

sends an experienced leader to establish al-Nusra group in Syria.

  • 2013: Baghdadi declares ISIS’ control over the al-Nusra faction. Al-

Nusra declares its allegiance to Al Qaeda. ISIS begins absorbing soldiers from al-Nusra and other Syrian groups, and also begins systematically attacking other Syrian rebel groups. Assad leaves ISIS alone, concentrating on forces closer to his power base (Damascus and the Mediterranean coast).

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 20

Proclaiming the Caliphate

  • 2014: ISIS secures control over most of eastern Syria, including oil

installations and other economic infrastructure. Mosul (a major Iraqi city) is taken in June 2014 by just 1000 fighters when the defenders flee. Al- Baghdadi declares himself the caliph – an important symbolic position that has not been filled since the collapse of the Ottoman empire in 1924. August 2014 ISIS begins enslaving Yazidi minorities on the Syrian border, as well as publicly committing a series of atrocities against Shi’a, Western prisoners, and others.

  • By early 2015, ISIS has expanded to its maximum size, spanning significant

portions of both Iraq and Syria.

  • ISIS relied heavily on former Saddam loyalists for expertise, and on foreign

volunteers for manpower. By late 2015 estimates suggested between 25,000 and 40,000 volunteers had served with ISIS.

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 21

Why ISIS was winning

  • Both Iraq and Syria were unwilling to arm Sunni tribes against ISIS,

and the tribes did not trust the (Shi’a and Allawi – dominated) local regimes.

  • The U.S. did not have forces in the region. Other key actors had

conflicts of interest – Baghdad, Damascus, Istanbul, Moscow, Riyadh.

  • Assad focused his efforts on groups threatening his power base near

the coast – leaving ISIS a free hand in the east.

  • Thousands of foreigners joined ISIS. Members of other Syrian Sunni

groups joined as well, as did former Ba’athists and Saddam loyalists.

  • Basically – all the major players in the region left it alone!

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
slide-22
SLIDE 22

Reversing the trend

  • After a series of public atrocities in late 2014, a very loose coalition

was formed to isolate and roll back ISIS. It included:

  • US special forces and air power
  • Jordanian and GCC air power
  • Iranian Shi’a militias and Revolutionary Guards (in Iraq)
  • Kurdish militias (in both Iraq and Syria)
  • Turkish forces (especially after the July 2016 bomb attack on Istanbul airport)
  • Russian intervention
  • Syrian forces under Assad
  • Some Syrian militias

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 23

January 2015 – October 2016: loss of territorysing ground

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 24

Hitting them in the wallet

  • In 2013-2015, ISIS had depended
  • n a combination of resource

extraction (especially oil) and taxation to fund its operations

  • This funding was crucial to keep

troops in the field and to buy the loyalty of tribes in both Syria and Iraq

  • In early 2016, ISIS reduced the

pay of its foot soldiers by 50%

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.
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SLIDE 25

Military action

  • By April 2016, the combination
  • f military strikes and increased

international cooperation dropped the number of foreign fighters coming to ISIS from 1500 /month in 2015 to 200/month.

  • In August 2016, GEN McFarland

announced that in the previous eleven months, 25,000 ISIS fighters had been killed (out of a force estimated at 15-30,000.)

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author alone, and not the US Naval War College, the US Navy,

  • r any other organization of the US government.