talking about and seeing blue (b) 2.5B 7.5BG 2.5BG (a) ! (a) vs. - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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talking about and seeing blue (b) 2.5B 7.5BG 2.5BG (a) ! (a) vs. - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Jan 17, 2023 286 likes •1.03k views

talking about and seeing blue (b) 2.5B 7.5BG 2.5BG (a) ! (a) vs. ! (b) (b) 2.5B 7.5BG 2.5BG Redness is visually presented in a way that having inertial mass and being fragile, for instance, are not. (a) That red denotes

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SLIDE 1

talking about and seeing blue

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SLIDE 2

(a) (b)

!(a) vs. !(b)

7.5BG 2.5B 2.5BG

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SLIDE 3

(a) (b)

!(a) vs. !(b)

7.5BG 2.5B 2.5BG “Redness is visually presented in a way that having inertial mass and being fragile, for instance, are not.” That ” ‘red’ denotes the property of an object putatively presented in visual experience” is a “subject-determining platitude” (Jackson 1996: 199-200).

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SLIDE 4

(a) (b)

!(a) vs. !(b)

7.5BG 2.5B 2.5BG

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SLIDE 5

the feeling of familiarty

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SLIDE 6 modified from http://www.columbia.edu/itc/psychology/rmk/T2/T2.2b.html

(a’) (b’)

!(a’) vs !(b’)

ATFGZ ATRGZ ALRGZ

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SLIDE 7 modified from http://www.columbia.edu/itc/psychology/rmk/T2/T2.2b.html

(a’) (b’)

!(a’) vs !(b’)

ATFGZ ATRGZ ALRGZ

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SLIDE 8

ALRGZ

“there can be no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content” (Byrne 2001: 204)

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SLIDE 9

ALRGZ

“there can be no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content” (Byrne 2001: 204) a ‘subject can only discover the phenomenal character

  • f her experience by

attending to the world ... as her experience represents it’ (p. 211)

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SLIDE 10

(a’)

!(a’) vs !(b’)

What is the feeling of familiarity?

  • perceptual experience of the familiarity of the stimulus
  • perceptual experience of a bodily change
  • cognitive experience
  • bare sensation

(a’) (b’)

ATFGZ ATRGZ ALRGZ

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SLIDE 11 modified from http://www.columbia.edu/itc/psychology/rmk/T2/T2.2b.html

(a’) (b’)

!(a’) vs !(b’)

ATFGZ ATRGZ ALRGZ

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SLIDE 12

(a) (b)

!(a) vs. !(b)

7.5BG 2.5B 2.5BG

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SLIDE 13

What is the feeling of familiarity? perceptual experience of the familiarity of the stimulus perceptual experience of a bodily change cognitive experience bare sensation

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SLIDE 14

What is the feeling of familiarity? perceptual experience of the familiarity of the stimulus perceptual experience of a bodily change cognitive experience bare sensation monadic properties of events perceptual experiences alter phenomenal character not determined by any intentional properties individuated by their normal causes

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SLIDE 15

What is the feeling of familiarity? perceptual experience of the familiarity of the stimulus perceptual experience of a bodily change cognitive experience bare sensation monadic properties of events perceptual experiences alter phenomenal character not determined by any intentional properties individuated by their normal causes

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SLIDE 16

What is the feeling of familiarity? perceptual experience of the familiarity of the stimulus perceptual experience of a bodily change cognitive experience bare sensation monadic properties of events perceptual experiences alter phenomenal character not determined by any intentional properties individuated by their normal causes

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SLIDE 17

What is the feeling of familiarity? perceptual experience of the familiarity of the stimulus perceptual experience of a bodily change cognitive experience bare sensation monadic properties of events perceptual experiences alter phenomenal character not determined by any intentional properties individuated by their normal causes

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SLIDE 18

(a) (b)

!(a) vs. !(b)

7.5BG 2.5B 2.5BG

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SLIDE 19

categorical perception

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SLIDE 20

“The colours to which human languages give names are experienced […] as sharply different from one another” Matthen (2005b:190)

categorical perception

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SLIDE 21

categorical perception “The colours to which human languages give names are experienced […] as sharply different from one another” Matthen (2005b:190)

? ?

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SLIDE 22

Source modified from Daoutis, Pilling & Davies. 2006. Categorical effects in visual search for colour. Fig A1

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SLIDE 23

Source modified from Daoutis, Pilling & Davies. 2006. Categorical effects in visual search for colour. Fig A1

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SLIDE 24

Source modified from Daoutis, Pilling & Davies. 2006. Categorical effects in visual search for colour. Fig A1

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SLIDE 25

TARGET

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SLIDE 26
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SLIDE 27

Source redrawn from part of Pilling, M et al (2003), "Is color "categorical perception" really perceptual?" Memory & Cognition, 31:538-551, p.543 fig 1A

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SLIDE 28
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SLIDE 29
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SLIDE 30
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SLIDE 31
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SLIDE 32

Source modified from Daoutis, Pilling & Davies. 2006. Categorical effects in visual search for colour. Fig 2

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SLIDE 33

“The category question concerns whether

  • bservers perceive qualitative similarities …

Discriminable wavelengths seem to be categorized together because they appear perceptually similar.” Bornstein (1987: 288-9)

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SLIDE 34

“The category question concerns whether

  • bservers perceive qualitative similarities …

Discriminable wavelengths seem to be categorized together because they appear perceptually similar.” Bornstein (1987: 288-9)

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SLIDE 35

Source modified from Clifford et al 2010

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SLIDE 36

(Press the spacebar when you see this)

Source modified from Clifford et al 2010

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SLIDE 37

Source modified from Clifford et al 2010

(irrelevant)

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SLIDE 38

Source modified from Clifford et al 2010

(irrelevant) 7.5BG 2.5B 2.5BG

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SLIDE 39

Source modified from Clifford et al 2010

(irrelevant) 7.5BG 2.5B 2.5BG

  • ddball

vMMN (visual mismatch negativity): an event-related potential thought to index pre-attentive change detection in the visual cortex

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SLIDE 40

Source modified from Clifford et al 2010

milliseconds

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SLIDE 41

Source modified from Clifford et al 2010

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SLIDE 42

Source modified from Daoutis, Pilling & Davies. 2006. Categorical effects in visual search for colour. Fig A1

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SLIDE 43

Source modified from Daoutis, Pilling & Davies. 2006. Categorical effects in visual search for colour. Fig A1

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SLIDE 44

phenomenological character heightened discrimination pop-out pre-attentive visual change detection verbal labelling …

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SLIDE 45

explained in part by a perceptual process which categorises phenomenological character heightened discrimination pop-out pre-attentive visual change detection verbal labelling …

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SLIDE 46

explained in part by a perceptual process which categorises phenomenological character heightened discrimination pop-out pre-attentive visual change detection verbal labelling …

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SLIDE 47

colour terms

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SLIDE 48

“surprising it would be indeed if I have a perceptual experience as of red because I call the perceived object red.” (Stokes 2006: 324-5)

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SLIDE 49
  • culture
  • training color terms (2 days)
  • verbal interference
  • right visual field (RVF) only
  • training affects RVF only
  • neural correlates

“surprising it would be indeed if I have a perceptual experience as of red because I call the perceived object red.” (Stokes 2006: 324-5)

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SLIDE 50

“surprising it would be indeed if I have a perceptual experience as of red because I call the perceived object red.” (Stokes 2006: 324-5) conscious attention “is more primitive than ... conceptual thought, and ... explains your capacity for conceptual thought by providing you with knowledge of reference” (Campbell 2002:3)

  • culture
  • training color terms (2 days)
  • verbal interference
  • right visual field (RVF) only
  • training affects RVF only
  • neural correlates
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SLIDE 51

development

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SLIDE 52

“[j]ustified belief … is available simply on the basis

  • f visual

perception” (Johnston 1992: 222) Phenomenal character “stands ready … to make a direct impact on beliefs” (Tye 1995: 143–4) “[p]erceptual experiences are … intrinsically … belief-inducing” (Smith 2001: 291).

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SLIDE 53

“[j]ustified belief … is available simply on the basis

  • f visual

perception” (Johnston 1992: 222) Phenomenal character “stands ready … to make a direct impact on beliefs” (Tye 1995: 143–4) “[p]erceptual experiences are … intrinsically … belief-inducing” (Smith 2001: 291).

  • 1. S can and does perceptually experience blue and green
  • 2. S can acquire beliefs involving BLUE
  • 3. S cannot acquire beliefs involving GREEN
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SLIDE 54

‘‘Which one of these is like the toy I just put away?’’

Source Kowalski and Zimiles (2006) The relation between children's conceptual functioning with colour and colour term acquisition

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SLIDE 55

‘‘Which one of these is like the toy I just put away?’’

Source Kowalski and Zimiles (2006) The relation between children's conceptual functioning with colour and colour term acquisition

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SLIDE 56

“[j]ustified belief … is available simply on the basis

  • f visual

perception” (Johnston 1992: 222) Phenomenal character “stands ready … to make a direct impact on beliefs” (Tye 1995: 143–4) “[p]erceptual experiences are … intrinsically … belief-inducing” (Smith 2001: 291).

  • 1. S can and does perceptually experience blue and green
  • 2. S can acquire beliefs involving BLUE
  • 3. S cannot acquire beliefs involving GREEN

! !

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SLIDE 57
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SLIDE 58
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SLIDE 59
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SLIDE 60
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SLIDE 61

Source Franklin et al 2005

7.5BG 2.5B 2.5BG

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SLIDE 62

Source modified from Clifford et al 2010

(irrelevant) 7.5BG 2.5B 2.5BG

  • ddball

vMMN (visual mismatch negativity): an event-related potential thought to index pre-attentive change detection in the visual cortex

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SLIDE 63

550 560 570 580

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SLIDE 64

Source Bornstein et al. 1976. Color vision and hue categorization in young human infants. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. Vol. 2(1) 2, no. 1 (February): 115-129.

550 560 570 580 570 550 560

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SLIDE 65

Source Bornstein et al. 1976. Color vision and hue categorization in young human infants. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. Vol. 2(1) 2, no. 1 (February): 115-129.

550 560 570 580 570 550 560

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SLIDE 66

Source Bornstein et al. 1976. Color vision and hue categorization in young human infants. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. Vol. 2(1) 2, no. 1 (February): 115-129.

550 560 570 580 570 550 560

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SLIDE 67

Source Bornstein et al. 1976. Color vision and hue categorization in young human infants. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. Vol. 2(1) 2, no. 1 (February): 115-129.

550 560 570 580 570 550 560

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SLIDE 68

Source Bornstein et al. 1976. Color vision and hue categorization in young human infants. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. Vol. 2(1) 2, no. 1 (February): 115-129.

550 560 570 580 570 550 560 570 560 580 570

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SLIDE 69

(a) (b)

!(a) vs. !(b)

7.5BG 2.5B 2.5BG

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SLIDE 70

“[j]ustified belief … is available simply on the basis

  • f visual

perception” (Johnston 1992: 222) Phenomenal character “stands ready … to make a direct impact on beliefs” (Tye 1995: 143–4) “[p]erceptual experiences are … intrinsically … belief-inducing” (Smith 2001: 291).

  • 1. S can and does perceptually experience blue and green
  • 2. S can acquire beliefs involving BLUE
  • 3. S cannot acquire beliefs involving GREEN

! !

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SLIDE 71
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SLIDE 72

(a) (b) 7.5BG 2.5B 2.5BG

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SLIDE 73

“ ‘red’ denotes the property of an object putatively presented in visual experience” (Jackson 1996: 200) Phenomenal character “stands ready … to make a direct impact on beliefs” (Tye 1995: 143–4) conscious attention “is more primitive than ... conceptual thought, and ... explains your capacity for conceptual thought by providing you with knowledge of reference” (Campbell 2002:3) “there can be no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content” (Byrne 2001: 204)