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The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Survey on Security Threats and Protection Mechanisms in Embedded Automotive Networks Ivan Studnia Vincent Nicomette Eric Alata Yves Deswarte Mohamed Ka aniche Renault

  1. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Survey on Security Threats and Protection Mechanisms in Embedded Automotive Networks ´ Ivan Studnia Vincent Nicomette Eric Alata Yves Deswarte Mohamed Kaˆ aniche Renault S.A.S LAAS-CNRS Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance team June 24, 2013 Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 1/19

  2. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion The Automotive Network 1 Threats 2 Protection mechanisms 3 Conclusion 4 Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 2/19

  3. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion The Automotive Network 1 Threats 2 Protection mechanisms 3 Conclusion 4 Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 3/19

  4. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Embedded networks Modern cars embed An internal network. . . Between 30 and 70 ECUs Several communication protocols: CAN, LIN, MOST, FlexRay. . . Source: [Checkoway et al., 2011] Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 4/19

  5. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Embedded networks Modern cars embed An internal network. . . Between 30 and 70 ECUs Several communication protocols: CAN, LIN, MOST, FlexRay. . . . . . with external connections On Board Diagnostic (OBD) port USB port Bluetooth WiFi Source: [Checkoway et al., 2011] GSM 3G/4G Car2Car Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 4/19

  6. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion CAN & Security SOF Identifier Control Data CRC ACK EOF 1 bit 12/30 bits 6 bits 0 - 64 bits 16 bits 2 bits 7 bits Content of a CAN frame Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 5/19

  7. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion CAN & Security SOF Identifier Control Data CRC ACK EOF 1 bit 12/30 bits 6 bits 0 - 64 bits 16 bits 2 bits 7 bits Content of a CAN frame Security properties Integrity ? Confidentiality ? Availability ? Authenticity ? Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 5/19

  8. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion CAN & Security SOF Identifier Control Data CRC ACK EOF 1 bit 12/30 bits 6 bits 0 - 64 bits 16 bits 2 bits 7 bits Content of a CAN frame Security properties Integrity ? → Just a CRC Confidentiality ? Availability ? Authenticity ? Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 5/19

  9. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion CAN & Security SOF Identifier Control Data CRC ACK EOF 1 bit 12/30 bits 6 bits 0 - 64 bits 16 bits 2 bits 7 bits Content of a CAN frame Security properties Integrity ? → Just a CRC Confidentiality ? → Broadcast only Availability ? Authenticity ? Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 5/19

  10. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion CAN & Security SOF Identifier Control Data CRC ACK EOF 1 bit 12/30 bits 6 bits 0 - 64 bits 16 bits 2 bits 7 bits Content of a CAN frame Security properties Integrity ? → Just a CRC Confidentiality ? → Broadcast only Availability ? → Easy DOS Authenticity ? Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 5/19

  11. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion CAN & Security SOF Identifier Control Data CRC ACK EOF 1 bit 12/30 bits 6 bits 0 - 64 bits 16 bits 2 bits 7 bits Content of a CAN frame Security properties Integrity ? → Just a CRC Confidentiality ? → Broadcast only Availability ? → Easy DOS Authenticity ? → No authentication Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 5/19

  12. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion The Automotive Network 1 Threats 2 Protection mechanisms 3 Conclusion 4 Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 6/19

  13. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Attack goals Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 7/19

  14. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Attack goals Challenge Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 7/19

  15. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Attack goals Challenge Theft Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 7/19

  16. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Attack goals Challenge Theft Tuning Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 7/19

  17. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Attack goals Challenge Theft Tuning Sabotage Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 7/19

  18. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Attack goals Challenge Theft Tuning Sabotage IP theft Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 7/19

  19. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Attack goals Challenge Theft Tuning Sabotage IP theft Privacy breach Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 7/19

  20. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Local attacks Direct access to the bus Additional device plugged in Through the OBD port Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 8/19

  21. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Local attacks Direct access to the bus Additional device plugged in Through the OBD port Results Many documented attacks Impersonation, reflashing, ”virus”. . . Up to complete takeover Source: [Koscher et al., 2010] Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 8/19

  22. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Remote attacks [Rouf et al., 2010] Target: Tire Pressure Monitoring System Eavesdropping from up to 40m Spoofed messages sent to monitoring ECU [Francillon et al., 2010] Target: Passive Keyless Entry and Start Relay attack Car unlocked and started 50m away from the owner Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 9/19

  23. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Remote/Indirect takeover [Checkoway et al., 2011] Vulnerabilities found in Physical indirect range: CD player, OBD plug-in device, infected smartphone. . . Short wireless range: Bluetooth Long range: GSM/3G unit One communication device compromised → Complete takeover of the car Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 10/19

  24. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion The Automotive Network 1 Threats 2 Protection mechanisms 3 Conclusion 4 Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 11/19

  25. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion A major concern Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 12/19

  26. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Constraints Hardware limitations Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 13/19

  27. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Constraints Hardware limitations Real Time Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 13/19

  28. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Constraints Hardware limitations Real Time Autonomy: (almost) no interaction required Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 13/19

  29. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Constraints Hardware limitations Real Time Autonomy: (almost) no interaction required Lifecycle: 20 years Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 13/19

  30. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Constraints Hardware limitations Real Time Autonomy: (almost) no interaction required Lifecycle: 20 years Compatibility: retrocompatibility and interoperability Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 13/19

  31. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Constraints Hardware limitations Real Time Autonomy: (almost) no interaction required Lifecycle: 20 years Compatibility: retrocompatibility and interoperability Physical constraints Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 13/19

  32. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Protections (1/2) Cryptography Authentication, integrity checks, encryption Dedicated hardware for cryptography [Wolf and Gendrullis, 2012] Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 14/19

  33. The Automotive Network Threats Protection mechanisms Conclusion Protections (1/2) Cryptography Authentication, integrity checks, encryption Dedicated hardware for cryptography [Wolf and Gendrullis, 2012] Software integrity Secure boot Virtualization [Groll et al., 2009] Ivan Studnia Security of embedded automotive networks survey 14/19

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