Still the Worlds Safe Haven? Redesigning U.S. Treasury Markets After - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Still the World’s Safe Haven?

Redesigning U.S. Treasury Markets After the Covid19 Crisis

Darrell Duffie∗ Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Markus Brunnermeir’s Zoominar Series on Covid-19 Economics Bendheim Center, Princeton University June 5, 2020

∗NBER, Independent Director of Dimensional’s US Mutual Funds Board.

The Fed rescued the Treasury market

• 1. Covid-19 news caused large liquidations of treasury positions.
• 2. Dealer balance sheet space is limited.
• 3. The market choked on the surge in demand for liquidity.

◮ Bid-ask spreads offered by dealers widened by a factor of 10. ◮ Order-book depth dropped by a factor of 10. ◮ The shape of the yield curve became disjointed. ◮ The treasury cash-futures basis exploded. ◮ Off-the-run treasuries got especially mis-priced.

• 4. A massive response by the Fed:

◮ Purchased $1 trillion of treasuries in 3 weeks – then more. ◮ Provided unlimited financing for treasuries. ◮ Exempted treasuries from capital required under the supplementary-leverage-ratio rule.

• 5. Large future growth in the marketable supply of treasuries

suggests a reform: A broad central clearing mandate.

Marketable treasuries outstanding and big-bank assets

10 20 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Quantity (trillions of dollars)

total big−bank assets projected marketable treasuries marketable treasuries outstanding

Figure: Marketable treasuries outstanding, including projections from 2020 from

deficit of Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, April 13, 2020. Total assets of the holding companies of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and Wells

• Fargo. Data: FRED, CRFB, 10K disclosures.

Growth of marketable treasuries relative to dealer positions

2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 2001−01 2004−01 2007−01 2010−01 2013−01 2016−01 2019−01

Ratio of outstanding to positions financed by dealers

Figure: The ratio of the stock of outstanding marketable treasuries to the total of

treasury positions for which primary dealers received financing with repurchase agreements and securities lending. Data sources: FRED and Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Financing of primary-dealer treasury inventories

1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 Jan Feb Mar Apr May

Date Dealer treasury positions financed ($ trillions)

Figure: Total of all treasury positions for which primary dealers received financing

with repurchase agreements and securities lending, January to May, 2020. Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Total treasury market trade volumes

0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6

1 / 3 1 / 2 2 / 7 / 2 2 / 1 4 / 2 2 / 2 1 / 2 2 / 2 8 / 2 3 / 6 / 2 3 / 1 3 / 2 3 / 2 / 2 3 / 2 7 / 2 4 / 3 / 2 4 / 1 / 2 4 / 1 7 / 2 4 / 2 4 / 2 5 / 1 / 2 5 / 8 / 2 5 / 1 5 / 2

Total Trade Volume ($trillions)

ATS & Interdealer Dealer to Customer Primary Dealer

Figure: Total treasury market volumes, dealer-to-customer and interdealer

(including ATS), for weeks ending on the indicated dates, and primary dealer volumes (which double counts trades between primary dealers). Data sources: FRBNY and TRACE (FINRA).

Record-high foreign gross sales of Treasuries

10 20 30 Frequency (months) 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 Foreign gross sales of US Treasuries ($ trillions) 2.72

Figure: A histogram of monthly gross sales of U.S. Treasury bonds and notes

by foreigners to U.S. residents, from January 2000. Data source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury International Capital System. The March 2020 observation is indicated in red.

Bid-Offer Spreads

200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 01/02/20 01/16/20 01/30/20 02/13/20 02/27/20 03/12/20 03/26/20 04/09/20 Indexed

Note: Average Bid-Ask Spreads indexed to 100 as of 01/02/2020.

Figure: U.S. treasury bid-offer spreads, indexed to 100 at January 2, 2020. This

figure by Lorie Logan, Manager of the System Open Market Account and Head of the Open Market Trading Desk, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was published with her speech of April 14, 2020. The underlying data source is Bloomberg Financial LP. Bloomberg publishes dealer bid and offer prices in the dealer-to-customer market.

Market depth

† Expected change in the price of an on

March …

score of market depth* and price impact†; unitless

… and though New York trading has shown the

50 100 150 200 2-Jan 16-Jan 30-Jan 13-Feb 27-Feb 12-Mar 26-Mar 9-Apr New York London Tokyo

Figure: Treasury market depth on Brokertec, in millions of dollars. The market depth

shown is the average of the largest three amounts bid or offered on Brokertec’s interdealer central limit order book market (New York, London, and Tokyo, respectively) for on-the-run 10-year U.S. treasuries between 8:30am and 10:30am

• EST. The figure was obtained from JP Morgan, US Fixed Income Strategy, Joshua

Younger and Henry St. John, April 2, 2020.

Cash-futures basis

• 2.00
• 1.00

0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 01/02/20 01/04/20 01/06/20 01/08/20 01/10/20 01/12/20 01/14/20 01/16/20 01/18/20 01/20/20 01/22/20 01/24/20 01/26/20 01/28/20 01/30/20 02/01/20 02/03/20 02/05/20 02/07/20 02/09/20 02/11/20 02/13/20 02/15/20 02/17/20 02/19/20 02/21/20 02/23/20 02/25/20 02/27/20 02/29/20 03/02/20 03/04/20 03/06/20 03/08/20 03/10/20 03/12/20 03/14/20 03/16/20 03/18/20 03/20/20 03/22/20 03/24/20 03/26/20

Implied difference in interest rate (percent)

10 Year 5 Year 2 Year

Figure: The difference, in percent, between (a) the repo rate implied by selling

treasury futures, purchasing the cheapest-to-deliver underlying treasury note, and closing the futures contract at maturity by delivering the treasury note, and (b) the actual market general-collateral one-month repo rate. The data shown in the figure were provided to the author by Andreas Schrimpf, Hyun Song Shin, and Vladyslav Sushko, from Graph 3 of their paper “Leverage and Margin Spirals in Fixed Income Markets During the Covid-19 Crisis,” BIS Bulletin, Number 2, April 2, 2020.

Fed purchases of treasuries during the Covid Crisis

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 1 6

• M

a r 2 3

• M

a r 3

• M

a r 6

• A

p r 1 3

• A

p r 2

• A

p r 2 7

• A

p r 4

• M

a y 1 1

• M

a y 1 7

• M

a y 2 5

• M

a y

Purchases ($ billions)

Figure: The Fed’s purchases of treasuries, March 16 to May 17, 2020. May data

include Fed projections. Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Central clearing of treasury transactions is still limited

c1 d1 c2

CCP

d2 d3 c3 c5 c4

Figure: Treasury Market Practices Group (2018) estimates that a firm faces a CCP on 22.4% of all treasury transactions.

Broad central clearing frees up dealer balance sheet space

c1 d1 c2

CCP

d2 d3 c3 c5 c4

Figure: A rule requiring the central clearing of transactions of all firms actively

trading Treasuries would relieve some of the need to warehouse trade flows on dealer balance sheets. Dealers would be better able to net their buy and sell trades with central counterparties (CCPs). Further, with a broad-market CCP, some treasury transactions could flow directly from ultimate sellers to ultimate buyers, without necessarily impinging on dealer balance sheet space.

One-day settlement risk: SPDR SP500 versus 10-year note

0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

3 / 2 / 2 3 / 4 / 2 3 / 6 / 2 3 / 8 / 2 3 / 1 / 2 3 / 1 2 / 2 3 / 1 4 / 2 3 / 1 6 / 2 3 / 1 8 / 2 3 / 2 / 2 3 / 2 2 / 2 3 / 2 4 / 2 3 / 2 6 / 2 3 / 2 8 / 2 3 / 3 / 2 4 / 1 / 2 4 / 3 / 2 4 / 5 / 2 4 / 7 / 2 4 / 9 / 2 4 / 1 1 / 2 4 / 1 3 / 2 4 / 1 5 / 2 4 / 1 7 / 2 4 / 1 9 / 2 4 / 2 1 / 2 4 / 2 3 / 2 4 / 2 5 / 2 4 / 2 7 / 2 4 / 2 9 / 2 5 / 1 / 2

One-day total settlement risk ($ billions) 10 Yr Note SPDR SP500

Figure: Estimated market-total one-day gross settlement risk, on-the-run 10-year

U.S. treasury notes and SPDR SP 500 ETF. One-day gross settlement risk is estimated as the dollar market value of the volume of trade multiplied by the

• ption-implied standard deviation of daily returns. Treasuries trades normally settle in
• ne day (T+1), whereas exchange-traded equities such as the SPDR SP500 ETF

settle in two days (T+2). Underlying data sources: FINRA, U.S. Treasury Department, CBOE, NYSE-Arca.

Settlement fails

$0 $100 $200 $300 $400 $500 $600

1 / 6 / 2 1 / 1 3 / 2 1 / 2 / 2 1 / 2 7 / 2 2 / 3 / 2 2 / 1 / 2 2 / 1 7 / 2 2 / 2 4 / 2 3 / 2 / 2 3 / 9 / 2 3 / 1 6 / 2 3 / 2 3 / 2 3 / 3 / 2 4 / 6 / 2 4 / 1 3 / 2 4 / 2 / 2 4 / 2 7 / 2 5 / 4 / 2 5 / 1 1 / 2 5 / 1 8 / 2

Settlement Failures ($ billions)

FICC fails Primary dealer fails

Figure: Settlement fails in treasury securities transactions involving primary dealers,

and centrally cleared settlement fails at FICC. Data sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York and FICC.

Appendix charts

Yield Curve Noise and Volatility

Jan Feb Mar Apr May 2020 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 Noise (bps) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 Implied volatility (percent)

HPW Noise (left axis) Treasury VIX (right axis)

Figure: Implied volatility of the 10-year treasury note and the Hu-Pan-Wang measure

• f yield curve noise, in basis points. The implied volatility measure is from CBOE

TYVIX data, based on options on the 10-year treasury note. The Hu-Pan-Wang (2013) noise measure of treasury market illiquidity is the square root of the mean squared error (RMSE) obtained when fitting the prices of treasury securities to a smooth model of the yield curve. Figure source: Professor Jun Pan.