Specication and Enforcement of Static Specication and Enforcement of - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Specication and Enforcement of Static Specication and Enforcement of Static Separation-of-Duty Policies in Usage Control Jianfeng Lu, Ruixuan Li, Zhengding Lu, Ji Jinwei Hu, and Xiaopu Ma i H d Xi M Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan, China 1

Outline li Background Background 1 1. Specification of SSoD Policies 2. Enforceability of SSoD Policies E f bilit f SS D P li i 3. 3 Enforcing SSoD Policies by SMEA Constraints 4. Conclusion and Future work 5. 2

Sensitive Task d Background k Alice Carl Bob

Why study SoD in UCON h d i  One of RBAC's great advantages is that SoD rules can  One of RBAC s great advantages is that SoD rules can be implemented in a natural and efficient way  UCON has been considered as the next generation access control model access control model  SSoD is a important type of SoD SS D i i f S D  UCON A is a sub-model of UCON only considering authorizations 4

Our contributions ib i  A set based specification scheme for SSoD  A set-based specification scheme for SSoD  Study the problem of determining whether an SSoD St d th bl f d t i i h th SS D policy is enforceable  Generate SMEA constraints to indirect enforce SSoD policies, by using attribute level SSoD requirements li i b i ib l l SS D i (ASSoD) as an intermediate step from SSoD policies to SMEA constraints to SMEA constraints 5

Related work l d k  SoD can be traced back to 1975 by Saltzer and  SoD can be traced back to 1975 by Saltzer and Schroeder, under the name “separation-of-privilege”  ChineseWall model  Specification:  RCL 2000 specification language  NIST RBAC: SMER && SSoD; DMER&& DSoD 6

Related work l d k  Enforcement:  Enforcement:  Sandhu presented a history-based mechanism for dynamically enforcing SoD dynamically enforcing SoD  Jason employed blacklist to enforce historical constraints Jason employed blacklist to enforce historical constraints  Ninghui Li uses SMER to enforce SSoD (motivated) g ( ) 7

Outline li Background Background 1 1. Specification of SSoD Policies 2. Enforceability of SSoD Policies E f bilit f SS D P li i 3. 3 Enforcing SSoD Policies by SMEA Constraints 4. Conclusion and Future work 5. 8

Specification of SSoD policies ifi i f li i  Three requirements ：  Three requirements ： ① An SSoD policy must be a high-level requirement ② An SSoD policy must be described in terms of restrictions on permissions restrictions on permissions ③ An SSoD policy must capture restrictions on user set ③ p y p involved in the task 9

Specification of SSoD policies li i f i ifi 10

Outline li Background Background 1 1. Specification of SSoD Policies 2. Enforceability of SSoD Policies E f bilit f SS D P li i 3. 3 Enforcing SSoD Policies by SMEA Constraints 4. Conclusion and Future work 5. 11

Enforceability of SSoD Policies f bili f li i  Example  Example  supervisor is a senior role to both engineer and programmer. 12

Enforceability of SSoD Policies ( (cont.) )  If (I, M) satisfies exactly the requirement of allowed(u, p), we say (I, M) is the threshold attribute set of p 13

Enforceability of SSoD Policies ) (cont.) ( 14

Outline li Background Background 1 1. Specification of SSoD Policies 2. Enforceability of SSoD Policies E f bilit f SS D P li i 3. 3 Enforcing SSoD Policies by SMEA Constraints 4. Conclusion and Future work 5. 15

Enforcing SSoD policies by SMEA Constraints i  Motivated by SMER constraint  SMEA (statically mutually exclusive attribute) constraint 16

SMEA constraints i 17

Translating SSoD Policies to ASSoD Requirements i  ASSoD: attribute level SSoD  ASSoD: attribute-level SSoD 18

Translating SSoD Policies to ASSoD Requirements (cont.) i ( ) 19

Generating SMEA Constraints to Enforce ASSoD Requirements f i 20

Generating SMEA Constraints to Enforce ASSoD Requirements(cont.) f i ( ) 21

Outline li Background Background 1 1. Specification of SSoD Policies 2. Enforceability of SSoD Policies E f bilit f SS D P li i 3. 3 Enforcing SSoD Policies by SMEA Constraints 4. Conclusion and Future work 5. 22

Conclusion l i  The specification and enforcement of SSoD in UCON  The specification and enforcement of SSoD in UCON.  The specification is set based and we show that it has  The specification is set-based and we show that it has simpler syntax than existing approaches  We have studied a number of problems related to generating SMEA constraints for enforcing SSoD policies in UCONA system 23

Future work k  The research of the SSoD policies in UCON onA  The research of the SSoD policies in UCON onA models  DSoD policies 24

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