Slide 1 Slide 2 Research Group on Russia and Eurasia KULeuven - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Slide 1

Slide 2

Research Group on Russia and Eurasia KULeuven

Slide 3

Russia’s Foreign Policy: Back to the Future?

• Dr. Ria Laenen (Russia and Eurasia

Research Group, KU Leuven) April 24, 2012

Development of Russia’s post- Soviet foreign policy (1992 – 2012)

1992 – 1996:

ad hoc foreign policy of a new state in the

process of nation- and state-building

division between Atlanticists and Eurasianists,

with dominant Atlanticist approach in foreign policy of president Yeltsin and FM Kozyrev

start of intense debate on what Russia’s own

national interests should be (Dec 1993 Duma elections: victory for ‘red-brown’ forces)

Development of Russia’s post- Soviet foreign policy (1992 – 2012)

1996 – 1999:

FM Primakov introduces concept of “multivector”

foreign policy

parameters of Russia’s national interests are set out “Near Abroad” is top foreign policy priority, declared

as zone of vital and exclusive national interests

increasing frustration about relationship with West:

peek = NATO bombing of Serbia in Spring 1999

assertive foreign policy rhetorics <-> weak economic

situation (Summer 1998: financial crisis)

Development of Russia’s post- Soviet foreign policy (1992 – 2012)

2000 – 2012:

national interests ‘doctrine’: basis for foreign policy several important foreign policy documents adopted and re-

adopted in newer versions (latest foreign policy concept, 2008)

spectacular economic growth 2000-2008 gives boost to even

more assertive foreign policy -> Russia one of the BRIC(S) countries

President Putin (2000-2008), PM Putin (2008-2012) is seen as

personification of strong and assertive Russia

energy is used as political tool, espc towards Near Abroad reclaiming of great power status high peek of assertiveness = Russian-Georgian military conflict,

August 2008

Russian claims to great power status

• “Russia is one of the world’s strongest countries with a centuries old history

and rich cultural traditions. Despite the complicated international situation and internal problems, it continues to play an important role in world processes based on its considerable economic, scientific-technical and military potential and its unique strategic location on the Eurasian continent.”[1]

[1] “Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti RF” [National Security Concept of the Russian Federation], Diplomaticheskii vestnik 2 (2000): 3-13.

• “with due account for the increased role of the country in international

affairs, its greater responsibility for global developments and related possibilities to participate in the implementation of the international agenda, as well as in its development.”[2]

[2] “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, 12 July 2008, as published on the Official Website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mid.ru

Legacy of the past

“Our foreign policy objectives are strategic

in nature and are not based on

• pportunistic considerations. They reflect

Russia's unique role on the world political map as well as its role in history and in the development of civilization.”

Vladimir Putin, “Russia and the Changing World” in Moskovskiye Novosti, 27 Feb. 2012

Russia’s Foreign Policy Under the ‘new/old’ President

continuation of foreign policy along

parameters set out in previous years

most interesting to watch:

dynamics in Russia-China-US relations Eurasian Union project future of BRICS cooperation !! internal developments within Russia

Russia’s multivector foreign policy

Russia and the West Russia and ‘the Near Abroad’ Russia and China Russia as global actor

Russia and NATO

• “We perceive some aspects of US and NATO conduct that contradict the

logic of modern development, relying instead on the stereotypes of a bloc- based mentality. Everyone understands what I am referring to - an expansion of NATO that includes the deployment of new military infrastructure with US-drafted plans to establish a missile defense system in

• Europe. I would not touch on this issue if these plans were not conducted in

close proximity to Russian borders, if they did not undermine our security and global stability in general. [...] Regrettably, our Western partners are unresponsive and have simply brushed our concerns aside. We are worried that although the outline of our "new" relations with NATO are not yet final, the alliance is already providing us with "facts on the ground" that are counterproductive to building mutual trust. At the same time, this approach will backfire with respect to global objectives, making it more difficult to cooperate on a positive agenda and will impede any constructive reallignment in international relations.”

Vladimir Putin, “Russia and the Changing World” in Moskovskiye Novosti, 27 Feb. 2012

Russia and NATO

Russia and NATO

from Russian perspective, NATO has lost its ‘raison

d’etre’ in post-Cold War context

NATO enlargement seen as security threat to Russia nevertheless, cooperation on selected areas "in the

interests of ensuring predictability and stability in the Euro-Atlantic Region" (Russian Foreign Policy Concept, 2008)

1997: Foundation Act NATO-Russia cooperation 2002: NATO – Russia Council areas of cooperation espc. counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics eg Afghanistan

Tensions in Russia-US/NATO relation

enlargement:

Russia maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders on the whole, which violates the principle of equal security, leads to new dividing lines in Europe and runs counter to the tasks of increasing the effectiveness of joint work in search for responses to real challenges of our time.

state sovereignty vs. R2P:

“The recent series of armed conflicts started under the pretext of humanitarian aims is undermining the time-honored principle of state sovereignty, creating a moral and legal void in the practice of international relations.”

Vladimir Putin, “Russia and the Changing World” in Moskovskiye Novosti, 27 Feb. 2012

reset button policy (initiated by Obama) has not worked

Tensions in Russia-US/NATO relations: The Arab World

“No one should be allowed to employ the Libyan

scenario in Syria. [...] Sadder but wiser, we oppose the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions that may be interpreted as a signal to armed interference in Syria's domestic development. [...] In this context and considering the extremely negative, almost hysterical reaction to the Russian-Chinese veto, I would like to warn our Western colleagues against the temptation to resort to this simple, previously used tactic: if the UN Security Council approves of a given action, fine; if not, we will establish a coalition of the states concerned and strike anyway.” V. Putin, “Russia and the Changing World” in

Moskovskiye Novosti, 27 Feb. 2012

Strong anti-US/NATO rhetorics

“All this fervor around the nuclear programs of

Iran and North Korea makes one wonder how the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation emerge and who is aggravating them. It seems that the more frequent cases of crude and even armed outside interference in the domestic affairs of countries may prompt authoritarian (and other) regimes to possess nuclear weapons.” V. Putin, “Russia and the Changing

World” in Moskovskiye Novosti, 27 Feb. 2012

Russia – EU: strategic partnership?

• different tone from Russia to Europe
• Russia and the concept of ‘Europe’: most

important ‘Other’

• mutual (economic) dependence
• discourse of strategic partnership
• PCA (concluded in 1994)
• 4 common spaces (May 2003

agreement)

• EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (set up in

2000)

• Partnership for Modernisation
• but lot’s of stumbling blocks

internal division within EU-

members about Russia

• ngoing negotiations on new

comprehensive cooperation agreement

first Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in

2006: eye opener for EU -> reliability of Russia as partner called into question

• divide and rule strategy towards EU:
• eg pipeline politics such as Nord

Stream and South Stream projects

EU-Russia energy relations

Formal energy frameworks:

EU-Russia Energy Dialogue: formalized talks in 3 thematic groups

Energy Strategy, Forecasts and Scenarios Market Developments Energy Efficiency

• coordinators: Russian Minister of Energy (S.Shmatko) and EU

Commissioner on Energy Issues (G. Oettinger)

Energy Charter Treaty: multilateral rules, signed by 50+ states

Russia signed but did not ratify Treaty issues with 3rd parties access to Russian pipelines withdrew from the Treaty in Aug 2009

energy also important part of trade issues discussed in new PCA

negotiations

Major concerns from EU perspective

Will Russia be able to produce enough gas to meet EU increasing

demand?

Will Russia continue to see EU as main energy partner or will it

prefer Asian orientation for energy market?

Possibility of “gas cartel”? (Russia, Qatar, Iran)? Increasing state power, “energy nationalism” -> not enough FDI

(needed in infrastructure, disclosure + development of new fields)

Russian problem of energy efficiency (eg gas flaring) = questions about Russia as reliable energy supplier main priority for EU = diversification of gas supply

Russian energy policy: up to date?

Major focus on Gazprom access to transportation, distribution Not enough investment in infrastructure, development of new fields:

new technology needed for development of new projects such as Shtokman gas field and Yamal peninsula

Need for more foreign investment recognized by modernisation

discourse of President Medvedev

Risk of becoming petrostate: too dependent on fluctuating world

energy prices, underdevelopment of other econ sectors

Price for domestic consumers: still heavily subsidized Bringing price for CIS states to world market level = sources of

tension eg new tensions emerged between Ukraine and Russia over gas prices end

• f August 2011

Forecasts on EU-Russia energy relations

“Until 2030 energy exports will continue to remain one of

the most significant factors contributing to the economic development of Russia. The export dynamics is expected to slow down and stabilize by 2030.”

“The energy markets of the EU and the CIS countries

will remain Russia’s major consumers until 2030. EU’s share is expected to decrease with regard to supply diversification and increase of Eastern exports to China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the countries of the Asian-Pacific region.”

source: 10th Progress Report, EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, Nov. 2009

Nabucco Pipeline Project

• EU strategic pipeline
• Aim = diversify gas supply bringing

Caspian gas to EU: Turkey -> Bulgaria -> Romania -> Hungary -> Austria (Baumgarten gas hub) -> different EU member states

• Long-time uncertainty, doubts
• Broader geopolitical context: EU

project with US support for East-West gas corridor independent from Russia

• Seen by Russia as threat to Russia’s

interests

• 2011:
• announcement of 2y delay in

completion: target date for first gas delivery 2017

• agreements signed between

Consortium and transit countries

Nabucco Pipeline Project

Pipeline politics: South Stream

Russian answer to Nabucco target launch date: 2015 Overlapping partners in Balkan and CEE gaining momentum: agreements with Hungary,

Bulgaria, Serbia, Slovenia (Nov 2009), Croatia (March 2010), Macedonia also expressed interest (October 2010)

Illustration of ‘divide et impera’ policy of Russia

towards EU-member states

Nabucco and South Stream

Pipeline politics: Nord Stream

Pipeline politics: Nord Stream

• Connecting Vyborg (Russia) with Greifswald (Germany) through

Baltic Sea

• to divert from Ukraine/Belarus as transit countries
• majority shareholder: Gazprom 51%
• Environmental concerns (sensitive maritime environment)
• divided EU members stance:

Protest voiced by Baltic states and Poland Former German chancellor Schröder: Nord stream Board

Chairman

German companies BASF-Wintershall + E.On 20 %

shareholders

Dutch gas company: 9% shareholder since June 2010 also French GDF-Suez 9 % shareholder

Pipeline politics

Russia - China Relations

“The Chinese voice in the world is indeed growing ever more

confident, and we welcome that, because Beijing shares our vision of the emerging equitable world order. We will continue to support each other in the international arena, to work together to solve acute regional and global problems, and to promote cooperation within the UN Security Council, BRICS, the SCO, the G20 and other multilateral forums.”

“There is an unprecedentedly high level of trust between the

leaders of our two countries. [...] Of course, this is not to suggest that our relationship with China is problem-free. There are some sources of friction.”

• V. Putin, “Russia and the Changing World” in Moskovskiye Novosti, 27 Feb. 2012

China’s policy towards Eurasia

‘triangle dynamics’ still at work in US-Russia-China relations:

Russia + China have been cooperating against unipolar

dominance by US

cooperation in framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

(SCO) together with CA states

common Russia-China stance on human rights, terrorism,

separatism (Chinese Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) eg support for Uzbek pres Karimov of handling Andijon events in May 2005

China significantly increased influence in Central Asia: post-9/11

US involvement in the region important factor in China’s policy in the region

Russia – Near Abroad

considered by Russia as part of its sphere of influence exclaimed as vital to Russia’s security interests:

weak underbelly of CIS fear for import of instability frozen conflicts

CSTO organisation: attempt to create regional security community CIS-integration: mixed record -> multi-level, multi-speed approach colored revolutions caused anxiety in Moscow important achievement: Customs Union with Kazakhstan, Belarus Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO): most successful

regional organisation?

Security integration: CSTO

• Collective Security Treaty Organisation (May 2002, Charter in October 2002)
• 7 members: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia
• Uzbekistan joined in 2006 (after withdrawal from GUAM)
• grew out of CIS Collective Security Treaty (May 1992):

renewal of the treaty in 1999 heavily negotiated by Russia, but Georgia,

Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan withdrew = main setback for Russia’s CIS policy

• example of deepened cooperation with core partners
• member states abstain from the use or threat of force against each other (security

community)

• aggression against one signatory states will be perceived as aggression against all

(similar to NATO principle)

• important: member states cannot join other military alliances or groups of states
• indirect subsidization by Russia to keep influence
• CSTO peacekeeping force agreement (2007)
• bserver status in UN General Assembly

Security integration and more: SCO

• grew out of Shanghai Five (1996): China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan
• started out as security organisation
• primarily concerned with border issues (legacy of Sino-Soviet border disputes)
• renamed as SCO in 2001
• gradually cooperation broadened to other fields, including economic cooperation: July

2002 SCO Charter adopted

• members: Russian Federation, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

(joined in 2001), (Mongolia observer status)

• most successful regional organisation?
• common discourse by authoritarian regimes on human rights, rejection of unipolar

system

• dynamics of Russia-China relationship in Eurasia: cooperation or competition?

Russia’s policy towards the South Caucasus

emphasis on fear for spill-over effect of ethnic

unrest from ‘weak underbelly’

ambiguous Russian role in ethnic conflicts in

early 1990s

very tense relationship with Georgia, especially

since Rose Revolution: · escalated into military conflict in Aug 2008

recognition of Abkhaz, South Ossetian

independence in 2008 in aftermath of war

Russia's policy towards the South Caucasus

Accusing Georgia of harboring Chechen

terrorist (Pankisi Gorge)

Military presence in Georgia = source of

tension

Close security and economic ties with

Armenia

Russian border guards in Armenia Shifting ties with Azerbaijan Limited military presence in Azerbaijan

Russia’s policy towards Central Asia

close economic ties/ economic

dependence on Russia (Soviet legacy)

Kazakhstan: close ally Tajikistan: high level of dependence on

Russia

Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan/Kyrgyzstan:

attempt to diversify foreign policy

Russian still lingua franca

Russia and BRICS

“We will continue to prioritize our

cooperation with our BRICS partners. That unique structure, created in 2006, is a striking symbol of the transition from a unipolar world to a more just world

• rder.”
• V. Putin, “Russia and the Changing World” in

Moskovskiye Novosti, 27 Feb. 2012

Some questions for debate

Is Russia a great power in today’s

international system?

norms and values vs interests debate Need for rethinking pan-European

security? role of NATO/OSCE/EU?

Return of Cold War polarisation between

Russia and West?

Great power concept

• Buzan’s differentiation between super powers, great

powers, regional powers can be useful for understanding the current international system.[1] In Buzan’s terminology, the difference between superpowers and great powers “is that superpowers

• perate globally, whereas great powers typically

have their main influence in two or more regions, but not globally”. The category of regional powers refers then to the next rank down “to states that define the power structure of their local region”.

[1] Barry Buzan, “The Security Dynamics of a 1 + 4 World” in : Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition, ed. by Ersel Aydinli and James N. Rosenau (SUNY Press, 2005): 177- 197.

Russia’s national interests discourse

“Every action taken by the government of any

state is largely determined by its understanding

• f the country’s national interests. Quite

naturally, those understandings may differ, as sometimes occurs in relations between such great world powers as the United States and Russia.” (Ryabkov, 2010: 207)

• Source: “The View From Moscow: Q&A with the deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Russian

Federation” (2010), Interview with Sergey Ryabkov, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2: 207-216.

Challenges

corruption economy dependent on oil and

gas

demographic crisis inter-ethnic/inter-confessional

conflicts

terrorism in North Caucasus divided society: gap between

rich and poor, gap between regions => biggest threats to Russia:

not external, but internal!

Some conclusions on Russian foreign policy

legacy of past present, but aware of new challenges mindset of the past still palpable, both in East and West pragmatic hegemonism: best definition of Russian

foreign policy

• bjective: being recognized as one of the great powers

in a multipolar world

reflection of Eurasian identity broad consensus on national interests very assertive, but not back to the Cold War

Back to the future?

"It's 2012, not the mid-1970s and Russia and the

US are not the enemies they once were; their current ties form a "mixed relationship" - a combination of practicality, antagonism and

• indifference. They may have political differences
• ver Syria or Iran but they have just as many

shared national security interests, which could

• ne day include "rising China".
• Z. Brzezinski, 2012 interview

Future scenarios

"It is not unrealistic to imagine a larger configuration of

the West emerging after 2025. In the course of the next several decades, Russia could embark on a comprehensive law-based democratic transformation compatible with both EU [European Union] and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] standards ... [Russians] would then be on their way to integration with the transatlantic community. But even before that occurs, a deepening geopolitical community of interest could arise among the US, Europe (including Turkey) and Russia." Z. Brzezinksi, Foreign Affairs

Slide 49