seeding clouds with trust anchors
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Seeding Clouds with Trust Anchors Joshua Schiffman , Thomas Moyer, - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  1. ������� ��� �������� �������������� �������� � � ������� ��� �������� �������� ������ ���������� �� �������� ������� ��� ����������� ������������ ����� ��������������������� ���� �� Seeding Clouds with Trust Anchors Joshua Schiffman , Thomas Moyer, Hayawardh Vijayakuamar, Trent Jaeger, and Patrick McDaniel CCSW ’10 Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 1 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  2. Hurdles to Cloud Adoption • Clouds offer customers a platform for on-demand resources and reduced administrative effort • However, fears of data loss and security breaches have stifled adoption by many businesses • We propose increasing the transparency of cloud platforms to build trust in them Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 2 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  3. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  4. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 DomU Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  5. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 DomU DomU Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  6. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 DomU DomU Xen Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  7. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 Dom0 DomU DomU Xen Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  8. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 DomU DomU Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  9. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 DomU DomU DomU Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  10. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 DomU DomU DomU DomU Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  11. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 DomU DomU DomU DomU Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  12. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 DomU DomU DomU DomU Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  13. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 DomU DomU DomU DomU Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  14. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 DomU DomU DomU DomU Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  15. Uncertainty in Clouds • Customers are concerned with: ‣ Host and VM integrity ‣ VM isolation / protection ‣ Data leakage • Need to verify integrity of those components Dom0 DomU DomU DomU DomU Xen Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 3 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  16. Cloud support for proofs • Clouds offer a unique administrative environment for integrity measurement ‣ Physical security, internal PKI, consistent components ‣ Centralized administration over many systems • Focus on using hardened / proven components ‣ Assured hypervisors (e.g., SEL4) and code ‣ Verifiable enforcement policies Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 4 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  17. Cloud Verifier • We propose a Cloud Verifier (CV) mechanism to enable verification of cloud platforms by proxy ‣ Verifiable component in the cloud ‣ Monitors the integrity of VM hosts using a public integrity criteria Node Controller Node CV Controller Node Controller Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 5 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  18. Cloud Verifier • We propose a Cloud Verifier (CV) mechanism to enable verification of cloud platforms by proxy ‣ Verifiable component in the cloud ‣ Monitors the integrity of VM hosts using a public integrity criteria Node Controller Node CV Controller Node Controller Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 5 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  19. Cloud Verifier • We propose a Cloud Verifier (CV) mechanism to enable verification of cloud platforms by proxy ‣ Verifiable component in the cloud ‣ Monitors the integrity of VM hosts using a public integrity criteria Node Controller Node CV Controller Node Controller Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 5 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  20. Cloud Verifier • We propose a Cloud Verifier (CV) mechanism to enable verification of cloud platforms by proxy ‣ Verifiable component in the cloud ‣ Monitors the integrity of VM hosts using a public integrity criteria Node Controller Node CV Controller Node Controller Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 5 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  21. Cloud Verifier • We propose a Cloud Verifier (CV) mechanism to enable verification of cloud platforms by proxy ‣ Verifiable component in the cloud ‣ Monitors the integrity of VM hosts using a public integrity criteria Node Controller Node CV Controller Integrity Node Criteria Controller Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 5 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  22. Customers using the CV • CV then vouches for integrity of a VM’s host using a signed public key Storage Node CV Controller Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 6 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  23. Customers using the CV • CV then vouches for integrity of a VM’s host using a signed public key Storage Node CV Verifies Integrity Controller Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 6 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  24. Customers using the CV • CV then vouches for integrity of a VM’s host using a signed public key Storage Node CV Verifies Integrity Controller Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 6 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  25. Customers using the CV • CV then vouches for integrity of a VM’s host using a signed public key Storage VM Node CV Verifies Integrity Controller Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 6 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  26. Customers using the CV • CV then vouches for integrity of a VM’s host using a signed public key Storage VM Node CV Verifies Integrity Controller Generate VM key pair Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 6 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  27. Customers using the CV • CV then vouches for integrity of a VM’s host using a signed public key Storage VM Node CV Verifies Integrity Controller Generate VM key pair Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 6 Saturday, October 16, 2010

  28. Customers using the CV • CV then vouches for integrity of a VM’s host using a signed public key Storage VM Node CV Verifies Integrity Controller Sign public key Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory (SIIS) Page 6 Saturday, October 16, 2010

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