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Risk Communication Theory, Design, Results
Jean Camp,
+ Risk Communication Theory, Design, Results Jean Camp, + Goals n - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
+ Risk Communication Theory, Design, Results Jean Camp, + Goals n How do you describe security & privacy risks in a way that communicates the risks and options? n Risk Communication n Ambient Risk Communication n Action-based
Jean Camp,
n How do you describe security &
n All we have to do is show them that they’ve accepted/
n All we have to do is show them that it’s a good deal for them
n The right hat for the right context
n Look for archetypes and categories
n Mental model communication
n Expertise
n Experience questions n Expertise questions n Knowledge was original control variable, confirmed with phishing ID
n Individual characteristics
n Expertise n Demographics
n P. Rajivan, P. Moriano, T. Kelley and J. Camp, “What Can Johnny
n How do you describe security &
n Risk Communication
n Phishing n Pharming n Malicious downloads n Malicious scripts n Rogue or misleading certs n Network traffic exposure n Password reuse
n Comprehensive threat landscape
n Modular architecture to identify risk
n White list/black list n Domain names, certificates, scripts, networks n Reputation n Domain names: familiarity, history, linear over time n Certificates: decision tree with observation & attributes n Scripts: familiarity, publisher n Network connection: familiarity, polities
n Model users n Communicate mental models n Be nice
n High Risk n No action n Medium Risk n Domain names, Certificates n Generate warning above a
n Block black list n Script n Block black list n Block categories (iFrame, flash) n Block plug-in, video n Networks n Warn unencrypted
Dialog specification History Observed settings, network activity
Ontology, probabilistic fusion
User decisions Browser settings
n The communication is the control
n Simple Controls n Use mental models n End to end risk measurement n For one person one button was too much!
n Changed human behavior: Cumulative Risk
n Most people changed settings n Browsed at different risk level n Large number of scripts blocked, certs rejected n Passwords will be transmitted in the clear n Setting at per-site basis
n How do you describe privacy risks in
n Risk Communication
n Heuristics n Memory n Passwords
n How do you describe privacy risks in
n Risk Communication
n User Rating n Popularity n Uninstalls
n Information requests n Permissions-based n Prashanth Rajivan & Jean Camp, “Too Much Too Late:
n Easier to create, recall in context
n Obvious benefit, clear communication, less risk
n Support risk-mitigating decisions
n L. Jean Camp, “Bringing Mental Models to Privacy and Security” IEEE Technology And
Society Magazine, 28 (3) 37-46 (2009).
n V
. Garg, and L. Jean Camp, “Heuristics and Biases: Implications for Security Design”, IEEE Technology & Society, 32.1: 73-79. (2013).
n Vaibhav Garg and L Jean Camp, “Cars, Condoms, and Facebook”, ISC 2013 (Dallas,
Texas) 13-15 November 2013.
n aine, K. E., Zimmerman, C. Y., Schall-Zimmerman, Z., Hazlewood, W
. R., Camp, L. J., Connelly, K. H., Huber, L. L, & Shankar, K, “DigiSwitch: A device to allow older adults to monitor and direct the collection and transmission of health information collected at home”, Journal of Medical Systems Vol. 35, No. 5, 1181-1195 (2011).
n L. Jean Camp, “Re-conceptualizing the Role of Security User”, Daedalus, Vol. 140 No. 4
(2011).
n Farzeneh Asgapour, Debin Liu and L. Jean Camp, “Risk Communication in Computer
Security using Mental Models”, WEIS 2007, (Pittsburgh, PA) 5-6 June 2007.
n IoT
n Protect Your Device n Clean Your Device n Without creating a mechanism for attackers that does more
n Distinguish attacker from updater
n Basic Approach
n First draft n Facilitated brainstorming -> redesign n Focus group -> redesign n Qualitative A/B (C/D ..) test -> redesign n In situ experiment