Remote Teleoperation
Tejas Sathe
Remote Teleoperation Tejas Sathe The Matrix The Papers Usability - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Remote Teleoperation Tejas Sathe The Matrix The Papers Usability Guidelines for the Design of Robot Teleoperation: A Taxonomy An Experimental Analysis of Cyber Security Threats Against Teleoperated Surgical Robotics Usability
Tejas Sathe
A taxonomy of design guidelines for robot remote teleoperation A list of UI design guidelines, classified by open card sorting Taxonomy further validated by closed card sorting
Platform architecture and scalability Error prevention and recovery Visual design Information presentation Robot state awareness Interaction effectiveness and efficiency Robot surroundings awareness Cognitive factors
Robots can guide themselves with limited human expertise encoding For high criticality situations, partial encoding my not be enough For example, agricultural robot cannot adjust spraying according to specific needs of the plant Suitable human-robot interface needed
Participants given cards with no groupings and asked to classify Participants: 6 female and 16 male experts Apparatus: Sorting done using WebSort online service Procedure: Drag and drop cards in appropriate groups
Used to test and refine proposed taxonomy obtained from earlier method Give cards with primary groups and classify into preestablished groups (from earlier)
Participants: 20 female and 18 male experts (23 HCI + 15 HRI) Apparatus: OptimalSort online service Procedure: guidelines and categories presented in random order; drag and drop
Used for generating taxonomy WebSort delivers categorizations generated both individually and cumulatively Three of the authors created their own categorizations for the data
One author used nominalizations to merge several groupings e.g. ‘Look’, ‘Orientation’, ‘Video Stream’ etc. were collectively grouped as ‘Viewing and Navigation’ This resulted in 6 metacategories The 70 guidelines were then placed in these
e.g. Metacategory A contains 1, 2 and 3 For each guideline, a sum indicates how many times it was placed in one of these If the sum was maximum among all subcategories, the guideline was assigned to A
The second author used the dendogram created by WebSort to group labels e.g. “Error Prevention” and “Provide Feedback” were placed under the standardized label “Design for error prevention and recovery”
The third author merged linguistically and conceptually similar groups into one single standardized group e.g. “Interface efficiency”, “Design efficiency”, “Interaction efficiency” etc. were placed under “User experience efficiency”
An analysis of a matrix with guidelines as rows, categories as columns and cells as percentage of participants who placed that guideline in that category was conducted Column-wise exploration of the same in conjunction with WebSort’s dendogram identified the group consistently formed by the participants consisting of the same guidelines
e.g. Guidelines like “Extensibility of system” and “Support evolution
scalability” Row-wise exploration was used to place the guidelines in the newly formed group
An overall agreement of 86% was observed between the results of the open and closed sortings For each guideline, a comparison of percentage of participants was done who placed it in different group in the open and closed sortings A statistically significant difference was found for only 10 out of 70 categories; this was found using two-sided two-proportion z-test, p<0.05 as the standard value
The final taxonomy had to be refined This was done by moving those ten guidelines into categories that the maximum number of participants chose for each of them
The proposed taxonomy was applied to an agricultural sprayer robot, AgriRobot The evaluated prototype implemented functionality for robot navigation and targeted spraying It was implemented using the Summit XL mobile platform, with three cameras for human-robot awareness
Four HRI experts conducted heuristic evaluation of the AgriRobot using the proposed taxonomy and severity rating proposed by Nielsen First, they studied the proposed taxonomy and carried out a free exploration on their own to identify usability problems Each expert then compiled a list containing problem description, the heuristic violated and a corresponding severity rating
They then shared notes, removed duplicates and refined problem descriptions and reordered the list by decreasing order of severity
This is the first endeavor to produce a taxonomy that takes inputs from HRI as well as HCI experts This taxonomy focuses specifically on the UI design aspect of robotics Several problems that were missed by UI experts in the AgriRobot were identified using this taxonomy
What did we like about this paper? What didn’t we like? Are the conclusions appropriate? How would we improve on this paper?
Surgical robots are being tested and used; what if they were hacked and turned into weapons? This paper analyzes possible cyber security attacks against Raven II, an advanced teleoperated surgical robotics system They identify various threats and evaluate scopes and impacts The also investigate methods of mitigating the damage
There has been a 20% increase yearly in the number of surgical robots sold These are expected to use of existing public networks and temporarily available ad-hoc wireless and satellite networks to transmit audio and video These can provide immediate relief in under-developed and remote rural areas; also in the battlefield
Security hasn’t been a major concern for medical robotics so far But worms like Stuxnet can affect any devices that use a PLC So, security does become an important aspect of remote surgery (but so is the case with literally everything)
A worm that exploited four zero-day vulnerabilities in the Windows OS; introduced into the device using a flash drive It propagates across the network, looking for Siemens Step7 software that controls a PLC If it doesn’t find it, it lays dormant, with the possibility of transmitting every time a flash drive is inserted into that device
If a Siemens Step7 is found, Stuxnet introduces an infected rootkit on the PLC and Step7 This modifies the code and gives unexpected commands and disrupts the functioning It also simultaneously transmits acceptable readings to the monitoring system Camera feed example
Currently, surgical roboticists face two dimensions of lack of understanding The first is how such a system can be attacked The second, what the motivation behind doing this might be
Attack identification and characterization Vulnerability analysis Risk assessment and defense directions Challenges specific to teleoperated procedures
The Raven II is a teleoperated robotics system to support research in advanced robotic surgery It can support both software development, experimental testing, and surgical training
The Raven II consists of two 7-degrees-of-freedom surgical manipulators The motion axes are: shoulder joint, elbow joint, tool insertion/ retraction, tool roll, tool grasping, tool wrist actuations 1 and 2
The surgeon control inputs are collected through a surgical control console Control inputs and robot feedback are transmitted using a communication standard designed specifically for surgical teleoperation It’s called the “Interoperable Telesurgery Protocol”, or ITP
The Raven II has been tested in extreme environments, like the Mojave desert It was controlled through the Internet, with the final link being a UAV- enable wireless network The following network states were identified as critical for performance: comm latency, jitters, packet delays/out-of-order arrival/losses, device failures
Two attack vectors are identified: endpoint compromise and network/communication based attack In the former, a surgeon’s control console or the robot can be compromised In the latter, the attacker may intercept network traffic and inject malicious packets
Endpoint compromise is a physical attack; you have to be present at an endpoint to compromise it This can be remedied by physical monitoring Network/communication based attack is a non-physical attack; it can be done remotely Due to the variety of such attacks and compromise points, remedying this can be much more intellectually challenging
Intention modification: Intention of the command modified by modifying sent packets Intention manipulation: Manipulation of robot feedback that makes surgeon send a wrong command Hijacking: Robot completely ignores surgeon’s commands and instead performs some other, potentially harmful operation
Network observer: Miscreant initially eavesdrops on network communication, and starts inserting false messages from both ends (like Stuxnet) Network intermediary: MitM attack, prohibits direct communication between surgeon and robot; can be done using ARP poisoning
Data collected from twenty human participants All were Electrical Engineering and CS students; aged 19 to 28 They were put through the FLS Block Transfer test
This test involves the subject using a robot’s arm to move blocks one at a time from the left side of a peg board to the right Then they are moved back to the left In the first, the block is picked up with the left arm, transferred in the air to the right, and placed with the right arm Exactly opposite for the reverse process
Since the security was under the microscope rather than the subjects’ proficiency, they were asked to perform a reduced version
They were asked to move only three blocks, only from left to right, without needing to transfer midair
Reordering: simple random reordering of messages sent by the surgeon; Raven skips out-of-order messages, resulting in jerky action Intent Loss: randomly drop packets, resulting in jerky motion; loss rate
above 0.9
Modify the surgeon’s packets on the fly Forward them to Raven through the attacker’s proxy Changing command changes in positions and rotations, inverting grasping states, inverting right and left, random scaling of commanded changes in position and rotation
Sequence number leading: read a packet, extract sequence number, add random
which are malicious Force reset: prevent robot arms from moving too fast or outside an area; whenever a command that needs this is issued, system-wide halt is imposed, aka E-stop E-stop is actually designed to protect the robot from mechanical and electric failure; but this can be misused by sending malicious packets that order such behavior
Encrypt communication stream end-to-end, rendering MitM attacks impossible Since dedicated staff can exist at both ends, encryption and authentication are both possible; out-of-band communication like texting AES was used with 128, 192 and 256-bit keys; no significant increase in CPU usage was observed; there was increase in memory usage, which is acceptable
Attacks pose significant risk to surgeons, patients and robots; a compromised robot can cause a lot of damage in even a routine surgery Patient recovery can slow down due to incorrect procedures being performed Hacking robot feedback can violate patient privacy
For surgeons, a compromised robot can cause legal repercussions Intent modification can make it look like the surgeon deliberately tried to harm the patient This can make them lose their medical license
For the robot, malfunction can cause it to break It may also damage other, unrelated equipment From the patient’s perspective, the advantages of teleoperated surgery are not worth the risk of being operated on by a compromised robot
The E-stop which is a protective feature, may be used in a malignant way; it’s challenging to reconcile the benefits of the E-stop with the potential of it being used as an attack Receiving packets in bursts may cause jerky motion and pose a threat to the patient; to protect against burst attacks, the packet processing rate should be limited For fast operation, datagram protocols are used; while packet losses can be tolerated, an attacker may cause large packet losses which poses a serious threat
Encrypting video feedback may induce delays which can be catastrophic in time critical surgeries; at the minimum, each packet should be authenticated ITP should be continuously updated to avoid sequence number and checksum attacks The communication link and network should be continuously monitored by competent people
Raven II is vulnerable in several places, all of which the authors were able to breach Some of these can be easily prevented by encryption and authentication Trade-off between speed, security and usability needs to be effectively handled
What did we like about this paper? What didn’t we like? Are the conclusions appropriate? How would we improve on this paper?