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Rational Partiality and Objective Value
Mike Deigan michael.deigan@yale.edu Formal Ethics 2019
Ghent University
Rational Constraints on Preference
1 / 12Rational Partiality and Objective Value Mike Deigan - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Rational Partiality and Objective Value Mike Deigan - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Rational Partiality and Objective Value Mike Deigan michael.deigan@yale.edu Formal Ethics 2019 Ghent University Rational Constraints on Preference 1 / 12 Rational Constraints on Preference State Guided by According to belief truth Plato,
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Rational Constraints on Preference
State Guided by According to belief truth Plato, Aristotle, et al.
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Rational Constraints on Preference
State Guided by According to belief truth Plato, Aristotle, et al. credence
- bjective chance
Lewis (1980) et al.
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Rational Constraints on Preference
State Guided by According to belief truth Plato, Aristotle, et al. credence
- bjective chance
Lewis (1980) et al. desire
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Rational Constraints on Preference
State Guided by According to belief truth Plato, Aristotle, et al. credence
- bjective chance
Lewis (1980) et al. desire the good Plato, Aristotle, et al.
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Rational Constraints on Preference
State Guided by According to belief truth Plato, Aristotle, et al. credence
- bjective chance
Lewis (1980) et al. desire the good Plato, Aristotle, et al. preference
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Rational Constraints on Preference
State Guided by According to belief truth Plato, Aristotle, et al. credence
- bjective chance
Lewis (1980) et al. desire the good Plato, Aristotle, et al. preference
- bjective value
Me
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Rational Constraints on Preference
State Guided by According to belief truth Plato, Aristotle, et al. credence
- bjective chance
Lewis (1980) et al. desire the good Plato, Aristotle, et al. preference
- bjective value
Me Lewis (1980): the Principal Principle
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Rational Constraints on Preference
State Guided by According to belief truth Plato, Aristotle, et al. credence
- bjective chance
Lewis (1980) et al. desire the good Plato, Aristotle, et al. preference
- bjective value
Me Lewis (1980): the Principal Principle Me: the Preferential Principal Principle
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The Preferential Principal Principle (PPP)
Preference: w ≻ w′
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The Preferential Principal Principle (PPP)
Preference: w ≻ w′ guided by Objective value: w ≻◦ w′
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The Preferential Principal Principle (PPP)
Preference: w ≻ w′ guided by Objective value: w ≻◦ w′
‘Objective’: perspective invariant
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The Preferential Principal Principle (PPP)
Preference: w ≻ w′ guided by Objective value: w ≻◦ w′
‘Objective’: perspective invariant
Fine print: EU(A|B) =- x∈R
- bjective chance that they obtain if the relevant proposition does), and v and u are units of objective value and
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Plan
Introduction The Preferential Principal Principle
- I. The Problem: Rational Partiality
The Gerrymandering Solution And Why it Fails
- II. The Solution: Centered Objective Value
De Se Preferences and Centered Worlds Centered Betterness, Two Ways Reconciling Rational Partiality and the PPP
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PART I
The Problem
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The Problem of Partiality
Impartiality: all that matters in de- termining what it is rational to pre- fer is how one takes things to be in a given world, ignoring which posi- tion in that world one would occupy.
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The Problem of Partiality
PPP →
Impartiality: all that matters in de- termining what it is rational to pre- fer is how one takes things to be in a given world, ignoring which posi- tion in that world one would occupy.
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The Problem of Partiality
PPP →
Impartiality: all that matters in de- termining what it is rational to pre- fer is how one takes things to be in a given world, ignoring which posi- tion in that world one would occupy.
✗
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The Problem of Partiality
PPP →
Impartiality: all that matters in de- termining what it is rational to pre- fer is how one takes things to be in a given world, ignoring which posi- tion in that world one would occupy.
✗
✗
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The Problem of Partiality
w1: my child drowns, but I rescue two other children w2: I rescue my child, but two other children drown w1 ≻◦ w2
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The Problem of Partiality
w1: my child drowns, but I rescue two other children w2: I rescue my child, but two other children drown w1 ≻◦ w2 w1 ≺ w2
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Gerrymandering
w1: my child drowns, but I rescue two other children w2: I rescue my child, but two other children drown w1 ≺ w2
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Gerrymandering
w1: my child drowns, but I rescue two other children w2: I rescue my child, but two other children drown w1 ≺◦ w2 w1 ≺ w2
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Intra-world Partiality (or, Why Gerrymandering Fails)
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Intra-world Partiality (or, Why Gerrymandering Fails)
Preferring to be Oneself: My life in the actual world has gone pretty well so far. But many people have led or are leading truly terrible lives. In particular, there have been plenty of morally vicious tyrants who have deliberately caused much needless suf- fering to innocent people and have done nothing to redeem themselves. Pick an arbitrary one of these tyrants; let’s call him Terry the Tyrant. I strongly prefer living my life as it actually is (and will be) to living Terry the Tyrant’s life as it actually was, I’d much rather be me than him.
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Intra-world Partiality (or, Why Gerrymandering Fails)
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Intra-world Partiality (or, Why Gerrymandering Fails)
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Intra-world Partiality (or, Why Gerrymandering Fails)
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Intra-world Partiality (or, Why Gerrymandering Fails)
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Intra-world Partiality (or, Why Gerrymandering Fails)
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Intra-world Partiality (or, Why Gerrymandering Fails)
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PART II
The Solution
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De Se Preferences and Centered Worlds
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De Se Preferences and Centered Worlds
?? ≺ ??
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De Se Preferences and Centered Worlds
?? ≺ ?? @ ≺ w?
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De Se Preferences and Centered Worlds
?? ≺ ?? @ ≺ w? ✗
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De Se Preferences and Centered Worlds
?? ≺ ?? @ ≺ w? ✗ T ≺ M?
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De Se Preferences and Centered Worlds
?? ≺ ?? @ ≺ w? ✗ T ≺ M? ✗
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De Se Preferences and Centered Worlds
?? ≺ ?? @ ≺ w? ✗ T ≺ M? ✗ @, T ≺ @, M
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De Se Preferences and Centered Worlds
?? ≺ ?? @ ≺ w? ✗ T ≺ M? ✗ @, T ≺ @, M w, T ≻ @, M
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De Se Preferences and Centered Worlds
?? ≺ ?? @ ≺ w? ✗ T ≺ M? ✗ @, T ≺ @, M w, T ≻ @, M
Lewis (1979), Quine (1969)
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What about the PPP?
Preference: w, i ≻ w′, i′ guided by Objective value:
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What about the PPP?
Preference: w, i ≻ w′, i′ guided by Objective value: w, i ≻◦ w′, i′
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Centered Betterness, Two Ways w, i ≻◦ w′, i′
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Centered Betterness, Two Ways w, i ≻◦ w′, i′
???
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Centered Betterness, Two Ways w, i ≻◦ w′, i′
???
Perspectival: w is better from i’s perspective than w′ is from i′’s (cf. Sen (1982))
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Centered Betterness, Two Ways w, i ≻◦ w′, i′
???
Perspectival: w is better from i’s perspective than w′ is from i′’s (cf. Sen (1982)) Individual: it is better to be i (in w) than it is to be i′ (in w′)
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Reconciling Partiality and the PPP w, i ≻◦ w′, i′
Individual: it is objectively better to be i (in w) than it is to be i′ (in w′)
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Reconciling Partiality and the PPP w, i ≻◦ w′, i′
Individual: it is objectively better to be i (in w) than it is to be i′ (in w′) PPP: prefer to be the objectively best individual-in-a-world
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Reconciling Partiality and the PPP w, i ≻◦ w′, i′
Individual: it is objectively better to be i (in w) than it is to be i′ (in w′) PPP: prefer to be the objectively best individual-in-a-world
PPP → Impartiality
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Reconciling Partiality and the PPP w, i ≻◦ w′, i′
Individual: it is objectively better to be i (in w) than it is to be i′ (in w′) PPP: prefer to be the objectively best individual-in-a-world
PPP → Impartiality
✗
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Reconciling Partiality and the PPP w, i ≻◦ w′, i′
Individual: it is objectively better to be i (in w) than it is to be i′ (in w′) PPP: prefer to be the objectively best individual-in-a-world
PPP → Impartiality
✗
Intra-word partiality: @, M ≻ @, T and @, M ≻◦ @, T
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Reconciling Partiality and the PPP w, i ≻◦ w′, i′
Individual: it is objectively better to be i (in w) than it is to be i′ (in w′) PPP: prefer to be the objectively best individual-in-a-world
PPP → Impartiality
✗
Intra-word partiality: @, M ≻ @, T and @, M ≻◦ @, T Normal partiality: w2, M ≻ w1, M and w2, M ≻◦ w1, M
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THANKS!
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Lewis, David (1979). “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. In: The Philosophical Review 88, pp. 216–212. Reprinted in Lewis (1983, pp. 133–159). – (1980). “A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance”. In: Studies in inductive logic and probability. Ed. by Richard Jeffrey. Vol. II. University of California Press, pp. 224–247. Reprinted with postscripts in Lewis (1986, pp. 82–132). – (1983). Philosophical Papers. Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. – (1986). Philosophical Papers. Vol. II. Oxford University Press. Quine, W. V. O. (1969). “Propositional Objects”. In: Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press,
- pp. 139–160.
Sen, Amartya (1982). “Rights and Agency”. In: Philosophy & Public Affairs 11.1, pp. 3–39.
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