Protecting Data in Untrusted Locations An exercise in Real World - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Protecting Data in Untrusted Locations An exercise in Real World - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Aug 22, 2022 300 likes •718 views

Protecting Data in Untrusted Locations An exercise in Real World threat modeling. Jan Schaumann 99CE 1DC7 770A C5A8 09A6 @jschauma 0DCD 66CE 4FE9 6F6B D3D7 Me. Errday. Obligatory James Mickens This World of Ours reference.

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Jan Schaumann @jschauma

99CE 1DC7 770A C5A8 09A6 0DCD 66CE 4FE9 6F6B D3D7

Protecting Data in Untrusted Locations

An exercise in “Real World” threat modeling.

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  • Me. Errday.
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https://t.co/Ej94YI4Ovr

Threat Model

Obligatory James Mickens “This World of Ours” reference.

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https://t.co/Ej94YI4Ovr

Threat Model

Obligatory James Mickens “This World of Ours” reference.

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gonna tweet Tweeters

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https://t.co/ykdsHGV84r

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https://t.co/ykdsHGV84r

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https://t.co/ykdsHGV84r

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Threat Actors:

  • hackeris vulgaris
  • organized crime (fsvo “organized”)
  • local governments or intelligence services
  • foreign governments or intelligence

services

Threat Model

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Threat Model

Assets:

  • Physical Equipment
  • Local Service Access Point
  • Access/Entry point to Infrastructure
  • TLS keys
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Access/Entry point to Infrastructure

  • physically protected systems
  • no “secrets” permanently stored on

systems

  • traffic severely restricted
  • all traffic must be mutually authenticated
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https://www.xkcd.com/538/

Obligatory XKCD comic.

This also works.

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TLS keys

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Y U NO HSM?

TLS keys

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No time to explain - get in the llama!

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Booting

First time:

  • boot into single-user mode
  • generate TPM-backed CSR
  • submit CSR to service in datacenter
  • cert generated, used to encrypt client puppet key
  • encrypted puppet key stored in host image

Nth time:

  • iPXE via TLS
  • init script decrypts puppet key using TPM
  • puppet does its thing
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http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html

Obligatory “Reflections on Trusting Trust” reference.

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Wile E. Coyote has an MBA.

Value of Asset Cost of Attack Wile’s ROI

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Wile E. Coyote has an MBA.

Value of Asset Cost of Attack Wile’s ROI

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Raising the cost of attack

Wile E. Coyote needs:

  • physical access
  • ability to attack running system
  • persistent undetected presence
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Wile E. Coyote has an MBA.

Value of Asset Cost of Attack Wile’s ROI

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Wile E. Coyote has an MBA.

Value of Asset Cost of Attack Wile’s ROI

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Reducing the value of TLS keys

  • Forward Secrecy
  • tightly scoped certificates
  • short-lived
  • alert if observed outside of expected env
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Possible scenarios

  • hardware compromised prior to us

racking it

  • resources compromised through

temporary physical access (ACME backdoor)

  • ACME fake hole, ACME rocket

powered roller skates, ACME do-it- yourself tornado kit, ACME earthquake pills, ...

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Lessons: You can’t just rub some crypto on it.

http://youtu.be/YsY2-yi5W74

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Lessons: Know your assets, know your adversaries.

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Jan Schaumann @jschauma

54FE 193F 64ED DD0B CFDE 40D6 1983 626F 1E52 3D3A

Thanks!

(now get in the llama!)