Prison or Sanctuary? An Evaluation of Camps for Syrian Refugees - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Prison or Sanctuary? An Evaluation of Camps for Syrian Refugees Thomas Ginn Center for Global Development April 2020

Motivation ◮ 68.5 million people displaced by conflict worldwide ◮ ≈ 10 million displaced people live in official camps or settlements ◮ Otherwise live in cities, towns, informal settlements, etc: “urban” 1/31

Motivation ◮ 68.5 million people displaced by conflict worldwide ◮ ≈ 10 million displaced people live in official camps or settlements ◮ Otherwise live in cities, towns, informal settlements, etc: “urban” ◮ Perception of camps: + Reduce tension with citizens, distribute short-run assistance - Restrictions on movement, prevent long-run “self-reliance” ◮ UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2014 policy change: “camps should be the exception and only a temporary measure” 1/31

Motivation ◮ 68.5 million people displaced by conflict worldwide ◮ ≈ 10 million displaced people live in official camps or settlements ◮ Otherwise live in cities, towns, informal settlements, etc: “urban” ◮ Perception of camps: + Reduce tension with citizens, distribute short-run assistance - Restrictions on movement, prevent long-run “self-reliance” ◮ UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2014 policy change: “camps should be the exception and only a temporary measure” ◮ What are the effects of creating a camp on well-being? ◮ Including camp residents, urban refugees & citizens 1/31

Setting: Syrian refugees in Jordan and Iraqi Kurdistan Figure: Za’atari Camp, Jordan; population 79,500 “If the road to hell is paved with good intentions, then the world’s newest slum, Za’atari in Jordan, is a four-lane highway there.” - Affordable Housing Institute’s 2014 report 2/31

Research Questions ◮ How does living in a camp, instead of the local community, affect: ◮ Labor market outcomes ◮ Income relative to cost of living ◮ Amenities: education, health care, social networks, safety, etc. ◮ Overall satisfaction 3/31

Research Questions ◮ How does living in a camp, instead of the local community, affect: ◮ Labor market outcomes ◮ Income relative to cost of living ◮ Amenities: education, health care, social networks, safety, etc. ◮ Overall satisfaction ◮ How does the difference across locations evolve over time? 3/31

Research Questions ◮ How does living in a camp, instead of the local community, affect: ◮ Labor market outcomes ◮ Income relative to cost of living ◮ Amenities: education, health care, social networks, safety, etc. ◮ Overall satisfaction ◮ How does the difference across locations evolve over time? ◮ Are camps cost effective? ◮ Would camp residents prefer the additional aid expenses in cash? ◮ Do camps in Jordan generate a deadweight loss or efficiency gain? 3/31

Data: Syrian Refugee and Host Community Survey ◮ Present Jordan first ◮ Cost estimates disaggregated by location (gov’t & humanitarian) ◮ Existing literature on effects of urban refugees on Jordanians ◮ 18% “choose” to live in camps; direct aid similar across locations ◮ Extend to Iraqi Kurdistan for comparison ◮ Collected in 2016; recall outcomes for 2010 (pre-conflict) & 2013 4/31

Identification Strategies 1. Flexibly control for rich set of baseline (2010) covariates 5/31

Identification Strategies 1. Flexibly control for rich set of baseline (2010) covariates 2. Compare to Lebanon with no camps 5/31

Identification Strategies 1. Flexibly control for rich set of baseline (2010) covariates 2. Compare to Lebanon with no camps 5/31

Identification Strategies 1. Flexibly control for rich set of baseline (2010) covariates 2. Compare to Lebanon with no camps 5/31

Identification Strategies 1. Flexibly control for rich set of baseline (2010) covariates 2. Compare to Lebanon with no camps ◮ Exploit different variation and require different assumptions ◮ Similarity of estimates suggests they are causal 5/31

Preview of Jordan Results ◮ Camp residence reduces income: $11 / person / month 6/31

Preview of Jordan Results ◮ Camp residence reduces income: $11 / person / month ◮ Camp residents save on rent: $22 / person / month 6/31

Preview of Jordan Results ◮ Camp residence reduces income: $11 / person / month ◮ Camp residents save on rent: $22 / person / month ◮ Minimal differences between camp & urban satisfaction, amenities 6/31

Preview of Jordan Results ◮ Camp residence reduces income: $11 / person / month ◮ Camp residents save on rent: $22 / person / month ◮ Minimal differences between camp & urban satisfaction, amenities ◮ Services & aid cost more in camps: $9 / person / month 6/31

Preview of Jordan Results ◮ Camp residence reduces income: $11 / person / month ◮ Camp residents save on rent: $22 / person / month ◮ Minimal differences between camp & urban satisfaction, amenities ◮ Services & aid cost more in camps: $9 / person / month ◮ Net efficiency gain from camps: ≈ $2 / person / month 6/31

Preview of Jordan Results ◮ Camp residence reduces income: $11 / person / month ◮ Camp residents save on rent: $22 / person / month ◮ Minimal differences between camp & urban satisfaction, amenities ◮ Services & aid cost more in camps: $9 / person / month ◮ Net efficiency gain from camps: ≈ $2 / person / month ◮ Urban refugees increase rent for Jordanians, few other net effects 6/31

Preview of Jordan Results ◮ Camp residence reduces income: $11 / person / month ◮ Camp residents save on rent: $22 / person / month ◮ Minimal differences between camp & urban satisfaction, amenities ◮ Services & aid cost more in camps: $9 / person / month ◮ Net efficiency gain from camps: ≈ $2 / person / month ◮ Urban refugees increase rent for Jordanians, few other net effects ◮ After 4 years, camps in Jordan are efficiently subsidizing refugees who opt out of the urban housing market. 6/31

Literature ◮ Forced Migration ◮ Krishnan et al (2017, internal World Bank) summarizing these data ◮ Outcomes for Displaced: Lehrer (2009), Betts (2014), Kondylis (2007), Clemens et al (2018), Krafft et al (2018), Stave (2015) Contribution: Extensive data; identification; cost-effectiveness ◮ Place-Specific Effects ◮ Immigrant Enclaves & Camps: Borjas (2000), Edin & Fredriksson (2001), Edin et al (2003), Ericksson (2017), Arellano-Bover (2018), Costa & Kahn (2007) ◮ General: Chetty & Hendren (2018a,b), Bryan & Morten (2018), Franklin (2018), Gollin, Lagakos, & Waugh (2014), Bryan et al (2014), Young (2013) Contribution: Humanitarian context, place is created 7/31

Roadmap ◮ Framework ◮ Setting ◮ Data ◮ Empirical Strategy & Selection ◮ Results ◮ Cost Effectiveness ◮ Policy Discussion 7/31

Stylized Framework ◮ How are people allocated across space? ◮ Geographic concentration: returns to scale vs. congestion costs 8/31

Stylized Framework ◮ How are people allocated across space? ◮ Geographic concentration: returns to scale vs. congestion costs ◮ Setup: one existing city, & a wave of forced migrants arrive: ◮ Market: households choose city or desert based on private returns ◮ Social planner: can choose city sizes based on total social welfare 8/31

Stylized Framework ◮ How are people allocated across space? ◮ Geographic concentration: returns to scale vs. congestion costs ◮ Setup: one existing city, & a wave of forced migrants arrive: ◮ Market: households choose city or desert based on private returns ◮ Social planner: can choose city sizes based on total social welfare 8/31

Stylized Framework ◮ How are people allocated across space? ◮ Geographic concentration: returns to scale vs. congestion costs ◮ Setup: one existing city, & a wave of forced migrants arrive: ◮ Market: households choose city or desert based on private returns ◮ Social planner: can choose city sizes based on total social welfare 8/31

Stylized Framework ◮ How are people allocated across space? ◮ Geographic concentration: returns to scale vs. congestion costs ◮ Setup: one existing city, & a wave of forced migrants arrive: ◮ Market: households choose city or desert based on private returns ◮ Social planner: can choose city sizes based on total social welfare 8/31

Stylized Framework ◮ How are people allocated across space? ◮ Geographic concentration: returns to scale vs. congestion costs ◮ Setup: one existing city, & a wave of forced migrants arrive: ◮ Market: households choose city or desert based on private returns ◮ Social planner: can choose city sizes based on total social welfare 8/31

Stylized Framework ◮ How are people allocated across space? ◮ Geographic concentration: returns to scale vs. congestion costs ◮ Setup: one existing city, & a wave of forced migrants arrive: ◮ Market: households choose city or desert based on private returns ◮ Social planner: can choose city sizes based on total social welfare 8/31

Stylized Framework ◮ How are people allocated across space? ◮ Geographic concentration: returns to scale vs. congestion costs ◮ Setup: one existing city, & a wave of forced migrants arrive: ◮ Market: households choose city or desert based on private returns ◮ Social planner: can choose city sizes based on total social welfare ◮ Camps potentially act as a coordinating mechanism for new arrivals 8/31