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Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid Presentations TCIP: Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for Power Focus Area: Quantitative & Qualitative Evaluation Presented by: David M. Nicol TCIP Industry Meeting, October 17, 2007


  1. Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid Presentations TCIP: Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for Power Focus Area: Quantitative & Qualitative Evaluation Presented by: David M. Nicol TCIP Industry Meeting, October 17, 2007 University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University Personnel PIs/Senior Personnel Students Scott Bai Roy Campbell Frank Stratton Frank Stratton Carl Gunter C l G t Matt Davis Himanshu Khurana Angel Aquino-Lugo David Nicol Kate Rodgers Tom Overbye Jianqing Zhang Zahid Anwar Bill Sanders Mirko Montanari Staff Sankalp Singh Sankalp Singh Tod Courtney Student Alumni Apollo Crum Steve Hanna Jeff Farris University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University University of Illinois Dartmouth College Cornell University Washington State University 1

  2. Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid Presentations Focus Area Activities Powerworld integration with devices [Overbye] – Power network simulator, integrated with physical power grid equipment (e.g., relay). RINSE (Real-time Immersive Network Simulation Environment) [Nicol] RINSE (Real time Immersive Network Simulation Environment) [Nicol] – Simulator / emulator which integrates virtual and physical systems. Designed for evaluation of hw/sw architectures (e.g. substation) Evaluation of Security Hub Architecture [Gunter] – Pushing security protocols onto IEDs in networked substation impacts latency. Is it acceptable? Automated Security Assessment [Campbell] – Combine models of power grid, SCADA, operational & recovery work- flow, and assertions about security to determine security risks associated with various recovery strategies APT (Access Policy Tool) [Nicol, Sanders] – Analyze system access policies for violations with global requirements Testbed that integrates virtual systems and physical systems [ALL] University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University Research Organization University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University University of Illinois Dartmouth College Cornell University Washington State University 2

  3. Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid Presentations Research in Algorithms RINSE • High fidelity mixed abstraction – Higher abstraction for background flows, detailed abstraction for flows of interest • Sampling for simulation kernel performance assessment – Understanding behavior is key g y to performance debugging – Full tracing far too expensive – Complicated interactions between system and user- defined threads University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University Research in Algorithms Power System Simulation • Abstraction focused on Phasor Measurement Units-- PMU PMU smaller system to analyze PMU bus PMU bus PMU bus PMU bus – Mathematics (equivalent Mathematics (equivalent circuit theory) to PMU Buses without PMUs PMU bus PMU bus determine what can be said removing buses w/o PMU bus PMUs PMU bus PMU bus PMU bus PMU PMU APT APT • Integrate analysis of firewall rules with host rules (SeLinux) to obtain reachability map of actors to objects University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University University of Illinois Dartmouth College Cornell University Washington State University 3

  4. Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid Presentations Research in Tools Powerworld integration with physical devices Relay signals breaker Energy Management Energy Management Relay System voltage Adaptive multi ‐ status channel source conversion to serial output Converter Program simulated current simulated current values PowerWorld Change in load distribution University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University Research in Tools: Wireless Models • Support Protocol focus area by emulation of wireless network – Developing wireless MAC and physical layers in RINSE Port of DaSSF/SWAN radio layer (4 years old) ld) – Refactor base and derived classes – 802.11b implemented – Simple radio models (free- space, 2 ray) ported 802.11e functionality to support real 802 11e functionality to support real Packet capture QoS middleware (in progress) From IP layer Zigbee model, and scalability studies (in Real applications & middleware progress) MAC layer protocol High performance / high fidelity RF Physical layer modeling modeling RINSE University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University University of Illinois Dartmouth College Cornell University Washington State University 4

  5. Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid Presentations Research in Tools: Integration University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University Integration Issues / Research Challenges • Scalable real-time proxy management • Packet capture at appropriate (and general) point in the protocol stack • State exchange between emulated and real devices g • Latency hiding in emulation University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University University of Illinois Dartmouth College Cornell University Washington State University 5

  6. Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid Presentations Research in Tools : Automated Security Assessment Objective : Integrate different sources of knowledge about power grid IT system to make security risk assessments about pre-planned work-flow activities (e.g., recovery) Approach • Analyze descriptions of – Physical power grid network – Control network components – Workflows describing maintenance and fault-recovery activities – Descriptions of known vulnerabilities and faults in software – Activities • Enables defense in-depth: – Automated security assessment – Distinguishes between faults & attacks – Give security advisories on which recovery paths would be the safest to follow University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University Research in Tools: Automated Security Assessment SCADA Model (CIM) + Power Grid Model •Security Attributes: viz Authorization Security Attributes: viz. Authorization •Element Vulnerabilities Database •Government Advisory Best Practices, Known Attacks Assertions about Security Operations+Recovery Workflows University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University University of Illinois Dartmouth College Cornell University Washington State University 6

  7. Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid Presentations Research in Tools : Automated Security Assessment University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University Case Study: Distributed Intelligent Agents • Intelligent Agents coordinate for control action, rather than a center • Agents would be distributed through the power network. • The research goals are: – Develop and evaluate new control algorithms for restoration scenarios, and for system reconfiguration and for system reconfiguration – Evaluate communication needs for a broad set of use contexts • A simulation test-bed is being developed using MATLAB/SIMULINK and tested in a simple restoration scenario. University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University University of Illinois Dartmouth College Cornell University Washington State University 7

  8. Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid Presentations Case Study: Latency in Security Hub • Security Hub – “Inverted” hub-and-spokes VPN • Ehost – Hosts operating in the p g Internet or enterprise network (HMI, technical services) • Ihost – Hosts (SIEDs) operating in the control network (substation network) • Performance Requirements: Performance Requirements: – Assure authenticated low- latency communications between SIEDs – Must meet process timing guarantees University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University 15 Case Study: Latency in Security Hub • Preliminary result (from emulation testbed) • Future work – Attack traffic and continuous technical service traffic – Key management and access control for SIEDs and Key management and access control for SIEDs and IEC61850 – Scalability studies using RINSE – Study on secure communication for control networks and the Internet University of Illinois • Dartmouth College • Cornell University • Washington State University 16 University of Illinois Dartmouth College Cornell University Washington State University 8

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