Presentation of the World Inequality Report 2018 Coordinated by: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Presentation of the World Inequality Report 2018 Coordinated by: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Presentation of the World Inequality Report 2018 Coordinated by: Presentation speakers: Facundo Alvaredo Lydia Assouad Lucas Chancel Lucas Chancel Thomas Piketty Clara Martinez-Toledano Emmanuel Saez Thomas Piketty Gabriel Zucman World


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World InequalityLab | December 14th, 2017

Presentation of the World Inequality Report 2018

Coordinated by: Facundo Alvaredo Lucas Chancel Thomas Piketty Emmanuel Saez Gabriel Zucman Presentation speakers: Lydia Assouad Lucas Chancel Clara Martinez-Toledano Thomas Piketty

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§ Report based on WI WID.world, the mo most ex exten ensive e da databa base on the historical evolution of income and wealth distribution. Project regrouping more than 100 100 re rese searc rchers rs over 5 continents. 100% 100% transparent, open source, reproducible. § The first sy syst stematic as assessment of globalization in terms of economic in inequalit ality. Despite high growth in emerging countries, global inequality increased since 1980. The top

  • p 1% ca

captured tw twice as as mu much gl global in income gr growth as as bo bottom 50% 50%. § Diverging country inequality trajectories highlight the importance of in instit itutio ional al ch changes and po political ch choice ces ra rather th than de determini nistic fo

  • forces. This suggests much

can be done in the coming decades to promote more equitable growth. Wo World In Ineq equality Re Report 2018: hi highl hlight hts

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1.

  • 1. Introduction: the WI

WID.world pr project

WID.world combines inequality data sources in a consistent way to fill a democratic gap.

2.

  • 2. Global in

income in inequalit ality dy dyna namics

Global top 1% captured twice as much growth as bottom 50% since 1980. Different national trajectories suggest that the trend was not inevitable. Fo Focus: the Middle East: the wo world’s mo most une unequa qual re region?

3.

  • 3. Public vs. pr

private ca capital dy dyna namics

Gradual rise in wealth income ratios since 1980s in the context of large transfers of public to private wealth in emerging and rich countries.

4.

  • 4. Global we

wealth in inequalit ality dy dyna namics

Combination of rising income inequality and fall of public wealth contributed to sharp rise in wealth inequality among individuals. Focus: from aggregate wealth to wealth inequality: illustration with Spain

5.

  • 5. Conclusion: ta

tackling in inequalit ality

Rethinking the policy cocktail of globalization

This presentation

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§ The World Inequality Report 2018 seeks to fill a democratic gap and to equip various actors of society with the necessary facts to engage in informed public debates on inequality. § The World Inequality Report 2018 relies on the most extensive database on the historical evolution of income and wealth inequality. Our methodology is fully transparent, open access and reproducible.

PART I

THE WID.WORLD PROJECT AND THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

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§ Co Continuation of pi pione neering ng wo work of

  • f Kuznets in the 1950s

1950s an and At Atkinson in in th the 1970s 1970s co combining fi fiscal and national ac accounts da data

Kuznets, 1953 and Atkinson and Harrison, 1978

§ WI WID.worl rld st started ed wi with th the publicati tion of hi historicalin inequalit ality ser series es ba based on

  • n top
  • p in

income sh shares es ser series es us using ng ta tax da data

Piketty 2001, 2003, Piketty-Saez 2003, Atkinson-Piketty 2007; 2010, Alvaredo et al., 2013.

§ In In 2011, 2011, we we re released the he World d Top p In Incomes es Da Database, , gra radually ex exten ended ed to to over th thirty ty co countries and to we wealth

Alvaredo et al., 2013, Saez-Zucman , 2016, Alvaredo-Atkinson-Morelli, 2016, etc.

Hi History of

  • f the WI

WID.worl rld pr project

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§ Ne New we webs bsite WI WID.worl rld lau launched Ja January 2017: 2017: collab llaborat ativ ive effort § Ke Key no novelty: : we co combine National ac accounts, , ta tax da data and nd su survey eys in in a a sy systematic ma manner à Distributional National Accounts (DINA, cf. Alvaredo

et al. 2016)

§ Th Three ma major extensions unde underwa way

1. Emerging countries 2. Entire distribution, from bottom to top 3. Wealth distribution and not only income distribution

WI WID.worl rld to today

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§ Co Constantly ex exten endingda databa base on

  • n the hi

historical ev evolution

  • f
  • f in

income an and we wealth

  • Income shares, averages, thresholds: 70 countries
  • Wealth income ratios, wealth distribution: 25 countries
  • Net National Income, CFC, GDP: 180 countries

§ Op Open ac access, , multi-lin lingual al we webs bsite an and vi visualization to tools

  • Chinese, English, French, Spanish : reach more than 3

3 billion people

§ St State of the art to tools fo for in inequalit ality re researc rch

  • GPINTER package: manipulate distributions online
  • Stata and R packages: access our data from Stata directly

WI WID.worl rld to today

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§ The top 1% captured twice as much global income growth as the bottom 50% since 1980 § We observe rising inequalitybetween world individuals, despite growth in the emerging world § Different national trajectories show rising global inequalityis not inevitable

PART II

GLOBAL INCOME INEQUALITY DYNAMICS

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§ Of Official st statist stics do do no not pr provide de an an ad adequat ate pi pictur ure of

  • f glob
  • bal in

inequalit ality

§ Official data mostly based on self-reported survey & underestimates inequality § No global distribution based on systematic combination of top and bottom income

  • r wealth data (National accounts, tax, surveys and wealth rankings)

§ WI WID.worl rld fo follows a a st step ep-by by-st step ep ap approac ach to towards a a consis istent glo lobal al di distribut bution n of in income an and we wealth

§ We only aggregate countries for which we have consistent series, in line with Distributional National Accounts § We confirm and amplify the « Elephant curve » pattern (Lakner-Milanovic) with more systematic tax data and larger country coverage To Towards a a glo lobal al dis istrib ibutio ion of in income an and we wealth

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To Towards a a glo lobal al dis istrib ibutio ion of in income an and we wealth

China Europe USA India Russia Brazil Middle East Global inequality dynamics

+ + + +

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▶ Inequality within world regions varies

  • greatly. In 2016, the share of total national

was 37% in Europe, 41% in China, 46% in 55% in sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil, and unequal region according to our estimates, the top 10% capture 61% of national income

Figure E1 ▶

India, and Russia. Inequality has grown inequality marks the end of a postwar egali tarian regime which took different forms in these regions.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

37% 41% 46% 47% 54% 55% 55% 61%

Middle East India Brazil Sub- Saharan Africa US-Canada Russia China Europe

Share of national income (%)

37% 41% 46% 47% 54% 55% 55% 61%

Figure E1 Top 10% national income share across the world, 2016

Income inequality varies widely across world regions

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.1.1. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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▶ There are exceptions to the general

high levels ( ). Having never gone through the postwar egalitarian regime, these regions set the world “inequality frontier.”

▶ ▶

  • r highly regulated countries, China, India,

moderate in China, and relatively gradual in India, refmecting different types of deregula tion and opening-up policies pursued over the

▶ The divergence in inequality levels has been

share was close to 10% in both regions in 1980, it rose only slightly to 12% in 2016 in Western than 20% in 1980 to 13% in 2016 (

in the United States is largely due to massive system that grew less progressive despite a surge in top labor compensation since saw a lesser decline in its tax progressivity, while wage inequality was also moderated by educational and wage-setting policies and middle-income groups. In both regions, has declined but remains particularly strong

Russia China India US-Canada Europe

Share of national income (%)

20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 2015 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980

Top 10% income shares across the world, 1980–2016: Rising inequality almost everywhere,

Income inequality rises almost everywhere, but at different speeds

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.1.1. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

Top 10% income shares across the world, 1980-2016

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sharply since 1980, despite strong

▶ The poorest half of the global popula

tion has seen its income grow signifjcantly thanks to high growth in Asia (particularly

  • f high and rising inequality within coun

tries, the top 1% richest individuals in the world captured twice as much growth ). Income growth has been sluggish or even zero for individuals with incomes between the global bottom 50% and top 1% groups. This includes all middle-income groups.

▶ The rise of global inequality has not been

  • steady. While the global top 1% income share

increased from 16% in 1980 to 22% in 2000, it declined slightly thereafter to 20%. The income share of the global bottom 50% has tion in between-country average income

Share of national income (%)

20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 2015 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 China Middle East Sub-Saharan Africa India Russia US-Canada Europe Brazil

Top 10% income shares across the world, 1980–2016: Is world inequality moving towards the

Is the world moving towards the high inequality frontier?

Top 10% income shares across the world, 1980-2016

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.1.1. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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Income estimates account for differences in the cost of living between countries. Values are net of infmation.

Real income growth per adult (%) Income group (percentile)

0% 100% 50% 150% 200% 250% 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

total income growth by percentile across all world regions, 1980–2016: scaled by population

In this representation of global income inequality dynamics discussed in Chapter 2.1, we scale the horizontal axis by population size, meaning that the distance between different points on the x-axis is proportional to the size of the population of the corre sponding income group. (See

Rise of emerging countries Squeezed bottom 90% In the US & Western Europe Prosperity of the global 1%

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Appendix Figure A1. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

The global elephant curve of inequality and growth: scaling by population

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account for differences in the cost of living between countries. Values are net of infmation. Source: Chancel & Piketty (2017). See wir2018.wid.world for data series and notes.

Real income growth per adult (%)

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 100 99.9 99 90 80 70 60 50 40 10

Income group (percentile) total income growth by percentile across all world regions, 1980–2016: scaled by share of growth captured

In this representation of global income inequality dynamics discussed in Chapter 2.1, we scale the horizontal axis by the share of growth captured by income group, meaning that the distance between different points on the x-axis is proportional to the share of growth captured by the corresponding income group. (See

Rise of emerging countries Squeezed bottom 90% In the US & Western Europe Prosperity of the global 1% Top 1% captured 27%

  • f total growth

Bottom 50% captured 12%

  • f total growth

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Appendix Figure A1. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

Does high income growth for the top 1% really matter? Scaling by share of growth

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  • growth. The top 1% captured 23% of total

growth over the period—that is, as much as fjgures help make sense of the very high growth rates enjoyed by Indians and Chinese sitting at the bottom of the distribution. Whereas growth rates were substantial among the global bottom 50%, this group captured only 14% of total growth, just slightly more than the global top 0.1%—which captured 12% of total growth. Such a small share of total growth captured by the bottom the global level. But this is not the only expla extraordinarily high to dwarf the growth The next step of the exercise consists of adding (140 million), Brazil (210 million), and the Middle East (410 million) to the analysis. These additional groups bring the total population now considered to more than 4.3 billion indi

  • population. The global growth curve presented

in Appendix Figure A2.3 is similar to the previous one except that the “body of the elephant” is now shorter. This can be explained Brazil are three regions which recorded low growth rates over the period considered. Adding the population of the three regions also slightly shifts the “body of the elephant” to the left, since a large share of the population of the very poor nor very rich from a global point of

  • tion. In this synthetic global region, the top 1%
  • ver this period. Income estimates account for differences in the cost of living between countries. Values are net of infmation.

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250%

99.999

99.99

99.9 99 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Real income growth per adult (%) Income group (percentile)

Squeezed bottom 90% in the US & Western Europe Rise of emerging countries Prosperity of the global 1% Bottom 50% captured 12%

  • f total growth

Top 1% captured 27%

  • f total growth

total income growth by percentile across all world regions, 1980–2016

The bottom 50% grew… but the top 1% captured twice more total growth.

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.1.4. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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Constructing the elephant: the « cobra curve » of growth in the Western World

We start with the distribution of growth in a region regrouping Europe and North America ). These two regions have a total

  • f 880 million individuals in 2016 (520 million

in Europe and 360 million in North America) and represent most of the population of high- tive per-adult income growth over the 1980– as compared to the global average (+66%). While the bottom 10% income group saw percentile 80 had a growth rate close to the average growth rate. At the very top of the distribution, incomes grew very rapidly; indi viduals in the top 1% group saw their incomes and those in the top 0.01% and above grew How did this translate into shares of growth captured by different groups? The top 1% of earners captured 28% of total growth—that is, as much growth as the bottom 81% of the captured 9% of growth, which is less than the top 0.1%, which captured 14% of total growth however, hide large differences in the captured as much growth as the bottom 51% top 1% captured as much growth as the The next step is to add the population of India The global region now considered repre sents 3.5 billion individuals in total (including 1.4 billion individuals from China and 1.3 billion from India). Adding India and China remarkably modifjes the shape of the global growth curve (

  • ver this period. Income estimates account for differences in the cost of living between countries. Values are net of infmation.

0% 100% 200% 300% 400%

500

99.999

99.99 99.9 99 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Real income growth per adult (%) Income group (percentile)

Bottom 50% captured 9%

  • f total growth

Top 1% captured 28%

  • f total growth

total income growth by percentile in us-Canada and Western europe, 1980–2016

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.1.2. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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Constructing the elephant: the « cobra curve » of growth in India and China

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.9.4. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

  • To

Total in income gr growth by by pe percent ntile in n In India an and China, a, 1980-2016 2016

Top 1% captured 18%

  • f total growth

Bottom 50% captured 10%

  • f total growth
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The fjrst half of the distribution is now marked by a “rising tide” as total income growth rates increase substantially from the growth rates which go as high as 260%, largely above the global average income growth of 146%. This is due to the fact that

  • f the bottom half of this global distribution,

enjoyed much higher growth rates than their

  • parts. In addition, growth was also very

below the richest 1%), income growth was substantially lower than the global average, reaching only 40–50%. This corresponds to the lower- and middle-income groups in rich countries which grew at a very low rates. The extreme case of these is the bottom half of grew at only 3% over the period considered. Earlier versions of this graph have been termed “the elephant curve,” as the shape of

  • animal. These new fjndings confjrm and

confjrm the share of income growth captured at the top of the global income distribution— a fjgure which couldn’t be properly measured At the top of the global distribution, incomes grew extremely rapidly—around 200% for 0.001%. Not only were these growth rates they also matter a lot in terms of global

  • ver this period. Income estimates account for differences in the cost of living between countries. Values are net of infmation.

Source: WID.world (2017). See wir2018.wid.world for data series and notes.

0% 100% 200% 300% 400% 500

99.999

99.99

99.9 99 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Real income growth per adult (%) Income group (percentile)

Bottom 50% captured 14%

  • f total growth

Top 1% captured 23%

  • f total growth

total income growth by percentile in China, India, us-Canada, and Western europe, 1980–2016

The « global elephant » : the sum of two « cobras »

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.1.2. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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  • growth. The top 1% captured 23% of total

growth over the period—that is, as much as fjgures help make sense of the very high growth rates enjoyed by Indians and Chinese sitting at the bottom of the distribution. Whereas growth rates were substantial among the global bottom 50%, this group captured only 14% of total growth, just slightly more than the global top 0.1%—which captured 12% of total growth. Such a small share of total growth captured by the bottom the global level. But this is not the only expla extraordinarily high to dwarf the growth The next step of the exercise consists of adding (140 million), Brazil (210 million), and the Middle East (410 million) to the analysis. These additional groups bring the total population now considered to more than 4.3 billion indi

  • population. The global growth curve presented

in Appendix Figure A2.3 is similar to the previous one except that the “body of the elephant” is now shorter. This can be explained Brazil are three regions which recorded low growth rates over the period considered. Adding the population of the three regions also slightly shifts the “body of the elephant” to the left, since a large share of the population of the very poor nor very rich from a global point of

  • tion. In this synthetic global region, the top 1%
  • ver this period. Income estimates account for differences in the cost of living between countries. Values are net of infmation.

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250%

99.999

99.99

99.9 99 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Real income growth per adult (%) Income group (percentile)

Squeezed bottom 90% in the US & Western Europe Rise of emerging countries Prosperity of the global 1% Bottom 50% captured 12%

  • f total growth

Top 1% captured 27%

  • f total growth

total income growth by percentile across all world regions, 1980–2016

Adding other world regions flattens the global elephant (lower growth in Africa)

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.1.4. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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§ Key question: are we sure that the en enormousrise of the global 1% was necessary for the growth of the bottom 50%? § Answer: No. § A careful analysis of country-levelgrowth and inequality trajectories suggest that it is possible to combine higher growth and lower inequality.

  • US vs Europe: huge rise of inequality in US, but stagnation of bottom 50% average

income

  • India vs China: higher rise in inequality in India, but less growth
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10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% 22% 2015 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980

Share of national income (%)

Top 1% US Bottom 50% US

US Top 1% vs. Bottom 50% national income shares in the US and Western Europe, 1980–2016: 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% 22% 24% 2015 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 Share of national income (%) Top 1% Western Europe Bottom 50% Western Europe Western Europe Top 1% vs. Bottom 50% national income shares in the US and Western Europe, 1980–2016:

US vs Europe: huge rise of inequality in the US but stagnation of bottom 50% average income

Top 1% vs. bottom 50% in the US and Western Europe, 1980-2016

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.1.3. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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India vs China: higher rise in inequality in India, but less growth

5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 2015 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980

Share of national income (%)

Top 1% Bottom 50%

China

This graph shows the evolution of top 1% and bottom 50% income shares in India and

  • China. It is an example of the additional graphs which can be produced online on wid.

world and which are discussed in the various methodological documents referred to in

5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 2015 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980

Share of national income (%)

Top 1% Bottom 50%

India

This graph shows the evolution of top 1% and bottom 50% income shares in India and

  • China. It is an example of the additional graphs which can be produced online on wid.

world and which are discussed in the various methodological documents referred to in

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Appendix Figure A4. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

Top 1% vs. bottom 50% in China vs. India, 1980-2016

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§ US vs. EU : similar levels of development, size, exposureto globalization and to new technologies in 1980. Radically diverging inequality trajectories due to different institutional and policy choices (less progressive taxation, unequal education, falling minimum wage, etc.).

  • US-Canada: average income grew by 63% btw 1980 and 2016, and bottom 50% by 5%;

Europe: average income grew by 40%, and bottom 50% by 26%. Diverging trajectories among similar regions highlight importance of policy

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§ China vs. India: rise in inequality in both countries but was extreme in India, moderate in China. More investmentsin education, health, infrastructure for the bottom 50% in China.

  • China: average income grew by 831%, and bottom 50% by 417%;

India: average income grew by 223%, and bottom 50% by 107%.

§ NB: none of the above countries meets new SDG targets (bottom 40% is supposed to grow faster than the average)

Diverging trajectories among similar regions highlight importance of policy

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Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.1.5. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

The geographical breakdown of global income groups changed significantly (1990)

earners captured 26% of total growth over the 50% captured 15% of total growth, more than the top 0.1%, which captured 12% of growth. The final step consists of including all remaining global regions—namely, Africa (close to 1 billion individuals), the rest of Asia these regions, we take into account between- growth is distributed in the same way as neighboring countries for which we have specifjc information (see allows us to distribute the totality of global income growth over the period considered to the global population. shape of the curve is again transformed ( ). Now, average global income growth rates America had relatively low growth over the period considered. This contributes to increasing global inequality as compared to the two cases presented above. The fjndings are the same as those presented in the right-hand column of : the top 1% income earners captured 27% of total growth over the 1980–2016 growth, about as much as the bottom 50%. cans, and Europeans in each global income

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 99.9 99.99 99.999 99 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 1

Population share within each global income group (%) Income group (percentile)

India Other Asia China Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America Russia Europe US-Canada Middle East

Geographic breakdown of global income groups in 1990

Global top 1%

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Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.1.6. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

groups and how has this evolved over time? tions by showing the geographical composi tion of each income group in 1990 and in geographic repartition of global incomes evolved only slightly, and our data allow for more precise geographic repartition in 1990, similar way to how Figures 2.1.2 through 2.1.4 decomposed the data, Figures 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 decompose the top 1% into 28 groups ). To be clear, all groups above richest 1% of the global population. within top global income groups. Indeed, the

  • bution. At the other end of the global income

ladder, US-Canada is the largest contributor to global top-income earners. Europe is largely represented in the upper half of the global distribution, but less so among the very top groups. The Middle East and Latin Amer among the very top global groups, as they within the top 1% global earners: in the next richest 1% group (percentile group p98p99), This indeed refmects the extreme level of inequality of these regions, as discussed in chapters 2.10 and 2.11. Interestingly, Russia into the very top groups. In 1990, the Soviet

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 99.9 99.99 99.999 99 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 1

Population share within each global income group (%) Income group (percentile)

India Other Asia China Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America Russia Europe US-Canada Middle East

Source: WID.world (2017). See wir2018.wid.world for data series and notes.

Geographic breakdown of global income groups in 2016

Global top 1%

The geographical breakdown of global income groups changed significantly (2016)

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Regional Focus

THE MIDDLE EAST, THE WORLD’S MOST UNEQUAL REGION?

§ Richest individuals of the Middle East barely visible in official statistics on inequality § Changing the scope of analysis (from the nation to the region) may be useful to better reveal perceived levels of inequality

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Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.1.6. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

groups and how has this evolved over time? tions by showing the geographical composi tion of each income group in 1990 and in geographic repartition of global incomes evolved only slightly, and our data allow for more precise geographic repartition in 1990, similar way to how Figures 2.1.2 through 2.1.4 decomposed the data, Figures 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 decompose the top 1% into 28 groups ). To be clear, all groups above richest 1% of the global population. within top global income groups. Indeed, the

  • bution. At the other end of the global income

ladder, US-Canada is the largest contributor to global top-income earners. Europe is largely represented in the upper half of the global distribution, but less so among the very top groups. The Middle East and Latin Amer among the very top global groups, as they within the top 1% global earners: in the next richest 1% group (percentile group p98p99), This indeed refmects the extreme level of inequality of these regions, as discussed in chapters 2.10 and 2.11. Interestingly, Russia into the very top groups. In 1990, the Soviet

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 99.9 99.99 99.999 99 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 1

Population share within each global income group (%) Income group (percentile)

India Other Asia China Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America Russia Europe US-Canada Middle East

Source: WID.world (2017). See wir2018.wid.world for data series and notes.

Geographic breakdown of global income groups in 2016

Global top 1%

In official data, the Middle East is barely visible in the global top 1%.

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An Arab inequality puzzle?

  • Is

Is th the re regional po political tu turmoil re related to to th the sp specific st structure re an and le level of

  • f so

socio-ec economic in inequalit ality?

  • Following the Arab Spring, there was a renewed interest in the measurement of income

inequality in the region, as greater social justice was among the main demands of demonstrators

  • The low levels of inequality found suggest that the source of dissatisfaction must be found

elsewhere

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The Middle East appears to be the most unequal region in the world Th The extreme level of inequality y comes fr from: 1.

  • 1. Enormous inequality between countries (particularly between oil-rich

and population-rich countries) 2.

  • 2. Large inequality within countries

Th The concept of nation-st state may not be the unique or r most st meaningful level of analysi sis s

  • Perceptions about inequality are not only determined by within-country inequality
  • Changing the geographical level of analysis affects the measurement of inequality
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Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.10.2 See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

The Middle East appears to be the most unequal region in the world

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Focus on inequality at the level of regions can change the picture… or not :

Western + EasternEurope (pop:510million) is still much less unequal than the US (320m)

30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 2015 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980

Share of national income (%)

US Eastern + Western Europe Western Europe

top 10% national income share in europe and the us, 1980–2016

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Enormous between-country inequality

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Large inequality within countries

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 2.10.4. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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Determinants of extreme inequality

  • There are different determinants to extreme inequality
  • In many of the most unequal regions in the world (Brazil, South Africa),

extreme inequality comes from a legacy of slavery, colonial or racial cleavage

  • In the Middle East, th

the origins of inequality ty are more “modern” : they are directly linked to the functioning of contemporary capitalism and to the geography of oil ownership and the transformation of oil revenues into permanent financial endowments.

  • Indeed, the dynamics of private and public capital ownership are critical

determinants of inequality.

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Part III

PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE CAPITAL DYNAMICS

§ Economicinequalityis largelydriven by the unequal ownershipof capital, which can be either privatelyor public owned. § We show that since 1980, very large transfers of public to private wealth occurred in nearly all countries, whether rich or emerging. § While national wealth has substantiallyincreased, public wealth is now negative or close to zero in rich countries. Arguablythis limits the abilityof governments to tackle inequality; certainly, it has important implications for wealth inequalityamongindividuals.

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Countries have become richer, but governments have become poor.

national income gives insight into the total

  • 100%

0% 100% 200% 300% 400% 500% 600% 700% 800% 2015 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 1975 1970

Value of net public and private wealth (% of national income)

(or private capital) was 500% of national income. In 1970, net public wealth amounted to 36% of national income while the fjgure was 326% for net

Spain France Germany UK Japan US Private capital Public capital

the rise of private capital and the fall of public capital in rich countries, 1970–2016

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure E6. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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Private capital also rose sharply in emerging countries...

  • n aggregate wealth in both countries.

which are fjrst evident in the evolution of income ratios. As examined in detail in chapter 3.2, the general rise of private wealth a combination of factors including the combi nation of growth slowdowns and relatively high saving rates and general rises in asset

  • prices. The case of Russia together with that
  • f China and other ex-communist countries

can be viewed as an extreme case of this general evolution, but the liberalization and public asset privatization strategies chosen limited back in 1980, at slightly more than by 2015, private wealth reached approximately 500% of national income in China, roughly approaching the levels observed in countries . This gap would have been larger if estimates of offshore in estimates for Russia as it represents approx

50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% 500% 550% 600% 2012 2008 2004 2000 1996 1992 1988 1984 1980

Value of net private wealth (% of national income)

France China UK Russia US

net private wealth to net national income ratios in China, russia and rich countries, 1980–2015: the rise of private wealth

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 3.1.1. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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… in China the share of public capital in national capital is now comparable to rich countries during the mixed-economy period (1950-1980).

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure E7. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

held by governments. The sum of private and

▶ There has been a general rise in net private

1970 to 400–700% today. This was largely unaffected by the 2008 fjnancial crisis, or by

Figure E6

large increases in private wealth; following approaching levels observed in France, the

wealth has even become negative in recent

  • nly slightly positive in Japan, Germany, and

). This arguably limits govern ment ability to regulate the economy, redis tribute income, and mitigate rising inequality. The only exceptions to the general decline in public property are oil-rich countries with large sovereign wealth funds, such as Norway.

  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 2013 2008 2003 1998 1993 1988 1983 1978

Value of net public wealth (% of national wealth)

China Germany France Japan UK US

the decline of public capital, 1970–2016

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There are some exceptions to the decline of public capital: Norway (sovereign funds without Russian leaks…)

  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 2013 2008 2003 1998 1993 1988 1983 1978

Share of net public wealth in net national wealth (%)

China UK Norway Germany France Japan US

the share of public wealth in national wealth in rich countries, 1978–2015

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 3.1.5. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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Part IV

GLOBAL WEALTH INEQUALITY DYNAMICS

§ The combination of rising income inequality and large transfers of public to private wealth contributed to the steep rise in wealth inequality. Wealth data however remains particularly opaque. § We observe a rise in global wealth inequality over the past decades. At the global level (China, Europe, and the US) the top 1% share of wealth increased from 28% in 1980 to 33% today, while the bottom 75% share hovered around 10%.

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44

Rise in wealth inequality since the 1980s in most countries after a historical decline

market, and by 2002, 85% of urban housing to quoted and unquoted housing assets through official markets. In contrast, Russians took a more gradual approach to cally given the right to purchase their housing to exercise this right immediately, while uncertainty surrounding the macroeconomic 1990s and even the 2000s to exercise this

  • right. Consequently, the property privatiza

tion process had a small dampening effect

  • f the middle 40% defjned as the top 50%

excluding the top 10% fell in both countries across the period. Interestingly, the group’s to the aftereffects of hyperinfmation that wiped out savings. experienced in the former communist coun fell considerably from the high levels of the Gilded Age by the 1930s and 1940s, due to drastic policy changes that were part of the New Deal. The development of very progres sive income and estate taxation made it much more diffjcult to accumulate and pass

  • n large fortunes. Financial regulation

sharply limited the role of fjnance and the

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 2010 2000 1990 1980 1970 1960 1950 1940 1930 1920

Share of personal wealth (%)

UK China France Russia US

top 1% personal wealth share in emerging and rich countries, 1913–2015

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 4.2.1. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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At the global level (China, EU, US), wealth inequality is on the rise

At the global level (represented by China, substantially more concentrated than income: fjgure is up from 28% in 1980. The bottom 50% than 2%). Focusing on a somewhat larger group, we see that the bottom 75% saw its tion levels would probably be even higher if regions would be in the poorer parts of the

Figure 4.1.1

the growth rates

  • f the different wealth groups between 1980

and 2017 (all growth rates are expressed in real terms—that is, after deduction of infma tion). A number of striking fjndings emerge. First, one can see that average wealth has grown faster since the 1980s than average income, refmecting the general tendency of Between 1987 and 2017, per-adult average Next, if we now look at the top of world wealth billionaire rankings—we fjnd that the top than average wealth holders: 5.3% since 1987 for the top 1/20 million, and 6.4% for the top 1/100 million (see ). By defjnition, forever: if top wealth holders were to grow on four times faster than average wealth in the

5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%

2015 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980

Share of global wealth (%)

Bottom 75% wealth share Top 1% wealth share

top 1% and bottom 75% shares of global wealth, 1980–2017: China, europe and the us

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figures 4.1.1. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

1987-2017 Annual wealth growth

  • f top 100 adults:

7.8% Annual wealth growth

  • f full population:

2.8% Annual income growth

  • f full population :

1.4%

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WID.WORLD

THE SOURCE FOR GLOBAL INEQUALITY DATA

FOCUS

FROM AGGREGATE WEALTH AND HOUSING BUBBLES TO WEALTH INEQUALITY: ILLUSTRATION WITH SPAIN

  • Complex interactions between the rise of total private wealth & the evolutionof

wealth inequalitybetween individuals. Need for detailed, country-by-country analysis.

  • Spain has experienced an unprecedentedrise in the personal wealth to national

income ratio in the last two decades due mainly to the housing bubble

  • However, littlemovements in wealth inequality: high housing prices benefit middle

class more than the top and mitigates the general trend in rising inequality; but this complicates access to housing for the young generation with no family wealth…

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47

Spain as an extreme case of rising private wealth-income ratios

national income gives insight into the total

  • 100%

0% 100% 200% 300% 400% 500% 600% 700% 800% 2015 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 1975 1970

Value of net public and private wealth (% of national income)

(or private capital) was 500% of national income. In 1970, net public wealth amounted to 36% of national income while the fjgure was 326% for net

Spain France Germany UK Japan US Private capital Public capital

the rise of private capital and the fall of public capital in rich countries, 1970–2016

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure E6. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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48

Huge rise in personal wealth to national income ratio

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 4.5.1. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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Wealth concentration high but nearly stable. Why?

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 4.5.2. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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The rich own a large share of their portfolio in housing

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 4.5.4. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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...even the very very rich own a large share of their portfolio in housing

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 4.5.3. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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Comparison with France: top wealth holders prefer financial/business assets in France

different wealth groups own very different mostly deposits in 2012, while housing assets distribution, fjnancial assets—other than deposits—gradually become the dominant form of wealth, largely because of their large equity portfolios. These general patterns of constant throughout the 1970–2014 period, except that business assets played a more important role during the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly among middle-high- wealth shares going to the bottom 50%, categories, the impact of asset price move ments on inequality is signifjcant. In particular, , indicates the signifjcant impact general increase in housing prices on the wealth shares of the middle 40% during the Changes to house prices played a notable role in reducing wealth inequality in France consumer price infmation (2.4% faster per adults owning property was significant, growing at an annual rate of over 6% during

euros (accounting for infmation). For comparison, €1 = $1.1 = ¥7.3 at market exchange rates.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 99.9-100 99.5-99.9 99-99.5 95-99 90-95 80-90 70-80 60-70 50-60 40-50 30-40 20-30 10-20 0-10

Share of personal wealth portfolio (%) Wealth group (percentile)

€205 000 €115 000 €23 800 €2 530 €513 000 €16 169 000 €2 447 000

Financial assets (excl. deposits) Business assets Deposits Housing (net of debt)

Source: Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret and Piketty (2017). See wir2018.wid.world for data series and notes.

asset composition by wealth group in France, 2012

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In Spain, the middle and the top have saved more than the bottom after the bubble

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 4.5.7a. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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The rich managed to reallocate their portfolios toward financial assets at the right time

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figures 4.5.7b and 4.5.7c. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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The rise of offshore wealth in Spain: a lower bound estimate

Using data series from the Swiss National Bank, offshore wealth taxation forms and the 2012 tax amnesty, Martínez-Toledano is series for offshore assets. As illustrated by

Figure 4.5.8

increased rapidly during the eighties, nineties and at the beginning of the 2000s, before stabilizing after 2007, when Spanish tax authorities became stricter with tax avoid €150 billion in 2012, representing 8.6% of personal fjnancial wealth. Investment funds corrected by assigning the annual estimate of

  • ffjcial documentation from the Spanish Tax

Agency that states that the majority of foreign wealth tax base in 2007 and 2015, respec 1984 and 2013. Including offshore wealth in fact larger during the 2000s than in the eighties, contrary to what it is observed when ages approximately 24% from 2000–2013, notably larger than the 21% estimated when

  • ffshore wealth is disregarded.

ence is quite remarkable, particularly given that during this period of time the country experienced a housing boom and both nonfj nancial and fjnancial assets held in Spain grew

€0 €20 000 €40 000 €60 000 €80 000 €100 000 €120 000 €140 000 €160 000 €180 000 2015 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985

Offshore wealth (constant 2016 € millions)

Notes: In 2015, unreported offshore wealth amounted to €147 billion. All values have been converted to 2016 constant euros (accounting for infmation). For Source: Martínez-Toledano (2017). See wir2018.wid.world for data series and notes.

In 2015, unreported

  • ffshore wealth amounted

to €147 000 million, the equivalent of 8.6% of personal fjnancial wealth.

total unreported offshore assets in spain, 1984–2015

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figure 4.5.8. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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Part IV

TACKLING GLOBAL INEQUALITY

  • The future of global inequalitydepends on convergence forces (rapid growth in

emerging countries) and divergence forces (rising inequalitywithincountries). No one knows which of these forces will dominate and whether current trends are sustainable.

  • Under « Business as usual » scenario, even with high growth in the emerging world,

within-country divergence will prevail. Other pathways are possible however: if all countries adopt a European inequalitypathway, global inequalitywould decrease by

  • 2050. This wouldhave enormous impacts on global poverty eradication.
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▶ Rising wealth inequality within countries

has helped to spur increases in global wealth and 2016.

0.1% global wealth owners (in a world repre States) catch up with the share of the global

Figure E9 Share of global wealth (%)

(27%). The evolution of global wealth groups from 1987 to 2017 is represented by China, Europe and the US. Values are net of inflation.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 2050 2040 2030 2020 2010 2000 1990 1980 Top 1% Middle 40% “Global middle class” Top 0.1% Top 0.01% Assuming “business as usual”

Figure E9 The squeezed global wealth middle class, 1980–2050

Business as usual: the global wealth middle class (China, Europe, US) will be squeezed

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figures 4.1.3. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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58

Business as usual: global income inequality will continue to rise, despite high growth in emerging world. Betweencountry convergence not enough to counter within-country trend.

13% of Chinese income growth up to 2050.

  • period. Following the above example, we

3% of total growth since 1980 in the United will capture 3% of growth over the 2017– 14% of total growth since 1980. income shares of the global top 1% and the global bottom 50% for the three scenarios. bottom 50% of the population slightly decreases from approximately 10% today to less than 9% in 2050. At the top of the global rises steeply in this scenario, despite strong growth in emerging countries. In Africa, for instance, we assume that average per-adult income grows at sustained 3% per year throughout the entire period (leading to a total growth of 173% between 2017 and These projections show that the progressive catching-up of low-income countries is not suffjcient to counter the continuation of worsening of within-country inequality. The results also suggest that the reduction (or stabilization) of global income inequality

Share of global income (%)

net of infmation.

… all countries follow US’s 1980–2016 inequality trend = scenario 2 … all countries follow their

  • wn 1980–2016 inequality

trend = scenario 1 … all countries follow EU 1980–2016 inequality trend = scenario 3 scenario 3 scenario 1 scenario 2

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 2010 2000 1990 1980 2050 2040 2030 2020 Global inequality assuming … Global Top 1% income share Global Bottom 50% income share

Global income share projections of the bottom 50% and top 1% , 1980–2050

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figures 5.1.1. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

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Different inequality trajectories at the national level matter enormously for global poverty eradication

for bottom groups? It is informative to focus different groups, and how they converge or diverge over time. But ultimately, it can be argued that what matters for individuals—and stress again here that our projections do not depicts the evolution of average global income levels and the average income

  • f the bottom half of the global population in

evolution of global average income does not straightforward to understand: in each of the a whole) experience the same total income and demographic growth. It is only the matter

  • f how this growth is distributed within coun

tries that changes across scenarios. Let us possible that global average income would actually be slightly lower in the future than in the fjgures presented. In particular, the global bottom 50% average income would be even In 2016, the average per-adult annual income was €3 100, in contrast to the €16 000 global average—a ratio of 5.2 between the overall average and the bottom-half average. In 2050, global average income will be €35 500 according to our projections. In the business- as-usual scenario, the gap between average would have an income of €6 300. In the US

Annual income per adult (€)

living between countries. Values are net of infmation.

€0 €2 000 €4 000 €6 000 €8 000 €10 000 2050 2040 2030 2020 2010 2000 1990 1980

… all countries follow EU 1980–2016 inequality trend

Average income assuming …

… all countries follow US 1980-2016 inequality trend … all countries prolonge their own 1980–2016 inequality trend

Bottom 50% average income €3 100 €1 600 €9 100 €6 300 €4 500

Global average income projections of the bottom 50%, 1980–2050

Source: World Inequality Report 2018, Figures 5.1.3. See wir2018.wid.world for data sources and notes.

Annual income per adult (2016 €)

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Tackling global inequality: more in the report. Aim is to open the discussion, not to close it! Progressive taxation Global financial registry Equal access to education and well-paying jobs Investing in the future

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CONCLUSION

  • The WID.world project: more than 100 researchers over the

five continents. All the data is entirely open source + transparent to feed publicdebates.

  • This report: first systematic assessment of globalization in

terms of inequality. Global top 1% captured twice as much growth as bottom 50% since 1980. Under Business as usual, even with optimistic growth assumptions in the emerging world, global inequalitywill continueto rise.

  • Rising inequality is not inevitable: different types of policies

can be implemented to promote equitable growth pathways in the coming decades.

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WID.WORLD

THE SOURCE FOR GLOBAL INEQUALITY DATA

Visit wir2018.wid.world for the online Version of the report.

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Additional slides

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WID.WORLD

THE SOURCE FOR GLOBAL INEQUALITY DATA

income tax rate from 40% to 50% in 2010 in part to curb top pay excesses. In the United and its famous “We are the 99%” slogan also refmected the view that the top 1% gained too much at the expense of the 99%. Whether this marked the beginning of a new tax policy tax rate was followed by slight reduction down to 45% in 2013. As we are writing these and congress are preparing a major tax over haul plan. The French government also proj ects to reduce tax rates on top incomes and Top inheritance tax rates were recently progressive reduction in top inheritance tax Germany, top inheritance tax rates have been wealth concentration through other means than tax policy. As with the question of income tax progressivity, it is impossible to know

  • progressivity. The US tax overhaul plan plans

to abolish the inheritance tax. in tax progressivity in rich countries, it is worth noting that major emerging economies still do not have any tax on inheritance, despite the extreme levels of inequality observed there. Inheritance is taxed at a particularly small rate in Brazil (at a national average of around 4%,

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% Japan US Europe (FR+DE+UK) Brazil South Africa Russia India China

Source: WID.world (2017). See wir2018.wid.world for data series and notes.

Top marginal tax rate (%)

In 2017, the top marginal tax rate of inheritance tax (applying to the highest inheritances) was 55% in Japan, compared to 4% in Brazil. Europe is represented by France, Germany and the UK.

61% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 61% 38% 61% 40% 61% 55%

Figure 5.2.4 top inheritance tax rates in emerging and rich countries, 2017