Presentation for K-seminar Valdar Tammik The general idea Lev - - PDF document

Presentation for K-seminar Valdar Tammik The general idea Lev Vygotsky had two very interesting ideas (among others). The first was that all higher mental processes are mediated by symbols, i.e. “natural” cognitive processes are transformed (into “cultural” ones) when symbols get incorporated into their structure (Toomela, 1996). To put it simply – symbols (usually words) allow us to processes information differently than would be possible relying on the natural (biological) processes alone. In (visual) perception: “From the first steps of the child’s development, the word intrudes into the child’s perception, singling out separate elements overcoming the natural structure of the sensory field and, as it were, forming new (artificially introduced and mobile) structural centres” (Vygotsky and Luria, 1994, page 125). The second idea was that symbols develop – i.e., there are different types of symbol meaning structures in a developmental relationship to each other (Vygotsky, 1934/1986; see also Toomela, 2003, for an elaboration of the theory). If symbols are central in organizing our cognition and symbols develop, then one would naturally expect that there are systematic differences in the cognition of people depending on the developmental level of symbols that they are (used to) using1. And this claim is general, applying to all higher cognitive processes like voluntary forms of attention, perception and memorizing, irrespective of their modality. This approach contrasts with the typical view in cognitive psychology and intelligence research that distinguishes between verbal and non-verbal cognition and tasks. One can see it for example in the extremely popular model of working memory by A. Baddley (1992; 2010) or in the most known intelligence test, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, that distinguishes between verbal and performance IQs. For this reason our research focuses on an apparently non-verbal task – a modified version of Poppelreuter’s task (see an example below). Based on Vygotsky’s ideas we expected to find the performance on this kind of task to be related to the propensity of thinking in either “everyday” or “scientific” concepts distinguished by him2 (Vygotsky, 1934/1986). The possible relation between relying more on either everyday or scientific concepts with the ability to analyze complex visual stimuli relies on the characteristics of the respective representations and thinking predominated by

• ne or the other. Thinking in everyday concepts is not guided by explicit abstract rules but rather

by subjective impressions derived from concrete (perceptual) experience. Thinking in scientific

1 Although it is usually discussed in the context of child development (e.g., Gredler, 2009) it should, of

course, apply equally well for adults.

2 Everyday concepts are formed based on everyday experience with the words and their use. They are

essentially bundles of exemplars and related experiences. As such, they do not contain metalinguistic information, making their boundaries fuzzy and implicit (i.e. the underlying reasons and principles for categorization are not consciously accessible to the user). The meaning of a word in this stage is concrete and factual. The scientific concepts, on the other hand, are abstract and logical. They are related to formal education and form the basis of everyday concepts as superordinate categories—that is, symbols for categorizing other

• symbols. They are essentially definitions that categorize concepts into logical hierarchies. As such, they

contain metalinguistic knowledge that makes their boundaries and interrelations (more or less) clear and explicit to the user. However, note that scientific concepts are not concepts from science, although most concepts from science are scientific concepts. What is essential is the structure, not the content, of the concept.

concepts, on the other hand, is based on abstract rules somewhat distanced from the concrete material upon which they are imposed, making it easier to guide ones attention to a specific property of the visual stimuli in order to solve the tasks. The goal of this research is thus confirming

• r refuting the expectation to inform theorizing.

Materials We used two tasks – a visual task to assess visual performance and a task to assess the propensity to think in either “everyday” or “scientific” type of concepts. Example of the visual task (modified version of Poppelreuter’s overlapping figures): The test to assess the type of concepts preferred consisted of three complementary parts. In the first part the participants were asked to define 6 concepts, half of them being concrete (e.g. school) and half abstract (e.g. republic). In the second part the participants were asked to describe the similarity

• f 6 concept pairs, some belonging to the same category (e.g. cat–dog) while others are in a

complementary relationship (e.g. horse–rider). In the last part the participants were presented with 6 triplets of words (e.g. carrot–soup–potato) from which they had to choose the two that ‘go together’ and explain why. Approach to data analysis To find out the relationship between these variables nothing more than correlations need to be

• computed. But, since we are ultimately interested in people not variables, the analysis should also

be carried out on the level of individuals to allow for the possibility to discover qualitatively different relationships between the variables in different individuals (Bergman & Magnusson, 1997; von Eye & Bogat, 2006). For this reason, we also used configural frequency analysis (von Eye, Spiel, & Wood, 1996) which allows one to identify patterns (configurations) of variables within individuals that occur more often (types) or rarely (antitypes) than would be expected by chance.

General findings The expectation that propensity to think in scientific type of concepts is related to better performance on these visual tasks was confirmed. There were also some other hypotheses and results but these are secondary to the main one; for more information and details see Tammik & Toomela, 2013. But… If the theory is correct then one would expect to find a moderating effect of propensity to think in scientific type concepts on aging-related cognitive decline. That is, one would expect that people with higher propensity to think in scientific type concepts would on average show less age-related decline in cognitive performance compared to those relying mostly on everyday concepts. This, however, seems not to be the case. Exactly mirroring the results of longitudinal studies on the “protective” effects of education (Zahodne, et al., 2011; van Dijk, van Gerven, van Boxtel, van der Elst, & Jolles, 2008), we find (in our cross-sectional sample) that the speed of change is unaffected by the propensity to think in one or another type of concepts. Although it is unexpected also for education, it is especially problematic for the theoretical framework followed here because while educational level usually remains unchanged after early adulthood, the preferred type of concepts used in thinking is free to vary during the life-course. These results and this problem is the focus

• f a paper that I’m working on currently. The main theoretical problem thus being what does this

(lack of) relationship with aging mean and what are the implications for the theory. Another theoretical question worthy of elaboration (in another article perhaps) is the above- mentioned distinction between verbal and non-verbal processing so common in mainstream cognitive psychology. This distinction is far from arbitrary and is based on several lines of evidence (selective experimental interference, clinical brain-lesion research, and factor-analytic studies of cognitive performance on different tests). Although it seems to me that there is actually no inherent conflict here with the Vygotskian framework, this topic deserves some elaboration – i.e. how can it be that if all higher mental processes are dependent on language we can see such clear dissociations. And why study this? Because this Vygotskian-Lurian theoretical framework would help to elucidate how people perceive and think in a way that naturally allows for individual as well as cultural differences that are now becoming also recognized in mainstream psychology (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) while clearly specifying what is universal (possible structures) and what is free to vary (content, use etc.). It is more specific than the theories based on latent variables that are derived statistically on a population level and posit some kind of latent entities (e.g. abilities) that produce performance without actually explaining what they are and how they produce this and so obviously raise serious questions about their ontological status and usefulness (e.g., Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003; Michell, 2012). As a whole this approach follows a more powerful epistemology compared to most of mainstream psychology enabling (in principle) a more thorough understanding of the underlying phenomena (Toomela, 2012). So, taken together, it seems a worthwhile path of theorizing to follow when one is interested in understanding cognition and wants to avoid the fragmentation, narrow scope, and many methodological and theoretical problems besetting modern cognitive psychology.

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