PREPARING FOR A POTENTIAL and Central Africa OCHA ROWCA REGIONAL - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE Dr Fatou Francesca Mbow IN NORTHERN NIGERIA: Save The Children Regional Humanitarian Health Adviser, West PREPARING FOR A POTENTIAL and Central Africa OCHA ROWCA REGIONAL CONFERENCE 22.01.14

CREDENTIALS: HUMANITARIAN HEALTH ASSESSMENT IN DIFFA REGION Dr Fatou Francesca Mbow, Save the Children 26.11.13

DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEY (DHS) Indicat ator or 2013 2013 North th- 2003 Not otes es nation onal al Est nation onal al Ferility rate 5.5 5.7 - (children) Married 15 3.2 13 - women family planning usage (%) U5MR 128 201 MDG target: (deaths per 64 1,000 births) ANC access 61 49 58 - (%) Delivery care 38 20 35 - (%) Fully 25 14.2 12 MDG target: vaccinated 90 12-23 months (%) Exclusive 17 - breastfeeding

NIGERIA EPIDEMICS 2013 Sahel Strategy targeted countries (WHO data):  65,000 cases of measles in 2013 (12,000 in 2012 i.e. increased 5.5 folds), 90% of Sahel caseload. CFR 1%  4,400 cases of cholera in 2013 (600 in 2012 i.e. increased 7 folds) , 90% of Sahel caseload. CFR 3% Both are preventable diseases with existing vaccines.

RESOURCES With a population of 158 million people, Nigeria is the largest country in Africa and accounts for 47% of West Africa’s population. It is also the biggest oil exporter in Africa, with the largest natural gas reserves in the continent. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX 2013

ARMED CONFLICTS, 2012

STATE OF EMERGENCY IN 3 NORTH-EASTERN SATES President Goodluck Jonathan ordered extra troops into Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states when declaring the 6-month-long emergency rule in May 2013 which was renewed in November http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/11/northern- 2013 for another 6 nigeria/kashi-photography#/05-soldier-checkpoint-sokoto-670.jpg months.

1960: : Nigeria independe ndent nt from British rule, remained member of the British Commonwealth. 1961: : North thern n section on of British Cameroo oon n incorporat rporated d into the new Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1966: : an Igbo o dominat ated d military factio tion staged a coup d'état that soon prompted a countercoup by members of the military. The intrastate armed conflict terminated civilian rule. Olusegun Obasanjo initiated the return to civilian rule from 1979 to 1983. After another 15 years of military government, civilian rule returne ned d with the preside dent ntial al electio tions ns of 1999. . 1967: : self-proc proclai aimed d Republ blic of Biafra ra, , formed by the three states of the Eastern region, declared its secession. Militarily inferior rebel forces formally surrendered to the government in early 1970. 1996: : short inte tersta tate conflict t with Cameroon roon over the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula .The International Court of Justice awarded the area to Cameroon. 2004: : the government of Nigeria became involved in two territorial intrastate conflicts: Ahlul Sunna Jamaa (Followers of the Prophet) strived for r the establ blishm hment nt of an independe ndent nt Islamic state te in North thern rn Nigeri ria, while the NDPVF (Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force), formed by ethnic Ijaws inhabiting the oil-rich Niger Delta, strived for r Ijaw aw self-de determi minat nation on and their r right to contr trol ol - or at least benefit t fro rom m - the vast oil resources urces near their homes. As civilian rule returned in 1999 ushering in political liberalisation inte ter-eth thnic te tension ons heightene ned d in N Nigeria a and a vast number of non-stat ate armed d conflicts ts erupt pted in the 2000s. Both the government of Nigeria and the Bakassi Boys, a vigilante http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/11/northern- group active in some regions in the south-east, have been recorded nigeria/kashi-photography#/05-soldier-checkpoint- as one-sided actors. sokoto-670.jpg http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id= 119

SOME CONSEQUENCES Attacks by the militant Islamist group Boko Haram and abuses by government security forces led to spiralling violence across northern and central Nigeria. This violence, which first erupted in 2009, has claimed more than 3,000 lives. http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/11/northern- nigeria/kashi-photography#/05-soldier-checkpoint-sokoto- 670.jpg http://www.hrw.org/world - report/2013/country -chapters/nigeria

REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE IN NIGERIA FEEDBACK FROM STAKEHOLDERS “ Depending on the participants involved and the objectives of the meeting some things that might be covered are:  A political economy analysis, by state.  Effects of climate change, flooding, conflict, by state.  Who's doing what humanitarian work, where, by state.  What is the interplay between development projects/actors and humanitarian projects/actors, by state.  Analysis of unmet humanitarian need, by state (even better, by LGA)  What humanitarian funding is available, by donor, by state (for example, OFDA has said it will only fund in the "States of Emergency").  What collaboration is available across humanitarian INGOs working in northern Nigeria, by state, by sector.”

REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE IN NIGERIA FEEDBACK FROM STAKEHOLDERS  “The recent FEWSNET (famine early warning system) release flagged that parts of northern Nigeria (north east) may be in Phase 3 Food Security Crisis (linked to low production, high rates and possibly poor health) in early 2014. The reaction here (and in Nigeria, I understand, including by our country office) has been very limited or non -existant, as most people are quite sceptical of FEWSNET’s methodology. Save the Children’s Early Warning activities (the HEA project) are not implemented in this region and I understand that the regional Cadre Harmonise is not yet functional in Nigeria, so there are no other real early warning systems other than FEWSNET. I also understand that one of the main reasons that people are sceptical of its accuracy is that because the region (north east) is inaccessible due to insecurity, the data that feeds into FEWSNET is secondary or collected very “roughly”. This means that despite the fact that the north east could be facing food insecurity very soon (again, due to poor production and health care) there may be little or no response (and no preparation despite the early warning )”

REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE IN NIGERIA FEEDBACK FROM STAKEHOLDERS  If the conference is in Dakar, will the Nigerian Embassy be invited?  Ensure participation of civil society, including journalists, who know Northern Nigeria  Can the conference pose any security threats to its participants?  Clearly explain the added value of a regional conference (distance from the country, regional accountability, other?)  Where will the funding for the conference come from?  Can the date of the conference take into account other events in Dakar which may give it wider resonance?