PREPARING FOR A POTENTIAL and Central Africa OCHA ROWCA REGIONAL - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Dr Fatou Francesca Mbow Save The Children Regional Humanitarian Health Adviser, West and Central Africa OCHA ROWCA 22.01.14

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA: PREPARING FOR A POTENTIAL REGIONAL CONFERENCE

CREDENTIALS: HUMANITARIAN HEALTH ASSESSMENT IN DIFFA REGION

Dr Fatou Francesca Mbow, Save the Children 26.11.13

Indicat ator

• r

2013 nation

• nal

al 2013 North th- Est 2003 nation

• nal

al Not

• tes

es Ferility rate (children) 5.5 5.7

• Married

women family planning usage (%) 15 3.2 13

• U5MR

(deaths per 1,000 births) 128 201 MDG target: 64 ANC access (%) 61 49 58

• Delivery care

(%) 38 20 35

• Fully

vaccinated 12-23 months (%) 25 14.2 12 MDG target: 90 Exclusive breastfeeding 17

• DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEY (DHS)

Sahel Strategy targeted countries (WHO data):  65,000 cases of measles in 2013 (12,000 in 2012 i.e. increased 5.5 folds), 90% of Sahel caseload. CFR 1%  4,400 cases of cholera in 2013 (600 in 2012 i.e. increased 7 folds) , 90% of Sahel caseload. CFR 3% Both are preventable diseases with existing vaccines.

NIGERIA EPIDEMICS 2013

With a population of 158 million people, Nigeria is the largest country in Africa and accounts for 47% of West Africa’s

• population. It is also the biggest oil exporter in Africa, with the

largest natural gas reserves in the continent.

http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview

RESOURCES

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX 2013

ARMED CONFLICTS, 2012

President Goodluck Jonathan ordered extra troops into Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states when declaring the 6-month-long emergency rule in May 2013 which was renewed in November 2013 for another 6 months.

STATE OF EMERGENCY IN 3 NORTH-EASTERN SATES

http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/11/northern- nigeria/kashi-photography#/05-soldier-checkpoint-sokoto-670.jpg

1960: : Nigeria independe ndent nt from British rule, remained member of the British Commonwealth. 1961: : North thern n section

• n of British Cameroo
• on

n incorporat rporated d into the new Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1966: : an Igbo

• dominat

ated d military factio tion staged a coup d'état that soon prompted a countercoup by members of the military. The intrastate armed conflict terminated civilian rule. Olusegun Obasanjo initiated the return to civilian rule from 1979 to 1983. After another 15 years of military government, civilian rule returne ned d with the preside dent ntial al electio tions ns of 1999. . 1967: : self-proc proclai aimed d Republ blic of Biafra ra, , formed by the three states of the Eastern region, declared its secession. Militarily inferior rebel forces formally surrendered to the government in early 1970. 1996: : short inte tersta tate conflict t with Cameroon roon over the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula .The International Court of Justice awarded the area to Cameroon. 2004: : the government of Nigeria became involved in two territorial intrastate conflicts: Ahlul Sunna Jamaa (Followers of the Prophet) strived for r the establ blishm hment nt of an independe ndent nt Islamic state te in North thern rn Nigeri ria, while the NDPVF (Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force), formed by ethnic Ijaws inhabiting the oil-rich Niger Delta, strived for r Ijaw aw self-de determi minat nation

• n and their

r right to contr trol

• l - or at

least benefit t fro rom m - the vast oil resources urces near their homes. As civilian rule returned in 1999 ushering in political liberalisation inte ter-eth thnic te tension

• ns heightene

ned d in N Nigeria a and a vast number of non-stat ate armed d conflicts ts erupt pted in the 2000s. Both the government of Nigeria and the Bakassi Boys, a vigilante group active in some regions in the south-east, have been recorded as one-sided actors.

http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id= 119 http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/11/northern- nigeria/kashi-photography#/05-soldier-checkpoint- sokoto-670.jpg

Attacks by the militant Islamist group Boko Haram and abuses by government security forces led to spiralling violence across northern and central

• Nigeria. This violence,

which first erupted in 2009, has claimed more than 3,000 lives.

http://www.hrw.org/world - report/2013/country -chapters/nigeria

SOME CONSEQUENCES

http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/11/northern- nigeria/kashi-photography#/05-soldier-checkpoint-sokoto- 670.jpg

“Depending on the participants involved and the objectives of the meeting some things that might be covered are:  A political economy analysis, by state.  Effects of climate change, flooding, conflict, by state.  Who's doing what humanitarian work, where, by state.

• What is the interplay between development projects/actors and

humanitarian projects/actors, by state.

 Analysis of unmet humanitarian need, by state (even better, by LGA)  What humanitarian funding is available, by donor, by state (for example, OFDA has said it will only fund in the "States of Emergency").  What collaboration is available across humanitarian INGOs working in northern Nigeria, by state, by sector.”

REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE IN NIGERIA FEEDBACK FROM STAKEHOLDERS

 “The recent FEWSNET (famine early warning system) release flagged that parts of northern Nigeria (north east) may be in Phase 3 Food Security Crisis (linked to low production, high rates and possibly poor health) in early 2014. The reaction here (and in Nigeria, I understand, including by our country office) has been very limited or non -existant, as most people are quite sceptical of FEWSNET’s methodology. Save the Children’s Early Warning activities (the HEA project) are not implemented in this region and I understand that the regional Cadre Harmonise is not yet functional in Nigeria, so there are no other real early warning systems other than FEWSNET. I also understand that one

• f the main reasons that people are sceptical of its accuracy is that

because the region (north east) is inaccessible due to insecurity, the data that feeds into FEWSNET is secondary or collected very “roughly”. This means that despite the fact that the north east could be facing food insecurity very soon (again, due to poor production and health care) there may be little or no response (and no preparation despite the early warning)”

REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE IN NIGERIA FEEDBACK FROM STAKEHOLDERS

 If the conference is in Dakar, will the Nigerian Embassy be invited?  Ensure participation of civil society, including journalists, who know Northern Nigeria  Can the conference pose any security threats to its participants?  Clearly explain the added value of a regional conference (distance from the country, regional accountability, other?)  Where will the funding for the conference come from?  Can the date of the conference take into account other events in Dakar which may give it wider resonance?

REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE IN NIGERIA FEEDBACK FROM STAKEHOLDERS