[PPT] - Post-War Economics Micro-Level Evidence from the African Great Lakes PowerPoint Presentation

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Post-War Economics

Micro-Level Evidence from the African Great Lakes Region Olivia D’Aoust

Université libre de Bruxelles (SBS-EM, ECARES) and FNRS

July 11, 2015

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Why?

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A third of civil conflicts happens in Sub-Saharan Africa

World Sub-Saharan Africa

10 20 30 40

No. of internal conflicts

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Source: UCDP/PRIO Dataset

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Divergence in economic growth between conflict-affected and peaceful countries in sub-Saharan Africa

Conflict−affected Peaceful

2000 4000 6000 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 GDP per capita (PPP, constant US$)

Source: World Development Indicators

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Where?

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Where?

Mostly Burundi, but also Uganda

Rwanda Uganda Tanzania DR Congo Burundi

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Burundi’s population: half below 14

Male Female Age groups 0−4 5−9 10−14 15−19 20−24 25−29 30−34 35−39 40−44 45−49 50−54 55−59 60−64 65−69 70−74 75−79 80+ 200 400 600 200 400 600

Population (in thousands)

Source: UN, 2010

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Belgium’s population: aging

Male Female Age groups 0−4 5−9 10−14 15−19 20−24 25−29 30−34 35−39 40−44 45−49 50−54 55−59 60−64 65−69 70−74 75−79 80−84 85−90 90−94 95−99 100+ 200 400 600 200 400 600

Population (in thousands)

Source: Census, 2011

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Revenue per inhabitant in 2013: comparing the Great Lakes to Belgium

1000 2000 Belgium Burundi DRC Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 2013 GDP per capita (US$, PPP)

Source: World Development Indicators

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Revenue per inhabitant in 2013: comparing the Great Lakes to Belgium

10000 20000 30000 40000 Belgium Burundi DRC Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 2013 GDP per capita (US$, PPP)

Source: World Development Indicators

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What?

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Chapter 1

Historical Background

Tutsi ¡

1993 ¡

Elec.ons ¡ Hutu ¡president ¡

1962 ¡

Independence ¡

1966 ¡

First ¡ ¡ Republic ¡

1972 ¡ 1976 ¡

Coup ¡ d’État ¡

1992 ¡

New ¡ ¡ Cons.tu.on ¡& ¡ Power-‑sharing ¡ ¡ ¡

1987 ¡

Coup ¡ d’État ¡

June ¡ ¡Oct. ¡

1996 ¡ 1994 ¡

Plane ¡ ¡ crash ¡ Coup ¡ d’État ¡ Government ¡by ¡Tutsi ¡from ¡Bururi ¡Lobby ¡ President ¡dies ¡ in ¡aSempted ¡coup ¡ Civil ¡war ¡onset ¡l ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡2009 ¡ Ethnic ¡ ¡ massacres ¡ Elec.ons ¡ Hutu ¡president ¡& ¡ Tutsi ¡coup ¡ ¡ Ethnic ¡ ¡ massacres ¡ Ethnic ¡ ¡ massacres ¡ ¡ ¡ Power-‑sharing ¡ ¡ ¡

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Chapter 1

Historical Background 1993 2000 2005 2009

Government (Tutsi) vs CNDD-FDD (Hutu) FNL (Hutu) Other smaller groups Government (Transition) vs CNDD-FDD (Hutu) FNL (Hutu) Conflict Onset Arusha Peace Agreement Demobilization CNDD-FDD Demobilization FNL

1996

Coup d’État Ethnic motives Political motives CNDD-FDD Government (Hutu) vs FNL (Hutu)

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Roadmap

The cycle of violence Large-scale violence Facilitating factors Reconstruction Micro Macro Structural transformations time Unobservable factors Institutions’ legitimacy

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Chapter 2

On the Instrumental Power of Refugees: Household Composition and Civil war in Burundi Large-scale violence Facilitating factors Reconstruction Micro Macro Structural transformations time Unobservable factors Institutions’ legitimacy 3 4 2 5 1

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Did violence during the war and the return of ex-combatants to their villages affect household composition?

Villages surveyed

Source: 2005 MICS survey

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Did violence during the war and the return of ex-combatants to their villages affect household composition?

Villages surveyed Violence

Source: ACLED

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Did violence during the war and the return of ex-combatants to their villages affect household composition?

Villages surveyed Violence 20km radius

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Did violence during the war and the return of ex-combatants to their villages affect household composition?

DR Congo Rwanda

Nr. ex-rebels per 1000

0 - 1 1 - 3 3 - 5 > 5 Bujumbura mairie

Source: CNDRR registers

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Chapter 2

The instrumental power of refugees

“Contrary to other refugee exodus from danger [...], it was an organized system of mass mobilization for a political purpose. The refugees settled in their camps, in perfect order, under the authority of their former leaders, ready to be used for further aims.” (Prunier, 2009) [This phenomenon] “devastating effects are nowhere more dramatically revealed than in the three states under consideration [DRC, Rwanda et Burundi] - the transformation of refugee-generating conflicts into conflict-generating refugees.” (Lemarchand, 1997)

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Chapter 2

Household Composition and Civil war in Burundi

Did violence during the war and the return of ex-combatants to their villages affect household composition?

1 Violence ◮ In more affected locations, there are relatively more adults (men)

within households.

◮ In-migrations after the war, or members staying to protect their family

and assets are the most likely explanations

2 Ex-combatant returns ◮ In less affected locations, there are more adult men within households ◮ Young ex-combatants originating from smaller households were more

likely to go back home rather than forming their own household

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Chapter 2

Household Composition and Civil war in Burundi

Did violence during the war and the return of ex-combatants to their villages affect household composition?

1 Violence ◮ In more affected locations, there are relatively more adults (men)

within households.

◮ In-migrations after the war, or members staying to protect their family

and assets are the most likely explanations

2 Ex-combatant returns ◮ In less affected locations, there are more adult men within households ◮ Young ex-combatants originating from smaller households were more

likely to go back home rather than forming their own household

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Chapter 3

Who Benefited from Burundi’s Demobilization Program? Large-scale violence 4 Facilitating factors Reconstruction Micro Macro Structural transformations time Unobservable factors Institutions’ legitimacy 3 2 5 1

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Chapter 3

Who Benefited from Burundi’s Demobilization Program?

(a) 2004 (b) 2009

DR Congo Rwanda

Nr. ex-rebels per 1000

0 - 1 1 - 3 3 - 5 > 5 Bujumbura mairie

DR Congo Rwanda

±

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Chapter 3

Who Benefited from Burundi’s Demobilization Program?

Land Drink/eat Clothing Small shop Working Wedding Housing Health Cattle Repay Savings Education % of respondents 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 loan equipment

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Chapter 3

Who Benefited from Burundi’s Demobilization Program?

Did the program improve the living conditions of ex-combatants and their communities?

1 Cash grants ◮ Both ex-combatants’ households and their communities benefited from

the cash grants paid by the program, in particular in villages with large returns.

◮ Consumption, current spendings and livestock ownings increased. 2 Cash and in-kind grants ◮ The indirect effect on the community disappeared as the cash gradually

escaped the local economy. Among ex-combatant’ households, the boom did not sustain either.

◮ Consumption, current spendings and livestock ownings decreased and

converge to initial levels

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Chapter 3

Who Benefited from Burundi’s Demobilization Program?

Did the program improve the living conditions of ex-combatants and their communities?

1 Cash grants ◮ Both ex-combatants’ households and their communities benefited from

the cash grants paid by the program, in particular in villages with large returns.

◮ Consumption, current spendings and livestock ownings increased. 2 Cash and in-kind grants ◮ The indirect effect on the community disappeared as the cash gradually

escaped the local economy. Among ex-combatant’ households, the boom did not sustain either.

◮ Consumption, current spendings and livestock ownings decreased and

converge to initial levels

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Chapter 4

From Rebellion to Electoral Violence Large-scale violence Facilitating factors Reconstruction Micro Macro Structural transformations time Unobservable factors Institutions’ legitimacy 3 4 2 5 1

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Chapter 4

From Rebellion to Electoral Violence

What are the drivers of electoral violence?

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Municipal Presidential Legislative Senatorial Hill 10 20 30 40 50 Violent episodes 01may2010 01jun2010 01jul2010 01aug2010 01sep2010

Source: Ushahidi Amatora Mu Mahoro

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Competition between demobilized rebels’ groups

1 2 3 Predicted no. of violent events .2 .4 .6 .8 1 Degree of competition between demobilized rebels

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Political competition demand for violence meets the “hard core supporters” supply

−2 2 5 10 2 4 6 Political competition (st.)

No. of

ex−rebels Predicted effect (log)

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Chapter 5

Who Benefits from Customary Justice? Rent-seeking, Bribery and Criminality in sub-Saharan Africa Large-scale violence Facilitating factors Reconstruction Micro Macro Structural transformations time Unobservable factors Institutions’ legitimacy 3 4 2 5 1

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Legal pluralism: co-existence of traditional and modern law

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Source: JuriGlobe research group, Université d’Ottawa

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Focus on Uganda

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Source: JuriGlobe research group, Université d’Ottawa

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Focus on Uganda “If my goat is stolen, I must find the wrongdoer and bring him to the chief; my remedy is then either to get the goat back or to be compensated in money or kind so that I am restored to my

riginal position.” (Lamony, 2007)

Customary justice pro’s

1 Cheap 2 Flexible 3 In local language 4 Accessible

Customary justice flaws

1 Discriminatory 2 Corrupted 3 Poorly monitored 4 Subject to conflicts of interest

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Chapter 5

Who Benefits from Customary Justice? Rent-seeking, Bribery and Criminality in sub-Saharan Africa

Within a dual judicial system, victims can often choose to which authority to complain, which may lead to inconsistencies in judgments’ outcomes What will be the choice of victims? How will criminals behave? What will judges decide? Victims report crimes to customary justice to get reparations, unless serious offense Expecting that, criminals commit petty crimes Customary judges grab money from victims (rent-seeking) and criminals (bribery)

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How?

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Behind the scene...

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So What...

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... should we take home

Insecurity is one of the most challenging impediment to economic growth and development In a post-conflict setting, relapse into violence is common Demobilization programs would benefit if training were offered in conjunction to money grants Programs that facilitate the transition from rebel groups to political parties, and from rebel to civilian life should be further studied and improved Investigating the nature and evolution of the conflict is crucial Recognized, accountable and legitimate institutions and public sector, allowing tangible changes, could also make a difference