Polling + Auctions Anna Karlin Agenda An application of The - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

polling auctions
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

Polling + Auctions Anna Karlin Agenda An application of The - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Polling + Auctions Anna Karlin Agenda An application of The Central Limit Theorem Polling A glimpse of auction theory Magic mushrooms Yesterday, Oregonians are voting on whether to legalize the therapeutic use of magic


slide-1
SLIDE 1

Polling + Auctions

Anna Karlin

slide-2
SLIDE 2

Agenda

  • An application of The Central Limit Theorem – Polling
  • A glimpse of auction theory
slide-3
SLIDE 3

Magic mushrooms

Yesterday, Oregonians are voting on whether to legalize the therapeutic use of “magic mushrooms”. If you take a "heroic" dose, supposedly, “the ego dissolves and the user feels inseparable from the rest of the universe.”

slide-4
SLIDE 4

CLT à Polling on magic mushrooms

slide-5
SLIDE 5

The Central Limit Theorem

Consider i.i.d. (independent, identically distributed) random vars X1, X2, X3, … Where Xi has μ = E[Xi] and σ2 = Var[Xi] As n → ∞, Restated: As n → ∞,

Mn = 1 n

n

X

i=1

Xi → N ✓ µ, σ2 n ◆

slide-6
SLIDE 6
slide-7
SLIDE 7

The Standard Normal CDF

slide-8
SLIDE 8
slide-9
SLIDE 9

Suppose want to use CLT to estimate Pr(28 ≤ 𝑌 ≤ 30 ) when X is Binomial (100, 0.3) Issue: Binomial is discrete, Normal is continuous.

The Continuity Correction (Idea)

slide-10
SLIDE 10
slide-11
SLIDE 11

Auctions

  • Companies like Google and Facebook make most of their

money by selling ads.

  • The ads are sold via auction.

○ Advertisers submit bids for certain “keywords”

slide-12
SLIDE 12

An auction is a …

  • Game

Players: advertisers

Strategy choices for each player: possible bids

Rules of the game – made up by Google/Facebook/whoever is running the auction

  • What do we expect to happen? How do we analyze

mathematically?

slide-13
SLIDE 13

Special case: Sealed Bid single item auction

  • Say I decide to run an auction to sell my laptop and I

let you be the bidders.

  • If I want to make as much money as possible – what should

the rules of the auction be? Some possibilities:

  • First price auction: highest bidder wins; pays what they

bid.

  • Second price auction: highest bidder wins; pays second

highest bid.

  • All pay auction: highest bidder wins: all bidders pay

what they bid.

slide-14
SLIDE 14

sealed bid single item auction

Some possibilities:

  • First price auction: highest bidder wins; pays what they

bid.

  • Second price auction: highest bidder wins; pays second

highest bid.

  • All pay auction: highest bidder wins: all bidders pay

what they bid. Which of these will make me the most money?

slide-15
SLIDE 15
slide-16
SLIDE 16

Bidder model

Each bidder has a value, say vi for bidder i. Bidder is trying to maximize their “utility” – the value of the item they get – price they pay.

slide-17
SLIDE 17
slide-18
SLIDE 18

The Central Limit Theorem

slide-19
SLIDE 19

Normal random variables

slide-20
SLIDE 20

The Standard Normal CDF

slide-21
SLIDE 21

END PIC

Alex Tsun Joshua Fan