CS344M Autonomous Multiagent Systems Patrick MacAlpine Department - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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CS344M Autonomous Multiagent Systems Patrick MacAlpine Department - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Mar 01, 2023 106 likes •638 views

CS344M Autonomous Multiagent Systems Patrick MacAlpine Department of Computer Science The University of Texas at Austin Good Afternoon, Colleagues Are there any questions? Patrick MacAlpine Logistics Peer reviews due Thursday Patrick

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SLIDE 1

CS344M Autonomous Multiagent Systems

Patrick MacAlpine Department of Computer Science The University of Texas at Austin

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SLIDE 2

Good Afternoon, Colleagues

Are there any questions?

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 3

Logistics

  • Peer reviews due Thursday

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 4

Logistics

  • Peer reviews due Thursday
  • Final tournament: 12/9 at 7pm in GDC 5.302 (this room):

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 5

Logistics

  • Peer reviews due Thursday
  • Final tournament: 12/9 at 7pm in GDC 5.302 (this room):
  • Final projects due in 3 weeks!

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 6

Logistics

  • Peer reviews due Thursday
  • Final tournament: 12/9 at 7pm in GDC 5.302 (this room):
  • Final projects due in 3 weeks!

− PhD Proposal: Katie Genter Wednesday 9am in GDC 7.808 “Fly with Me: Algorithms and Methods for Influencing a Flock”

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 7

Distributed Rational Decision Making

Self-interested, rational agent

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 8

Distributed Rational Decision Making

Self-interested, rational agent

  • Self-interested:

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 9

Distributed Rational Decision Making

Self-interested, rational agent

  • Self-interested: maximize own goals

– No concern for global good

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 10

Distributed Rational Decision Making

Self-interested, rational agent

  • Self-interested: maximize own goals

– No concern for global good

  • Rational:

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 11

Distributed Rational Decision Making

Self-interested, rational agent

  • Self-interested: maximize own goals

– No concern for global good

  • Rational: agents are smart

– Ideally, will act optimally

Patrick MacAlpine

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Distributed Rational Decision Making

Self-interested, rational agent

  • Self-interested: maximize own goals

– No concern for global good

  • Rational: agents are smart

– Ideally, will act optimally The protocol is key

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 13

Evaluation Criteria

  • Social welfare
  • Pareto efficiency
  • Stability

Patrick MacAlpine

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Evaluation Criteria

  • Social welfare
  • Pareto efficiency
  • Stability
  • Individual Rationality

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 15

Evaluation Criteria

  • Social welfare
  • Pareto efficiency
  • Stability
  • Individual Rationality
  • Efficiency (computational, communication)

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 16

Voting vs. auctions

  • Voting: maximize social good

– result affects all

Patrick MacAlpine

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Voting vs. auctions

  • Voting: maximize social good

– result affects all

  • Auctions: maximize profit

– result affects buyer and seller

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 18

Activity

  • Pick an integer between 1 and 20, write it down

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 19

Activity

  • Pick an integer between 1 and 20, write it down
  • Draw a line under it
  • Pick another number, write it under the line.

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 20

Activity

  • Pick an integer between 1 and 20, write it down
  • Draw a line under it
  • Pick another number, write it under the line.
  • 1st price auction for my pen

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 21

Activity

  • Pick an integer between 1 and 20, write it down
  • Draw a line under it
  • Pick another number, write it under the line.
  • 1st price auction for my pen
  • The top number is your utility

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 22

Activity

  • Pick an integer between 1 and 20, write it down
  • Draw a line under it
  • Pick another number, write it under the line.
  • 1st price auction for my pen
  • The top number is your utility
  • Goal: as much profit as possible

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 23

Activity

  • Pick an integer between 1 and 20, write it down
  • Draw a line under it
  • Pick another number, write it under the line.
  • 1st price auction for my pen
  • The top number is your utility
  • Goal: as much profit as possible
  • Write down your bid

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 24

Activity

  • Pick an integer between 1 and 20, write it down
  • Draw a line under it
  • Pick another number, write it under the line.
  • 1st price auction for my pen
  • The top number is your utility
  • Goal: as much profit as possible
  • Write down your bid
  • Repeat with 2nd price auction
  • Number under the line is your utility

Patrick MacAlpine

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Auctions

  • Valuations:

Patrick MacAlpine

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Auctions

  • Valuations:

− private value

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 27

Auctions

  • Valuations:

− private value − common value

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 28

Auctions

  • Valuations:

− private value − common value − correlated value

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 29

Auctions

  • Valuations:

− private value − common value − correlated value

  • Types:

− first-price open-cry (English)

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 30

Auctions

  • Valuations:

− private value − common value − correlated value

  • Types:

− first-price open-cry (English) − first-price sealed-bid

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 31

Auctions

  • Valuations:

− private value − common value − correlated value

  • Types:

− first-price open-cry (English) − first-price sealed-bid − descending (Dutch)

Patrick MacAlpine

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Auctions

  • Valuations:

− private value − common value − correlated value

  • Types:

− first-price open-cry (English) − first-price sealed-bid − descending (Dutch) − second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey)

Patrick MacAlpine

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Auctions

  • Valuations:

− private value − common value − correlated value

  • Types:

− first-price open-cry (English) − first-price sealed-bid − descending (Dutch) − second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) Revenue equivalence: private-value, risk-neutral

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 34

Auctions

  • You value a bunch of flowers at $100

Patrick MacAlpine

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Auctions

  • You value a bunch of flowers at $100
  • What strategy if auction is:

– English

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 36

Auctions

  • You value a bunch of flowers at $100
  • What strategy if auction is:

– English – first-price sealed-bid

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 37

Auctions

  • You value a bunch of flowers at $100
  • What strategy if auction is:

– English – first-price sealed-bid – Descending

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 38

Auctions

  • You value a bunch of flowers at $100
  • What strategy if auction is:

– English – first-price sealed-bid – Descending – Vickrey

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 39

Auctions

  • You value a bunch of flowers at $100
  • What strategy if auction is:

– English – first-price sealed-bid – Descending – Vickrey

  • What if it’s an antique?

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 40

Auctions

  • Vickrey, English are truthful

Patrick MacAlpine

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Auctions

  • Vickrey, English are truthful
  • First-price sealed-bid: bidders bid lower than values

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 42

Auctions

  • Vickrey, English are truthful
  • First-price sealed-bid: bidders bid lower than values

– Private value case: why?

Patrick MacAlpine

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Auctions

  • Vickrey, English are truthful
  • First-price sealed-bid: bidders bid lower than values

– Private value case: why?

  • In common (and correlated) value case, bids lower in all

mechanisms

Patrick MacAlpine

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Auctions

  • Vickrey, English are truthful
  • First-price sealed-bid: bidders bid lower than values

– Private value case: why?

  • In common (and correlated) value case, bids lower in all

mechanisms – Why?

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 45

Auctions vs. voting

  • Auctions: maximize profit

– result affects buyer and seller

  • Voting: maximize social good

– result affects all

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 46

Gibbard-Satterthwaite

  • Example: Trump, Carson, or Bush?

Patrick MacAlpine

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Gibbard-Satterthwaite

  • Example: Trump, Carson, or Bush?

– Assume your preference is Trump > Carson > Bush – For whom should you vote?

Patrick MacAlpine

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Gibbard-Satterthwaite

  • Example: Trump, Carson, or Bush?

– Assume your preference is Trump > Carson > Bush – For whom should you vote? – What if we change the system?

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 49

Gibbard-Satterthwaite

  • Example: Trump, Carson, or Bush?

– Assume your preference is Trump > Carson > Bush – For whom should you vote? – What if we change the system? – Plurality, Binary, Borda?

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 50

Gibbard-Satterthwaite

  • Example: Trump, Carson, or Bush?

– Assume your preference is Trump > Carson > Bush – For whom should you vote? – What if we change the system? – Plurality, Binary, Borda?

  • 3+ candidates =

⇒ only dictatorial system eliminates need for tactical voting − One person appointed

Patrick MacAlpine

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Gibbard-Satterthwaite

  • Example: Trump, Carson, or Bush?

– Assume your preference is Trump > Carson > Bush – For whom should you vote? – What if we change the system? – Plurality, Binary, Borda?

  • 3+ candidates =

⇒ only dictatorial system eliminates need for tactical voting − One person appointed

  • No point thinking of a “better” voting system
  • Assumption: no restrictions on preferences

Patrick MacAlpine

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SLIDE 52

Gibbard-Satterthwaite

  • Example: Trump, Carson, or Bush?

– Assume your preference is Trump > Carson > Bush – For whom should you vote? – What if we change the system? – Plurality, Binary, Borda?

  • 3+ candidates =

⇒ only dictatorial system eliminates need for tactical voting − One person appointed

  • No point thinking of a “better” voting system
  • Assumption: no restrictions on preferences

What about Clarke tax algorithm?

Patrick MacAlpine