Political Party System 1 Two parties equal size More like mass - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Political Party System

 Two parties – equal size  More like mass movements – 800,000 members  Two party system unusual – multi-party the norm  Makes national consensus difficult to achieve  Government of National Unity almost impossible

1

Perpetual Civil War

 Von Clausewitz in reverse?  “Politics is the continuation of war by other means”  Reminiscent of Ireland in the 20s – 50s?  NOT a basis for long term solutions  “Ní neart go cur le chéile”

2

Political Competition

 Competition intense – winner takes all  Swing vote decisive  Pendulum politics – alternating governments  Irresponsible politics – vote buying  Promise lower taxes and higher spending

3

Public Finances Crisis

 Result is unsustainable deficits  Masked by EU transfers  Plus artificially high growth  Driven by domestic demand based on abundant

credit

 Greek crisis has roots in public finances not banking

4

The Parties

 Broad coalitions of two traditions  New Democracy monarchist and conservative  PASOK republican and radical  Both formed after the dictatorship  Dynastic, factional, weak organisation  Need reform – decouple party from personal

dynasties

5

Product of History

 Turbulent history since independence in 1830  Defeat by Turkey after World War I – 1.5m refugees  500,000 deaths (1941 – 47) due to wars and famine  Military dictatorship 1967 – 74  Legacy of hatred – no shared vision

6

Modern Greece

 Argue only born in 1980  Basically pre-industrial society  Pre-modern state  No parliamentary tradition  Weak state institutions

7

Pre-Modern Features

 Clientilism – clients not citizens  Patronage on a grand scale  Corruption widespread  Tax evasion as a way of life  Bloated public service  Factionalism

8

Societal Features

 Individualism – weak communal identity/civil society  Self interest v national interest  Protected professions, disengaged elite  Weak ‘social ethic’ – solidarity absent  Self absorbed – like Northern Ireland  Re-inforce “pre-modern” argument

9

Social Contract

 Fundamental concept in political science  Basis for democratic legitimacy  Greece: low taxes, high spending  Being re-written unilaterally by government  Loss of legitimacy/public anger/street violence

10

Questions

 Has Greece (society and state) the capacity to:  Overcome the current crisis?  Remain a member of the euro?  Survive in the long term?  Contribute to the European Project?

11

Overcome Current Crisis?

 Electorate not educated in spirit of the constitution  Dysfunctional political system  Huge reform agenda - poor delivery capacity  Strong political leadership - but isolated  Success depends initially on state capacity to deliver

reform

12

Consequences of Political Culture

 No sense of responsibility for the crisis  No agreed framework of analysis  Outright opposition from New Democracy, trade

unions, professions, students, media etc.

 No ownership of solution, no buy-in  NOT a basis for long term reform

13

Consequences

 Political leadership operating off narrow support

base

 Open to ambush – internal and external  Doubts over government’s ability to run full term  This adds to feeling of insecurity about future  A lot riding on Papandreou

14

The State – Public Service

 Public service riddled by patronage  No professional civil service  Overstaffed, overpaid, generous perks and pensions  Under-skilled, poorly organised  Unreformed (like 18th century Ireland)

15

Consequences

 Poor quality advice – partisan approach  No “neutral” civil service  The state is weak and inefficient  Does not have the capacity to act effectively  NOT the basis for long-term reform

16

The Juvenal Factor

 “Who will guard the guardians?”  So, who will reform the reformers?  No skills to reform the civil service  Outside capacity building programmes needed  Fundamental task is reform of the culture

17

Stay in the euro?

 Depends on four factors  Introduction of “stability culture”  Implementation of reform agenda  Modernisation of economy  EU style “Marshall Plan”

18

Economy

 Closed, no industrial revolution  Composed of SMEs and self employed  Bureaucratic obstacles to enterprise  No development strategy, like Ireland  NOT the basis for long-term growth

19

Ability to Contribute to EU?

 YES - Greece has four key positives:  Cosmopolitan educated elite - new social ethic  Institutional framework in place - foundations  Cadre of administrators etc - capacity potential  Intelligentsia - among the best

20

Reflections

 Greek systemic problems known thirty years ago  It can comply with conditions for EU membership  But not with conditions for euro membership  Failure of Greece - failure of euro - failure of EU?  Conclusion - save Greece to save euro to save EU

21

Ireland as a Template

 Agreed economic development model  Multi-party political system encourages policy

continuity

 Efficient civil/public services and institutions  “Neutral” state, transparency, integrity  Social Solidarity - “Ireland Inc”

22

Political Challenge for EU

 “We can’t do it on our own. We must be made do

it.”

 “Please keep up the pressure - don’t let up”.  Success lies in political will and state capacity  How do we sustain the first and build the second?  Formalise “political” criteria for euro membership?

23

Questions

 Is intrusive interference in MS affairs permissible?  Who acts? Other MS, Council, Commission, EP?  What is to be done with a failed political entity?  Need for political equivalent of Maastricht criteria?  Is EU heading for a Directoire?

24

Closing Remarks

 Greece can’t do it on its own: a pre – modern society  Saving Greece is worthwhile – act of solidarity  Needs new political thinking about European

integration

 New EU is 25emerging  Modern Greece being built for the first time

25