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Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 1 Fertility Decisions in Transition: Highly-Educated Young Adult’s Views on Fertility Three Decades Apart in Spain Xiana Bueno Harvard University Abstract: Spain has had low fertility levels for almost thirty years now. Qualitative interviews with highly-educated young adults from two studies in 1985 and 2012 provide a unique opportunity to explore their fertility intentions across two generations almost thirty years apart. Both studies share an uncertain economic context characterized by high unemployment. Economic insecurity, therefore, stands out as a stagnant factor behind fertility intentions of both generations coupled with the lack of support for work-life balance. Interviewees' reasoning also suggests that besides the advancements in gender equity the transition of gender-role norms towards greater egalitarianism remain unfinished. However, results indicate that changing age and family norms underline the differences between the fertility decision-making of respondents from the 1980s and 2010s setting aside the Second Demographic Transition. This study contributes to the debate

• n the central role of gender equity at the individual and the institutional level.

Keywords: low fertility, highly educated, Spain, comparative analysis, interviews

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 2 Introduction It has been more than three decades since Spain has joined the group of low-fertility countries. Spanish total fertility rate declined sharply after 1975 and crossed in 1982 below the two-child red

• line. From then on, below replacement fertility in Spain, and other post-industrial societies, has

been the focus of the research agenda in demography, among other disciplines, especially since survey data confirms the persistence of the two-child norm as couples’ ideal family size (Sobotka & Beaujouan, 2014). One of the significant concerns among demographers has been to study the effect of the fertility postponement and whether or not low-fertility is a reversible or transitional phenomenon (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998, Bongaarts 2002; Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999, McDonald 2002). In the 1990s, demographers explained the decline in fertility that spread across many European countries since 1960s as the consequence of a series of changes in family norms and new patterns of family formation that resulted primarily from changes in gender roles after females’ incorporation to the labor market and greater individual autonomy. Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa (1986) and Van de Kaa (1987) gave to these set of changes the name of the second demographic transition (SDT). Spanish demographers embraced the SDT perspective to explain the fertility decline after 1975 in the light of the changes observed in family formation patterns, particularly the delay in the mean age at first child (Alberdi 1995, Bernardi and Requena 2003, Delgado et al. 2006, Devolder and Cabré 2009). Despite the initial relatively good reception of SDT perspective among demographers and its wide usage to explain changes in family formation, time uncover some contestant reactions in the discipline. To many, SDT is ambiguous and its main criticism is that as a “transition”, its starting and endpoint has never been defined (Cliquet 1991), while the concept itself implies a convergence of behaviors across countries that it has not been

• bserved (Sobotka 2008). In recent years, the debate on fertility behavior in postindustrial

societies has evolved towards the centrality of gender-role norms and individuals’ gender-role

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 3 ideology positing that greater gender egalitarianism is the keystone for couple’s fulfillment of their fertility aspirations (McDonald 2000a, 2000b, Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015, Goldscheider, et

• al. 2015). However, at the micro level of analysis, individual’s reasoning on fertility decisions from

the time of emerging new family behaviors has never been analyzed through the lens of the SDT. Does young adults’ reasoning on family formation has evolved or has remained steady? How valid are the theoretical explanations in the past today? Is today’s young adult reasoning on family formation similar to the one that their parents’ generation had thirty years back? The aim of this study is to contribute to the scientific debate on fertility behavior by exploring whether the reasoning behind the fertility decisions of young adults in the middle 1980s was similar, or not, to one of young adults in the early 2010s. This work leverage the great opportunity

• f analyzing original qualitative materials carried out in 1985 and 2012. Both are periods of

economic uncertainty with unemployment rates over 20 percent among 25-34-year-old

• individuals. The possibility of comparing the narratives about the family formation of two

generations almost thirty years apart appeared to be an alluring occasion. The research designs of the two non-related projects from 1985 and 2012, have several commonalities that make them extraordinary appealing to be compared to each other. Both use qualitative in-depth interviews carried out in the urban areas of Madrid and Barcelona to native, highly-educated, young adults of similar ages, experiencing different stages of the family formation process. In common, they have an uncertain economic context characterized by high unemployment, but young adults from the 1980’s experienced their family formation in a context stricken by a strong social, political and demographic change after dictator Franco died in 1975. Both sets of interviews represent valuable materials to explore attitudes and experiences of young adults towards gender roles and fertility. We select only highly-educated individuals for a threefold purpose. First, higher human capital has been associated with a greater likelihood of fulfilling fertility aspirations (Toulemon and Testa

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 4 2005). Second, previous empirical research has found a close link between higher-education and gender egalitarianism (Blau 1998). Third, it has been pointed out that highly-educated individuals have been the forerunners of fertility change (Skirbekk 2008, Sobotka 2008). Explaining fertility decline: the process of fertility transition Second Demographic Transition (SDT) is the name given by Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa in 1986 to a set of interrelated changes on family formation that has been associated with the decline of fertility in Western societies and the weakening of the traditional gender-role model. Three sets of changes can be identified. First, cultural changes mainly related with a shift of values on the partnership behavior and new family models such as the secularization process, the increase of divorce rate, the spread of non-marital cohabitation, the larger social acceptance of births out of wedlock, as well as single-parent families or other family arrangements. Likewise, cultural changes also refer to a greater individualistic values and individual autonomy and a greater importance of self-fulfillment. Second, technological and legal changes such as the general access to contraceptive measures, the development of assisted reproduction, or the legalization of safe abortion under certain assumptions. And third, structural changes such as the educational expansion and the incorporation of women into the labor market. In short, according to SDT the life-cycle transitions have become more frequent, less strictly patterned and more complex (Lesthaeghe 1995). It escapes to the aim of this study to bring here the debate of whether or not the SDT represents a common pattern for a plurality of societies, as one of its main critics stands for (Sobotka 2008). Changes associated with the SDT are also changes closely linked with a shift in the gender role division of labor. The end of the prevalence of the male-breadwinner model led to the onset of a new, and not yet solved, gender-role conflict, based on the inability of social institutions and

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 5 individual behaviors to adapt to the new dual-earner model for families. In McDonald’s (2000b) terms, there is an incoherence between a high level of gender-equity in social institutions addressed to individuals (i.e. access to education and the labor market), and a low gender-equity level in social institutions that deal with families, such as labor market characteristics (i.e. working hours flexibility, gender wage gap), as well as the State intervention in supporting families (i.e. tax system, parental and childcare leave policies). Indeed, the gender dimension of fertility behavior has recently been under the microscope of social scientists under different labels such as the Gender Equity Theory (McDonald 2000a, 2000b), the Female Revolution (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015), or the Gender Revolution (Goldscheider, et al. 2015). The related concern for this work is whether or not the characteristics associated to the SDT are present on the individual’s narratives as reasons, obstacles, or concerns on their fertility decisions and if they persist over time on two generations thirty years apart. The subsequent implication will shed light on the concept of the transition itself informing about the length of such transition and to what extent is the fertility decline an exclusive consequence of this process or not. The main expectation of this work is that the reasons affecting fertility decisions exposed by interviewees in the eighties were broadly represented by what the SDT posits, but not exclusively. Other structural factors such as the economic uncertainty and the work-life conflict are present. But while structural changes are expected to remain over time, changes related to the SDT as a reasons influencing fertility decisions, will come to an end due to its transitioning nature. The Spanish context: Determinants of the fertility decline Figure 1 shows that Total Fertility Rate was in 1985 well below replacement level (1.64) and on the track to cross the barrier of 1.5 children per women which would tag Spain as a low fertility

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 6 country in 1987. In 2012, the TFR decreased until 1.27 children per woman, acquiring a new tag of lowest-low fertility country that it had been already applied between 1993 and 2003, and again since 2011 onwards if we attend only to Spanish citizens. At the same time, the mean age at first child had uninterruptedly increased during the period, being six years apart between the time of

• ur interviews from 1985 when it was of 25.8 years old, and 2012 when it was of 30.9 years old.
• - Figure 1 about here --

The continuous postponement of the first child, and the fall in the birth rates of the third and fourth orders, are the two most important demographic explanations of the transition of Spain to a low fertility country (Bernardi and Requena 2003; Delgado and Livi-Bacci 1992; Delgado, López, and Barrios 2006; Osona and Kohler 2001). Likewise, this postponement of fertility must be understood within the context of a variety of social and economic changes that are inevitably linked one another. The transition to democracy in Spain after Franco’s death in 1975 brought radical changes and transformations that lead Spain towards the modernization of the economy and the society. Important changes in family-related policies were achieved: the use of contraceptives was approved in 1978, the divorce law arrived in 1981 and the abortion was legalized in 1985. However, since that time Spain has also been characterized by a high unemployment level that must be described as structural over time. Democracy also meant the flexibility of gender roles due to the women educational expansion and the consequent increase in female labor-force

• participation. Spain has arrived to have lowest-low fertility levels and latest-late mean age at first

child (Billari and Kohler 2004) through a process driven by the combination of two main forces. First, couples assess the opportunity cost of having children (as Becker’s (1960) New Household Economics Theory posits) due to men and women preference for supporting females’ labor-force

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 7

• participation. Second, the high levels of economic uncertainty for young adults made difficult their

economic independence, and the access to the housing market. In consequence, it resulted in a delay for life events progress, including the timing for leaving the parental home, the union formation, and the arrival of the first child (Baizán, Aassve, and Billari 2003). In addition, albeit Spain gender-role attitudes have evolved fast to higher gender-egalitarian levels (Arpino, et al. 2015), the pace of change is slower when it concerns to behaviors (Abril, et.al. 2015) resulting in a non-solved gender-role conflict. Data and methods Two qualitative studies. This analysis is based on two independent qualitative studies on family formation carried out between May and November of 1985 and between January and July of

• 2012. Data collected in 1985 comes from the research study “The Couple’s Formation: Madrid and

Barcelona, 19851”, whereas data collected in 2012 come from the study “Gender Equity and Fertility in Postindustrial Societies2.” Both were carried out in the metropolitan areas of Madrid and Barcelona, to men and women of similar ages and in different stages of the family formation

• process. Even though, the research interests behind each study were slightly different –the

emerging non-marital cohabitation in the former data, and the link between gender and fertility in the later data-, the interview scripts were noticeably alike. In both studies, interviewees provided details about their economic and job situation, the couple’s union formation and parenthood intentions, housework and childcare division of labor, or gender role attitudes among others. In addition, a questionnaire regarding socio-demographic characteristics was filled out in both cases. Although both studies interviewed individuals, the information obtained accounts also for

1 The study was directed by Prof. Anna Alabart, Prof. Anna Cabré and Prof. Verena Stoclke at the Center for

Demographic Studies in Barcelona (Spain.)

2 The study was directed by Prof. Mary C. Brinton at Harvard University in Cambridge (The U.S.)

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 8 extended information on the respondents’ spouses and partners. The richness of materials provides details not only on the present situation of the couples, but also their past experiences and their expectations for the future. Interviews were conducted face-to-face with no other family

• r household members present and lasted from 60 to 120 minutes. All interviews were recorded

and later transcribed in full. Sample characteristics. In both cases, a corresponding subsample has been selected compounded

• f interviewees, men and women, in stable unions holding a higher education degree. By focusing
• nly on highly-educated people, we not only minimize the social class heterogeneity for the

qualitative comparative analysis, but also focus on the group of individuals that have been considered the precursors of the fertility change, as well as tend to hold more egalitarian gender- role values. The sample from 1985 consists in 44 respondents, while there are 53 respondents from 2012. Table 1 summarizes the basic socio-demographic characteristics of both samples. Interviewees from 2012 are equally distributed by sex, however in 1985 males double females given that higher education among women was less frequent by then. Although the age range is wider for the earlier data (20 to 40 years old) than in 2012 (24-35), the mean ages are similar, 29.3 and 30.3 respectively. A remarkable difference between two samples is that the research design of the 80’s study allowed for respondents having two children. Therefore, a quarter of its sample are parents of two children while all respondents from 2012 have one or none children. The sample of 1985 was purposely made of a bigger sample of cohabiters. Rather than a limitation entails an advantage for the purpose of this study since allows to contrast the narratives of those, the cohabiters, that can be considered the forerunners of the SDT compared to those who hold more conservative ideologies.

• -- Table 1 about here ---

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 9 Findings Results are organized in three sections that follow the comparison between both samples in their narratives for fertility decision-making processes. Table 2 offers a summarizing table of the

• btained results.
• -- Table 2 about here ---

Transitioners and transitioned The comparison of the narratives on fertility decisions of respondents from the two qualitative studies suggest that the many of the obstacles and conditions that were present through the voices of respondents in 1985, and that were associated to the SDT, become meaningless among respondents in 2012. These reasoning can be grouped in two sets of changes: changes in age norms and changes in union formation. Changes in age norms. As mentioned, the decline of fertility in Spain has been associated as the result of the delay in life-cycle transitions (i.e. adulthood, union formation) and consequently the postponement of the first and subsequent children. This postponement has also generated a shift in what it is considered an appropriate age to have children, that is, a shift in age norms. In this study, two examples illustrate this shift. First, among respondents from the 1985 study we found a twofold reasoning. In one hand, there are a number of respondents who unexpectedly became pregnant at a young age (under 25 years old), reason that immediately speed up other life transitions like marriage or finding a job. In the other hand, there are respondents that manifest an explicit interest for enjoying their period of being childfree to focus in personal projects or their career development or simply to enjoy their lives as a childless couple. These respondents represent the values of individualism and argue for their right to choose on their life decisions, one

• f the features that characterize the SDT. Guillermo for example had 24 years old in 1985. He and

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 10 his partner are a childless dual-earner couple and both hold a university degree in psychology. They are not planning to have a child at least until being close to his 30s. What conditions do you need in order to have a child? Mainly… comfort. Having a child would limit us too much. I don’t know, our relationship, but also many other aspects of our life, at work, at socializing with others, and this is mainly what influences [our decision]. We don’t have a deadline, maybe in 5 years we can start trying, but first, we want to stay some years without children. Also because we don’t want to live for a very long time in the same place, or work at the same company… and in this sense, a child conditions [your life] a lot. Respondents in the 2012 sample also mentioned the idea of “enjoying childlessness” before having kids, but the meaning and the age reference is different for them. For many of them having enjoyed childlessness is a reason for deciding to have a kid, rather than a reason to postpone parenthood as we have seen in the eighties’ sample. Cristian is 33 years old and his partner is 31. They had a 1-year-old daughter in 2012. When he is explaining his fatherhood experience he states: … [I don’t miss] To go to parties, go out at night, and this kind of things… We used to do it but we were already tired of it [by the time we had our daughter], to be honest. We have already spent many years doing it and we got tired of it. The second example that illustrate the shift in age norms is the social and family pressure that respondents from the eighties felt to become parents. Some interviewees in 1985 express how their parenthood decisions are somehow influenced by the pressure they feel to have children at a certain age. This is the case of Maria Jesús, a 25 year-old childless administrative in 1985 whose husband works as a mechanic. I think [I will have] one [child] and let’s see. I don’t really like them [children], this is the

• true. I don’t like children and If I have one, I will have it because… it seems that at a certain

age you should have a kid, or because both of us need it, or I don’t know why…. But at a certain time there is this need… … He doesn’t say anything. He says that not [to have children] yet, not now… maybe in a few years. [He says] that I still have 5 years [ahead]. I said to him that when I turn 30 we can have one [child].

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 11 Although the entire sample from 2012 reported their intention to have children someday (all of them belong to stable partnerships), the majority of them felt relax in terms of social or family

• pressure. While declaring that their parents might feel sad if the respondent ends up not having

children, they also state that their decision would be respected by their family. For them, the concept of pressure does not appear in their narratives as coming from family or society. Conversely, it appears related to the feeling of being “running out of time” when for some of them –mostly women, but also men- the biological clock starts ticking. It is the mentioned shift in age norms for family formation what makes this former reasoning less likely to come from interviewees in the eighties. Changes in union formation norms. The second set of reasons expressed by respondents in 1985 that are missing in 2012 interviewees’ narratives have to do with changes linked to partnership

• formation. The most important one is not only the secularization process, but also the progressive

loss of legitimation of the institution of marriage. Since the study from 1985 had as main purpose to explore the emergence of non-marital cohabitation in Spain the sample is also purposely over representing cohabiters. Still, the number of married couples doubles the number of cohabiters in

• ur sample. While the catholic church plays an active role on fertility decisions for some of the

married respondents whose fertility intentions are the ones that “God’s will” (implying the no use

• f contraceptive measures), this is more an anecdote than a norm in the 1985 study. The norm for

these respondents, however, is that marriage should precede the birth of the first child. It is there a necessary condition for many respondents in order to become parents. This is the case of Esther a 23-year-old childless primary school teacher that cohabit with her partner of 27-years-old teacher as well, in 1985. She talks about marriage as an “administrative” condition before having a child and about how she also received the family pressure from her parents. Her words reflect as well the younger age norms for parenthood in the eighties.

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 12 Anything will change, it is just the matter of having a paper. We have concluded that, if we are going to get married, it will be by the time we want to have a kid, which actually we are starting to think about, especially him, who is already 27 years-old. We know for sure that we want to have children, but I still see myself very young. I tell him “let’s wait until I have 25 or so” and he respects it… … then, yes, we will get married because of the child and also because I will make my parents happy. It is not a big deal. With the 21st century non-marital cohabitation becomes well-accepted in the Spanish society. As a matter of fact, more than a forty percent of babies in Spain in 2012 were born from non-married

• mothers. With very few exceptions, respondents from the 2012 study did not express that

marriage would be a condition for their transition to parenthood. Indeed, many of those who are already parents are not married, or got married after having a baby. Whereas cohabitation is extensively accepted, it is still far from being the norm. Young adults in Spain continue getting

• married. For many, marriage has a symbolic meaning of commitment, but for many others means

an administrative procedure that offers some advantages, such as to obtain certain benefits from employers or for better conditions in paying taxes. Thus, among the younger generation in this study, marriage is far from being a pre-condition for having children. A second difference in union formation and childbearing that emerges comparing both samples is the presence in 1985 of numerous shotgun marriages, that is, hurried marriages that followed an unexpected pregnancy. Technological changes such as the wide use of contraceptive measures and legal changes such us the legitimation of abortion under certain assumptions, contributed to the individuals’ right of choosing the timing of their parenthood. It does not mean that there were not unexpected pregnancies among respondents in 2012. There were a few, but the majority of them happened to couples in which both partners were in their early thirties, and who were already in a stable relationship. Thus, the implications of an unexpected pregnancy for ones and the others were diametrically different. Some respondents in 1985 explained their experience regretting sometimes to have had to give up many things for having started a family. Felix is one of

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• them. He and his partner were 24 years old in 1985, and she got pregnant when they were 18. He

hesitates when he is asked about having a second child. His testimonial reflects as well the individualism values mentioned in the previous section. Not at the moment. No because she wants to continue studying in the University, she just has started so. She is now in the second year at the business school and she wants to continue, then a child would interrupt [her studies]. And in addition… I am very happy with my kid but we also have to live our own life and having another kid means, at least for another 4 years, to be very focus on the child without doing our own life, without… Do you know what I mean? Without being able to live, socialize with others. Then, at least for now, we prefer to have only one and we don’t want more kids. A third interesting aspect in this comparison on the reasoning for fertility has to do with the feeling of provisionality for cohabiters, and instability for married couples had in some respondents from the eighties. In those years in which non-marital cohabitation and the legalization of divorce burst into the, until then, apparently stable and homogeneous marriages, the individual autonomy of partners for many couples was a necessary condition and sometimes an obstacle for the well-being of the couple. However, for some respondents it becomes a concern that stops them from deciding to have a child or a reason for delaying the decision. Moncho’s reasoning illustrates this idea. He is a 25-years-old father of a 5-years old child in 1985. His partner is also 25-years-old and both hold university degrees. I would like to have another child. Honestly, I wish I have had another child some time ago, especially for our child, to not grow up lonely. She [his wife] … she has always been more hesitant, not only because of the economic situation… She… I don’t know if she was looking for certain stability, emotional stability within our relationship, well… I mean, I never ever asked her, or imposed on her to be faithful to me or not to be faithful to me. It is, in any case, her problem and not mine. And well, recently we have decided that it is the right moment, and we are going to try it [to have a second child]. Again, it is not argued here that respondents from the younger generation interviewed in 2012, did not express instability in their relationships and the necessity of being emotionally ready as a couple in order to have a child. What it is argued is that the changes in union patters happened during the three decades that separate respondents from both studies make that couples in 2012

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 14 are in general more democratic being significant that none of the respondents brought up the issue of open-relationships as a reasoning that conditions fertility decisions. Gender in transition The previous section presented a set of reasons that interviewees from 1985 expressed to justify their fertility decisions and that represented most of the changes gathered under the umbrella of the second demographic transition. Changes that are not present anymore in young adults’ narratives on fertility thirty years later. However, the changes in gender-roles associated with the SDT have not yet been fully incorporated in individuals and institutions. Gender-roles change towards greater egalitarianism have experienced a considerable advancement since 1985 but it is still in transition. Two aspects of this unfinished gender-role transition needs to be highlighted as

• bstacles and conditions for fertility within the frame of this study: the changes in females’ labor

force participation and the remaining gender inequality in the household. These two sets of reasons are present in the narratives of many respondents from 2012, but also started to appear in those respondents from 1985 who hold a more progressive ideology and who coincide with those who were in stable cohabiting relationships by that time (Alabart et al. 1988b). Cohabiters from 1985 can be considered the forerunners of the value change. Females’ labor force participation. It is extensively accepted in the scientific community that the female educational expansion and greater labor force participation has been, coupled with the economic uncertainty, the main factors influencing the postponement of the age at first child and, eventually, the fertility decline in Spain. We find a twofold pattern of female labor force participation among respondents from the eighties. In one hand, there were couples in which the male partner was the breadwinner and the female partner either was a stay-at-home wife or mother or was working part-time considering their labor-force participation as a “hobby” or a

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 15 small contribution –named by themselves as “help”- to complement the household income (see results from the original project in Alabart et al. 1988a). For them, female labor force participation was not a priority, and it was not among the reasons explaining their fertility decisions. In the

• ther hand, there were a small number of more progressive couples, the emerging transitioners,

for which having or not a(nother) child was subject to the female partner stability in the labor-

• market. María Luisa is a 21 years old childless college student cohabiting with her partner who is a
• photographer. In spite of her youth, she has a number of plans for her future among which

becoming a mother will arrive after fulfilling other personal goals. Not now, but in the distant future. I need to do many things until the moment arrives in which I can say “Well, this is the right moment to have a child” because a child is a lot… If you have a child, you need certain conditions…. And, right now, I don’t have enough time, and I don’t consider myself mature enough to have a child… I think, at least, at least not in 10 years. Because now, now I want to finish my studies, I want to go study abroad… and well, then, I want to continue doing things like that. I want to work, and have a good job. And of course, if you have a child you cannot focus in jobs that require from you many hours or the whole day. However, Maria Luisa was part of a minority in the sample from 1985. When comparing interviewees’ narratives from both studies, it becomes clear that placing females’ job and career development before the transition to parenthood turns out a very common, although not generalized, reasoning for respondents in 2012. By then, female labor-force participation increased substantially in Spain. Indeed, according to OECD statistics female labor force participation of women aged 25-54 years old increased from 35.1% in 1985 to 81.1 in 2012, but job precariousness and unemployment remained affecting more females than males, as it is reflected in our samples as well. Manuel and her partner represent one of those cases. They were 30 and 29 years old respectively in 2012. Both hold university degrees but while he has a full-time job as a researcher, she works part-time in an unsatisfying job non-related to her field of studies.

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 16 In our case, the most important is that my partner wants it [have a child]. I have told her that whenever she wants, whenever she feels ready and considers that it is the right

• moment. Economically, I think we can afford it now, but it will depend on when she feels

fulfilled in other aspects. She wants to wait. Gender inequality in the household. Traditional gender-roles and the male breadwinner models was still deeply rooted in the Spain of 1985 and our sample. As it will be address in the next section, the economic crisis led many women to participate in the labor-market in order to complement the household income but usually from a secondary earner role. In addition, the majority of women in the 1985 sample were also responsible of most of the housework chores and childcare tasks (Alabart, et al 1988). As noted before, some of the female respondents from 1985 (and female partners of male respondents) were stay-at-home mothers, who often quit their jobs and careers to become mothers. This was exactly the case of Mariví, a 31-year-old biologist mother of two children in 1985, who stop working with the arrival of her first child. In light of the unequal distribution of unpaid job at home, Mariví rejects her husband suggestion of having a third child. He is a 42-year-old journalist. My husband wouldn’t mind [having another child] (She laughs). He thinks three is ok. But

• f course! He doesn’t take care of them… Me? Three? No, no, no, no. Don’t even talk about

it, no way, Jose. I mean, it is great to dedicate my life to them, and I love them [my children], but they drive you crazy, they exhaust you, precisely because I am devoted to them… …Here is the thing, if I spend half of the day outside and then I spend a little time with them in the afternoon, then I would probably have a different view. But when the evening arrives, I am fed up with them, and now, I don’t see myself with another child… forget it! The plurality of women from the 1985 sample, besides having a job, assumed their role as primary housekeepers and caregivers with little negotiation with their partners. They were the women carrying the second shift (Hochschild, 1989). Those who reported a more equal distribution of labor at home coincide with the overrepresented subsample of cohabiters. They were the precursors of the change.

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 17 In recent years, Spain have reached levels of gender-equality similar to those of many other Western European countries (Arpino et al. 2015). However, previous research on family and fertility in Spain has also shown that egalitarian gender-role attitudes are not necessary translated into egalitarian behaviors (Abril et al. 2015). In the 2012 sample, even though more than half of the sample reported having gender-egalitarian dynamics at home, the conflicts within the couple related with the distribution of housework were also a constant, especially coming from female

• interviewees. Daniel is one of the 2012 respondents who perform egalitarian behaviors but from a

passive attitude, meaning that his partner carries with the logistics and decisions of the household. He is 35 and she is 34. Both work full-time and they are parents of a 2-year-old daughter. He knows that in order to have a second child he will need to be more involved in the housework and childcare. Well, the truth is that it [the housework distribution] is a little unbalanced eh, that is, she handles the issue of cooking and meals and I do more cleaning and that sort of things,

• basically. And with respect to our daughter ... the truth is that we started a dynamic and

now it is complicated to change it. And these are that kind of thing that we discuss and generates a conflict in order to have a second child… …with the experience of the first [child], we will have to be much more involved, the two of us, to better distribute the tasks and keep in mind that the dedication will be double [for two kids]. Stagnation: uncertain economic context and insufficient family policies Finally, this section presents the reasoning on fertility that interviewees from both studies shared in their narratives in spite of the passage of three decades. Saving the differences, both studies where carried out in a context of economic crisis and low investment in family policies, which were both reflected in interviewees’ reasoning on fertility. Economic stability. The most common condition for fertility alluded by respondents either in the eighties or thirty years later was to achieve certain economic stability in relation with the fact that having a child is perceived as costly, sometimes a “luxury”. Both studies were carried out in times

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 18

• f economic crisis. Economic uncertainty can be considered an intrinsic characteristic of Spain

during the last four decades and high levels of unemployment has been a structural part of the labor-market. Unemployment rate for individuals aged 25-34 years old in 1985 and 2012 were of 21.6% and 27.6% respectively. And although the interviewed individuals in this study had certain human capital (at least post-secondary education) the subjective perception of economic insecurity among them was also present in many of their narratives, even when both partners were employed. It affects not only the timing of childbearing but also the number of intended children (Domingo 1988). In the 1985 sample, Felipe represents this reasoning. He is a 37-year-old employee for an electrical company and his wife is a primary school teacher. Yes, we want to have a second child, but so far the decision depends on, mainly, the job situation we have gone through, that it has influenced us in not having yet another kid, because [having another kid] would have brought economic problems to the family, so it stop us. And also because of some other aspects of my job… which are preventing us of having another child right now. While unemployment in the eighties sample affected to eight of the couples, in 2012, a total of 18 couples had one of their partners unemployed. Men were more affected in 1985, whereas in twelve of eighteen couples from 2012 was the female partner who was unemployed. At the same time, there are in the recent study compared with the eighties’ study more couples in which the female partner out earns the male partner or it is the sole provider. Ruth and her partner are one

• f these couples. They were 26 and 28 respectively in 2012 and would like to become parents. She

talks about the main obstacle for having the first child. Right now? My partners’ job [is stopping us from having a child]. His salary is too low. I have a fellowship [for four years] and [the salary] is more than what I used to earn before, but it is still crap. If he could have a more or less average salary, then maybe… [we would go for it] But, he has now a temporary contract, that implies certain instability. It is also true that he wouldn’t mind working in whatever other things if it would be necessary. I know he will respond, but yeah… now it is not a good moment.

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 19 In relation to the search for economic stability respondents often mentioned reasons related to the access to housing, although in two different ways. Respondents from 1985 tend to mention housing ownership as a condition for having a child, whereas respondent in 2012 reported the necessity to obtain more space (a bigger apartment) in order to have a(nother) child. For the former, accessing to housing ownership was presenting frequently as a necessary condition before having a child, while for the later, the culture of ownership haves lost some strength, and although

• wn their home is described as a desire it is not always affordable.

Shortage of family policies. No matter if it is today or thirty years ago, the insufficient intervention

• f the State in supporting families is a shared perception among our interviews. Young couples

need to make arrangements in their daily life to be able to combine work and family, and this becomes particularly struggling during the 0-3-year-old of the child. In the eighties, those who have more conservative values opted for a male-breadwinner, female-caregiver model, whereas those couples who did not assume those roles, either postponed their parenthood or dealt with the work-family conflict. Menchu was in 1985 a 24-year old, married, childless, administrative

• fficer and IT student. She and her partner had stable jobs in the public administration, and they

were saving to buy an apartment. As a dual-earner couple, they envision children after some years when their jobs allow them, at least for one of them, a certain flexibility in their working hours. Yes, but in a few years... My plan is, well, besides finishing the IT studies and having our

• wn apartment, I would like that at least one of us have a flexible schedule to take care of

the child… …because what I don’t see logic is that… ok, after the three months of breastfeeding leave and maternity leave that they [the state] give you, and because both parents start working at 7 am, you then have to put your child in the daycare at 6 am. It’s inhuman! But, well, it’s what most of the people have to do, right? And maybe it’s going to be the same for us... But we would like that… maybe not me for my type of job, but he, being a psychologist, a liberal profession, he might have a job in which he can start at 9 am, so the child can have a more normal life and not be at the daycare at 6 am… because the fact is that it happens in Madrid, if you start working at 8 am and you live in the suburbs, you have to leave home two hours earlier. I guess in Barcelona too…”

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 20 Thirty years later, this type of reasoning is still in young adult’s voices. During the last three decades, improvements in parental leaves and public childcare availability were limited. Paternity leave, implemented since 1930’s, consisted in 2 days by 1985 and it was not extended to 15 days until 2007. Maternity leave started in 1980 and consisted of 16 non-transferable weeks. Up to four

• f them became transferable to the father between 1989 and 1999, and afterward, it was

extended to ten weeks. The Spanish parental leave system increases, then, gender inequality by preserving gender differences associated with gender role specialization (Lapuerta, Baizán, and González, 2011.) Childcare leaves are generous in its length, but they remain unpaid. Respondents from the 2012 sample expressed the difficulty of taking unpaid childcare leaves and be able to live with only one salary. Paradoxically, the limited availability of public daycares and the high cost of private ones lead individuals to think in terms like Clara does. Clara is, in 2012, a 24-year old, mother of one child who works for a transportation company. She expresses what would have happened if her daughter would not have access to a public daycare: It is true that more and more there are people who say ‘considering what I have to pay for the daycare, I prefer to stay at home and take care of them [the children] myself.’ I also prefer this, because I cannot [afford to] pay 400€ for daycare if my child doesn't get into the public daycare. I make 800€, if I pay four hundred, imagine that I have two kids, you’d have to pay 800, to do that I would rather stay at home, obviously. Clara’s salary is especially low, but her reasoning comes up among several couples as a situation that might happen to them or around them. All couples in 2012 sample are dual-earner couples, the majority of which do not consider the possibility of one of the partners assuming the role of

• caregiver. An alternative arrangement for them is obtaining the support of the family network,

grandparents in most cases.

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 21 Discussion This paper compares the reasoning on fertility decisions in two generations almost thirty years

• apart. It is the result of the thrilling opportunity of analyzing two independent qualitative studies

carried out in 1985 and 2012 in Spain. Its aim and research question relies on whether the reasoning behind the fertility decision-making of young adults in the middle 1980s was similar, or not, to one of the young adults in the early 2010s. The lens of the second demographic transition is applied to evaluate the steadiness of fertility reasoning across two generations that could easily represent parents and their children generation being asked about fertility while both being young adults. Is today’s young adult reasoning on family formation similar to the one that their parents’ generation had thirty years back? Whereas for the parent’s generation the reasoning that drove their family formation decisions in the 80’s was largely linked to obstacles and conditions associated with the Second Demographic Transition; results show that the next generation has mostly surpassed those barriers due to the changes in age and union formation norms being an important part of their fertility intentions mainly explained by the unfinished transition of gender- role norms, not only at the individual level (i.e. gender-role attitudes, housework and childcare division of labor) but also at the institutional level (i.e. labor market, family policies). Also, it has been noticed on interviewees how the persistent economic uncertainty remains as a stagnant reason that influences the timing of fertility and eventually the intended number of children that respondents wish to have. Likewise, it is possible to identify, among 1980’s respondents, those who represented the forerunners of the changes in family norms. They coincide for the most part with the subsample of

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 22 respondents in non-marital cohabitation that purposely was overrepresented to understand the emergence of cohabitation in the eighties. The gender-role conflict is, therefore, the result of the process that the second demographic transition started. Many of the obstacles and constraints that individuals faced during the 80s to form their families were directly related with the SDT, but they are not present anymore in the reasoning of younger generations given that certain aspects of the transition have come to an end. Besides, results show how other factors related to the economic and institutional context remain still along the passing of time. What implications do these results have for the debate on fertility in Spain? From the analysis of reasoning on fertility decisions in two different generations, it can be concluded that the obstacles and conditions associated to the SDT have been set aside by newer generations, but SDT gave place to a gender-role transition which has not yet been completed. The reasoning on fertility has, therefore, a dynamic component that adapts to the social change and norms, and, apparently, a static component fruit of an exogenous factor, the economic context. The thin interrelation between the economic context, the institutional context, and the unfinished gender-role transition explains why a great deal of young adults in Spain are (and were) unable to meet their fertility aspirations. During a period of economic recession, public expenditure in welfare system drops, including family policies, contributing to a persistent gender-unequal childcare leave system and to the lack of protection in the labor market. This situation difficult labor-market flexibility in helping parents to face the work-life balance which, in consequence, perpetuates gender-inequality within the households.

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 23 Figure 1: Total Fertility Rate and Mean Age at First Child, Spain, 1975-2015. Note: Data after 2001 refers only to Spanish citizens. Source: Demographic series, Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE.)

24.0 25.0 26.0 27.0 28.0 29.0 30.0 31.0 32.0 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00 2.20 2.40 2.60 2.80 3.00 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Age children per woman

Mean age at 1st birth Total Fertility Rate

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 24 Table 1: Samples’ main characteristics, 1985 and 2012. 1985 2012 N 43 53 Sex Females 16 27 Males 27 26 Age range 20 to 40 24 to 35 Mean age 29.3 30.3 Life-stage Childless 20 28 One-child 13 25 Two-children 10 Intended number of children Less than two 9 9 Two 13 24 More than two 6 15 (missing or uncertain) 15 5 Mean 1.80 (N=28) 2.08 (N=48) Source: Interview materials.

Paper submitted to IPC-IUSSP, Cape Town, South Africa, 2017 25 Table 2: Summary table comparing the reasoning on fertility decisions of respondents from 1985 and 2012. Reasoning stage Observed changes 1985 2012 Transitioned Age norms Enjoy childlessness (Already enjoyed childlessness) Pressure from family relatives (No social or family pressure, pressure from biological age) Union formation norms Marriage as a requirement (religiosity) (Cohabitation equals marriage (general secularization)) Unexpected pregnancies at young ages that lead to marriage (Spread of contraceptive use and abortion) Couples' instability influences fertility decisions (Open-relationships does not come out) In transition Gender-role norms Traditional model or female labor participation as a hobby or "help" for household income Career development of both partners and rejection of the traditional model Women assumed more housework without negotiation More gender egalitarianism in housework and childcare Stagnation Institutional context Economic stability Economic stability Ownership as a condition Cost of housing as a concern Lack of work-flexibility and work-life conflict Lack of work-flexibility and work-life conflict Note: Reasons expressed by respondents from one generation or the other are expressed in bold. Source: Interview materials.

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