44 pt Object security In web of things t pt JOHN MATTSSON GÖRAN SELANDER ΆΈΉΊΌΎΏΐΑΒΓΕΖΗΘΙΚΛΜΝΞΟΠΡΣΤΥΦΧΨΪΫΆΈΉΊΰαβγ δεζηθικλνξορςΣΤΥΦΧΨΩΪΫΌΎΏ ЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩ ЪЫЬЭЮЯАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩЪЫ ЬЭЮЯЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏѢѢѲѲѴѴҐҐәǽ № GÖRAN AP ERIKSSON ERICSSON RESEARCH Ericsson | 2014-06-25 | Page 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 44 pt • Market potential for IoT is held back by fragmentation: • a plethora of communication technologies, focus on transport layer protocols t • lack of a common approach to enabling services pt • Web of Things brings new security and privacy challenges, trust models with many parties • Flexible security solutions and standards required: • to protect sensitive data and user privacy • to distribute policies in a secure and standardized way. ΆΈΉΊΌΎΏΐΑΒΓΕΖΗΘΙΚΛΜΝΞΟΠΡΣΤΥΦΧΨΪΫΆΈΉΊΰαβγ δεζηθικλνξορςΣΤΥΦΧΨΩΪΫΌΎΏ ЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩ • cannot be solved in a satisfactory way with only transport layer security. ЪЫЬЭЮЯАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩЪЫ ЬЭЮЯЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏѢѢѲѲѴѴҐҐәǽ № • Same privacy problems arise in the general web setting • processing and storage more and more moving into the cloud. Ericsson | 2014-06-25 | Page 2
Authorization 44 pt • Fundamental question: Who has the right to access what? Drives the security and privacy requirements – defines the solution. t Client Resource Server pt PUT “1” /lock GET /lock GET /bloodpressure PUT “2.5mg” /sedative ΆΈΉΊΌΎΏΐΑΒΓΕΖΗΘΙΚΛΜΝΞΟΠΡΣΤΥΦΧΨΪΫΆΈΉΊΰαβγ δεζηθικλνξορςΣΤΥΦΧΨΩΪΫΌΎΏ ЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩ ЪЫЬЭЮЯАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩЪЫ ЬЭЮЯЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏѢѢѲѲѴѴҐҐәǽ № • New IETF WG: Authorization in Constrained RESTful Environments (ACE) • Problem: How to support explicit and dynamic authorization in networks of constrained devices from various vendors? Ericsson | 2014-06-25 | Page 3
BASE ARCHITECTURE 44 pt Authentication and Authorization (Identity/Policy/Key Management) • Sensors, Actuators (some constrained) Supporting constrained devices t pt • Clients (may be browsers) • A chain of Services (sensor and client) ΆΈΉΊΌΎΏΐΑΒΓΕΖΗΘΙΚΛΜΝΞΟΠΡΣΤΥΦΧΨΪΫΆΈΉΊΰαβγ δεζηθικλνξορςΣΤΥΦΧΨΩΪΫΌΎΏ ЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩ ЪЫЬЭЮЯАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩЪЫ ЬЭЮЯЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏѢѢѲѲѴѴҐҐәǽ № • Servers (e.g. Sensors/Actuators Services Services Client authorization) Hosting Resources Hosting and Using Hosting and Using Using Resources Resources Resources Ericsson | 2014-06-25 | Page 4
Object security 44 pt • Transport layer security is not sufficient, only supports fully trusted services. • Object security protects sensitive information and policy data e2e, enables caching of protected data t • Hop-by-hop channel security includes services. Only needed data and metadata accessible to services pt • Ensures control and security of information owners as well as end-user privacy AuthenBcaBon,'AuthorizaBon' IoT'Device' Cloud'Service' Client' (IdenBty/Policy/Key'Management)' Cache' Channel' Channel' Channel' Security' Security' Security' ΆΈΉΊΌΎΏΐΑΒΓΕΖΗΘΙΚΛΜΝΞΟΠΡΣΤΥΦΧΨΪΫΆΈΉΊΰαβγ δεζηθικλνξορςΣΤΥΦΧΨΩΪΫΌΎΏ ЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩ �� ЪЫЬЭЮЯАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩЪЫ ЬЭЮЯЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏѢѢѲѲѴѴҐҐәǽ № Data'object'1'(Plaintext)' Data'object'2'(Encrypted'and/or'Integrity'Protected)' ApplicaBon'Layer' (Object'Security)' Policy'Data'(Integrity'protected)' Ericsson | 2014-06-25 | Page 5
CONCLUSIONS 44 pt • Web of Things with services requires standardized flexible security solutions on the application layer • to protect sensitive data and user privacy t • to distribute policies and authorization information • Many pieces are available, some are in the making, some are missing pt • W3C should secure handling of data and policies in the Web of Things: • Developing standards and best practices for object security, including: • Multiparty protocol for secure exchange of information objects, metadata, identities of the information objects and endpoints, key management, etc. ΆΈΉΊΌΎΏΐΑΒΓΕΖΗΘΙΚΛΜΝΞΟΠΡΣΤΥΦΧΨΪΫΆΈΉΊΰαβγ δεζηθικλνξορςΣΤΥΦΧΨΩΪΫΌΎΏ ЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩ • Browsers need APIs for key management, object encryption, decryption, manipulation etc. ЪЫЬЭЮЯАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩЪЫ ЬЭЮЯЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏѢѢѲѲѴѴҐҐәǽ № • Interoperable scalable formats for policies syntax, semantics. • Management of large sets of policy information • Access control in general, privacy more specifically Ericsson | 2014-06-25 | Page 6
REFERENCES 44 pt IETF Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-ace/ http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-seitz-ace-usecases-00 t http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-seitz-ace-problem-description-00 pt IETF Javascript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/jose/charter/ W3C Encrypted Media Extensions ΆΈΉΊΌΎΏΐΑΒΓΕΖΗΘΙΚΛΜΝΞΟΠΡΣΤΥΦΧΨΪΫΆΈΉΊΰαβγ δεζηθικλνξορςΣΤΥΦΧΨΩΪΫΌΎΏ http://www.w3.org/TR/encrypted-media/ ЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩ ЪЫЬЭЮЯАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩЪЫ ЬЭЮЯЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏѢѢѲѲѴѴҐҐәǽ № W3C Subresource Integrity http://www.w3.org/TR/SRI/ Ericsson | 2014-06-25 | Page 7
44 pt t pt ΆΈΉΊΌΎΏΐΑΒΓΕΖΗΘΙΚΛΜΝΞΟΠΡΣΤΥΦΧΨΪΫΆΈΉΊΰαβγ δεζηθικλνξορςΣΤΥΦΧΨΩΪΫΌΎΏ ЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩ ЪЫЬЭЮЯАБВГДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОПРСТУФХЦЧШЩЪЫ ЬЭЮЯЁЂЃЄЅІЇЈЉЊЋЌЎЏѢѢѲѲѴѴҐҐәǽ № Ericsson | 2014-06-25 | Page 8
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