www.npec-web.org DTRA-ASCO Fort Belvoir, VA April 21, 2009 1 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Nuclear Abolition and the Next Arms Race

A Presentation by

Henry Sokolski

Executive Director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

www.npec-web.org

DTRA-ASCO Fort Belvoir, VA April 21, 2009

1

Good News: Declining US/Russian Nuclear Deployments*

Operational tactical and strategic nuclear warheads since 1965

• 2

The Hope Ahead: 1,000 Warheads on the Road to Zero

(World with 1,000 US operationally deployed strategic warheads)

3

Bad News: Others Are Coming Up

Operationally Deployed Strategic Warheads

1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 2008 2016 2020 US Russia France China UK Israel India Pakistan

4

What’s in the Wings: Growing Plutonium Stockpiles for States to Ramp Up or Break Out

Frank Von Hippel et al., Global Fissile Materials Report 2008

5

And Plenty of Weapons Uranium for Weapons States to Enlarge Their Weapons Arsenals

Frank Von Hippel, Global Fissile Materials Report 2008

6

CTBT

Current concerns center on whether or not this treaty will enter into force; what Russian and China think it might ban; and how verifiable it might be given Russian and Chinese interest in low blast weapons. Bigger issue may be how necessary testing is for states wishing to acquire a nominal bomb. Also, how relevant might a CTBT for restraining states with advanced nuclear weapons interested in building new, over-engineered weapons designs

7

FMCT

Current debate focuses on whether this treaty will ever come into force; how verifiable it will be; and if it will create a double standard for verifying non-weapons and weapons states’ civilian nuclear fuel making plants

Bigger question may be how relevant this treaty is to arresting states from acquiring additional nuclear weapons from existing nuclear weapons material stockpiles or from legitimate civilian stockpiles of separated plutonium and nuclear fuel making plants

8

More START Debate will likely focus on what the appropriate level of Congressional consent should be and what US must concede to Russia on tactical nuclear weapons and nonnuclear weapons to conclude a follow-on to START Bigger question may be will others follow in reducing or be goaded on by US-Russian reductions to catch up

9

Current Horizontal Proliferation Seems Manageable

(With DPRK Disarming and Iran Nonnuclear)

10

Number of States or Regions that Have Significant Civil Nuclear Capabilities Is Limited

11

What Nuclear Enthusiasts Are Planning

Middle Eastern Countries Intent on Building Power Reactors by 2030

Turkey (US, France, Rus.) Egypt (US, Fr. PRC, Rus.)

• S. Arabia, (Fr., US, Rus.)*

UAE (France)* Yemen Morocco (France) Jordan (US, France, Rus.)

• Applauded by Israeli officials as an “announcement directed against Iran”

( ) Countries that have initialed or are discussing nuclear cooperation to build power reactors

Qatar (France) Tunisia Syria (DPRK?, Russia?) Libya (US, France Russia) Algeria (Rus., Fr., US) Iran (Russia)

13

13

A Potential Problem: Power Reactors Used for Nuclear Weapons Material Production

• US Watts Bar, Sequoyah’s reactor units 1 and 2,(LWRs), tritium

for US nuclear weapons

• Pakistani KANUPP, (PHWR) pu diversion prior to 1982 for 1998

test weapon Nuclear Express, p.258

• Russian RMBK reactors
• French EDF series (at Chinon, St. Laurent, and Bugey)
• British Magnox reactors at Calder Hall and Chapelcross (fuel

grade Pu)

• Indian unsafeguarded CANDU reactors

Yet Another Worry: “Peaceful” Reactors As a Cover for Weapons Activities -- the Iranian Case

• Bill Clinton and John Bolton agreed Bushehr was being used as a

procurement cover for other weapons-related nuclear projects (enrichment, HWR, etc.)

• Oct 10, 2008 NYT reported a Russian implosion expert “visited” Iran.

Bushehr will soon have 2,600 Russian technicians.

• Dr. Prasad of India believed to have transferred tritium extraction

technology useful for nuclear weapons “boosting” on “safety” assistance visits to Bushehr

• Hundreds of Iranians trained in Russia and elsewhere on the entire fuel

cycle

• US and EU are still hostage to Russian “assurances” that nuclear transfers

“outside of Bushehr” will cease

• Dingell letter and GAO study on the completeness of Bush explanation of

Russian proliferation activities in Iran

15

15

The Russian Are Coming

Lower prices than US or France No requirement for accident coverage for any of its nuclear controlled goods Looser control requirements than the US, access to sensitive technology and experts With reported, projected cooperation with Siemens, high- quality assurance products

16

16

Managing Proliferation Risks In the Middle East: Distrust and Strike

13 Military Strikes against IAEA member nuclear projects since 1980

11 against safeguarded reactors since 1980

1980 Iran against Osirak 1981 Israel against Osirak 1980-1985 Seven Iraqi strikes against Bushehr 1990 US against Osirak 2003 US against Osirak

1 Iraqi Scud attack attempted against Diamona 1 Israeli strike against Syria’s Reactor

17

17

18

But Reactors Will be Safeguarded LWRs. Aren’t They “Proliferation Resistant”?

18

18

Perhaps, but Not Enough: Estimated Yields for Different Bomb Technologies Using LWR Pu (Hubbard)

• !
• !!"#$

%#!!&! '# #"!#!& !!'# (#$'')#!! &!!!'#

19

19

20

Small, Covert Reprocessing Plant --20 or More Bombs/Month from Spent Fuel <10-day startup, 1 bomb’s-worth-a-day production rate

20

20

Fresh LWR Fuel Is A Worry Too

Using Natural Uranium, Iran’s Uranium Bomb Takes Nearly a Year

• 4,000 swus needed to convert natural uranium into a bomb’s worth (20 kgs) of HEU, 2.5

SWUs/P1centrifuge and 3,000 machines operating with batch recycling

Using 4.8% enriched LWR fuel, only 4 to 13 Weeks Are Needed

• Tons of fresh LWR fuel shipped to Bushehr every 12-18 months and loaded over a

period of weeks, affording opportunities for gradual or abrupt diversion.

• Crushing, heating, and fluorinating the ceramic fresh fuel pellets is all that’s needed to

get 4.8% enriched UF6 feed. Using this as feed, you need to expend as little as 1/5th the effort or time to enrich it to get one bomb’s worth

• Iran could conceivably beat the inspections system: IAEA inspections are at Natanz at

most once a month and sometimes are every three months

21

Detecting Illicit Nuclear Fuel Making: A Record

• f Regret
• Taiwanese hot cell activity–detected after begun
• RoK weapons efforts—ditto
• Algerian fuel diversions detected—after they occurred Natanz –detected

after 18 years through Humit

• Early North Korean reprocessing campaigns – debated through 1991 within

US intelligence community -- a textile plant?

• North Korean uranium enrichment efforts – US claim, still in doubt
• Operational Iraqi EMIS – US detected after war using UNSCOM
• Libyan centrifuges – confirmed after delivered
• Syrian production reactor– US detected after near completion;

reprocessing plant not found

22

22

But Can’t the IAEA Safeguard Systems Prevent Fresh and Spent Nuclear Fuel Diversions?

23

23

24

Not Unless They Are Upgraded

• Of IAEA’s ~1,200 remote nuclear inspection cameras, nearly 800 still have

no near-real-time feedback. Virtually all of the countries of concern have no near-real-time feedback

• IAEA internal review of May 2005 found in that “Over the past 6 years,

there have been 12 occasions when facility lights were turned off for a period greater than 30 hours” See http://www.npec- web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20070731-NPEC- ReportOnIaeaSafeguardsSystem&PDFFolder=Reports

• Of those ~ 400 IAEA cameras that have near-time feedback today, many

depend on internet connections that can be interrupted

• US State Dept. officials requested NPEC self-censor 2 scenarios for spent

fuel rod diversions that could evade IAEA detection entirely. Similar scenarios, it turns out, were described elsewhere on the web by IAEA’s own Safeguards advisory group chairman. See http://www.npec- web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20041022-GilinskyEtAl- LWR&PDFFolder=Essays

24

24

25

Also Too Hard: Keeping Track of Declared Nuclear Fuel Making

• Sellafield (Euratom safeguards meeting IAEA criteria)

29.6 kgs pu MUF (Feb. 2005) 190 kgs pu in “leak” undetected for 8 months

• Tokia Mura

MoX, 69 kgs pu MUF (l994) scrap 100-150 kgs pu MUF (1996) Pilot reprocessing 206kgs – 59 kgs pu MUF (2003) Commercial reprocessing 246 kgs/yr pu MUF (2008?)

• Cogema-Cadarache reprocessing plant

Euratom report 2002, “unacceptable amount of MUF”, 2 yrs to resolve

• Similar MUF challenges at centrifuge enrichment plants

seehttp://www.asno.dfat.gov.au/publications/addressing_proliferation_challenge s_from_spread_enrichment_capability.pdf

• No Country-specific listing of MAF (material accounted for)

26

Where We’re Headed Assuming Current Safeguards and a Presumed per se Right to Any Nuclear Technology

“The regime will not be sustainable if scores more States Develop the most sensitive phases of the fuel cycle and are equipped with the technology to produce nuclear weapons

• n short notice – and, of course, each individual State which

does this only will leave others to feel that they must do the

• same. This would increase all of the risks – of nuclear

accident, of trafficking, of terrorist use, and of use by states themselves.” – The Secretary – General of the United Nations, NPT Review Conference, May 2, 2005

Catalytic Nuclear Escalation “If not constrained, this proliferation could prompt nuclear crises and even nuclear use at the very time that the United States and Russia are trying to reduce their nuclear weapons deployments and stockpiles” WMD Commission

27

With More Nuclear-Ready States: Ramp Up to a Nuclear 1914?

28

US Policies: Again, How Effective?

Strengthen the NPT: But we claim NPT protects countries’ right to get to the brink of making fuel (aka. Making bombs). Strengthen IAEA: But IAEA favors spreading nuclear technology and there are limits to what it can safeguard Create an international fuel bank: But will this prompt more “rightful” nuclear development or will it be irrelevant? Take back exports from nuclear violators: But how? More cooperative threat reductions: But with whom and to what extent?

29

Positive Trends

30

31

Bad Business: Atoms for Peace in the Middle East, the Saudi Case

32

New Nuclear Reactors: What Markets Tell Us

New Power Reactor Construction Cost Projections (Overnight nominal $ /kwe installed, exclusive of financing costs)

• !*!+,-.

/.0

• +#))

1## $-!+)2! .!(/ 3!4#!

33

/')#!5#6!!7!+)!+8!78#

• 78#2#!'!9,2!+(#
• !"

#$ %&'' ( ) * + ,

• ,
• .

+

.+

:

!"#$ !"%$

• 78#2#!'!9,2!+(#
• !"

#$ %&'' ( ) * + ,

• ,
• .

+

.+

:

!"#$ !"%$

The Nuclear Renaissance Will Be Delayed

The world economic crisis, is "very bad news" for investment in nuclear power and renewable energy production. "Utilities are losing their appetites for projects" because they can't borrow money and, the low price of fossil fuels makes investment in nuclear power and renewable energy less attractive -- Fatih Birolin, chief economist of the OECD International Energy Agency, April 15, 2009

34

Some of the Most Dangerous Nuclear Technologies Are Still Uncompetitive against Safer Alternatives

Nuclear fuel making

BNL study on Iran for State , 2004

Reprocessing repeatedly determined to be more costly than interim storage

Study done at the request of French Socialist Prime Minister Jospin, 2000 Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission Long term Nuclear Plan, 2004 CBO study for Congress, Nov. 14, 2007

35

Key States that Might Go Nuclear or Proliferate Remain Security Allies or Now Have Close Ties with the US Taiwan Japan Turkey RoK Saudi Arabia Pakistan Iraq Egypt Libya UAE

36

Russia and China Are Acquiring Strategic Headaches More Similar to Our Own

China How to manage the Indian-Pakistani Competition How to maintain energy exports from the Gulf How to keep East Asia from becoming so unstable, US friends go nuclear Russia How to keep foreign oil and gas markets from bankrupting the domestic economy

37