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No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Political Incentives for Education - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Political Incentives for Education Reform in Tanzania James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018 James Habyarimana,

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Political Incentives for Education Reform in Tanzania

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Research Question

Do competitive elections create incentives for improvements in the provision of public goods and services?

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Do competitive elections help improve service delivery?

◮ Large literature

◮ elections and child mortality (Blaydes and Kayser,

2011); health (Fujiwara, 2015)

◮ Elections and agricultural policy (Bates and Block,

2013)

◮ Elections and road construction (Burgess, 2015;

Harding, 2015)

◮ Elections and UPE (Stasavage, 2005; D’Archy, 2013;

Stasavage and Harding, 2014)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

How do politicians signal credibility?

◮ Unbundling education provision

◮ Easily verifiable and attributable inputs (buildings,

fees)

◮ Hard-to-measure outcomes (learning outcomes)

◮ Voters demand easily attributable and verifiable effort ◮ This is especially true in contexts of low state capacity

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Politics and Education Reform in Tanzania

◮ We examine education reform through multiple electoral

cycles

◮ In 2000 Tanzania had one of the lowest secondary school

enrollment rates in the world (7.5%)

◮ Ahead of the 2005 election the incumbent party (CCM)

promised to improve access (one school per ward)

◮ Result: (i) Number of O-level schools ballooned from

1628 (2005) to 4016 (2010); (ii) Performance plummeted, with pass rates decreasing from over 70% to under 40%

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Findings

◮ There was an initial electoral boost associated with school

construction of about 2 percentage points in 2005 (promise)

◮ But in 2010 there was a penalty of about 1.4 percentage

points

◮ We argue that this was driven by the manner in which the

policy was implemented (tax increase & learning

  • utcomes)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Access vs Learning Outcomes

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Changes in Secondary (O-Level) Pass Rates

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Global Shift Towards Increasing Access

◮ MDGs and UPE ◮ Increased demand for secondary education

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Changes in Secondary Enrollment (Bashir et al., 2018

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

The Political Context

◮ CMM’s 2005 campaign promise explicitly tied school

construction to electoral outcomes

◮ Wards are the lowest electoral units in Tanzania

(simple plurality SMD)

◮ Elected Ward representatives sit in district councils ◮ Each district has a District Education Officer (DEO) ◮ Tanzania is a hegemonic party-state dominated by

CCM (Av. 65.4% vote share in last 5 elections)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Rapid Increase in Number of Secondary Schools

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Rapid Increase in Enrollment

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

An Extensive Construction Program

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Drivers of Schools Construction

2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 total number of wards 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 year

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Drivers of Schools Construction

Ward Splits CCM Vote ’05 Pop (logged) Rural

  • Dist. to Road

−.1 −.05 .05 .1 .15

No Schools in 2005

Ward Splits CCM Vote ’05 Pop (logged) Rural

  • Dist. to Road

−.5 .5 1

At Least One School in 2005 James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

How do you keep a promise with no cash?

◮ Secondary school construction delegated to communities

◮ Households contributed money, labor, and materials ◮ Government committed to provide roofing and

  • perational assistance

◮ This provided strong incentives for politicians to

signal effort by delivering on a Ward Secondary School

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

How do you keep a promise with no cash?

They can do it [contribute] but only if they are forced. The

  • nes who refused to attend the meetings are taken to the ward

executive officer for penalties; their properties taken to be sold and to fund the works?? (Languille, 2014, p. 122).

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Empirical Strategy

◮ We estimate whether exposure of local political

units (wards) to school construction affects CCM’s vote share

◮ Our unit of analysis is the ward (2000

boundaries)

◮ Data sources: Electoral Commission, MoE school

registration

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Changes in Ward Boundaries

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Distribution of CMM Vote Share vs Poverty Rates

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

School Construction and CMM Vote Share (Ward-Level)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

School Construction and CMM Vote Share (Ward-Level)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Key Takeaways

◮ Elections create incentives for programmatic

policies

◮ Promises of public goods provision can win votes ◮ But the devil is in the details (implementation

does reveal information that voters may not like)

◮ Current Addition: Examining the electoral

impacts of attempts to improve learning

  • utcomes (BRN-Education)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Extension: Politics and Learning Outcomes

◮ Examining the electoral impacts of attempts to

improve learning outcomes (BRN-Education)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

The Politics of Improving Learning Outcomes

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Summary Statistics

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Orthogonality Tables

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

Balance (School Registration)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

School Construction and CMM Vote Share (Ward-Level)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

School Construction and CMM Vote Share (Ward-Level)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

School Construction and CMM Vote Share (Ward-Level)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

School Construction and CMM Vote Share (Ward-Level)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

School Construction and CMM Vote Share (Ward-Level)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018

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Motivation Policy and Political Context Empirics Conclusion Appendix

School Construction and CMM Vote Share (Ward-Level)

James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018