New Concepts in CBRN Warfare in the Light of the Gulf War Experience and Current Reality of Global Terrorism Asaf Durakovic The current reality of the use of modern biotechnology, new chemical agents, and the recent relatively easier accessibility for fissile materials and technology for making tactical nuclear weapons, presents mass casualty medicine with a new reality and a changed CBRN scenario, significantly different from the conflicts previous to the Gulf War. Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons, in general, are considered a tactical warfare arsenal, which can be decisive in The chemical component of modern CBRN war- the outcome of a battlefield. However, chemical fare is still classified in four main categories. 1) weapons can not destroy the infrastructure of the Choking agents cause pulmonary, morphological, enemy territories, but can successfully eliminate and functional alterations (chlorine and phos- the enemy forces not prepared for the chemical gene), 2) blood gases agents (hydrogen cyanide) weapon attack. Chemical weapons can be pro- with the blocking action on oxygen metabolism, 3) duced in commercial facilities and in some cases, vesicants which cause external and internal tissue stored for decades, depending on chemical wea- damage e.g. mustard gas, and 4) nerve agents such pon’s shelf-life. New technology of binary wea- as Tabun, Sarin, VX, causing enzyme alterations in pons utilizes the storage of chemical agents of a the central nervous system. The chemical agents low toxicity mixed to highly toxic compounds are most effective in densely populated areas re- shortly before their deployment. sulting in residual persistence in the environment Chemical warfare agents could be effectively requiring high cost, post-impact recovery of the used as terrorist weapons with a missile attack on habitat. densely populated strategic areas, disrupting com- Chemical warfare frequently does not require mand posts and infrastructure with potential dis- high technical skills or expense rendering it acces- aster proportions. sible for various non-military and non-govern- Chemical weapons have been extensively ment protagonists, best exemplified by the use of used in the twentieth century from World War Sarin in the public transportation terrorist action One to the Iran-Iraq war. Both the United States in Japan by the Aum Shinrikoyo cult. A single ter- and Russia still hold operational large quantities rorist act resulted in an instant killing of a dozen of chemical weapons. Their importance emerging and incapacitation of over five thousand people, in the areas of current political, ethnic, and nation- by the single use of approximately one hundred al conflicts together with chemical weapons in or- kilograms of Sarin. ganized crime, sabotage, and terrorism warrants a Chemical agents have been successfully pro- sustained alert and preparedness. duced in many countries not bound by the con- ventions to destroy their chemical arsenal. The Biological Warfare United States, until recently, was bound to destroy all of its chemical weapons by the year 2004. These The biological component of CBRN warfare has weapons have been labeled as the atomic bombs considerably changed in the past three decades, by of poor countries, which do not necessarily sub- the introduction of new biotechnologies. This in- scribe to the conventions on the prohibition of the cludes genetic modifications of pathogen strains, development, production, stockpiling, and use of the use of gene probes, detection of genetic sen- the chemical weapons, and are not bound to col- sors marking the surface of biological agents, in- laborate with the organization for prevention of creased virulence and lethality of new biological chemical weapons (OPCW) which has been man- agents. Since the Gulf War, there has been a dra- dated to oversee CWC technical implementation. matic increase in the development of the new
biological warfare agents, in the production of Nuclear Warfare monoclonal antibodies, genetic engineering of the sequencing of the genomes, advanced diversity of The nuclear component of the future CBRN war- delivery systems, and new horizons in their syn- fare remains an inevitable concern of future mili- chrony with computer equipment. There has also tary strategies. The prospective increase in the been a dramatic increase in funding of these new number of nuclear club countries does not biological warfare agents which after the Gulf War necessarily mean they will be signatories of the exceeded fifty billion dollars in the United States non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The current stock- alone. The investments in biotechnology have pile of plutonium-239 in excess of 250 tons at been even higher in the private sector, mainly in $6,000 per kilogram and much larger quantities of the pharmaceutical industry for diagnostic, pro- enriched uranium at $1,200 per kilogram require phylactic, and therapeutic agents with the main relatively simple technology to make nuclear wea- interest in the advancement of monoclonal anti- pons. This constitutes the basis of a realistic proba- bodies, combination biochemistry of receptor and bility of the expansion of the nuclear arsenal. sensor pharmaceuticals and genetic probe biologi- Currently there are over 35,000 nuclear weapons cal agents. The ultimate aim of the military related in the world arsenal, equivalent in the destructive research in this area has been the production of a power to over 10,000,000 kilotons of TNT, approxi- super organism with unmatched virulence and mately one million Hiroshimas. pathogenicity. The biological pool of highly viru- Tactical CBRN warfare has to consider the lent agents is exemplified by the Ebola and Hanta medical consequences of mass casualty manage- viruses. Other agents not as readily available can ment as well as post impact management of the be obtained in the national collections of most of population and the environment. In the nuclear the industrialized nations. The production and de- component of the CBRN warfare, medical man- ployment of these recently developed technologies agement includes thermal, blast, and acute radia- is not entirely beyond the access of various non- tion illness after the initial impact, and chronic ra- government groups, interested in the access to the diation illness as well as contamination with 440 source organisms and their use for the purpose of organotropic radionuclides as a chronic impact. biological warfare without investing in the com- This long-term global hazard includes both somat- plex technology. ic and genetic alterations. Current reassessment of The agents of biological warfare are generally the risk of the nuclear weapons confirms the in- classified in four biosafety levels, ranging from (1) creased incidence of immune system pathology, minimal potential hazard, (2) infectious cultures, increased cancer risk, and genetic effects mani- (3) concentrated cultures, to (4) exceedingly haz- fested in increased heritable mutations. The future ardous agents such as Congo hemorrhagic fever, risks of nuclear weapons in the tactical conflict or Ebola, Lassa, Omsk and Krimean hemorrhagic fe- the terrorist bomb scenario is enhanced by the re- ver, Khazakstan and Russian Encephalitis, An- ality of the new aspects of nuclear technology and thrax, Brucella, Tullaremia, Plague, Maleus. The access to plutonium and enriched uranium. Mixed basic production techniques do not differ between oxide rods (MOX), pyroprocessing, and the pro- the military and industrial establishments, except duction of more plutonium than is needed for the in the areas of purification and containment facili- reactor operations open a realistic possibility of ties. The lesson from the Gulf War in the biological such materials being available on the international warfare was the presence of the Scud missiles with clandestine market. the warheads containing Anthrax and Botulism The concepts of nuclear deterrence do not ap- toxin. The existence of the ongoing development ply to clandestine nuclear terrorist networks. To of biological weapons in other countries of the deter a terrorist attack, a weapon of precise and world is well illustrated with the accident in the selective destructive capability would need to be biological weapons facility in the Sverdlovsk re- available for use against any target, anywhere in gion of Russia in which a release of Anthrax the world. The hidden arsenals of target nations spores left scores of the general public dead in and the command posts are not easily identifiable 1979. or accessible by conventional weapons since they
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