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National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) and the Irish Housing Crisis Problems and Solutions By: Robert Curry, MBA Class of 2011 Contact Robert Curry Harvard Business School MBA Class of 2011 MBA Class


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SLIDE 1

National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) National Asset Management Agency (NAMA)

and the Irish Housing Crisis Problems and Solutions By: Robert Curry, MBA Class of 2011

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SLIDE 2

Contact

Robert Curry Harvard Business School MBA Class of 2011 MBA Class of 2011 Email: rcurry@mba2011.hbs.edu Tel: +1 860.538.1154

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SLIDE 3

Abstract

For the 12 years preceding the crash, the Irish economy experienced rapid expansion. Following the freeze-up of international banking markets in 2007/08, Irish banks no longer had the liquidity to fund operations The real estate market subsequently collapsed and had the liquidity to fund operations. The real estate market subsequently collapsed and the Irish government stepped in to create the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) to relieve banks of their bad assets so that the banks could begin lending again. This was a necessary and unavoidable step. NAMA has faced much public criticism as it appears that banks and developers received a bailout not available to the general public. Several other countries including the US, Sweden, and Japan faced similar crises in the past. The countries which most successfully addressed these problems acted swiftly and with broad political support The countries which had less success were often slow to act broad political support. The countries which had less success were often slow to act. Learning from these past crises, local communities need to approach NAMA and property

  • wners with a plan for failed developments, partnering with solvent developers.

These plans should be as specific as possible. plans should be as specific as possible. NAMA must accept and prepare for the owning and disposing of large amounts of real estate assets rather than just loans. In addition NAMA must address its poor public image and misinformation in the press. Seller financing should be used to jumpstart the market. The government must address antiquated bankruptcy laws. The government should also abolish the stamp duty on property and introduce an annual property tax. This should increase liquidity in the housing market. In addition, the government should create a debt e t t ing pl n fo indi id l homeo ne b ed on net

  • th

nd bilit to p The restructuring plan for individual homeowners based on net worth and ability to pay. The moratorium on foreclosures is only delaying the inevitable and creating further illiquidity.

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SLIDE 4

The Irish Banking & Housing Crisis

  • 1996-2008: rapidly expanding economy

– 1995-2000 GDP Grows 9.5% – 2000-2008 GDP Grows 5.5%

  • Rapidly increasing home prices

At peak new construction accounts for 12% of – At peak new construction accounts for 12% of GDP

  • 2007-8 international banking market freezes

– Banks have trouble financing operations Banks have trouble financing operations – Banks stop lending

  • Construction cannot continue
  • Construction cannot continue
  • Housing market collapses
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SLIDE 5

Housing Prices

2010 to Q3 only Source: 5

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SLIDE 6

Banking Problems

  • Without international financing available

b k t bl t fi d il ti banks are not able to finance daily operations

  • Real estate and construction loans begin to

g go into default Government steps in to recapitalize banks

  • Government steps in to recapitalize banks

– Essentially nationalizes 5 major banks

  • Government guarantees liabilities (€440bln)

– deposits & bank bonds – deposits & bank bonds

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SLIDE 7

NAMA Created – a timeline

  • April 2009: Decision that a “bad bank” needs to be

established to deal with non-performing loans established to deal with non performing loans

– Will protect performing assets of bank – “bad bank” called National Asset Management Agency

  • July 2009: legislation drafted
  • October 2009: Dáil Éireann (RoI Parliament) passes NAMA

legislation.

  • November 2009: NAMA singed into law
  • December 2009: NAMA board appointed and comes into

existence

  • February 2010: EU commission approves NAMA
  • March 2010: First loans transferred to NAMA

Source: 27

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SLIDE 8

NAMA Purpose

———————— Number 34 of 2009 ———————— NATIONAL ASSET MANAGEMENT AGENCY ACT 2009 ———————— AN ACT— TO ADDRESS A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE ECONOMY AND TO THE SYSTEMIC STABILITY OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN THE STATE GENERALLY BY PROVIDING, IN PARTICULAR, FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BODY TO BE KNOWN AS THE NATIONAL ASSET MANAGEMENT AGENCY FOR THE PURPOSES OF 10.—(1) NAMA’s purposes shall be to contribute to the achievement of the purposes specified in section 2 by— (a) the acquisition from participating institutions of such eligible bank assets as is appropriate, (b) dealing expeditiously with the assets acquired by it, and (c) protecting or otherwise enhancing the value of those assets in the interests of the State (c) protecting or otherwise enhancing the value of those assets, in the interests of the State. (2) So far as possible, NAMA shall, expeditiously and consistently with the achievement of the purposes specified in subsection (1), obtain the best achievable financial return for the State having regard to— (a) the cost to the Exchequer of acquiring bank assets and dealing with acquired bank assets, (b) NAMA’s cost of capital and other costs, and (c) any other factor which NAMA considers relevant to the achievement of its purposes. NAMA Mission Statement To manage acquired loans, efficiently, effectively and expeditiously and in the best interests of the State. NAMA aims to attain the best achievable financial return subject to acceptable financial risk. It will conduct its activities in a way which assists the property j p y p p y market to operate efficiently and in a way which achieves longer term sustainability while taking account of NAMA’s wider societal

  • bjectives.

Source: 11& 26

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SLIDE 9

Why NAMA is needed?

  • To relieve banks of non-performing assets so

th t b k ti l di that banks can continue lending

– Assets transferred to NAMA are Real Estate backed loans – Assets transferred at a discount to NAMA Assets transferred at a discount to NAMA – By allowing banks to retain performing assets, banks will be free to make new loans banks will be free to make new loans – Ensures banks meet capital requirements

  • To realize the long term economic value of

loans

  • To provide working capital to debtors
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SLIDE 10

How Loans are transferred to NAMA

Bank identifies NAMA determines the long term NAMA issues senior and loans that meet transfer standard the long term economic value of these loans senior and subordinated bonds to banks If l b NAMA assumes loan liability NAMA and debtor create business plan for loan* If plan cannot be agreed upon, NAMA takes over plan for loan asset

*NAMA di l k i h 100 l d b b k i k *NAMA directly works with 100 largest debtors, banks continue to work with other debtors.

Source: 26

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SLIDE 11

How NAMA makes money

  • Original NAMA business plan:

10% 10% Base Scenario 10% positive scenario 10% negative scenario Estimated Book Value of EstimatedBookValueof loansacquired 81.0 €₭ 81.0 €₭ 81.0 €₭ ValueofBondsissuedto Banks 40 5 €₭ 40 5 €₭ 40 5 €₭ Banks 40.5 €₭ 40.5 €₭ 40.5 €₭ AmountNAMARecovers fromloans 44.7 €₭ 49.2 €₭ 40.2 €₭ NPV of NAMA Profit 1 0 €₭ 3 9 €₭ (0 8) €₭ NPVofNAMAProfit 1.0 €₭ 3.9 €₭ (0.8) €₭ ValueofBonds redeemedbybanks 40.5 €₭ 40.5 €₭ 38.5 €₭

  • 5% of bonds issued to banks are subordinate and will only be paid if

NAMA makes a profit

– Makes banks share in downside risk Makes banks share in downside risk

  • Bonds carry an implicit guarantee of the Irish Government

Source: Compiled from 26

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Nuances of NAMA

  • NAMA only acquires assets of 1,500 largest

d bt debtors

– Represents the largest exposures by banks – Assumes that banks are inherently solvent and can handle losses from smaller borrowers can handle losses from smaller borrowers

  • Both performing and non-performing loans

acquired acquired

– Allows NAMA to leverage performing assets to maximizes repayment of non-performing loans

  • Buys loans at current market price + uplift

Buys loans at current market price + uplift

Source: 4

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SLIDE 13

NAMA Balance Sheet – to date

  • €71.2B in loans acquired for €30.2B*

– 11,000 total loans from 850 debtors – Top 30 debtors represent €27B in loans p p – Next 145 debtors represent €30B in loans

  • €16B (book value) yet to be purchased
  • €16B (book value) yet to be purchased
  • €2.7B recovered thus far (sales approved)

Tranche1and2(purple)** AIB BOI ESB INBS Anglo Total BookValue 6.02 €₭ 3.75 €₭ 0.18 €₭ 1.26 €₭ 16.00 €₭ 27.21 €₭ TotalConsideration 3.30 €₭ 2.39 €₭ 0.11 €₭ 0.44 €₭ 6.73 €₭ 12.97 €₭ Discount(Tranche1&2) 45.2% 36.3% 38.1% 65.1% 57.9% 52.3%

* As of December 2010 ** Only tranche 1 and 2 data is available Source: 25

DiscountonallLoans 54.0% 42.0% 60.0% 64.0% 62.0% 58.0%

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Asset breakdown

* Investment is any property intended as a rental . These are mainly commercial. Source: Compiled from 25

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Property Locations

Source: Compiled from 25

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Plans

  • Work with debtors to create realistic business

l plans

– Debt restructuring – Restructuring of principle not an option

  • Foreclose on uncooperative/incapable debtors
  • Foreclose on uncooperative/incapable debtors

– Last resort – Receivership process has begun with some

  • debtors. However, no real property assets seized

to date

  • Minimize operating of assets (running hotels,

Minimize operating of assets (running hotels, letting apartments etc.)

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Timeline going forward

Year %ofNAMA bonds paid off Year bondspaidoff 2013 25% 2015 40% 2015 40% 2017 80% 2018 95%

  • Of the €2 7B in asset sales to date NAMA

2019 100%

  • Of the €2.7B in asset sales to date, NAMA

has repaid €250M in bonds

– Bond repayments ahead of schedule – Remaining cash used for NAMA operating g p g expenses and working capital loans (€730M to date )

Source: 26 & 4

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Perception of NAMA - Headlines

“NAMA sells Ireland’s tallest building to Google”

  • Irish Voice, February 18, 2011
  • FACT: NAMA never owned the building. NAMA approved a business plan

and provided working capital for debtor to complete construction.

“Youth found dead in Nama building”

  • Irish Times, March 11, 2011

“Nama takes control of INBS-backed London property”

  • Sunday Business Post, March 6, 2011

“Nama failing to look after historic buildings in its portfolio” Nama failing to look after historic buildings in its portfolio

  • Irish Times, April 27, 2011
  • FACT: NAMA is only the debt holder on the loans to these properties.

Source: 24, 7, & 21

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SLIDE 19

Public Perception of NAMA

  • General perception of NAMA is very negative

– Public perception that Property Developers and Banks caused the economic collapse

  • Property Developers get bailed out with working

capital loans

  • Banks get bailed out with government capital infusion
  • Common man gets stuck with the bill

– General mistrust:

“Daly claimed that he is aware of one particular UK property, which, apparently, Nama sold for a figure below its market rate to an associate of the original owner who in turn sold the property on at a profit ” market rate, to an associate of the original owner, who in turn, sold the property on at a profit.

  • Irish Times, February 3, 2011

“Some had claimed that NAMA – which now controls 83 hotels, having taken over the facilities as collateral for underperforming loans – had used its resources to make the hotel sector overtly competitive, resulting in private p g y p , g p hoteliers having to slash costs and massively reduce profits in order to stay in business.

  • The Journal, March 23, 2011

Source: 22 & 23

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SLIDE 20

Why the public mistrust of NAMA?

  • Lack of government plan to help individual

d bt debtors

– Government has stopped all foreclosures for the time being, but no long-term plan

  • People most qualified to work at NAMA
  • People most qualified to work at NAMA

worked in banking sector before collapse E S

  • Easy Scapegoat
  • Opaqueness of NAMA leads to a General

Opaqueness of NAMA leads to a General misunderstanding of how NAMA works and why it is necessary why it is necessary

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SLIDE 21

Challenges for NAMA ahead

  • Political Interference

– Pushing actions on NAMA outside of best interest

  • Further Macro Economic declines

Further Macro Economic declines

– Further significant deterioration in real estate prices could prevent NAMA from making a profit prices could prevent NAMA from making a profit

  • Public expects higher standard

– People expect more from NAMA then other banks

  • Housing collapse extends far beyond the
  • Housing collapse extends far beyond the

residential loans that NAMA owns

NAMA t t t ff d t h dl ll – NAMA not set-up or staffed to handle small individual defaults

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SLIDE 22

New housing problems today

  • Completed estates with few or no residents

– Poor construction quality – Unfinished services

  • Half built estates with no prospect for

completion completion

– Built in areas of low demand

  • Planned estates with no

a ed estates t

  • progress

Bankrupt builders

  • Bankrupt builders
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SLIDE 23

Ghost Estates

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New construction vacant units

Legend g

Number of Vacant Units

h h h

  • This map shows vacant housing units

in estates with at least two units. This does not include standalone houses not part of a development. not part of a development.

  • This map only looks at vacant

completed units. Its does not take into account dwellings under construction.

Source: 1

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SLIDE 25

Vacant units as % to total units

Legend

% of complete units vacant

h h h f

  • This map shows the percentage of

units that are vacant in an estate.

  • The vacancy percentage does not

include units under construction include units under construction.

Source: 1

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SLIDE 26

# of units under construction

Legend

Units under Construction

h h h b f

  • This map shows the number of units

that are under construction. These are units for which ground has already been broken. been broken.

  • In most cases construction on these

units is at a standstill.

Source: 1

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SLIDE 27

Unfinished units as % of total units

Legend

% of incomplete units

h h h f

  • This map shows the percentage of

units that are incomplete in an estate.

Source: 1

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SLIDE 28

Housing Problems beyond NAMA

  • It is unknown on which estates NAMA holds the debt

– Many estates have nothing to do with NAMA Many estates have nothing to do with NAMA

  • Macro-Economic

– Very week economy yet strong currency y y y g y

  • Wage reductions and layoffs have born the brunt of austerity

– Single family home repossessions

G l h f l b l

  • Government currently has a moratorium on foreclosures but no long

term plan

– Hoping for the sector to improve is not a strategy

dd l l f l d

  • An additional €5 - €10B in losses from personal mortgages expected
  • Stamp Duty & Lack of Property tax

Tax structure incentives holding land – Tax structure incentives holding land

  • Bankruptcy Law
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Bankruptcy in Ireland

  • Antiquated Victorian era laws

– Focus on punishment rather than rehabilitation Focus on punishment rather than rehabilitation

  • “The debtor must have done something wrong to be in this position”

– 12 years to get out of bankruptcy

  • Debtors prison still common

– 276 people jailed for debts in 2008 S t d t di ti i h b t th h t d th – System does not distinguish between those who cannot and those who choose not to repay debts

  • High court abolished prison for inability to pay but system still cannot distinguish
  • One inmate costs the state over €2,000/week to imprison
  • Bankruptcy little used

4 B k t i i 2007 8 i 2008 – 4 Bankruptcies in 2007; 8 in 2008

  • No other system for addressing insolvency

Discharge of debts is still largely voluntary on the part of lender – Discharge of debts is still largely voluntary on the part of lender

  • Little motivation to discharge debts because lender can always go after the debt
  • Both lender and debtor lose

Source: 20

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SLIDE 30

What can we learn from similar crises?

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Similar Crisis

US Sweden Japan Ireland External Factors ExternalFactors PreCrisis:Consolidated BankingSector X X TroubledBanksPreserved Few Some Some PoliticalandPublicSupport X X Some Interest Rates Moderate High Low Moderate InterestRates Moderate High Low Moderate Actions SwiftandTimelyAction X X X Consolidatebanks X X X X d RequiredManagement Change X Major Social Policy MajorSocialPolicy Incorporated X

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SLIDE 32

US banking problem – 1980s

  • Between 1980 and 1994 2,912 banks failed with

$924B in assets $924B in assets

– Equivalent to 1 failure every other day for 15 years! – $168M in assets to be liquidated or resolved every day! $168M in assets to be liquidated or resolved every day!

  • Resolution Trust Corp (RTC) in 1989 to act as

conservator and receiver of assets Triple Mandate: conservator and receiver of assets. Triple Mandate:

– Conservator: “take control of failing institution to preserve assets and protect depositors” – Receiver: Take control of bank assets (loans) and dispose of them to maximize value Social: Preserve affordable housing held by receiverships – Social: Preserve affordable housing held by receiverships

Source: 10 p6.

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SLIDE 33

RTC resolution strategy

  • Most assets sold directly from conservatorship & receivership

– Limited assets passed on to acquirer Limited assets passed on to acquirer – Change in policy from previous failures – Asset and liability sales generally separate

  • Quick disposition of assets at fair price essential

– Securitized loans to speed up sales – Broke assets into small pieces to increase competition bidder participation and flexibility

  • Partnered with public & private entities to advance social
  • Partnered with public & private entities to advance social

goals

– By Dec. 31, 1995 over 100,000 affordable housing units sold y , , g

  • Most assets (loans and property) sold to public

– Transparent process – Partnered with local and national private firms for auctions, etc.

Source: 10 p13-28

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SLIDE 34

RTC asset sales strategy

  • Loan sales

– Placed loans into pools based on geography asset type quality and Placed loans into pools based on geography, asset type, quality, and maturity – Used private contractors for all selling phases

  • Eg. Evaluating, packaging, marketing, auctioning
  • Eliminated the need to hire thousands of people
  • Real estate sales
  • Real estate sales

– RTC provided seller financing. – Sealed Bids

  • At first just for single assets, later for pools of property
  • Perceived as faster

A ti – Auctions

  • Used for both distressed and non-distressed properties

– Took away negative perception of auction; Drove up prices

  • Used for pools of properties
  • In both cases, widespread use of private contractors.

Source: 10 p28-39 & 28

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SLIDE 35

RTC - equity partnerships

  • Created 72 equity partnerships on $21.4B in

l (b k l ) loans (book value)

  • Allowed the RTC to share in the upside while

p disposing of the asset as quickly as possible Allowed the RTC to remove itself from the

  • Allowed the RTC to remove itself from the

management of the assets while maximizing long-term value for taxpayer

  • All types of assets included

All types of assets included

  • Used for small, poor quality loans

– General Partner, often a collection agency

Source: 10 p40-42

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SLIDE 36

RTC – Affordable housing programs

  • Provided seller financing to 25% of single

f il h ld family homes sold

  • Donated assets with nominal value to NGOs
  • r public agencies at no cost

Property had to be used for public good – Property had to be used for public good

  • Low income housing, homeless shelter, day care, etc.

M th 1000 t d t d

  • More than 1000 assets donated

– Cost of this program unknown, est. at $135M

  • Less than 0.5% of total liquidated assets in

the program the program

Source: 10 p36-37

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SLIDE 37

Swedish Problem

  • Deregulation of banking

sector increased credit sector increased credit availability and drove up real estate prices up real estate prices

  • Rapid decline in

housing prices housing prices

  • High interest rates

( 00%) d b l k (500%) caused by link to ECU basket

– Once krona floated, substantial depreciation

Source: 29

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SLIDE 38

Swedish Solution

  • Rapid response

– Government guaranteed all deposits

  • All would be made whole except equity holders
  • Bank Support Authority (BSA) set up

– Determined long term condition of all banks – Determined long term condition of all banks – Hammock Approach

  • Bank A: requires little to no state
  • Bank A: requires little to no state

support

  • Bank B: requires substantial state

support but is viable in the long support but is viable in the long term

  • Bank C: requires state liquidation

Source: 31

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SLIDE 39

Swedish Solution

  • Banks valued assets based on BSA

t bli h d it i established criteria

– Market value not “panic sale value”

  • Difficult due to illiquidity in property market
  • All asset values set as of a specific day for consistency

p y y

  • 2 Asset Management Companies (AMC) set

up to deal with loans up to deal with loans

– Repackage loans and sell – Foreclose on and sell property – Maximize value

Source: 15 & 16

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SLIDE 40

BSA vs. AMC

BSA AMC BSA AMC

Supports banks and d it ( b k Separate entity from bank that assumes depositors (eg. bank guarantees) bank that assumes bank loans (can be public or private) Solves structural Converts loans to t ( l d Solves structural problems with banks (eg. forces mergers) assets (real and financial) and sells them them

Source: 16

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SLIDE 41

Why was Sweden so successful?

Ireland

  • Very decisive and quick action

– Some action is better than no action Some action is better than no action

  • Early disclosure of loan losses
  • Broad political and public support
  • Currency deflation to cushion the

Currency deflation to cushion the real value of loss

– Be careful: If too large can cause even bigger problems Be careful: If too large can cause even bigger problems

  • Luck

k – Quick macroeconomic recovery

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SLIDE 42

Japanese Problem

  • Deregulation of banking

sector increased credit sector increased credit availability and drove up real estate prices up real estate prices

  • Tax misalignment drove

l d i up land prices

– High transfer tax – Low property tax

  • Followed by prolonged

economic stagnation

– Near 0% interest rates

Source: 12

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SLIDE 43

Japanese Situation

  • Housing prices peaked in 1991 / 1992
  • PM proposed early action in 1992 to rescue

the banks with public funds p

– Politically impossible: Proposal abandoned

I f t t di ti l i t d

  • Infrastructure spending stimulus instead
  • 6 years of denial by banks and politicians

y y p

– Banks would not write down the value of loans

  • 1998 action finally taken
  • 1998 action finally taken

– Similar to Sweden

  • Much longer timeframe

Source: 12 & 13

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SLIDE 44

Jpn Solution – why less successful?

  • Worked once the plan was implemented
  • Exceptionally low interest rates incentivized

holding onto property g p p y

– “Its cheep to carry, the value will come back soon!!” soon!!

  • Lack of political

ill willpower

  • Lack of immediate

Lack of immediate direct action

Source: 13

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SLIDE 45

Recommendations

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SLIDE 46
  • Rec. – For Communities
  • 1. Come up with a plan for the property

– Financial and physical

  • 2. Find partner
  • 2. Find partner
  • 3. Make necessary planning / zoning changes
  • 4. Approach NAMA / owner with plan

– Clearly layout financing requirement to NAMA y y g q

  • Establish fines and public ordinances for

eyesores eyesores.

  • Revoke planning permission for

p g p undeveloped land

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SLIDE 47

Recommendations – for NAMA

  • Asset selling recommendations

– Hope (for debtors) is not a strategy

  • Take properties to receivership as soon as possible

fl d h ll f h f

  • Briefly managing and then selling an asset is far cheaper for

NAMA than a business plan that ultimately fails

Work with local real estate firms to figure out – Work with local real estate firms to figure out best method of disposing of each property

  • Bulk sales auctions listings etc
  • Bulk sales, auctions, listings, etc.

– Provide guarantee for bank issued financing (or seller finance) seller finance)

  • NAMA set credit stands, use banks to asses and lend
  • Could jumpstart lending market
  • Could jumpstart lending market
  • Buyer must have plan for property
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SLIDE 48

Recommendations – for NAMA

  • Selling assets continued

– Take equity share in sales properties (RTC)

  • Share risk and upside
  • General recommendations

– Increase public relations and explain why you are – Increase public relations and explain why you are the good guys. C t i t t bli – Create a consistent public message

  • Be careful about the term “asset”
  • Don’t confuse bank and real assets in Public Relations

Don t confuse bank and real assets in Public Relations

Live up to public expectations

“NAMA is an asset management agency, not a “toxic” or “bad” bank.” – NAMA Business Plan, 30 June 2010 “Now I have said that NAMA will acquire bank debts rather than the underlying secured assets…”- Peter Stewart speech to N.I. Econ. Conf.

– Live up to public expectations

Source: 26 & 30

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SLIDE 49

Recommendations – for NAMA

  • General recommendations continued

– Accept the fact that NAMA will have to own and briefly manage significant amounts of property

  • Prepare for this by getting contractors who specialize

in this ready to mobilize

– Recognize that many properties are in rural locations where demand may NEVER come back

  • Provide working capital loans to tear down estates
  • Work with other developers to move people out of

half-built estates into more viable locations

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SLIDE 50

Recommendations – for NAMA

  • Community recommendations

– For more difficult properties, partner with local communities to establish best use – Offer local community/ county council right of first refusal (at market price) for public use ( p ) p

  • Low/moderate income housing, community centre, Old age

home, hospital, etc.

– Recognize that not every property will recover your investment; Donate low value property to d f l community or NGO on condition of a plan

  • Even open space is a plan

– Provide below market financing for community based projects

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SLIDE 51
  • Rec. – for the Government
slide-52
SLIDE 52

Reform Bankruptcy Law

  • Bankruptcy law must be reformative, not

iti punitive

– The debtor doesn’t want to be bankrupt either – More money is recovered in reformative systems

  • US Chapter 7 and 11

US Chapter 7 and 11

  • Remove the full recourse nature from future

mo tgages mortgages

– Post crash, houses should serve as enough collateral

  • Look to UK, Individual Voluntary

Look to UK, Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA)

Source: 20

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SLIDE 53

Abolish Stamp Duty and VAT

  • Currently, property only taxed when it

h hi St D t changes ownership: Stamp Duty

– First €125,000: nil – Next €875,000: 7% – Balance: 9% Balance: 9% – First time home owners and small owner

  • ccupied homes exempt
  • ccupied homes exempt

– Additional 13.5% VAT on Commercial home sales

  • Encourages developers to sit on property
  • Discourages sales
  • Discourages sales

Source: 32 & 33

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SLIDE 54

Introduction of Property Tax

  • Proposal: Abolish stamp duty and VAT on

l t t l real estate sales

– Introduce annual property tax (Rates) to make up lost revenue

  • Discourages unproductive use of land
  • Discourages unproductive use of land
  • Lowers sales costs

– Encourages liquidity in property market

  • Exempt owner occupied homes

Exempt owner occupied homes

– Removes popular resistance to plan

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SLIDE 55

Property Swap

  • Swapping units in an underutilized estate for

l f ll tili d t t nearly fully utilized estates

  • Allows ghost estate to be torn down without

harming residents harming residents

  • May be difficult to implement

May be seen as favoritism by population – May be seen as favoritism by population

slide-56
SLIDE 56

Debt Restructuring for Individuals

  • Freeze on foreclosures is not a sustainable

l t l long term plan

  • Existing mortgages must be restructured to

g g g reflect individuals ability to pay and LTEV Index to individuals net worth and income

  • Index to individuals net worth and income
  • Only for owner occupied homes

y p

  • All profit from sales return to Government
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SLIDE 57

Risks going forward

  • Delayed recovery
  • Fire sale on non NAMA assets
  • Euro stability
  • Euro stability
  • Half built properties

– Dangerous, unsightly

  • Tax introduction could harm economy

Tax introduction could harm economy

  • Political will
  • ECB / IMF mandates
  • Prolonged illiquidity
  • Prolonged illiquidity
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SLIDE 58

Thanks

  • Prof. Nic Retsinas,

John Driscoll, International Centre

  • Dr. Karen

Keaveney Harvard Business School for Local and Regional Development Keaveney, Queens University Belfast p Barry Wides, Barry Wides, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Stefan Ingves, Riksbank Göran Lind, Riksbank Currency David Proctor, NAMA Jonathan Fiechter, IMF

slide-59
SLIDE 59

Bibliography

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