Military Operational Research (ISMOR) Syndicate Session on - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

International Symposium on Military Operational Research (ISMOR)

Syndicate Session on Non-Lethal Weapons Concept Development & Experimentation

John Nelson SAS-094 Co-Chair john.nelson@americansystems.com +1 703-441-8363

Syndicate Session Outline

Insights from National and NATO NLW Activities

– What Are NLW – Operational Relevance – NLW Effectiveness – Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) Highlights

• NLW Requirements
• Characteristics Needed in Future Capabilities
• Integrated NLW Experimentation Framework

Desired Syndicate Feedback

– Analytical Tools, Models, or Other OR Techniques to Support Concept Development and Experimentation – Applicability/Adaptability of Existing Tools, Models,

• etc. for Addressing Non-Lethal Weapons Concepts

2

What Are Non-Lethal Weapons?

NATO Definition:

NLW are explicitly designed and developed to incapacitate or repel personnel, with a low probability of fatality or permanent injury, or to disable equipment, with minimal undesired damage or impact on the environment.

3

Fielded Developmental Conceptual

Types of NLW

Technology Type Current and Programmed NLW Acoustic

Flash bang and acoustic hand grenades (including warning munitions, thermobaric payloads, combined acoustic and blunt impact devices, and combined acoustic and light devices), loud speaker arrays, and underwater acoustic devices (with acoustic and pressure effects)

Chemical-Based Riot Control Agents (RCA)

Tear gas, oleoresin capsicum (OC) pepper spray, and irritants deployed using various means (canisters/personal dispensers, hand grenades, 12 gauge, 40mm, 66mm, and breaching rounds) and in some instances in combination with smoke, acoustic, optical, and/or kinetic effects

Electromagnetic

Optical warning devices (laser dazzlers and non-coherent light), Human Electro- Muscular Incapacitation (current Taser™ stun devices, potential 12-gauge or 40mm systems with longer range, or potential nanosecond electrical pulses with still greater range), laser induced plasma, thermal lasers, laser-based flow modulation, Radio Frequency vehicle or vessel stopping, disruptive wide-band high-power microwaves, and millimetre wave active denial technology (ADT)

Mechanical/Kinetic

A wide variety of handheld batons, grenades and other hand-thrown devices, 12- gauge rounds, 40mm/56mm/66mm munitions, FN-303, and Modular Crowd Control Munitions with blunt impact effects, sometimes combined with marking; water cannon; 40mm ring air foil projectile; air gun diver interdiction system; caltrops; and various counter vehicle and vessel nets and barriers.

4

Overarching NATO Lessons from Ongoing Operations

Challenges to Conventional War Paradigm

– Adversaries avoid overmatch by complicating engagements (operating amid the populace) and using asymmetric means – Avoiding collateral damage (especially civilian casualties) is paramount

Battle for the Narrative

– Adversaries use of incidents (including false reports) – Ability to influence local and international perceptions and support

Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS)

– Recognized as a vulnerability that adversaries exploit – “Tools gap” between visual methods for assessing intent and lethal force – Recommendation: Conduct a “deep dive” to identify non-lethal capabilities and

• ptions (Initial data showed enhanced NLW warning effectiveness of 80-90%)

5 Sources: Draft report from Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) and Civilian Casualty Study Update for ISAF: Quick Impact Recommendations, 26 September 2011

Dealing with Restricted Fire

6

“We must balance our pursuit of the enemy with our efforts to minimize loss of innocent civilian life, and with our obligation to protect our troops."

General David H. Petraus, US Army

Commander, International Security Assistance Force and Commander, US Forces Afghanistan 2011

Needing to Isolate/Segregate

7

“Every citizen of Afghanistan must know ISAF will continue to do all we can to reduce casualties that affect the Afghan civilian population."

General John R. Allen, US Marine Corps

Commander, International Security Assistance Force and Commander, US Forces Afghanistan 2012

Stopping Vehicles or Vessels

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Ability to seize the initiative Need for increased decision space/time

• Act while determining intent
• Additional options for escalation/de-escalation
• Deny an area to increase engagement range & standoff
• Delay approach and increase time to respond

KosoVO Afghanistan Collateral damage concerns:

−Bridge over Danube, destroyed during 1999 NATO Air Campaign −Reconstruction costs −Impact on Danube until 2005

Distinguish/respond to threats

−Limits of C4ISR and passive force protection −Move, separate, or isolate combatants/non-combatants

Value of non-lethal effects

−Reversibility/Recovery −Complement lethal force

• Act when lethal force is restricted
• Facilitate use of lethal force by

determining and isolating hostiles

−Minimize regrets

9

Additional NLW Lessons from NATO Operations

ISAF CIVCAS Lessons

Adaptive Enemy in an Ambiguous Environment

– CIVCAS recognized as a vulnerability that adversaries exploit – Evolution of adversaries’ TTPs to increase CIVCAS likelihood and increase risks faced by coalition forces

Limited Tools

– Shortage of non-lethal options cited – “Tools gap” between visual methods for assessing hostile intent and

• ptions for lethal force

– Most EOF CIVCAS incidents lacked any kind of enhanced warning – “CIVCAS resulting from EOF incidents (the second leading cause of CIVCAS behind indirect fire) continue to be a strategic issue which negatively affects host nation populations and senior leadership relations.”

Recommendations

– Conduct a “deep dive” to identify non-lethal capabilities and options (Initial data showed enhanced NL warning effectiveness of 80-90%)

10

Components of NLW Effectiveness

• Task Accomplishment

– Meet the military requirement (required target response) independent of constraints

• Constraint Satisfaction vs. Target

– Meeting the degree of reversibility/recovery (non-permanent effect on the intended target)

• Constraint Satisfaction vs. Other

– Having no effect or a relatively reversible effect on bystanders, own force, or infrastructure

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NLW Effectiveness Overview

System Characteristics MoPs MoRs

MoEs Scenario

+ + + Environment Target Military Requirement

Duration Recovery Onset time Te N R A2,1 c d q p Ma gni tud e Duration Recovery time Ma gnit ude Te N R A1,1 b c d a Onset time

1. Task Objective

Recovery Onset time Te N’ R’ A3,1 b c d a Ma gni tud e

3. Collateral Constraint 2. Target Constraint

1. Mobility 2. Communications 3. Physical Function 4. Sense and Interpret 5. Group Cohesion 6. Identification 7. Motivation

NATO NLW Capabilities-Based Assessment (SAS-078) Highlights

Purpose: Conduct a Capabilities-Based Assessment to Determine NLW Requirements, Gaps, and Candidate Solutions, Including Associated Work on Experimentation Participants:

Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany Netherlands Norway Spain United Kingdom United States ACT, ACO, and NURC

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SAS-078’s Analytical Approach

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Gap and Solution Analysis

Mit. Res. Gap Gap Gap Mit. Res. Mit. Gap

Requirements Analysis Review of NATO/National Sources Scenario Analysis In-Service and Programmed NLW

Capabilities Analysis

Potential NLW Non-Materiel Options

Gap Analysis

Gap Gap Gap Gap Gap Gap Gap Gap Gap

Experimentation

NLW Requirements

Counter Personnel Counter Materiel

Provide warning to individuals, including operators of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft (Air/Land/Maritime) Tag/Mark vehicles, vessels or aircraft in an open or confined area (Air/Land/Maritime) Tag/mark individuals in an open or confined area (Land/Maritime) Deny access to vehicles in an open or confined area (Land) Move individual(s) out of an open area (Land) Deny access to surface and submerged vessels in an open

• r confined area (Maritime)

Move individual(s) out of a confined area (Air/Land/Maritime) Deny the use of landing zones or airfields by aircraft (Land) Move individual(s) within or out of buildings (Land) Degrade/Disable/Stop vehicle(s) in an open or confined area (Land) Move individual(s) out of an area (Maritime) Degrade/Disable/Stop vessel(s) in an open or confined area (Maritime) Deny access to individual(s) in an open area (Land) Degrade/Disable weapons (including explosive devices), sensors, communication equipment (Air/Land/Maritime) Deny access to individual(s) in a confined area (Air/Land/Maritime) Degrade/Disable facilities (Land/Maritime) Deny access to individual(s) to facilities (Land/Maritime) Stop an aircraft on the ground (Land) Deny access to individual(s) on or underwater (Maritime) Divert aircraft in the air (Air) Degrade/Disable/Stop individual(s) in an open area (Land/Maritime) Degrade/Disable/Stop individual(s) in a confined area (Air/Land/Maritime) Degrade/Disable/Stop individual(s) in a building (Land) 15

Capabilities Database Items

Technology Type Current and Programmed NLW

Acoustic (29 NATO items in the Capabilities Database) Flash bang and acoustic hand grenades (including warning munitions, thermobaric payloads, combined acoustic and blunt impact devices, and combined acoustic and light devices), loud speaker arrays, and underwater acoustic devices (with acoustic and pressure effects) Chemical-Based Riot Control Agents (RCA) (35 NATO items in the Capabilities Database) Tear gas, oleoresin capsicum (OC) pepper spray, and irritants deployed using various means (canisters/personal dispensers, hand grenades, 12 gauge, 40mm, 66mm, and breaching rounds) and in some instances in combination with smoke, acoustic,

• ptical, and/or kinetic effects

Electromagnetic (18 NATO items in the Capabilities Database) Optical warning devices (laser dazzlers and non-coherent light), Human Electro- Muscular Incapacitation (current Taser™ stun devices, potential 12-gauge or 40mm systems with longer range, or potential nanosecond electrical pulses with still greater range), laser induced plasma, thermal lasers, laser-based flow modulation, Radio Frequency vehicle or vessel stopping, disruptive wide-band high-power microwaves, and millimetre wave active denial technology (ADT) Mechanical/Kinetic (78 NATO items in the Capabilities Database) A wide variety of handheld batons, grenades and other hand-thrown devices, 12- gauge rounds, 40mm/56mm/66mm munitions, FN-303, and Modular Crowd Control Munitions with blunt impact effects, sometimes combined with marking; water cannon; 40mm ring air foil projectile; air gun diver interdiction system; caltrops; and various counter vehicle and vessel nets and barriers. 16

Gap and Solution Characterization

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Requirement (Assessment of Gap Priority – Top Ten, Middle, or Lowest Ten) Highest Scoring Current/Programmed NLW Highest Scoring Candidate Materiel Solution Highest Scoring Candidate Non- Materiel Solution Context Domain Required Domain(s) Capability (Gap) Yes Yes Space Required Space(s) Yes Yes Yes Characterization Target Number Target Number requirement Yes Yes Yes Targeting Targeting requirement Capability (Gap) Capability (Gap) Capability (Gap) Mobility Mobility requirement Yes Yes Yes Physical Properties Physical Properties requirement Yes Yes Yes Range Range requirement (showing the desired range and the range that covers most cases) Yes Yes Yes Coverage Coverage requirement (Results are shown with circular areas of a given radius and the equivalent area in m²) Capability (Gap) Yes Yes Onset Onset requirement Yes Yes Yes Duration Duration requirement Yes Yes Yes Score from assessment model xx% yy% zz%

Candidate Materiel Solutions

Acoustic Chemical Electromagnetic Mechanical/Kinetic Ancillary/Other Distributed Sound and Light Array (DSLA) Whistle grenade Anti-swimmer grenade Pheromones followed by insects Malodorants Sleeping agents/ calmatives Barrier foams Sticky foam Anti-traction materials Combustion modifiers and inhibitors Foam to disable fuses Active Denial Technology (ADT) Electrified grid IR/thermal laser Underwater ‘sparker’ Underwater taser RF and HPM to stop engines, disrupt C4ISR,

• r break detonators

Counter sensor laser Laser modified airflow to affect wings by increasing drag Taser XREP, multi-shot, and/or shockwave Water cannon/gun Riot net Barriers/Fences (TACRION) Underwater vortex/ wave generator Expanding wires/ microfibers Bubble stream (DiDiMo system) Mechanical barriers based on airbag technology Landing zone obstacles Air turbulence generators and blowers Constant target velocity weapon UAV-delivered payloads Animals (dogs, marine mammals, etc) Radiological/isotope tagging NL mine field Fog system or persistent smoke IR/RF smart dust Micro-GPS trackers 18

Integrated NLW Experimentation Framework (INEF)

19

DOTMLPFI Lines of Development Capability Gaps and Emerging Solutions Fielded Capability Specific General Technology Performance Response Behaviour Environment Target Interpretation Risk & Outcome Requirements

SAS-094 Purpose and Participation

Purpose: SAS-094 will provide analytical support for the development

• f NATO and national NLW Concepts of Operations/

Employment and associated operational experimentation

Participants:

Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany Netherlands Norway Sweden United Kingdom United States ACO, ACT, and NURC

20 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Timeline

Phase 1

Start to Month 15

Phase 2

Month 15-21

Phase 3

Month 21-30

Phase 4

Month 30-36

Possible CD&E Event

Assessment/Refinement via Operational Experimentation

Final Deliverables Support Concept Development Concept Analysis NLW Analysis

Workshop

Coordination with Other NATO and National Efforts

SAS-094 Organization

Working Group Chair Vice Chair Other Participants

Concept Analysis

GBR CAN ACO, ACT, BEL,DEU, DNK, FRA, NLD, NOR, and USA

NLW Analysis

USA CAN ACO, NURC, BEL, DEU, DNK (?), FRA, GBR, NLD, and NOR

Support Concept Development

ACO/ACT Desired NURC, BEL, CAN, DNK, FRA (?), GBR, NLD (?), NOR, and USA

Assessment/Refinement Using Operational Experimentation

CAN ACO, ACT, NURC, BEL, DEU, DNK, FRA, GBR, NLD, NOR, and USA

Co-ordination with Other Efforts

SAS-094 Chair/Vice Chair ACO, ACT, NURC (with NMIOTC and NNAG), CAN (with TTCP), DEU (with LCG-9 or successor organisation), DNK (with NMSG), GBR, and USA

Documentation

SAS-094 Chair/Vice Chair Working Group Chairs/Vice Chairs

22

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Objectives and Activities

– Analyse NLW Usage and Operational Experience – Military and law enforcement uses, NATO and national experience, lessons learned, and the role of NLW in delivering effects – Facilitate Concept Discovery – Analyse the future security environment and potential NLW implications, assessment of current concepts as well as potential changes in the operating context (particularly adversary capabilities and concepts) that have NLW implications. Analyse previous concepts to identify what makes concepts successful in subsequent

• perations

– Analyse current and potential NATO and national concepts to identify NLW implications, opportunities, and linkages – Conduct mission and task analyses to identify potential NLW roles and effects – Synthesise findings for application in concept development and assessment

Concept Analysis

24

October 2009

Concept Analysis Programme of Work

NLW Analysis

Bottom-Up Approach Building on Lessons Learned & Case Studies

• Entry Control Point
• Convoy Security (Mounted Patrol)
• Vehicle/Traffic Control Point
• Establish and Secure a Perimeter
• Cordon and Search
• Detain Personnel
• Clear Facilities
• Crowd Control
• Urban Patrolling
• Maritime VBSS
• Naval Vessel Restricted Maneuvering During Strait Transits

25

Desired Syndicate Feedback

• 1. What are the Key Issues with Implementing

Approach?

• 2. What Analytical Tools, Models or other OR

techniques Are Able to Address the Key Issues in CD&E?

• How Applicable/Adaptable are Analytical Tools, Models or
• ther OR techniques for Addressing Non-Lethal Weapons

CD&E?

• How can existing bio-effects and target response models be

interfaced with OR techniques and models given effect- response sensitivity, variability, and uncertainty?

26

Scenario Context

Mobile Checkpoint

– Background: Developed by ACT, based on NRF mission set – Context: To limit civilian casualties, Commander ISAF has ordered new procedures: sufficient mobile checkpoints to make it impossible to evade, patrols to investigate hiding vehicles, and the extensive use of NLW. – Situation: A checkpoint operation has been launched in a remote valley with just one important road entering and leaving the valley. Two mobile checkpoints have been set up (10km apart). An 18-wheeled truck approaches Checkpoint Alpha at 80 kph. The driver disregards the road signs at 800m to slow to 20 kph. The truck is approaching the 400m signs (5 kph) and light barriers with unchanged speed. One passenger car is in the checkpoint; no other vehicles are awaiting inspection. – Mission: Stop and investigate suspicious truck, prevent suicide attack – Forces/Assets: The checkpoint is manned with 30 soldiers, 4 machine guns, assault rifles and advanced non-lethal capabilities. Each checkpoint is also reinforced by a hovering attack helicopter.

27

Scenario Analysis

• Relevant NLW Requirements:

– Provide warning to individuals, including operators of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft – Deny access to vehicles in an open or confined area – Degrade/Disable/Stop vehicle(s) in an open or confined area – Degrade/Disable weapons (including explosive devices), sensors, communication equipment

• Relevant Current and Potential NLW Capabilities:

– Mechanical/Kinetic Devices (Various counter vehicle nets, barriers, and caltrops) – Acoustic (Flash bang and acoustic hand grenades (including warning munitions, thermobaric payloads, combined acoustic and blunt impact devices, and combined acoustic and light devices), and loud speaker arrays) – Electromagnetic (Optical warning devices, Radio Frequency vehicle stopping, disruptive wide-band high-power microwaves, and millimetre wave active denial technology)

28

Scenario Considerations

29

Stop Truck Prevent Suicide Attack Policy/Operational/Legal Considerations, such as:

 Restrictions (e.g., Directed Energy)  ROE and Use of Lethal and/or Non-Lethal Force (e.g., Minimize CIVCAS)

Feasibility/Supportability/Desirability

 Number of Systems

• Load/Portability
• Single lethal/NLW system (Scalable)

versus separate systems  Individual/Unit/Vehicle-Mounted

Effectiveness

 Required Outcome/Constraints/Risk

• Intended Target
• Collateral

 Comparative (Lethal vs. Non-Lethal)  Likelihood of Countermeasures

Scenario Context

• Hostage Rescue Scenario

– Background: Developed by ACT, based on NATO Response Force mission set – Context: NATO Response Force deployed to establish a minimum level of security and order following a collapse of local security and public services – Situation: UN High Commissioner and delegation taken hostage – Mission: Encircle the area and conduct a hostage rescue, with as few victims as possible – Forces/Assets: 50 SOF soldiers, 2 infantry companies, Armoured Personnel Carrier, NLW capabilities

30

Scenario Analysis

• Relevant NLW Requirements:

– Deny Access to Individuals in a Confined Area – Degrade/Stop/Disable Individuals in a Confined Area – Degrade/Stop/Disable Individuals in a Building – Disable Weapons (Including Explosive Devices), Sensors, and Communications Equipment

• Relevant Current and Potential NLW Capabilities:

– Mechanical/Kinetic Devices (A wide variety of handheld batons, grenades and

• ther hand-thrown devices, 12-gauge rounds, 40mm/56mm/66mm munitions,

FN-303, and Modular Crowd Control Munitions with blunt impact effects) – Chemical-Based Riot-Control Agents (Tear gas, OC pepper spray, and irritants deployed using various means (canisters/personal dispensers, hand grenades, 12 gauge, 40mm, 66mm, and breaching rounds) – Acoustic (Flash bang and acoustic hand grenades and loud speaker arrays) – Electromagnetic (Optical warning devices Human Electro-Muscular Incapacitation, Radio Frequency vehicle or vessel stopping, disruptive wide- band high-power microwaves, and millimetre wave active denial technology)

31

Scenario Analysis

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Encircle the Area Hostage Rescue Policy/Operational/Legal Considerations, such as:

 Restrictions (e.g., RCA)  ROE and Use of Lethal and/or Non-Lethal Force (e.g., the mission explicitly calls for minimizing victims)

Feasibility/Supportability/Desirability

 Number of Systems

• Load/Portability
• Single lethal/NLW system (Scalable)

versus separate systems  Individual/Unit/Vehicle-Mounted

Effectiveness

 Required Outcome/Constraints/Risk

• Intended Target
• Collateral

 Comparative (Lethal vs. Non-Lethal)  Likelihood of Countermeasures