John Kerr Michigan State University
Importance of collective action for PES Lack of attention in the literature Implications of alternative payment types for collective action and conditionality Some implications and research questions More questions than answers
Image source: news.mongabay.com
Image source: author
Initial programs: individual contracts for individual landholders Subsequent expansion to collective contracts Photo source: FONAFIFO
Identify, negotiate, establish contracts, monitor, enforce, pay. ranged from $1.48 to $14.78 per tCO 2 in CDM carbon sequestration projects (Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005) Image source: Chicago Climate Exchange
About a quarter of developing country forests are community owned or managed (Rights & Resources, 2012) They must contract as a group and absorb transaction costs internally Image source: ICRAF
Photo source: Wunder, 2005
Image source: Indiawaterportal.org: Joe Madiath & Anusha Bharadwaj
Image source: http://www.geo.coop/vol-2/issue-9
Main image source: author. Inset image photo credit: downtoearth.org.in Aug 2, 2014
Image source: mindmapinspiration.com
Image source: mediabistro.com
Image source: acceleratingscience.com
Payment types and collective action
Cash Conditional land tenure security In-kind services & development support training, employment, market access, infrastructure Image sources: USAID
Direct Facilitates annual payments Divisible Image source: FONAFIFO
P S D Q
Substantial experimental evidence of unexpected response to incentives Image sources: galleryhip.com, dircoolclips.com
60% 50% 40% 30% 51% 20% 25% 25% 25% 10% 0% none $2,000 $4,000 $6,000 % yes, by compensation amount
21
Social norms have independent motivating power (Cleaver 2000, Vatn 2009) Social vs. money ‘markets’ (Heyman & Ariely 2004) Motivations not additive (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997)
Image source: www.tutor2u.net
Image source: timeshighereducation.co.uk Image source: www.tos.ohio.go
Image source: zambiahuntingexpeditions.com
Image source: author
% familiar with % who say it ’ s Community PES payment common to have Village work frequency allocation a good leader 1 Annually 14 10 2 Monthly 55 22 3 Weekly 67 43 4 Weekly 44 21 5 Weekly 83 58
actually showed up 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 31 30 25 19 20 10 0 no pay pay community pay
70 60 50 40 no pay pay 30 community pay 20 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 totals
Cooperative groups respond better to carrots Uncooperative groups better to sticks (Vollan 2008) Image source: highachieversnetwork.com
Sumberjaya, Indonesia Image source: author
Image source: thehindu.com Image source: aljazeera.com
Image source:fftc.agnet.org
Cash Conditional land tenure security In-kind services & development support training, employment, market access, infrastructure Image sources: USAID
1. For groups with less established cooperation, there is a tradeoff between approaches promoting conditionality and those promoting collective action. 2. Where there is such a tradeoff: • …if collective action is a prerequisite for successful conservation behavior, • …then approaches that promote collective action may be a better bet than those that promote conditionality.
Compliance, not agreement Image sources: denelelabs.com, blog.3back.com
Decisions/ Social Systems Ecosystems Actions Payment
Image source: pinterest.com Image source: tripadvisor.com Image source: snowleopard.com Image source: pappygeek.com 40
Image source: ICRAF
42
Image source: author
• Conservation Stewards Program Images source: CI CSP
1. PES as commodity (e.g. carbon market) Actual delivery of ES 2. PES as compensation for opportunities lost (e.g. typical PES) Maintenance of ecosystem in desirable state Performance of agreed actions 3. PES as co-investment in mutually agreed upon management plan (more of a partnership)
Indonesia Image source: Google Maps
Images source: CI CSP
Financial incentives are powerful but less straightforward than they appear, so care is needed in their use
Motivation crowding out: under what conditions? Experimental evidence but what about real field settings? Institutional crowding out: Under what conditions do cash payments undermine institution-building for collective action? What steps to avoid it?
When is strict conditionality the right approach and when is it not? How does an arrangement that focuses less on conditionality avoid devolving back to the ICDP experience?
What approaches to promote institution- building, & when to use them? CSP approach? ▪ Long preparation to identify different interests ▪ Multiple reward types to address those different interests Financial incentives with a focus on transparency?
How will different institutional arrangements & different reward types coexist at different scales and different cases?
For more details see: Kerr, J.M., M. Vardhan, and R. Jindal. 2014. Incentives, Conditionality and Collective Action in Payment for Environmental Services. International Journal of the Commons . 8(2): 595- 616.
Bromley, D. 2008. Incentive- compatible institutional design: who’s in charge here? Keynote address for a conference “Designing Pro- Poor Rewards for Ecosystem Services” sponsored by the Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, April 7, 2008 . Child, B., and D. Clayton. 2004. The Luangwa Experiment in Zambia. In Getting Biodiversity Projects to Work. Towards More Effective Conservation and Development , ed. T. McShane and P. Wells, 256-289. New York: Columbia University Press. Cleaver, F. 2000. Moral ecological rationality, institutions and the management of common property resources, Development and Change, 31(1):361-383. Clements, T., A. John, K. Nielsen, D. An, S. Tan, and E. J. Milner-Gulland. 2010. Payments for biodiversity conservation in the context of weak institutions: Comparison of three programs from Cambodia. Ecological Economics 69(6):1283-1291. Frey, B.S. and F. Oberholzer-Gee. 1997. The cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out, American Economic Review, 87(4):746-755. Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini. 2000b. A fine is a price. Journal of Legal Studies. 29(1):1-17. Heyman, J., and D. Ariely. 2004. Effort for payment: a tale of two markets. Psychological Science 15:787-793. Jindal, R, J.M. Kerr, P.J. Ferraro, and B.M. Swallow. 2013 (first published online in 2011). Social dimensions of procurement auctions for environmental service contracts: Evaluating tradeoffs between cost-effectiveness and participation by the poor in rural Tanzania. Land Use Policy , 31: 71-80. Kerr, J.M, M. Vardhan, and R.Jindal. 2012. Prosocial Behavior and Incentives: Evidence from Field Experiments in Rural Mexico and Tanzania. Ecological Economics , 73: 220-227. DOI:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.10.031 Lapinski, M.L., J.M. Kerr, and J. Zhao. National Science Foundation. Interdisciplinary Behavioral Social Science Program. The Influence of Short-Term Financial Incentives on Social Norms and Behaviors. Three-year grant. Meinzen-Dick, R. 2007. Beyond Panaceas in Water Institutions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104:15200 – 15205. Narloch, U., U. Pascual and A. G. Drucker. Collective Action Dynamics under External Rewards: Experimental Insights from Andean Farming Communities. World Development 40(10):2096-2107. Rights and Resources Initiative. 2012. What Rights? A Comparative Analysis of Developing Countries’ National Legislation on Community and Indigenous Peoples’ Forest Tenure Rights. Rights and Resources Initiative, Washington, DC. Vatn, A., 2009. Cooperative behavior and institutions. The Journal of Socio-Economics 38:188-196. Vollan, B. 2008. Socio-ecological explanations for crowding-out effects from economic field experiments in southern Africa. Ecological Economics 67(4):560-573. Wunder, S. (2005). Payments for environmental services: some nuts and bolts (Vol. 42, pp. 1-32). Jakarta, Indonesia: CIFOR.
Recommend
More recommend
