Michigan State University Importance of collective action for PES - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Michigan State University Importance of collective action for PES - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Apr 11, 2024 336 likes •901 views

John Kerr Michigan State University Importance of collective action for PES Lack of attention in the literature Implications of alternative payment types for collective action and conditionality Some implications and research

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John Kerr Michigan State University

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 Importance of collective action for PES

  • Lack of attention in the literature

 Implications of alternative payment types for

collective action and conditionality

 Some implications and research questions  More questions than answers

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Image source: news.mongabay.com

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Image source: author

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Initial programs: individual contracts for individual landholders Subsequent expansion to collective contracts

Photo source: FONAFIFO

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 Identify, negotiate, establish contracts, monitor, enforce,

pay.

 ranged from $1.48 to $14.78 per tCO2in CDM carbon

sequestration projects (Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005)

Image source: Chicago Climate Exchange

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 About a quarter of developing country forests are

community owned or managed (Rights & Resources, 2012)

 They must contract as a group and absorb

transaction costs internally

Image source: ICRAF

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Photo source: Wunder, 2005

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Image source: Indiawaterportal.org: Joe Madiath & Anusha Bharadwaj

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Image source: http://www.geo.coop/vol-2/issue-9

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Main image source: author. Inset image photo credit: downtoearth.org.in Aug 2, 2014

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Image source: mindmapinspiration.com

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Image source: mediabistro.com

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Image source: acceleratingscience.com

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Payment types and collective action

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 Cash  Conditional land tenure security  In-kind services & development

support

  • training, employment, market

access, infrastructure

Image sources: USAID

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 Direct  Facilitates annual payments  Divisible

Image source: FONAFIFO

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S D P Q

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 Substantial experimental evidence of

unexpected response to incentives

Image sources: galleryhip.com, dircoolclips.com

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51% 25% 25% 25% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% none $2,000 $4,000 $6,000 % yes, by compensation amount

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21

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 Social norms have independent motivating

power (Cleaver 2000, Vatn 2009)

 Social vs. money ‘markets’

(Heyman & Ariely 2004)

 Motivations not additive

  • (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997)
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Image source: www.tutor2u.net

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Image source: www.tos.ohio.go Image source: timeshighereducation.co.uk

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Image source: zambiahuntingexpeditions.com

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Image source: author

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Village Community work frequency % familiar with PES payment allocation % who say it’s common to have a good leader 1 Annually 14 10 2 Monthly 55 22 3 Weekly 67 43 4 Weekly 44 21 5 Weekly 83 58

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25 31 19 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

no pay pay community pay

actually showed up

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10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1 2 3 4 5 totals

no pay pay community pay

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 Cooperative groups respond better to carrots  Uncooperative groups better to sticks (Vollan 2008)

Image source: highachieversnetwork.com

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Sumberjaya, Indonesia

Image source: author

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Image source: aljazeera.com Image source: thehindu.com

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Image source:fftc.agnet.org

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 Cash  Conditional land tenure security  In-kind services & development

support

  • training, employment, market

access, infrastructure

Image sources: USAID

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  • 1. For groups with less established cooperation,

there is a tradeoff between approaches promoting conditionality and those promoting collective action.

  • 2. Where there is such a tradeoff:
  • …if collective action is a prerequisite for

successful conservation behavior,

  • …then approaches that promote collective

action may be a better bet than those that promote conditionality.

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 Compliance, not agreement

Image sources: denelelabs.com, blog.3back.com

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Ecosystems Social Systems Decisions/ Actions Payment

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40 Image source: pappygeek.com Image source: pinterest.com Image source: snowleopard.com Image source: tripadvisor.com

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Image source: ICRAF

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42

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Image source: author

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  • Conservation Stewards Program

Images source: CI CSP

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  • 1. PES as commodity (e.g. carbon market)
  • Actual delivery of ES
  • 2. PES as compensation for opportunities lost

(e.g. typical PES)

  • Maintenance of ecosystem in desirable state
  • Performance of agreed actions
  • 3. PES as co-investment in mutually agreed

upon management plan (more of a partnership)

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Indonesia

Image source: Google Maps

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Images source: CI CSP

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 Financial incentives are powerful but less

straightforward than they appear, so care is needed in their use

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 Motivation crowding out: under what

conditions?

  • Experimental evidence but what about real field

settings?

 Institutional crowding out:

  • Under what conditions do cash payments

undermine institution-building for collective action?

  • What steps to avoid it?
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 When is strict conditionality the right

approach and when is it not?

 How does an arrangement that focuses less

  • n conditionality avoid devolving back to the

ICDP experience?

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 What approaches to promote institution-

building, & when to use them?

  • CSP approach?

▪ Long preparation to identify different interests ▪ Multiple reward types to address those different interests

  • Financial incentives with a focus on transparency?
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 How will different institutional arrangements

& different reward types coexist at different scales and different cases?

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 For more details see:

  • Kerr, J.M., M. Vardhan, and R. Jindal. 2014.

Incentives, Conditionality and Collective Action in Payment for Environmental Services. International Journal of the Commons. 8(2): 595- 616.

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Bromley, D. 2008. Incentive-compatible institutional design: who’s in charge here? Keynote address for a conference “Designing Pro- Poor Rewards for Ecosystem Services” sponsored by the Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison, April 7, 2008.

Child, B., and D. Clayton. 2004. The Luangwa Experiment in Zambia. In Getting Biodiversity Projects to Work. Towards More Effective Conservation and Development, ed. T. McShane and P. Wells, 256-289. New York: Columbia University Press.

Cleaver, F. 2000. Moral ecological rationality, institutions and the management of common property resources, Development and Change, 31(1):361-383.

Clements, T., A. John, K. Nielsen, D. An, S. Tan, and E. J. Milner-Gulland. 2010. Payments for biodiversity conservation in the context of weak institutions: Comparison of three programs from Cambodia. Ecological Economics 69(6):1283-1291.

Frey, B.S. and F. Oberholzer-Gee. 1997. The cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out, American Economic Review, 87(4):746-755.

Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini. 2000b. A fine is a price. Journal of Legal Studies. 29(1):1-17.

Heyman, J., and D. Ariely. 2004. Effort for payment: a tale of two markets. Psychological Science 15:787-793.

Jindal, R, J.M. Kerr, P.J. Ferraro, and B.M. Swallow. 2013 (first published online in 2011). Social dimensions of procurement auctions for environmental service contracts: Evaluating tradeoffs between cost-effectiveness and participation by the poor in rural Tanzania. Land Use Policy, 31: 71-80.

Kerr, J.M, M. Vardhan, and R.Jindal. 2012. Prosocial Behavior and Incentives: Evidence from Field Experiments in Rural Mexico and

  • Tanzania. Ecological Economics, 73: 220-227. DOI:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.10.031

Lapinski, M.L., J.M. Kerr, and J. Zhao. National Science Foundation. Interdisciplinary Behavioral Social Science Program. The Influence

  • f Short-Term Financial Incentives on Social Norms and Behaviors. Three-year grant.

Meinzen-Dick, R. 2007. Beyond Panaceas in Water Institutions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104:15200–15205.

Narloch, U., U. Pascual and A. G. Drucker. Collective Action Dynamics under External Rewards: Experimental Insights from Andean Farming Communities. World Development 40(10):2096-2107.

Rights and Resources Initiative. 2012. What Rights? A Comparative Analysis of Developing Countries’ National Legislation on Community and Indigenous Peoples’ Forest Tenure Rights. Rights and Resources Initiative, Washington, DC.

Vatn, A., 2009. Cooperative behavior and institutions. The Journal of Socio-Economics 38:188-196.

Vollan, B. 2008. Socio-ecological explanations for crowding-out effects from economic field experiments in southern Africa. Ecological Economics 67(4):560-573.

Wunder, S. (2005). Payments for environmental services: some nuts and bolts(Vol. 42, pp. 1-32). Jakarta, Indonesia: CIFOR.