Michael Polanyi and the Study Group for Foundations of Cultural - - PDF document

1

Michael Polanyi and the Study Group for Foundations of Cultural Unity (SGFCU) and the Study Group on the Unity of Knowledge (SGUK) Introduction

Lovers, consumers, and producers of published texts that we are, when we look back we may over-emphasize the role of Polanyi’s publications in the spread and influence of his ideas during the last three-quarters of a century, important though those books and articles may have been. Professors cite published sources and there are even evaluation schemes based on counting citations, endnotes, and other quantitative measures of explicit knowledge. Consequently, we may be assuming that Polanyi’s ideas spread because other people read what he published and then published other articles and texts explicitly citing Polanyi, thereby encouraging other to read him, and so on … . While this chain of influence undoubtedly occurred, the story we are going to tell and explore shows an additional way Polanyi’s ideas spread in the sixties….one that should not surprise Polanyians who are aware of the realms beyond explicit thought involving tacit assumptions, the importance of good problems, communities of practice, apprenticeship, convivial groupings and deeper levels of intellectual life than explicit published words. Our presentation is carved out of a great mass of material we have reviewed from the Michael Polanyi papers at Chicago, archival materials we have received from the Ford Foundation, and published works that you may not be familiar with unless you have shared our fascination with these Study Groups in the sixties and early

• seventies. This was a significant chapter in Polanyi’s influence on intellectual

history and also in the development of his late thought. If you find our presentation interesting, we will be happy to share more – Phil has written several excellent digests or summaries drawing on related correspondence and other documents that are spiced with his questions, observations, and analysis. They are much too long to use tonight but are available on the Polanyi Society

2 website or by email if you want to read through them. And we hope that others will dig into these materials further – there is probably even more to learn from archives at Davis, Reno, and other sources we have not yet examined. We think that the two Study Groups (SGFCU) at Bowdoin College in August of 1965 and 1966 and the nineteen or so Study Group meetings (SGUK) that began at MIT in 1967 and continued through 1972 began as a deliberate attempt to encourage an intellectual movement (a term used throughout the correspondence) based in Polanyi’s thought. This attempt was to some extent successful early on, but Polanyi’s influenced diminished even as the Study Groups evolved into significant intellectual gatherings whose influence continues to reverberate in areas

• f philosophy and social science well into the 21st century. The recent Taylor and

Dreyfus book discussed last at this conference is a prime example of continuing influence of what started or was encouraged in these meetings. Some of us may well be able to trace our intellectual roots to the work of these Ford Foundation funded study groups that “were brought together by a common awareness of the need for a fundamental conceptual reform that might both free the sciences, humanities, and arts from the inadequacies of scientism and open up an approach to the nature of knowledge and the nature of man on more adequate terms.” (p. 1, Narrative Report, August 23-28, 1965, meeting at Bowdoin College) A few publications can be traced directly to these meetings (and these will be discussed) and surely many other publications of the distinguished participants were shaped by experiences in these exploratory groups. But the tacit shared understandings developed, the convivial relationships forged, and the cooperative projects resulting from these groups should also be recognized as originating through Polanyi’s influence. The problems and issues identified and discussed helped to set the agenda for decades to come in philosophy of mind, philosophical biology, philosophy of art, and other areas. Simultaneously, Polanyi’s own work in the last five to seven years of his productive life was significantly shaped by his experience in these groups. BACKGROUND AND PLANNING FOR BOWDOIN CONFERENCES

• A. Deep Background

Polanyi’s interest in initiating these groups and his ideas about how they should be structured were undoubtedly influenced by his experience in the Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF) and even by earlier experiences in the Moot in the 1940’s

3 – a group explicitly attempting to shape the postwar intellectual landscape and

• culture. Both of these groups of leading intellectuals were involved in attempting

to influence Western culture that was understood to be in crisis. Polanyi and others believed his thought might offer alternatives to underlying conceptual commitments at the root of the crisis, so an effort to spread his ideas made good sense to him and his allies. Scott and Moleski intermittently discuss Polanyi’s involvement in the Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF) from 1953 through his resignation in 1968. The CCF was founded in Berlin in June 1950 and included artists, scientists, writers, and philosophers from twenty one countries. Its purpose was “to combat totalitarian threats to freedom of critical and creative thought wherever they might appear in the world.” (Scott and Moleski, 222) Polanyi and the Moot are also treated in the biography as well as in articles in TAD and POLANYIANA and APPRAISAL. Phil Mullins has prepared a digest of related correspondence and bibliographical information on Polanyi and the CCF that is available from the authors. Here are the concluding paragraphs from that document that outlines Polanyi’s extensive involvement with the CCF over 12-15 years: In sum, it appears that while important preliminary work on the Study Groups project occurred in Polanyi’s Duke residency (and involved Polanyi, Grene, Koch who soon left Duke for the Ford Foundation and Eduard Pols) there was also work on early stages of this project with the CCF. Various letters in the Ford archival correspondence make this clear as well as other Polanyi letters. Polanyi’s conversations with Michael Josselson, a major figure in the CCF, about funding a book project with Koestler, about something like the SGFCU and the possibility of mailing the early invitations to the 65 SGFCU Bowdoin meeting are an outgrowth of Polanyi’s long relation with Josselson and his work with the CCF. Polanyi apparently was collaborating with Koestler as early as 1963 on what appears to be a seed that grows into the later Study Groups project (Scott and Moleski, 258). Polanyi was deeply involved in CCF programs from the early fifties. Insofar as many of the programs were seminars, study groups and conferences (some quite large) with papers by academics, presented and discussed, it seems safe to conclude that in general CCF work provided the model for the 1965 and 1966 Ford-funded Bowdoin conferences. (Mullins, The CCF Connection)

4

• B. Duke Residency

The idea for the Study Groups in the form in which they finally emerged was discussed, if not birthed, during Polanyi’s residency at Duke in the Spring semester

• f 1964. Conversations with Sigmund Koch, Marjorie Grene, and others are

referenced in correspondence. Koch was moving from Duke to the Ford Foundation in October to become Director of Humanities and Arts. The letters between Grene, Koch, and Polanyi demonstrate increasing conviviality, even though Koch is a relatively new acquaintance. The first letters between Koch and Grene are filled with mutual high compliments. On August 1, 1964 Grene writes Koch describing her letter as “fan mail” because she has been in Oxford “devouring” the reprints of articles Koch gave Polanyi. She later asks to be put on Koch’s list for reprints and states, “To find a philosophically enlightened psychologist is a Great Experience!” Koch’s response is similarly complimentary. On August 16 he thanks her for her “gracious note” and writes “Nothing so tonic has ever come my way—and it arrived at the precise moment of maximum need” … “Your name was a household word here in Durham last year. You are obviously a constant, luminous presence in

• Dr. Polanyi’s mental field: he quotes you for authority at every turn. And every

time I attempted some callow witticism about Existentialist opacity, he re- convinced me that I must have a course at your feet. I therefore already regarded you as friend and teacher before your note arrived.”

A July 15, 1964 letter of Polanyi to Koch confirms that Polanyi has discussed the

Study Group idea with Mike Josselson (Secretary of the Executive Committee of the CCF) and had hopes of getting CCF funding (“out of its Ford grant.”). Polanyi continued to explore CCF sponsorship of the Study Group movement at least until November of 1964. He hoped to model what he was tentatively calling “the Unity

• f Culture movement” on “Eranos and other organized movements of thought in

Europe.” This name should cover in the first place the unity of culture menaced by the abdication of philosophy and the wilderness of scientistic incursions in the

• humanities. Cultural coherence is menaced also by the progressive

atomization of universities, which makes the best of them most incapable of dealing with broader, vital issues. There is also the cultural split between the Continent and Anglo-America, closely connected with the scientistic blight

5 leading either to existentialist absurdities or positivistic paralysis. Last not least, there are the great cultural divisions of the Iron Curtain and between the white haves and coloured have-nots.(Polanyi to Koch, July 15, 1964) All but the last issue are familiar themes in Polanyi’s thought, so his ideas about

• rganizing a movement to address them are not surprising, although they are

certainly ambitious! Polanyi mentions to Koch that, on Josselson’s advice, he will “ask a few friends who would be at the center of the enterprise to think about this and send me… a list of persons – cum-books whom we should bear in mind in consolidating our ideas about the whole business.” He intends to discuss the idea with Marjorie Grene, Arthur Koestler, and Bill Poteat and to confer further with Josselson. Other correspondence between Koch, Polanyi, and Grene in the months prior to the formal proposal for the 1965 Bowdoin Conference funding reveals the developing relationships between these three. Koch is very much in Polanyi’s camp and speaks often of “the movement” with enthusiasm. “In my newly acquired administrator’s-mind’s-eye, I am beginning to see the movement you propose as a possible point of departure for such enterprises as the type of “unity of knowledge research institute that we once discussed.” (Koch to Polanyi, July 15, 1964) In another letter Koch writes of his predecessor at Ford who has been promoted to Vice President, “Lowry, may I add, is sharply apprised of my regard for you and is utterly sympathetic towards considering all schemes, plots, intrigues, etc., that you may wish to suggest. I mentioned that I was anticipating a visit from you…and Mr. Lowry is eager to make your acquaintance at that time.” (Koch to Polanyi, August 16, 1964)

• C. Potential Participants, Group Names, and Cutting the CCF Connection

Names of possible participants are discussed and their appropriateness is assessed

• candidly. Of particular concern was Jacques Barzan, whose star must have been

rising to the point that he would be expected by many to be included. Yet they both expressed grave reservations about his depth and Polanyi was relieved to learn that Koch did not think it wise to include him. Polanyi is clearly the leader in shaping the group at this point, though he accepts detailed recommendations and suggestions from the others as the plans for the conference take shape.

6 Of course, as with so many other matters, Marjorie Grene’s role in shaping,

• rganizing, and executing was indispensible. Once she gets involved, the mission

and shape of the conferences are clarified and she provides an outline that becomes the roadmap for organizing the Bowdoin conferences and the rationale for the grant from Ford to support them. Along with the participants, the matter of the name for the first study group conference was discussed at length. Nothing seemed quite right but “Study Group

• n Foundations of Cultural Unity” was finally selected.

The questions around the CCF and Polanyi’s involvement with them are worthy of a separate study. Polanyi had been very active with CCF since the early 50’s and many of his publications appear in journals affiliated with or supported by them. He had addressed numerous CCF meetings and Scott and Moleski discuss these involvements at various points. What he and many others involved with CCF did not know at this time was that it was largely a CIA sponsored movement. Whether Polanyi would have cared about the CIA connection, had he known, is another question! Jumping ahead three years we see Polanyi’s passionate appeal in a letter to Raymond Aron in 1967 defending the CIA and Josselson: Supposing Mike accepted to serve the C.I.A. after the war, and supposing that this was wrong, is it our practice to victimize those who have erred, so as to be free from any blame that may be cast upon them? Surely, we have in our ranks many former Communists, who served Stalin, his murders and lies, We do not dream of reproaching them, nor does anybody demand that we do so. But Mike’s past actions were, by contrast to those of former Communists, not wrong at all, I would have served the C.I.A (had I know of its existence) in the years following the war, with pleasure. We were faced with an ubiquitous madness, supported by an empire and organized on conspiratorial lines. (Polanyi to Rayond Aron, May 9, 1967. See Mullins’ note on “The CCF Connection” for more about all of this including a copy of this impassioned letter.)

7 However, by December of 1964, Polanyi’s involvement with the CCF had become problematic for Koch, possibly at Lowry’s insistence. The full exposure of CIA involvement in funding CCF and Josselson’s later forced resignation have not yet become public, but Ford was obviously distancing its programs from CCF

• connections. Koch writes: “I must now reluctantly bring up a matter about which

I am somewhat disturbed.” It appears that Polanyi was receiving some kind of CCF support for his secretary, and Koch says that cannot continue if Ford is going to support the emerging program. Polanyi’s “reluctance to make a clean separation between the organization we are planning and your affiliation with the CCF” cannot continue if he wants Ford support. I am sorry that you apparently find such a constraint uncongenial, but it is an unalterable part of the framework in which I must operate.”…”I shall quite understand (and maintain the same high level of personal sympathy with the “movement”) if you decide to form the organization under their auspices rather than ours. (Koch to Polanyi, December 16, 1964)

• D. Ford Foundation Response, and Polanyi/ Pols Tensions

Apparently, Polanyi got the message with this letter and the proposal was officially submitted to Ford in January of 1965 with no CCF ties. Bowdoin’s President, James Coles, wrote on behalf of the organizing committee of Polanyi, Pols, and Grene: The members of the committee share the belief that there is need for a deep- seated philosophical reform – one that would radically alter prevailing conceptions of the nature of knowledge, or creative achievement in general, of the human agent that inquires and creates, and of the entire fabric of culture formed by such activities. (Coles to Koch, January 18, 1965) This will be addressed by the meeting of a number of European and American people in a number of different fields who are “converging” to this end. The ambitious program, if successful, may prove to be the first of annual meetings devoted to this general purpose. Letters between Grene, Polanyi, and Koch are quite candid, sometimes perhaps in humorous ways, about the SGFUK’s purpose being a means of promoting Polanyi’s ideas. “Movement” is the most common term but other terms like

8 “subversive,” “revolutionizing philosophy,” “the gospel of Polanyi,” and “underground” also appear. The internal Ford document leading to the grant clearly puts Polanyi at the center

• f the effort they are funding. Identifying Polanyi as “perhaps outstanding among

the efforts of those who have essayed reassessment of the nature of knowledge” the proposal states that Personal Knowledge “carries out what is perhaps the most incisive and comprehensive critique of scientism in the history of thought; at the same time, he presents the outline of a new and, in the opinion of some, fertile approach to the nature of inquiry, knowledge and culture.” Going on to speak of

• thers who have independently made recent efforts to scrutinize the “texture of our

culture,” the document states that “the time has for some years been ripe for the establishment of closer communication among thinkers of this cast.” (Internal Ford grant request, January 18, 1965) Listing dozens of major thinkers who seem to be independently providing critiques and alternatives to common problems, the proposal identifies a need for communication to facilitate convergence among them. “It would be both appropriate and strategic for Polanyi to be the focal person in any venture that might try to bring about such communication.” (Internal Ford grant request, January 18, 1965) Letters do reveal some tensions between Polanyi and Pols as the proposal is being formalized, some regarding location and logistics but some about the more substantial questions of whether an explicit philosophical system should be articulated as background or as the result of the meetings. Polanyi’s comments about philosophy and philosophers are revealing. He says he and Pols must not try to produce or even to pursue exclusively the outlines of a new

• philosophy. Only you and I have made this attempt and I think we would

reap resistance and confusion if we tried to put it into the center of our discussion at the meeting of our conference.(December 5, 1964, Polanyi to Pols) A few days letter Polanyi writes Koch with the provisional outline of the program. He describes a gathering of persons who have “trouble arising from their conflict with the predominant positivistic mentality.” These persons will respond to each

• ther and produce a “diagnosis of our time.” He lists potential participants and

interestingly indicates he does not want too many philosophers:

9 If you want to revolutionize philosophy, you have one set of people who are dead against you, namely professional philosophers. To suggest to them that they should write off their professional work up to this day and learn to think in different terms is surely dangerous. And even should they wish to follow you they would find their minds full of a complex systems which would bar access to new ideas requiring a different approach. (Polanyi to Koch, December 7, 1968) This is an interesting comment. It reflects Polanyi’s wariness of professional philosophy (like Grene) and his sense that too many professional philosophers will spoil the project. But, as the proposal and some letters make clear, the SGFCU is seeking persons already critical of the culture of scientism, persons who are “convergent” voices; the idea is to pull an interdisciplinary group of folk together. This is consistent with Polanyi’s call for a “post-critical” philosophy in the emerging “post-critical” era which Grene, Poteat, and others clearly support at this

• stage. We have earlier referred to this as Polanyi’s “grand program.” ( TAD

42:15-33) Interestingly, Polanyi thinks Pols’ recent book says much the same thing as PK so presumably Pols is a fellow traveler. On November 6, 1964, Polanyi wrote Richard Gelwick, I had a valuable experience reading at last the Recognition of Reason by Edward Pols, and meeting the author . . . It is amazing [that]Pols has duplicated the fundamental ideas of Personal Knowledge. His back-ground (sic) was entirely different than mine, with no science to speak of and a great deal of philosophy I lack. His idiom is also quite different, yet everything he says can be translated into my formulations. But even though their philosophical positions may be compatible, the development

• f an explicit philosophical basis for the conference should not be emphasized.

Polanyi cautions Pols that he and Pols cannot be too direct in pushing for a “post- critical” philosophy. Judging by who finally is invited and comes to the 65 Bowdoin meeting, it is an interdisciplinary group ( this was part of the deal with Ford); it certainly has representatives of new voices in biology (new voices that were out of the mainstream of NeoDarwinism) in Pantin and Chance, and Plessner—all figures Grene was interested in and encouraging Polanyi to read.

10 There were representatives from the sciences, social sciences, humanities, and arts, including some philosophers. At the end of his letter to Koch, Polanyi mentions that the “description of our subject matter” as “ ‘Life and Mind’” seems to be a title acceptable to Grene and Pols: “. . . I have not been able to find any more suitable title up to now.” Naming the Study Group and focus of the study continue to be at issue. (Polanyi to Koch, December 7, 1964) The initial grant for $25,000 is approved, and the budget shows that $16,000 will be for travel expenses with the remainder being allocated for accommodations, administration, and contingencies. The approval appears to have been almost

• immediate. How different are most grant procedures today!

BOWDOIN CONFERENCES August 23-28, 1965 and August 21-27, 1966 The first meeting (B1) was on all accounts quite successful. The twenty-six persons from the humanities, arts, and sciences discussed fifteen papers, mostly submitted and circulated in advance, in meetings where the authors’ summaries were followed by respondents and general discussion. The narrative report states “It seems to be agreed by all that the discussions were extraordinarily fruitful, in that a great effort was made by all to bring out the convergences that are so often hidden by the languages of the several disciplines.” (Narrative Report, August 23-28, 1965) Polanyi’s “The Creative Imagination” was the featured paper for the opening

• session. Polanyi “outlined the theory of tacit knowing” (on which the pre-

distributed paper was based) and showed how “scientism, and the consequent reduction of man to an automaton, was the product for a demand for totally explicit

• knowledge. . .” . (Narrative Report, August 23-28, 1965)

The initial focus on the theory of tacit knowing thus apparently was a strategy designed both to identify the cultural problems the conference was set to discuss and to provide Polanyi’s particular response to these problems. This strategy seems to have been highly successful. Polanyi’s role was central and according to the narrative report his ideas were considered throughout the week. The Tuesday afternoon session was also devoted to “the problem of levels of

11 existence, as presented by Professor Polanyi.” * Many of the other speakers related their comments to his ideas. This is clear from the published transcripts of portions of the discussions as well as from the narrative report. * The following excerpt from Mullins’ “Michael Polanyi and the SGFU and SGUK Meetings: A Sketch of His Involvement in and Publications Related to these Meetings.” This document outlines how Polanyi’s discussion of l;evels apparently played into the B1 conference and subsequent related publications.

Textual material very close to that found in two sections of Polanyi’s essay “The Structure of Consciousness” (drafted earlier in 1965) appears in the monograph as a very long “discussion comment” by Polanyi. This 6.5 page comment [compare PI, 205-212 and KB 216-221] is not acknowledged as a version of Section 2 “Principles of Boundary Control” and Section 3 “Application of These Principles to Mind and Body” of “The Structure of Consciousness.” Polanyi’s discussion comment, Grene notes, is relevant to M.R.A. Chance’s paper “Man in Biology” (which it immediately follows), but also to other papers by Helmut Plessner and C.F.

• A. Pantin in the same section of the monograph (“Science and the Living Subject”) as well as a

paper by Eugene Wigner in another section of the monograph and a 1965 SGFCU paper by Edward Pols that Grene included only in The Anatomy of Knowledge (PI, 112). The 1965 narrative report for Ford notes that Polanyi made an important comment on “levels of existence” (5) in the discussion of Plessner’s paper. Polanyi’s long discussion comment in the monograph is preceded by an editorial comment in which Grene indicates the comment is concerned with “Levels of reality: A pervasive problem which arises in connection with almost all our discussions is that of explanation in terms of hierarchies of structure as against a single principle

• f physic-chemical explanation” (PI, 205). In several papers at the 1965 conference, Grene noted

in her introductory remarks, she found “the problem of levels of reality,” which is “the type of metaphysical problem” which “comes up so urgently whenever the relation of physics and biology is in question” (PI, 112). She emphasized that “rethinking the concept of organic reality” and in particular “the conceptual structure of biology” (PI, 112) was important to the 1965 Study Group meeting. Polanyi apparently “plugged into” the discussion of Plessner’s paper (and perhaps other papers) his main ideas (clearly stated in “The Structure of Consciousness”) concerning boundary conditions, the operation of higher and lower principles of control and levels of reality. But the close parallel between Polanyi’s long “discussion comment” and the sections of “The Structure

• f Consciousness” is striking. There are a few differences between the two insofar as the

discussion comment includes some references to the conference context. Perhaps, Polanyi simply read from the soon to be published manuscript of “The Structure of Consciousness” at the 1965 Bowdoin conference. Alternatively, perhaps Grene simply inserted the material from “The Structure of Consciousness” into the monograph because she thought it was a concise and relevant treatment of a topic important at the conference. (continued)

12 Ideas and their implications were vigorously discussed and debated. Charles Taylor “inquired about the relation of this theory to the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.” Poteat chaired a session in which Wigner paper “Epistemology of Quantum Mechanics --- Its Appraisal and Demands” reported as “one of the high points of the week.” Bill Scott, Erwin Strauss, Edward Pols, Sigmund Koch, John Silber, M.H. Pirenne, Helmuth Plessner and others’ contributions are summarized in the report and/or published in The Anatomy of Knowledge. The last presentations were from the arts: Weismann on “Tacit Knowledge and Painting” and Elizabeth Sewell reading “Cosmos and Kingdom.” If the 1965 narrative report can be trusted, “as the week went on there was an increasing and palpable sense, not so much just of agreement, as of something very important that the whole procedure was building up to. This can be specified, perhaps, along a number of lines.” The report goes on to identify interdisciplinary contact, contact between men of distinguished achievement in differing fields, the strong display of kinship of philosophical, scientific and artistic problems, and the articulation of important ideas and problems and ideas about people with whom to discuss them in the future, which was viewed as particularly important for the younger participants (Silber, Taylor, Lucas, and Klein are mentioned specifically in this regard). The problems identified for further discussion include a number of central Polanyian themes: the nature and role of the imagination from involvement in scientific discovery through biology (particularly taxonomy) to the arts, questions about levels of explanation and levels of reality, the problem of reality and its capacity to teach us about ourselves and our world, emergence and evolution, and the more specialized problem that emerged from discussion of the physics of “incompleteness theorems” and their nature and importance in a number of fields. ________________________________________

(continued) This is certainly a possibility since Grene unexpectedly had to cut drastically, late in the publication process, the material in the monograph. Grene perhaps got the idea from Polanyi himself about inserting sections of Polanyi’s essay somewhere in the monograph. A Polanyi letter of August 1, 1966 to Grene (B16, F1, MPP), written on the eve of the 1966 Bowdoin conference, notes that much of the upcoming conference will be at least indirectly concerned with “the bane of determinism,” but “if Cartesian dualism can be disproved, as I believe to have done, determinism should vanish.” Polanyi then quoted a section of “The Structure of Consciousness” (which he viewed as decisively rejecting a Cartesian ontological bifurcation and determinism) and asked what Grene thought of his statement, adding “Could you insert these lines into the book on the first Bowdoin conference?

13 Because of the success of B1 a second conference (B2) was planned for August 1966 and the Ford Foundation again picked up the tab. President Coles’ letter to Koch formally applying for support for B2 asks for $36,500 to fund an interdisciplinary meeting on “Levels of Understanding.” The committee of Pols, Polanyi, and Grene, and other participants agreed that, among the problems that emerged at the first conference, one was “most urgent and most promising”: “the problem of relating, in terms of a conception of insight, the types

• f knowledge achieved in the arts, the exact sciences, and the biological and social

sciences.” (Coles to Koch, December 27, 1965) The narrative report submitted after the B2 conference (signed by Pols) gives a more elaborate definition of this topic from another proposal document that further explains what would be involved in the examination of the similarities and differences among various disciplines exploring various levels of reality. And it states that the committee intends to focus on works of art as bearers of truth that have power: “The influence of society on art has been often studied, but the power

• f art to change society, though a major force in contemporary history, is

unaccountable in terms of the main philosophic tradition.” The report goes on to state that, even though this topic was not lost sight of in the planning or the course

• f the meeting, “…the organizing Committee does not feel that this year’s

meeting, lively though it was, brought us in sight of an adequate understanding of it.” (Narrative Report, August 21-27, 1966) Barry Commoner’s opening paper (“Is Biology a Molecular Science?”) led to such a lively discussion, particularly around Polanyi’s strong disagreement with it, that an additional evening session was scheduled to continue the debate.* Holtmark presented on “Goethe and the Phenomenon of Color,” Silber on “Status Responsibility,” Iris Murdoch on “’God’ and ‘Good,’” and Bossart on “Three Directions in Phenomenology.” All of these and several others appear in Anatomy

• f Knowledge which has papers from both B1 and B2. Other papers and

transcriptions of some of the discussions from 1965 can be found in the Psychological Issues monograph. *See Mullins’ “Michael Polanyi and the SGFCUK and SGUK Meetings” for an analysis of Polanyi’s dispute with Commoner which ultimately led to Polanyi’s writing his late essays (e.g. “Life’s Irreducible Structure”) on biology

14 Background papers cited in the narrative report as relevant to particular presentations but not formally presented and/or discussed included Polanyi’s “Message of the Hungarian Revolution” and a paper by Poteat titled “Myths, Stories, History, and Action.” The similarity of this title to Poteat’s essay in Intellect and Hope,“Myths, Stories, History, Eschatology and Action: Some Polanyian Meditations(1968), suggests a close relationship between those papers, but we have not yet received Poteat’s Bowdoin paper from the Ford Foundation to compare them. We believe these two conferences mark major chapters in the story of Polanyi’s influence. They helped to spread Polanyi’s contributions through a range of disciplines by showing the bearing of some of his key conceptual contributions on problems across the disciplines. The themes and ideas clarified through his presentations and the conference discussions are among the most substantial contributions he made and they appeared in various forms in numerous publications including Grene’s anthology Knowing and Being.(1969) In thinking about the influence of these conferences in spreading Polanyi’s ideas, it appears that his influence spread not only through introducing others to his thought, convincing others of the importance of his contributions, and having

• thers build on his ideas directly. At this point in his career, Polanyi was also

interested in finding allies -- finding others who were addressing similar problems with similar solutions. Fostering this convergence was also a goal of the Ford

• Foundation. He was building a movement as well as spreading his own philosophy.

Of course he was also always interested in showing that he had come up with ideas first, or that his formulations were better, as can often seen in his correspondence, particularly with Grene. Along with the publications already mentioned that relate to these conferences, it is also important to recognize the relationship of these meetings to Poteat and Langford’s Intellect and Hope.(IH) The possible relationship of Poteat’s essay to a paper for B2 has already been mentioned. A total of six of the fifteen essays in IH were written by Bowdoin participants, and others who are included in the volume were invited to at least one Bowdoin Conference. Six contributors, but not Poteat, attended later SGUK discussed below. Finally we would note again that William Poteat, who had been so involved from the inception through the planning and execution of these Bowdoin conferences, and is shown to be an active participants by the schedules and the transcribed discussions, does not participate in the later SGUK meetings. We don’t know why

15 for sure, but we have offered some speculations about that in our presentation at the Yale Poteat Conference, summarized briefly in TAD 40:1, 24ff. THE MOVE FROM BOWDOIN TO UC DAVIS With these two successful conference behind them, Pols, Polanyi, Grene, and Koch turned to a larger project which became “The Study Group on the Unity of Knowledge.” Although Pols is still involved, by October of 1966 it seems that Marjorie Grene is taking more control of the “movement” and that the central office will be located at Davis where she joined the faculty to chair the Philosophy Department in July of

• 1965. Polanyi writes Pols and copies Koch and Grene about his concerns that the

Study Group is becoming too closely associated with Bowdoin, particularly in the minds and publications of those at Bowdoin. He alerts Koch and Pols that UC Davis (this of course means Grene) is preparing a grant for continuing the Study Group and that he, Polanyi, wants to accept their offer. (Polanyi to Pols, October 11, 1966) A letter from Koch to President Coles of Bowdoin (with a copy to Pols) explains several reasons that the program will be shifted to Davis, including the residency there of Jerald Kindred who is designated at that time to be the executive director. Ford is interested in funding another program growing out of the Bowdoin conferences that will have “a more effective form.” The organizing committee is to be expanded from three to nine persons and the new organization will meet at several institutions and will not be “tied too closely to any single institution.” Koch does write that he is “personally unhappy over the fact that the proposed realignment would lead to the dissociation of the enterprise from Bowdoin.” (Koch to Coles, October 25, 1966) Pols writes Koch (in a letter dated the next day and marked as received on October 28th) apparently unaware of Koch’s letter to President Coles and the news the decision has already been made, appealing to Koch for an appointment to talk about the “proposed” move. He expresses disagreement with the idea of moving to Davis as well as the appointment of Kindred and claims that Marjorie is “absolutely undecided whether we should apply from Davis, Bowdoin, or somewhere else.” (Pols to Koch, October 26, 1966) While Pols attends some later SGUK meetings, he resigns from the steering committee in the Spring of 1969 and from the SGUK in March of 1970.

16 THE STUDY GROUP ON THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (SGUK) The project that was funded to be administered at Davis was a remarkable

• achievement. But it does not develop exactly in the way we anticipated when

beginning this study or perhaps in the way anticipated by the organizers (Polanyi, Grene, Pols) and the Ford Foundation principals (Koch, Lowry, and others) who funded it. While the SGUK was of some significance in spreading Polanyi’s ideas further, the significance of the SGUK meetings and project moves well beyond the interests of Polanyi and the goal of spreading his existing ideas. Polanyi’s involvement in some SGUK work was quite important in the development of Polanyi’s late thought in directions we discuss below. The SGUK’s significance for a variety of thinkers and areas of thought continued for decades, even as Polanyi’s direct role and influence on the group diminished as the group evolved. We hope others, include George Gale, can comment on this and possibly work further on these influences in the future. The second grant from the Ford Foundation (initially for five years for $220,000) supported some 19 meetings of leading scholars in many different fields across the United States and Western Europe. The list of names of those who attended one or several of these meetings is quite impressive to anyone familiar with major thinkers in science, social science, and the humanities in the second half of the twentieth century. NARRATIVE REPORTS ON THE EARLY SGUK MEETINGS The narrative reports to the Ford Foundation are among the most revealing documents we have found in the materials about these groups. Alongside the individual letters and published volumes, they provide fascinating glimpses into the groups’ activities and significance. The narrative report filed for 1968-69 provides an enthusiastic overview of the groups’ activities and plans with 19 pages of details and observations. Liberally peppered with Grene’s opinions, wit, and even occasional disdain for some participants’ contributions, it reviews conferences held, those being planned, publications already out or in press, and other features of the groups. It opens with claims of success for the four exploratory meetings already held:

17 These conferences have been extraordinarily successful, both from the point

• f view of the group members and of the visiting speakers and discussants.

Indeed, the group is convinced that these small meetings constitute our unique contribution to interdisciplinary research. The opportunity for informal discussions among a small number of philosophers, scientists, and,

• n occasion, artists, has proved of invaluable assistance to the work of all
• concerned. (Narrative Report,1968-69, p. 1)

Note the distinction here between the “group” more narrowly defined and the wider set of “visiting” participants. This distinction appears elsewhere but we have not uncovered the exact procedures, criteria, or membership of the inner circle referred to as the Study Group more narrowly defined. Study Group “members” identified at various points include Polanyi, Grene, and Pols of course. Others identified as study group members are Dreyfus, Silber, Weismann, Taylor, MacIntyre, Prigogine, Bronowski (withdraws 1968), ….. There are references to people leaving the “Group” and people being added, and this inner circle is clearly different, although overlapping, with the steering committee, not to mention the more than 100 other people who attended one or several meetings. Positions and arguments are summarized in the reports and the intellectual exchanges were clearly vigorous. For example, after succinctly summarizing key points in presentations on biology by Wantanbe and Ayala, Grene writes: Both speakers were sharply criticized by other participants, in particular by Professor Prigogine and Professor MacIntyre. Professor Prigogine gave a most illuminating presentation of his thesis that biological phenomenon can in fact be explained, not by means of orthodox thermodynamical concepts, but by reference to the principles and experimental techniques of irreversible thermodynamics, a discipline which he and his co-workers are in the process

• f developing in research institutes both in Brussels and Austin. (Narrative

Report, 1968-69, p. 2) The biologists present presented “a united front” and the philosophers “were critical of the biologists’ fundamental position.” MacIntyre then contributed “an analysis of the distinction between teleological and mechanistic explanation which substantially clarified the issues before us.” All of this at the first meeting and the group intends to return to “this nexus of problems, involving as it does systems theory, cybernetics, evolutionary theory and, indirectly, the interpretation of man and his place in nature” in future meetings. (Narrative Report, 1968-69, p. 3)

18 At a session in Montreal on May of 1968 arranged by Dreyfus and Taylor, the question addressed was whether the psychological theory of Jean Piaget, who attended the meeting, confirms or falsifies the thesis that mind can be successfully simulated by machines. Grene summarizes the back and forth between Papert and Frijda and others with various positions on this question and Piaget’s agreement with all sides: “Professor Piaget agreed again, and it became clear that he was full

• f good will but not really prepared to take sides in the debate.”(p.5) That ended

the morning session and Piaget was unable to return for the afternoon. Grene continues “In spite of his (Taylor’s) excellent presentation of the argument, Professor Papert did not seem to get the point and so there was no real debate.” (Narrative Report, 1968-69, p. 6) Polanyi participated in three of the meetings: Austin, April 1968; Bellagio, July, 1968, and Austin, March, 1969. He gave a paper on the epistemology of perception in the visual arts in Bellagio Italy in July, 1968. But these groups were not structured around his thought in the way that the Bowdoin meetings largely were. Exactly what form the Study Groups’ activities would take continued to change as the grant period continued. “As agreed by the committee, Dr. Grene traveled to London, Cambridge and Ediburgh last spring and summer to consult with a number of possible participants.” (13) There are references scattered through the document to phone calls, letters, and informal meetings of the participants beyond the formal meetings. Steering committee meetings undoubtedly included substantive discussions when these intellectuals met for planning. The Davis office, apart from its routine work, had begun the compilation of a library of reprints and books by Study Group members, has circulated background materials for meetings and other reprints by members as requested, and has rearranged the files and records of the group’s predecessor at Bowdoin, as well as preparing a complete file of the discussions from the two Bowdoin meetings for their library. (Narrative Report, 1968-6914) This is an important resource yet to be explored, assuming some records remain at

• Davis. George Gale can tell us more about these activities.

Publications were encouraged and at least three, possibly five or six volumes emerged:

19 The Anatomy of Knowledge (1965 and 1966 Bowdoin Papers plus some additional materials by Polanyi) Psychological Issues monograph (Selected 1965 Bowdoin papers, plus some edited transcriptions of 1965 Bowdoin discussions) Interpretations of Life and Mind (Papers selected from at least three SGUK meetings). Grene writes about the topic of this last volume: “ Reducibility,” admittedly sounds rather narrow in relation to the Study Group’s whole range of interest, But on the one hand we feel that we can make our best contribution at present through keeping our interdisciplinary interests in fairly definite areas as we move along, rather than trying to cover in every meeting, or in every volume the whole range of the conceptual synthesis towards which we hope to be working. And on the other hand this problem is particularly germane to our wider field of interest, since our view

• f man and man’s place in his own world and the world of nature is

intimately affected by our view of the relation of life sciences to non-living nature and to the austere principles of physics, which have so often been presented during the past three hundred years as the authoritative and indeed exclusive model for knowledge and even for practice. (Narrative Report, 1969-70, pp. 4-5) Two projected volumes are mentioned (p. 5) of this report along with an indication that arrangements have been made with Routledge and Kegan Paul and U. Massachusetts Press for publication: Politics and Art (ed. Wartofsky) and Comparative History and Sociology of Science (ed. Cohen). These volumes are also discussed in the 1970-71 Narrative Report where there is also detailed information about expenses related to editing and publishing these volumes indicating they do exist. We have not yet found them. An early plan to publish transcripts of all of the discussions of the meetings was scrapped after experimenting with transcripts of the first Bowdoin meetings in favor of a series of collected essays in the same format as The Anatomy of

• Knowledge. But there was a plan to tape all of the meetings and we do not know

if those tapes still exist at Davis. (Narrative Report 1968-69, p. 16)

20 Tracing the additional publications influenced by these Study Groups in the form

• f books and articles by all of the members and participants would involve writing

a small intellectual history of the last half of the 20th century! Grene’s conclusion to the first long narrative report again expresses enthusiasm for their work, particularly for the format of the small interdisciplinary groups with substantial exchange. While the larger meetings also have their place, there seems to be strong support for increasing the number of smaller meetings. These smaller gatherings “with their spontaneity and their specific relevance to work in progress, furnish unequalled opportunities for criticism and cooperation across professional barriers, and this kind of occasion, which the Study Group uniquely provides, should plainly be fostered, if not given first priority, in our future plans.” (Narrative Report 1968-69, p.19) LATER NARRATIVE REPORTS Later narrative reports document vigorous discussion, exciting interdisciplinary exchange, occasional misfires, and many interesting entrees into key issues. The influence of Polanyi’s thought becomes less apparent as the SGUK pursues topics that emerge in current discussions. But the SGUK’s significance and interest, in

• ur view, are no less impressive than were the earlier meetings of the SGFCU. We

can here mention only a few comments, particularly some which raise questions of interest for us. Attendance at the approximately nineteen meetings from 1967 to 1972 involved more than 130 participants, possibly as many as 150. A few meetings are mentioned in the narrative reports with no identification of participants other than the organizers and other lists are incomplete. Out of the 130 participants that are listed, a few more than 100 attended only one of the meetings. Some of the more regular participants are familiar to students of Polanyi. Charles Taylor attended at least 11 meetings, Marjorie Grene and Hubert Dreyfus at least

• 10. Alasdair MacIntyre was present at least 7 times, Marx Wartofsky and Robert

Cohen were at 6, and John Silber at 4. Three others were present for at least 3 (Pols, Koch, Polanyi) and at least fourteen were listed for 2 (Derrida, Putnam, Bernant, Stroud, Bever, Todes, Pribam, Wang, Prigogne, Gregory, Gunderson, Harre, Weismann, Arnheim).

21 Apparently the Berkeley, August 1969, “Concepts of Mind” meeting was the most successful SGUK meeting. Grene’s 1969-70 report states “the discussions, both formal and informal, added up to an immensely instructive and indeed unforgettable occasion,” according to member of the Study Group as well as many letters from distinguished visitors from Harvard, Cambridge, Oxford, and Edinburgh. Remember that meeting included most of the important Study Group members but also other scholars such as J J.. Gibson, John Searle, Barry Stroud, Hilary Putnam, and Amelie and Richard Rorty. Questions and topics raised at this meeting occupy several subsequent gatherings. The list of attendees is truly impressive! A meeting in Austin (April, 1969) did open with a presentation on Polanyi’s theory

• f heuristics and of scientific knowledge in general by Robert Cohen. The

discussion raised questions of sufficient interest to schedule another meeting in Boston later in the year. Apparently, as we will discuss in more detail below, Polanyi was not enthusiastic about the direction of the discussion, so Rom Harre was asked to provide a discussion of Polanyi’s views for the second conference. Since Professor Polanyi could not be present, and since Dr. Harre, who had been asked to take part in continuing this discussion, presented some aspects

• f his own view rather than continuing the discussion of the problem of

heuristics as it had been opened at Austin, the discussion, though interesting in part, proved to raise something of a side issue rather than to contribute to the further clarification of our original theme. This is further evidence of the divergence of the group’s work from a focus on Polanyi’s thought. Two interesting themes were considered but never brought into a focused exploration by the group. One was the crisis in the universities as related to the study group’s concerns, and Grene’s report acknowledges its importance but states “There is plenty for the Study Group to do in continuing the field of its original interest without raising this very knotty set of practical and philosophical questions.” Another topic that was serious considered but never approached by a meeting was “man, nature, and environment.” Interestingly, MacIntyre submitted a report on this and Grene states that there were plans to spend $20,000 of their remaining funds to a series of exploratory meetings in this field. But we find no evidence that this plan was implemented. (Narrative Report 1969-70, p. 3)

22 After the ten meetings whose topics, locations, and participants are listed in Interpretations of Life and Mind, there were at least nine more meetings from what we can piece together from the correspondence and narrative reports. Some of the reports become rather cryptic as the money gets closer to running out and as the administration moves to persons other than Grene and Gale. Many of these meetings engaged issues and thinkers who made substantial contributions to their respective fields in subsequent years. A potentially important example (although we have to leave final judgment about this to someone with more expertise in this area) would be the meetings involving Jacques Derrida and Stanley Cavell in France in 1970 and 1972. Taylor, Dreyfus, Lucas, and Wartovsky were all there as well. The report includes a clear summary

• f a paper Taylor gave explaining the background of differences in the traditions

that have informed the positions of Cavell and Derrida and their resulting rebellion against them which led to some convergences between them. This 1970 meeting and the subsequent one in Paris involving Derrida need to be explored in more detail by someone with extensive knowledge of the issues involved in philosophy of language in these traditions and Derrida’s and Cavell’s subsequent development. It appear to us that this may have been early in Derrida’s engagement with the analytic tradition, an involvement that became quite significant in his developing work and may have led into his famous encounter with Searle which has been reported as ending badly with Searle calling Derrida “obscurantist” and Derrida calling Searle “Superficial.” Apparently, the Study Group’s meeting between the Continental and the American analytic representatives was more convivial. In summary, we find this series of nineteen or so meetings of the Study Group on the Unity of Knowledge to be a fascinating chapter in the intellectual history of the twentieth century involving, but hardly limited to, Polanyian concerns. Along with figures well known to many of us (Polanyi, Grene, Pols, Koch, Piaget, Taylor, Dreyfus, Cavell, Derrida, Silber, Rorty, Searle, Toulmin, Lakatos – to list only those with whom we are somewhat acquainted), there were more than 125 other participants in the 19 or so meetings across the world between 1967 and 1972. Among the important areas of inquiry which we believe may have been significantly influenced by the SGUK, along with influences on Polanyi's own later thought as will be discussed below, are:

23 Philosophies of Realism History and Sociology of Science Philosophy of Art including Art and Politics Philosophy of Biology AI and Philosophy of Mind Foundations of Language The Engagement of Phenomenology with the Analytic Tradition or Convergence of Continental and Anglo-American Philosophy While actual participation by Polanyi and explicit consideration of his ideas became less and less evident as the meetings progressed, the significance of these SGUK meetings for developments in all of these fields is exciting. In our understanding, in all of these areas a major theme was resistance to what might be generally described as reductionistic trends in these fields through the articulation of alternative conceptual models and intellectual passions that gave some protection to the integrity of embodied, active (in the sense of being agents), knowing persons in the face of alternative accounts that diminished or explained away these dimensions of being human. The Taylor-Dreyfus work discussed at this conference may be the best example of how these groups continue to impact intellectual inquiry even today, for their close relationship as leaders of this group has continued for decades. Much more work could and should be done to explore the influence of these groups in the decades that followed. THE BEAARING OF THE SGUK ON POLANYI’S LATER THOUGHT We find a number of interesting relationships between some early SGUK meetings and Polanyi’s later thought, even as his influence on and involvement in these meetings diminished from his leadership role in B1, B2, and the early planning for SGUK. The four threads we discuss briefly are Polanyi’s late work on life’s irreducible structure, his examinations and discussions of art, his concern with accounting for historical/cultural disasters of the twentieth century, and the examination and

24 understanding of meaning more generally. These are clearly interrelated and the Prosch/Polanyi book Meaning comes out of and attempts to tie together all of these concerns. The essay in Knowing and Being titled “Life’s Irreducible Structure” has a complicated history prior to and after its 1968 original publication date provided in Grene’s anthology. A version of this essay may have been circulated in advance of the Austin, 1968 Study Group Meeting on “The (Ir)reducibility of Biology to Physics and Chemistry.” The 1966 B2 discussion and debate with Barry Commoner is the initiating seed that grows into “Life’s Irreducible Structure”, and this discussion and debate continued in other contexts after B2 including an AAAS symposium in 1967 which was published in Zygon in December, 1968. Many letters between Grene and Polanyi discuss the issues involved in the discussion and publications, with Grene’s ambivalence about Polanyi’s arguments expressed in a marginal note in one letter: “The Ayala paper [for the 1968 Austin SGUK meeting] is so bad, I have to circulate your new one ----with some misgivings and a few editings ---hope you don’t mind” (Grene to Polanyi, March 13, 1968) All of these late Polanyi public lectures and publications on theoretical biology represent a further development and refinement of Polanyi’s ideas about biology that go back at least to Part IV of Personal Knowledge. Questions about life remained important themes in Polanyi’s later writings. See Mullins “Polanyi and the SGFCU and SGUK Meetings” for more detailed discussion of all of these complexly related matters. The second thread concerning Polanyi’s late writing about art also can be traced back to Bowdoin, in this case B1, where a presentation by M.H Pirenne (described by Grene in the Narrative Report as concerning “the philosophy of visual perception”) seems to have engaged Polanyi along with the art historians present in lively conversation. Polanyi continued to actively correspond with Pirenne until September 1974 – there are a total of 28 letters in Polanyi’s papers. Polanyi gave a paper, “What is a Painting,” at the Bellagio SGUK meeting in July of 1968 and he wrote a Foreword to a 1970 book by Pirenne. Grene apparently did not find Pirenne very interesting. In an August 26, 1968 letter to Polanyi, just after the presentation of Polanyi’s Bellagio presentation, she notes, “I am glad you find Pirenne so helpful. I suppose I shall never recover from the appalling impression he made on all of us at Bowdoin.” In a 2 February 1970

25 letter Grene comments to Polanyi that she thinks Polanyi “grossly over-rate[d]” Pirenne and she takes a dim view of his Foreward since Polanyi merely repeats what is said in Pirenne’s book . But she adds, “as far as my recollection goes the

• nly MS of yours I did nothing with at all was the preface to the Pirenne book.”

Other Grene letters also raise questions about ideas in “What is a Painting?” (1970) Polanyi’s Meaning lectures (variously titled and clearly related but not always identical) in the Spring of 1969, the Spring of 1970 and the Spring of 1971 incorporate some of the ideas about art in “What is a Painting?”, but treat also metaphor, symbol, ritual and religion in terms of the integration of incompatibles. Polanyi struggled to articulate a framework for a recovery of a richer humanistic vision to counter the destruction of meaning in modernity by scientism – or, more generally stated, a recognition of the epistemic and ontological orientation of the critical era. What is required is a philosophical and cultural revolution which Polanyi believed should be based in a fundamental re-conception of human life in the cosmos and an account of human endeavor rooted in the theory of tacit knowing. The Meaning lectures become the backbone of the book Meaning, which Harry Prosch is primarily responsible for assembling (see Moleski and Mullins, TAD 32:2: 8-24 on Prosch and Meaning) and the Prosch-Polanyi letters, overlap some of the period of the Grene-Polanyi correspondence. Comments on Prosch and Prosch’s work with Polanyi, Grene’s contact with Prosch as well as her often sharp criticisms of Polanyi’s formulations of matters in the Meaning lectures are all part

• f the Polanyi-Grene correspondence. Again, Phil Mullins’ digests give much

more detailed information about all of this. The third thread in Polanyi’s late thought related to the SGUK is Polanyi’s explorations of historical developments in the modern West that issued in the crises of the twentieth century. This thread was also not new to his thought at this

• stage. His various formulations of the theory of moral inversion dating back to the

forties are the theme he picks up here again. But this area of inquiry seems to have taken on a renewed urgency as the sixties drew to a close and Polanyi approached

• 80. He was eager to formulate an explanation of what had gone wrong in the

twentieth century and he wanted to have this examined by others. This was to be the focus of a projected meeting on the topic of “Science and History,” apparently to be sponsored by the Study Group and to be held in Europe. Plans got quite specific, with help from Grene in spite of her ambivalence about

26 the project, for such a meeting by 1970, as we will suggest below. The conference never occurred, although some of the ideas on which he was working were published in his essays “Science and Man” (1970) and “Why Did We Destroy Europe? “(1970) and are also in Meaning. These three threads emerging in the late sixties are tied together in the fourth thread: the focus on, even obsession with, the book Meaning in Polanyi’s declining years even as his cognitive powers began to fail. Meaning was not just another book --- the larger project from which it emerged is really an attempt to write volume II of PK. That is Polanyi desperately hoped to integrate his historical explanation of the West’s decline with a hermeneutic of discovery that integrated art and science in a grand project that would provide a new basis for humanity’s

• future. It is painful at points to see him struggling with this while he knows his

mind is failing, and you can get a sense of this in the closing quotation at the end of this paper. CORRESPONDENCE The correspondence from this period between Grene and Polanyi shows a less tidy dynamic than the accounts in the Ford Narrative Reports was operating behind the

• scenes. Tensions arose early on, Polanyi’s involvement in the SGUK was

increasingly questionable. Grene herself is ready to pass off the administration to someone else by 1970. While Polanyi was central to the original proposal and participates in two 1968 meetings (and one in 1969), in early 1968 Grene writes Polanyi an interesting comment that indicates some tensions between Polanyi’s thought and the work of the SGUK. This apparently relates to Polanyi’s discussions with a London Times journalist about possible European branches of the Study Groups:

Moreover, you TES [likely a typo for TLS later letters suggest] man is, in

my view a very weak reed on which to hang such an enterprise. And further, whatever you do, please do not allow him to print anything about us without clearing it with me! Otherwise we’ll have another write-up of this as a movement to spread the Polanyian gospel and I’ll be in hot water all over the

• place. However devoutly I may happen myself to subscribe to the principles
• f your philosophy (some of them), I do have to operate on the thesis that

“not Socrates but the truth shall prevail.” If you are right we’ll discover it some time (“we” as distinct from “I”) but let us get there at our own pace in

• ur own way. (Grene to Polanyi, February 9, 1968)

27 What were these other write-ups? Were some participants complaining that Polanyi’s thought was too central to the Group’s efforts? Does she agree? She is clearly distinguishing the work of the study group from Polanyi’s views (the Polanyian gospel). It becomes apparent as the story continues that Polanyi’s thought becomes less significant and he participates less and less, as he shifts more and more of his efforts and failing powers of attention to “Meaning.” Possibly because of this “focus,” Polanyi does continue engaging in the Art and Perception discussions and remarkably continues corresponding with Pirenne to as late as 1974! Polanyi also continues to attempt to organize a European meeting to focus on his new (or renewed) concerns about historical developments in the West, sometimes with some help from Grene, that may or may not be related to SGUK. They (Grene prepares the grant but submits it as Polanyi’s idea) formally approach the Rockefeller Foundation for a site for a 1971 conference but are unsuccessful. This meeting never happens - another one of Polanyi’s unfulfilled dreams as his powers are fading. Here is Phil Mullins’ summary of this small part of the story to give you an idea of what you can find in his documents: In July of 1970, there is correspondence between Grene and the Rockefeller Foundation (Olson to Grene, 2 July 1970 and Grene to Olson, 6 July 1970, Box 16, Folder 5, MPP) indicating that Grene has submitted a proposal seeking funds for a conference in the spring of 1971. Grene seems to be applying on behalf of the SGUK, but she clearly identifies the proposal, which apparently was on the topic “Science and History,” for a spring meeting as coming from Polanyi! She advises the Rockefeller Foundation to direct requests for additional information to Polanyi. There are a number of later letters in which Grene and Polanyi discuss matters such as who should be invited to such a meeting and Polanyi apparently meets with some of these people to discuss a conference. Polanyi says in his 17 July 1970 letter to Grene (Box 16, Folder 5, MPP) about the proposed meeting he hopes it will “examine the origin of the disasters which have befallen us in the Twentieth Century. I am inviting as a point of departure, a critique of my views on moral inversion, particularly as stated in “Science and Man”. He notes the “weakness of my historical documentation” and indicates he is “honestly anxious to hear my suggestions criticized and corrected.” (Mullins, “Michael Polanyi and the SGFU and SGUK Meetings”)

28 Meanwhile tensions within the leadership team and steering committee had erupted, and factions emerged by 1969 – perhaps earlier. Perhaps George Gale can tell us more about this but by Fall of 1969 Silber resigns with a fiery letter soon to be followed by Koch and Weismann (other Texas participants). The many connections and complications with Texas at this point would be interesting to sort

• ut because both Polanyi and Grene spent time there – as did Poteat – during these
• controversies. Silber, of course, gets fired at Texas, ends up as President at Boston

University, where Koch lands for the last two decades of his very productive life. Pols also resigns from the steering committee in 1969 and eventually from the

• SGUK. He wrote the Ford Foundation about his resignation and says he “felt
• bliged to resign entirely from the group as of March 25, 1970.” (Pols to Lowry,

May 29, 1970) In an interesting response to Pols letter informing Ford of his decision to leave the group entirely, Lowry (Koch’s predecessor at Ford who had moved up to Vice- President) writes in June of 1970: “I remember you very well and the importance Sigmund Koch attached to you interest in the Polanyi project. I regret to learn that you have felt obliged to resign from the Study Group, even though in our position here we of course cannot interfere with the inner workings of project committees.” (Lowry to Pols, June 5, 1970) So in Lowry’s and Ford’s mind, the SGUK was and still is “the Polanyi project” in

• 1970. Yet Grene in 1968 was concerned about press accusations that they were

“spreading the gospel of Polanyi.” And by this time, Polanyi has distanced himself from most of the Study Group’s efforts. He wrote Grene in June of 1969: “I am getting a bit doubtful whether to attend the meeting of the Study Group in October. On second thought I find none of the questions or remarks at the Austin meeting to have been of use to me. Such a meeting exhausts me without corresponding benefits. And in any case this kind of discussion can be conducted more freely and effectively in my absence. (Polanyi to Grene, June 10, 1969) Grene seems to be in agreement:

29 It’s too bad that you find the Austin meeting was of so little use; the rest of us found it very useful indeed. But I do agree with you that perhaps we could continue the discussion (in the October meeting), to quote you, “more free and effectively”, in your absence. (undated but not much later) In July she writes Polanyi advising him against attending the SGUK meeting because he might impede discussion: After all, you would have Rom (Harre) and me there as sympathetic advocates (and Rom, you said earlier, approved his arrangement). It is, very reasonably, hard for you to understand the difficulties of those who are interested up to appoint but not entirely convinced, and I think both they and we would feel freer to carry on our discussion if you were not in fact

• present. Please don’t go into a tailspin about this ---I say it in the spirit of a

friend and disciple! (Grene to Polanyi, July 18, 1969) Apparently at this Boston Meeting Harre presented his ideas rather than continuing the discussion based on Polanyi’s heuristics as was planned and discussed above. (p.22) Polanyi’s ideas continue to diminish in importance as the work of the Study Groups continues. So we have what the Ford Foundation thinks is the “Polanyi project” operating increasingly without Polanyi. Grene seems to keep Polanyi informed – he is probably still on the Steering Committee but we have not yet confirmed that – and she alternates between enthusiasm and frustration about the meetings and particularly about the politics of the steering committee. Her letters are a hilarious running commentary on her conflicts with others on the SGUK Steering Committee. By the fall of 1970 Grene is desperately trying to move out of the leadership of the Study Groups and hopes to move it to Boston. Then she learns that such a move would require a new application and it seemed unlikely that Ford would fund it under their new guidelines. “So it seems I have to keep on with the wretched thing – and as we are not spending enough money I’ll have to plan your meeting.” (Grene to Polanyi, October 5, 1970) She is at first ambivalent about Polanyi’s plans for the European meeting and then, at least in part because of other demands

• n her time, appears to oppose it.

30 In a way reminiscent of other Polanyi letters to Grene in the last six years of his live, Polanyi seems deeply appreciative of Grene, of their long and complex relationship spanning many joint projects, and at the same time he recognizes his

• wn waning powers:

I am grateful to you for your letters, even though your decisions have change in them in response to my strange project. In a way your acceptances have been a joy, but your refusals have been almost equally refreshing to my lacking faculties (Polanyi to Grene, November 27, 1970) We end our story here There are many loose ends and much material with which to work in trying to tie things them together. We look forward now to hearing a first-hand report now from someone who was in the middle of all of this for a number of years, the (as Marjorie Grene put it in one preface) “indefatigable George Gale” who served as executive secretary of the later Study Groups, the SGUK. We will let George tell us about his role in the SGUK but you should know that after that period of his life he went on to become a distinguished scholar and leader in the areas of history and philosophy of science, spending most of his career at

• UMKC. Among his many areas of expertise are the wines of Languedoc about

which he has written both scientific and philosophical articles….more on that perhaps later at the reception. We are eager to hear whatever he has to tell us but we hope especially to learn more about:

• 1. How central Polanyi’s thought and leadership was to the Study Group as the

years progressed.

• 2. What was behind all of the tension in the Steering Committee that led to so

many resignations.

• 3. What influence he sees of these Groups on later scholarship of any of the

participants and/or on any fields of study (AI, Theory of Mind, philosophical biology, dynamic systems theory (Prigogne), history and philosophy of science, art history and aesthetics, etc?)