is state support for the work-wage bargain vanishing? Resolve - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Eurofound – European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions www.eurofound.europa.eu

Key Influences on Bargaining Approaches: is state support for the work-wage bargain vanishing?

Resolve Symposium Cork - 19 November 2014 Christian Welz

• 1. Prologue
• 2. Actors u n d e r p r e s s u r e
• 3. Processes u n d e r p r e s s u r e
• 4. Outcomes u n d e r p r e s s u r e
• 5. Conclusions
• 6. Epiloque and discussion

Table of content

• “By viewing labour as a commodity, we at once get rid of the

moral basis on which the relation of employer and employed should stand, and make the so-called law of the market the sole regulator of that relation.”

(Dr. John Kells Ingram, address to the British TUC in Dublin )

• Clayton Anti-Trust Act

(section 6)

• 'that the labor of a human being is

a commodity or article

• f commerce'.

 Samuel Gompers – leader of the American Federation of Labour for

20 years was inspired by Dr. Ingram

Prologue

• Treaty of Versailles

(article 427)

first principle of the new ILO pro- claimed ‘ that

labour should not be regarded as a commodity

• r article of commerce

introduced by British delegation  Gompers > personal defeat

• ILO DECLARATION OF PHILADELP

 labour is

a commodity

Prologue

Actors

Impact Member State

successful tripartite negotiation (8-10) BE, BG, CZ, EE, FR, LT, LV, NL, PL, PT breakdown of tripartite negotiations (10---) BE(2011/12), ES, FI, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LU, PL(2011/12), SI reorganisation of public actors and bodies ES, GR, HR, HU, IE, LU, RO decline in trade union density CY, BG, DK, EE, IE, LT, LV, SE, SI, SK, UK halt in trade union density decline/increase in trade union density AT, CZ, DE, EE (for transport), LT changes to membership of employer bodies CY (increase), DE (increase in members not bound by CA), LT (first decline then increase)

Actors

Impact MS

decreasing influence and visibility BE, DK, EE, HU, IE, LV, NL increased cooperation between the social partners DE, HU, LT, NL emergence of new social movements ES, GR, PT, SI increase government unilateralism BE, BG, EE, ES, GR, HR, IE, PL, PT, SI new power balance among actors BG, EE, ES, GR, LT, LV, PT

Processes

PROCESSES - SUMMARY Type of change MS Main level(s) of bargaining: Decentralisation AT BG CY EL ES FR IE IT RO SI Recentralisation BE FI Horizontal coordination across bargaining units AT ES HU IE RO SE SK Linkages between levels of bargaining Ordering between levels EL ES PT Opening and opt-out clauses AT BG CY DE EL ES FI FR IE IT NO PT SE SI Extending bargaining competence EL FR HU PT RO Reach and continuity of bargaining Extension procedures EL IE SK PT RO Increased / changed use of existing procedures BG DE IT Continuation beyond expiry EE EL ES HR PT Minimum wage setting and indexation mechanisms

Trade union density _ 2011 v 2012

EIRO/ETUI 2013

FR LT PL EE HU LV CZ SK ES NL DE PT BG UK SI EU IE AT HR RO LU IT BE MT DK SE FI 2011 8 10 12 11 11 12 16 16 15 21 22 20 18 26 27 31 34 34 35 40 37 36 52 59 67 70 68 2012 8 9 10 11 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 20 22 26 27 29 31 33 35 35 37 37 50 57 67 70 74

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 % of workforce

2011 2012

Employer density _ 2012 v 2013

EIRO 2013/14

LT PL EE HR SK LV UK CZ BG EU DK IT FR FI BE LU SI SE NL AT 2011 15 20 25 28 33 34 35 41 42 54 58 58 60 70 76 80 80 87 90 100 2012 15 20 25 28 30 41 35 49 56 58 75 71 80 80 80 86 85 100

20 40 60 80 100 120

% of employees in companies members of an EO

2011 2012

TU developments in 2013

• membership
• rganisational change

increase DK (1), FR (1), LU, MT, NL, RO(1) decrease AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK (2), EL, ES, HR, IE, IT, LV, MT, NL, RO(2), SI, SK, UK stable BE, BG, DE, DK (3), FI, FR(2), IE, IT(1), NO, PL, SE no data EL, FR(3), HU, IE(2), LT, MT, NO, PT, RO(3) merger BE, FR, HU, UK fragmentation NL

• ther

EL, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, RO, SI, UK

Employers developments in 2013

• membership
• rganisational change

merger FR, LT fragmentation NL

• ther

EL, FR, HU, IE, IT, LU, NL, RO, SI increase EL, LV, MT(1), NO decrease AT, LU, MT (2), RO(1), SI, SK stable BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, HR, IE, MT (3),IT, SI, UK no data ES, FR, HU, LT, MT, NL, MT (4), NO, PL, RO(2), SE

Collective bargaining coverage _ 2011 v 2012

EIRO/ETUI 2013/14

LT LV HU PL BG EE CZ SK UK RO IE DE CY LU EU HR DE MT GR DK ES IT NL PT SE FR FI SI BE AT 2011 15 17 23 25 33 33 34 35 37 38 44 49 52 54 56 60 61 61 65 65 68 80 84 90 90 90 90 96 96 100 2012 15 16 23 29 29 33 33 35 29 38 44 36 59 51 60 53 61 65 58 80 80 12 88 92 93 75 96 97

20 40 60 80 100 120 % of workforce

2011 2012

Outcomes

Impact MS

inconclusive outcomes BG, CY, CZ ES, MT, NL decrease in number of agreements CY, CZ, EE, LV, MT, PT, RO, SI increase in duration of agreements AT, DE decrease in duration of agreements BG, CY, DK, GR, LV, ES, SE decrease in the level of pay increases AT, ES, FI, NL pay cuts or freezes AT, BE, BG, DE, DK, ES, FI, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, NL, PL, PT, SI, SK, UK working time reduction/short-time working AT, BE, BG, DE, FR, HU, IT, LT, NL, PL, SI, SK non-renewal of agreements BG, CY, EE, ES

Average hourly labour costs (2012)

EIRO 2014

BG RO LV LT PL HU SK EE CZ PT GR SI CY EU UK ES IT IE DE AT FI NL SE FR LU BE DK 2012 3 4.4 5.3 5.8 7.4 7.5 8.3 8.4 11 12 15 15 18 20 20 21 28 29 30 31 31 32 33 34 35 37 38

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

EUR

Monthly minimum wage _ 2011 v 2012

EIRO 2013/14

BG RO LV LT CZ EE SK HU HR PL PT GR EU ES MT SI CY UK FR BE IE NL LU 2011 128 158 285 232 310 290 327 338 385 345 485 585 661 641 685 748 855 109014251415146114461757 2012 145 157 287 290 312 320 337 372 372 393 485 683 712 753 763 763 870 126414301443146114851874

200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000

EUR 2011 2012

Real labour productivty (2012)

EIRO 2014

EE SI LV LT PL CZ MT CY EU IT BE AT FI DE SE FR NL IE 2012 1.7 2.4 8.2 10.3 10.4 13.2 14.5 21.5 27 32.2 37.2 39.5 39.5 42.6 44.9 45.4 45.6 50.4

10 20 30 40 50 60

EUR per h worked

Number of working days lost _ 2013

EIRO 2014

BG CZ HU LT LU LV MT PL RO SK HR NO AT SE IE FI DE BE DK UK CY ES 2013 2 3 3 9 15 26 150 174 379 444 605 1099

200 400 600 800 1000 1200

in 1000 days

2008 2011 Austria MEB MEB Belgium MEB MEB Bulgaria Mixed Mixed Croatia MEB MEB Cyprus Mixed Mixed Czech Republic SEB SEB Denmark MEB MEB Estonia SEB SEB Finland MEB MEB France MEB MEB Germany MEB MEB Greece MEB MEB Hungary SEB SEB Ireland MEB SEB Italy MEB MEB Latvia SEB SEB Lithuania SEB SEB Luxembourg MEB MEB Malta SEB SEB Netherlands MEB MEB Norway MEB MEB Poland SEB SEB Portugal MEB MEB Romania MEB SEB Slovakia Mixed Mixed Slovenia MEB MEB Spain MEB MEB Sweden MEB MEB United Kingdom SEB SEB

Company level Sector level National level

AT CY EL IT BG ES FR

FI

LT

RO SI IE

Trends in main levels of CB

BE

PT

• continental Western, central Eastern and Nordic IR regimes apply the

favourability’ principle to govern the relationship between different levels of CB



CAs at lower levels can only

• n standards established by higher levels



exceptions: IE and the UK > reflecting their different legal tradition based on voluntarism

• FR

 FR made changes already in 2004 (loi Fillon)

• ES

 2011 law inverted the principle as between sector or provincial agreements and company

agreements EL

 2011 law inverts the principle between the sector and company levels for the duration of

the financial assistance until at least 2015

• PT

 2012 Labour Code inverts the principle, but allows EOs and TUs to negotiate a clause in

higher-level CA reverting to the favourability principle

Ordering / favourability principle

opening clauses in sector/cross-sector CAs provide scope for

further negotiation on aspects of wages at company level

opt-out clauses permit derogation under certain conditions from

the wage standards specified in the sector/cross-sector CA

changes in opening clauses  6 MS

AT, DE, FI, IT, PT, SE

changes in opt-out clauses  8 MS

BG, CY, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, SI

• Changes in opening/opt-out clauses

• changes: EL, FR, HU, PT and RO
• EL

 under 2011 legislation, CAs can be concluded in companies with

fewer than 50 employees with unspecified ‘associations of persons’  these must represent at least 60% of the employees concerned

• RO

 legislation (2011) introduces harder criteria for trade TU

representativeness

 where TUs do not meet the new criteria at company level, EOs can

now negotiate CAs with unspecified elected employee reps

Extension of CB competence

Extension mechanisms

of the 28 MS > 23 MS have extension mechanisms or a functional

equivalent (IT)

 no legal procedure for extending collective agreements in

CY, DK, MT SE and UK

changes to either extension procedures or in their use

in 8 MS

BG, DE, EL, IE, PT, RO, SK, IT

 clauses providing for agreements to continue to have

effect beyond the date of expiry until a new agreement is concluded are intended to protect workers should employers refuse to negotiate a renewal

 they are found in a 9 MS at least  AT, DK, EE, EL, ES, HR, PT, SE, SK  changes have been made to such provisions in 5 MS  EE, EL, ES, HR, PT

Continuation of CAs beyond expiry

• No. of CAs

EIRO 2014

AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL1 EL2 ES FR IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SK UK

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

sector CA

200 164 166 115 46 46

company CA

95 87 64 55 39 48

total CA

295 251 230 170 85 94

extension

137 102 116 17 12 9

coverage / in 1000 pers.

1,894 1,397 1,407 1,236 327 242

• No. of CAs in PT

• change has been concentrated amongst 6 MS, whose WSMs

have each undergone multiple changes

 CY, EL, ES, IE, PT, RO  been in receipt of financial assistance packages from the ‘troika’  changes in WSMs were required in all except ES

• in a further 4 MS there have been some changes to WSMs

 HR, HU, IT and SI  change primarily driven by domestic actors > governments or SP

• in a majority of 18 MS WSMs have seen few or no changes

since 2008

• 6. Conclusions

• impact of the ‘troika’ in inducing changes to WSMs

amongst those countries receiving financial assistance packages is clear

• government-imposed measures in these countries

have substantially reconfigured WSMs

• 6. Conclusions

• ILO DECLARATION OF PHILADELP

 labour is not a commodity

• wage setting in the crisis and the new economic

governance …..

•  towards a re-commodification of labour

Epilogue and discussion

• Labour is not a commodity

> clause not in the EU Treaties

• Albany case (1996)

Albany used the competition rules in article

101(1) TFEU) claiming that mandatory pension scheme compromised their competitiveness

Epilogue and discussion

• CJEU
• “ social policy objectives pursued by CAs would be seriously

undermined if management and labour were subject to Article 85(1) “

• Advocate General Jacobs
• “ CAs enjoy automatic immunity from antitrust scrutiny”
• art. 153(5) TFEU
• The provisions of this Article

,

Epilogue and discussion

Crisis vs. megatrends

Trend Origin Restructuring of actors Megatrend Decline in trade union density Megatrend Public Sector Reform Megatrend Decentralisation of collective bargaining Megatrend (crisis accelerated) Increase in opt-out clauses Crisis-induced trend Increase in opening clauses Crisis-induced trend Decrease of extensions Crisis-induced trend Shorter duration of collective agreements Crisis-induced trend Drop in volume of bargaining Crisis-induced trend Drop in quality of bargaining Crisis-induced trend Shorter continuation of CAs upon expiry Crisis-induced trend Reforms in wage-setting mechanisms Crisis-induced trend More adversarial industrial relations Crisis-induced trend

Source: EIRO 2013

• http://www.eurofound.europa.eu
• christian.welz@eurofound.europa.eu

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