Interdomain Routing Decisions Mingchen Zhao * Wenchao Zhou * - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Interdomain Routing Decisions Mingchen Zhao * Wenchao Zhou * - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Private and Verifiable Interdomain Routing Decisions Mingchen Zhao * Wenchao Zhou * Alexander Gurney * Andreas Haeberlen * Micah Sherr + Boon Thau Loo * * University of Pennsylvania + Georgetown University 1 SIGCOMM 2012 (August 16, 2012)

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SIGCOMM 2012 (August 16, 2012)

Private and Verifiable Interdomain Routing Decisions

Mingchen Zhao* Wenchao Zhou* Alexander Gurney* Andreas Haeberlen* Micah Sherr+ Boon Thau Loo*

* University of Pennsylvania + Georgetown University

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Challenge: Privacy

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Charlie Doris Eliot Alice Bob

5 hop (3+1) hop

I do not want to reveal all my routes to Alice!

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Security

Can we have our cake and eat it too?

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Privacy Security

S-BGP, soBGP, psBGP, NetReview, …

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Goals

  • Security: If Bob breaks his promise, Alice

will detect it.

  • Privacy: Verification does not reveal more

information than BGP.

  • Evidence: If Bob breaks his promise, Alice

can prove it.

  • Accuracy: If Bob does not break his

promise, nobody can prove he did.

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Outline

  • Motivation
  • Goal: Verify promises about routing decisions
  • Challenge: Privacy
  • The SPIDeR system
  • Evaluation
  • Summary

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Background: Merkle Hash Tree

  • Merkle Tree

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b1 b2 b3 b4

Hash Hash Hash Hash Hash Hash Hash

b2

Hash Hash Hash Hash Hash

Proof that the second value is b2 Reveals nothing about b1, b3, b4!

Path to the root

Values

Commitment

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Making SPIDeR practical

  • So far: We can verify promises about a single

prefix and a single decision

  • We have a protocol
  • It meets all four goals
  • We proved the correctness (in a TR)
  • Guarantees hold even if an AS is malicious
  • Practical issues
  • , temporal privacy, loose

synchronization, logging system, withdrawals, incremental deployment Loose synchronization, Logging sys

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Multiple prefixes

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Multi-Prefix: Additional Challenges

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Outline

  • Motivation
  • The SPIDeR system
  • Single prefix
  • Practical Challenges
  • Evaluation
  • Functionality check
  • Microbenchmarks
  • Overhead
  • Summary

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Evaluation: Microbenchmarks

  • An important metric is how fast we can

make hash trees.

  • How quickly can we capture transient routing

configuration problems?

  • Experiment: generate a tree for a full BGP

routing table on Dell PowerEdge 860.

  • Result: 17.4s (with three cores)
  • Scales almost linearly with the number of cores

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Evaluation: Experimental Overhead

  • Small AS topology with Quagga routers
  • Injected a RouteViews trace
  • AS 5’s SPIDeR ran on a single machine

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Data Collected

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Evaluation: Overhead

  • Computation
  • 2.4 GHz core: 81.3% utilized
  • Commodity workstation is sufficient
  • Bandwidth
  • Signatures etc.: 20.8kbps
  • Verifying 1% of commitments per minute: 3.0Mbps
  • On the order of a single DSL upstream link
  • Storage
  • Keeping 1 year’s worth of logs: 145.7GB
  • Fits on a commodity hard drive

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SIGCOMM 2012 (August 16, 2012)

Evaluation: Overhead

  • Computation
  • 2.4 GHz core: 81.3% utilized
  • Commodity workstation is sufficient
  • Bandwidth
  • Signatures etc.: 20.8kbps
  • Verifying 1% of commitments per minute: 3.0Mbps
  • On the order of a single DSL upstream link
  • Storage
  • Keeping 1 year’s worth of logs: 145.7GB
  • Fits on a commodity hard drive

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  • A small AS could run SPIDeR on a single

machine

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Summary

  • Goal: Verify promises about interdomain

routing decisions

  • Problem: Offer both security and privacy
  • Solution: Collaborative verification
  • Implemented in the SPIDeR system
  • Provable security and privacy guarantees
  • Efficient enough to run on a single

commodity workstation

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More information: http://snp.cis.upenn.edu/