IN THE NEIGHBOURS GARDEN: Contrasting Safety Assurance Approaches in - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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IN THE NEIGHBOURS GARDEN: Contrasting Safety Assurance Approaches in - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Boeing Research and Technology Europe Boeing Research and Technology IN THE NEIGHBOURS GARDEN: Contrasting Safety Assurance Approaches in the Flight Deck & ATM Domains Lars Fucke, New Programs and Safety Richard J. Kennedy, New Programs


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Boeing Research and Technology Europe Boeing Research and Technology

EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009

IN THE NEIGHBOURS GARDEN:

Contrasting Safety Assurance Approaches in the Flight Deck & ATM Domains

Lars Fucke, New Programs and Safety Richard J. Kennedy, New Programs and Safety

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Boeing Research and Technology Europe

2 / 13 EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009

_ The ATM Safety Case approach

How is Human Reliability treated in the ATM Safety Case?

_ Airplane Certification and Airworthiness process

Human Reliability in Certification

_ How do the two approaches compare? _ Challenges of increasing ATM / Airborne integration

Overview

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Boeing Research and Technology Europe

3 / 13 EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009

ATM Safety Assurance Approach

Safety Considerations Operational Concept Initial Safety Argument FHA PSSA Implementation Transfer into Operation Safety Plan Project Safety Case Unit Safety Case Evidence Approval Evidence Evidence Evidence Evidence Update, if required Safety Monitoring Reports Update Update Evidence SSA Integration Operation & Maintenance Safety Considerations Operational Concept Initial Safety Argument FHA PSSA Implementation Transfer into Operation Safety Plan Project Safety Case Unit Safety Case Evidence Approval Evidence Evidence Evidence Evidence Update, if required Safety Monitoring Reports Update Update Evidence SSA Integration Operation & Maintenance

_ Operator Responsibility _ Safety Case-based _ Covering complete system life cycle _ ESARR 4 compliant _ Process and Methods proposed by EUROCONTROL ANS SAM _ Mandatory / Voluntary Occurrence Reports

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SLIDE 4

Boeing Research and Technology Europe

4 / 13 EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009

Human Reliability in the ATM Safety Case

Task Analysis Human Involvement in Accident Sequences Error Probabilities Integral part of failure / event analysis Quantification of Human Reliability (CARA, etc.)

Detailed Task Analysis Select GTT EPC Representation Detailed Operation/ system Description Problem Scoping Evaluation Final docum ent Remedial Measures Calculation Calculation PSF

CARA Process

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SLIDE 5

Boeing Research and Technology Europe

5 / 13 EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009

Airplane Safety Assurance Process

_ Manufacturer responsibility (Type Certification) _ FAR, CS & national regulations and Means of Compliance (FAR/CS 25 for Transport category) _ Operators (FAR 125), part manufacturers, maintenance, training

  • rganizations and personnel require

certification _ In-service reports to regulator & manufacturer

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SLIDE 6

Boeing Research and Technology Europe

6 / 13 EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009

Safety in Type Certification

_ AMC 25.1309, System Design and Analysis Fail-Safe Design Concept:

redundancy, isolation, proven reliability, checkability, failure warning, crew procedures

Qualitative evaluation of failure condition:

effect on airplane, crew and pax

Airplane / system level safety analysis:

qualitative or quantitative

Minor? Similar? Major? Simple? Redundant? Simple & conventional?

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Boeing Research and Technology Europe

7 / 13 EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009

How to demonstrate a system is safe?

Effects on _ A/C _ Occupants _ Flight crew

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_ Qualitative FHA, design and installation appraisal, service history of similar equipment, FMEA, fault trees (redundancy) _ Quantitative Fault tree analysis, Markov analysis, system dependency analysis

25.1309: e.g. stall

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Boeing Research and Technology Europe

8 / 13 EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009

How is flight crew action considered?

“… quantitative assessments of crew errors are not considered feasible. …”

(AMC 25.1309)

Which tasks? _ Alleviating failure conditions _ Periodic checks _ Discovery of obvious failures Under which conditions? _ Tasks assumable to be executed correctly (full credit only!) _ No exceptional skill or strength required _ Not compromising other safety related tasks _ Workload and time permits

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SLIDE 9

Boeing Research and Technology Europe

9 / 13 EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009

Design Guidance Provided

_ AMC 25.1309, System Design and Analysis Presence of suitable alerting indications (additional guidance in 25.1322, Warning, Caution, and Advisory Lights) Guidance in AFM if not normal airmanship Placing and protection of switches (high workload!) Monitoring systems preferred over periodic checks for identification of latent failures _ CS 25.1302, Installed Systems and Equipment for Use by the Flight Crew Human factors guidance on design of controls, displays, systems behavior

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Boeing Research and Technology Europe

10 / 13 EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009

How do ATM & airplane approaches compare?

_ Approval to operate, safety case covering complete life-cycle _ Operator _ Quantitative Human Reliability assessment _ Freedom of choice for SSA methods _ Severity based on effect on ATC / a/c _ Greater design freedom _ Certification / continued airworthiness process _ Manufacturer _ Full credit for crew actions only (conditions) _ Guidance on methods and depth of SSA _ Based on effects on a/c, pax, crew _ Detailed design guidance

ATM Airplanes

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SLIDE 11

Boeing Research and Technology Europe

11 / 13 EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009

Challenges of ATM / Airborne integration?

ATM AIRCRAFT Operator OEM Approval to Operate Certification Operational Reporting Continued Airworthiness

Pre- implementation Post- implementation EUROCONTROL SRC

EASA

Does increased integration pose new challenges in certification and require increased communication between ANSPs and aircraft OEMs? Is a harmonization of ATM and airplane regulations required?

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SLIDE 12

Boeing Research and Technology Europe

12 / 13 EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009

We should spend more time in the neighbour’s garden!

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SLIDE 13

Boeing Research and Technology Europe

13 / 13 EUROCONTROL Safety R&D Seminar, Munich, 21st & 22nd October 2009