Impacts of institutional change on edible caterpillars and Miombo - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Impacts of institutional change on edible caterpillars and Miombo woodland conservation in Mpika District, northern Zambia

Rhoda Nthena Kachali*¤∞ Graham E Wallace¤, Andrea P C Wallace¤, James Gambiza∞

Zambia Wildlife Authority*, Frankfurt Zoological Society¤, Rhodes University∞

Study area

Study Area

3

Kopa

Mpumba

Mukungule

Miombo: The social woodland

• Over 100 million

inhabitants

• Key habitat for charismatic

herbivores (rhinos, elephant)

• Supports agricultural

systems (chitemene/slash and burn)

• Fire is a key management

tool and driver of ecosystem change

Kapanda Lupili Falls Picture by Carl F. Huchzermeyer

Commercially important members of the moth family Saturnidae in Mpika

Gynanisa maya Gonimbrasia zambesina

Why caterpillars?

Environment

• Healthy woodlands = healthy caterpillar

population

Self organizing Institutions

• Code of conduct for fire and caterpillar

management practices

Benefits

• Sustainable protein and income source

Win win

•  The ideal Community based Natural

Resource Management case!

The problem

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Kwacha (ZMW) per kg % change of caterpillar abundance

Perceptions of caterpillar abundance and prices 2010 – 2014

Abundance Price Mumpa Price Chipumi

Socio-ecological system

Ecosystem health Caterpillar abundance Benefits Codes of conduct and behaviour with regards to fire management and caterpillar Government policy/Institutions

Research questions

• Which institutions govern natural resource use, particularly fire

and edible caterpillars, in Mpika district?

• What knowledge do stakeholders have about these institutions?
• How effective are these institutions in governing edible

caterpillar and fire use?

• How have these institutions changed over time?
• Does institutional change have an impact on edible caterpillar

abundance?

Institutions: a definition

“Commonly understood codes of behaviour that potentially reduce uncertainty, mediate self- interest and facilitate collective action” Ostrom and Cox 2010*

*Ostrom, E. and Cox, M. (2010) Moving beyond panaceas: a multi-tiered diagnostic approach for social-ecological analysis. Environmental Conservation 37, 451–463.

“Commonly understood codes

• f behaviour that potentially

reduce uncertainty, mediate self-interest and facilitate collective action” Ostrom and Cox 2010*

Methods

377 Semi-structured interviews 6 key informant interviews 9 focus groups Observing/following harvesters Females = 52% Males = 48% Respondents with experience harvesting caterpillars = 82%

Institutions for Natural Resource Management

 Primary custodians  Perceived in communities as the enforcers of rules and regulations Traditional institutions: Chiefs, Village Headmen Primary policy makers Not directly involved in day to day management of resources Government of the Republic

• f Zambia

 Community Resource Boards (CRBs) Government attempt at community participation Role and authority established by statute Non-governmental

• rganizations (NGOs)

Facilitators with financial and technical resources Not beneficiaries but provide support

Who is responsible for enforcing sanctions?

58% 33% 5% 1% 1% 1%

What are the codes of conduct for caterpillar management?

1% 1% 16% 40% 42% Early burn Not specified Local taboos No cutting trees Specified harvest time

Codes of conduct: Fire management

• “You should burn early in
• rder to have more

caterpillars”

• “You only burn when the

Chief says so”

• 84% of respondents knew

about fire regulations

• “You should burn early in
• rder not to destroy the

environment”

Are institutions effective?

• Sanctions are not
• common. Only 19%

knew someone who had been punished for breaking rules

• “I will be taken to the

police if I dare punish anyone” Senior Chief

• “I only had authority

to punish people in the

• ld days” Chief

Are Institutions effective?

Lack legal authority to enforce rules and regulations Traditional institutions: Chiefs, Village Headmen Lack capacity to enforce laws due to lack of resources Strong focus on agricultural production Government of the Republic

• f Zambia

 Community Resource Boards (CRBs) Lack legal authority to enforce regulations Prone to elite capture Non-governmental

• rganizations (NGOs)

Short term projects May inadvertently exacerbate elite capture

Differences in government policy: Caterpillars versus maize

Edible caterpillars Maize

No subsidies Subsidize production Only 3 forestry officers for entire district (42,000 km2) 26 Agriculture extension

• fficers

No land use policy for non-timber forest products Secure land for farms and maize production Not promoted as part of the national food basket Maize seen as food security Price determined by market Guarantees market price for producers

What happens during actual enforcement of Codes of conduct?

 Greater adherence to rules when livelihoods were at stake  Mpumba - Charcoal  Kopa - Charcoal and Caterpillars  Mukungule - Chitemene  No actual policing of rules and regulations because of reduced social acceptance

Conclusions so far

• Institutional prescriptions that are devoid of

meaningful content have failed to engender community participation

• Government policy and action:
• Dis-incentive for conservation action
• Contribute to erosion of traditional institutions
• Benefits from caterpillars may not be a sufficient

incentive to conserve  The ideal CBNRM case?

Next steps

A deeper look at the key assumptions under-pinning CBNRM Benefits lead to pro-environmental action? Ownership leads to pro-environmental action?  Win-win is possible?

Acknowledgements

• Rhodes University – Dr. James Gambiza
• Zambia Wildlife Authority – Mr. Chuma Simukonda
• European Union
• CREATE project and Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS) -
• Dr. Graham Wallace, Dr. Andrea Wallace, and Dr. Anke

Fischer

• University of Zambia - Professor Keith Mbata and Dr.

Bridget Bwalya Umar