Impact on the Large and Impact on the Large and Complex Bureaucracy - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Impact on the Large and Complex Bureaucracy of the EU Impact on the Large and Complex Bureaucracy of the EU

Jan Foghelin 23 ISMOR 2006-08-28 – 09-01 New Place Hampshire 1(22)

Contents Contents

Introduction - Cases EU – Anatomy and physiology EU – Terrorism. Threat assessment and countermeasures EU – How to have an impact on EU EU – EU – a typical large organization? Introduction - Cases EU – Anatomy and physiology EU – Terrorism. Threat assessment and countermeasures EU – How to have an impact on EU EU – EU – a typical large organization?

Introduction - Cases Introduction - Cases

PASR 1. Project: SeNTRE PASR 2. Project proposal: EUROSECURITY PASR 3. Project proposals: BIO3R and STACCATO Project for the Swedish Emergency Management Agency: Threat perceptions in the EU concerning

• terrorism. Assessment processes

PASR 1. Project: SeNTRE PASR 2. Project proposal: EUROSECURITY PASR 3. Project proposals: BIO3R and STACCATO Project for the Swedish Emergency Management Agency: Threat perceptions in the EU concerning

• terrorism. Assessment processes

• EU. Anatomy and physiology
• EU. Anatomy and physiology

Source: Crisis Group Europé Report No 160, 17 January 2005

Source: Crisis Group Europé Report No 160, 17 January 2005

Decision Making in the EU Institutions Decision Making in the EU Institutions

According to EU Guy Peters, interplay within the EU takes place at three different levels. Firstly, the Member States try to push through their interests and gain as much as possible from cooperating with one another. Secondly, there is interplay between the various institutions. The Commission, in somewhat simplified terms, guarantees the rights

• f the European Union, while the European

Council protects national interests (which is intimately connected to the interplay between the Member States). According to EU Guy Peters, interplay within the EU takes place at three different levels. Firstly, the Member States try to push through their interests and gain as much as possible from cooperating with one another. Secondly, there is interplay between the various institutions. The Commission, in somewhat simplified terms, guarantees the rights

• f the European Union, while the European

Council protects national interests (which is intimately connected to the interplay between the Member States).

Continoue.. Continoue..

Thirdly, there is a bureaucratic play between dthe different Directorates-Generals (DG), which all have their own organizational culture, interests and views on different policy

• sectors. According to Peters (1992; 1996), the

DGs are often involved in conflicts concerning who should take responsibility for borderline questions in their policy sectors. Conflicts also exist betwween different groupings and individuals.

Larsson S., Olsson E-K., Ramberg B.: Crisis decision Making in the European

• Union. CRISMART. Stockholm 2005. p 9.

Thirdly, there is a bureaucratic play between dthe different Directorates-Generals (DG), which all have their own organizational culture, interests and views on different policy

• sectors. According to Peters (1992; 1996), the

DGs are often involved in conflicts concerning who should take responsibility for borderline questions in their policy sectors. Conflicts also exist betwween different groupings and individuals.

Larsson S., Olsson E-K., Ramberg B.: Crisis decision Making in the European

• Union. CRISMART. Stockholm 2005. p 9.

Crisis Management Capacities within EU´s three pillars Crisis Management Capacities within EU´s three pillars

Crisis management capacities exist within each of EU´s three pillars: the European Communities (at the supranational level) Commission, the ESDP/CFSP (at the interstate level), and the Justice and Home Affairs (at the interstate level). The first pillar provides a framework for the community institutions. The European Commission is basically the main actor and essentially all discussions on the first pillar focus

• n the activities of the European Commission.

Crisis management capacities exist within each of EU´s three pillars: the European Communities (at the supranational level) Commission, the ESDP/CFSP (at the interstate level), and the Justice and Home Affairs (at the interstate level). The first pillar provides a framework for the community institutions. The European Commission is basically the main actor and essentially all discussions on the first pillar focus

• n the activities of the European Commission.

Continue.. Continue..

Consequently, the crisis management capacity of the first pillar is more or less managed and finaced by the European Commission. The second pillar deals with establishing a common foreign and security policy for the EU. The aim is uniting the Member States on major foreign and security policy issues so that it is possible to execute joint actions. Likewise, the second pillar addresses issues regarding community values, international cooperation, defense, and European

• security. This is a challenge since many of the

Member States have quite different security and defense policies (e.g., NATO, WEU, nuclear weapons, etc.). Consequently, the crisis management capacity of the first pillar is more or less managed and finaced by the European Commission. The second pillar deals with establishing a common foreign and security policy for the EU. The aim is uniting the Member States on major foreign and security policy issues so that it is possible to execute joint actions. Likewise, the second pillar addresses issues regarding community values, international cooperation, defense, and European

• security. This is a challenge since many of the

Member States have quite different security and defense policies (e.g., NATO, WEU, nuclear weapons, etc.).

Continue… Continue…

In order for the EU to strengthen its role as an international crisis mangager, it is of crucial that the EU displays a solid, united front. The third pillar (cooperation in justice and home affairs) focuses on cooperation between police and judicial authorities in the Member States in an attempt to eliminate crime, racism, and xenophobia (European Union, down loaded in December 2004).

Larsson S., Olsson E-L., Ramberg B.: Crisis Decision Making in the European

• Union. CRISMART. Stockholm 2005. p 25-27.

In order for the EU to strengthen its role as an international crisis mangager, it is of crucial that the EU displays a solid, united front. The third pillar (cooperation in justice and home affairs) focuses on cooperation between police and judicial authorities in the Member States in an attempt to eliminate crime, racism, and xenophobia (European Union, down loaded in December 2004).

Larsson S., Olsson E-L., Ramberg B.: Crisis Decision Making in the European

• Union. CRISMART. Stockholm 2005. p 25-27.

• EU. Terrorism

Threat assessment and countermeasures

• EU. Terrorism

Threat assessment and countermeasures

Initial hypotheses concerning threat perceptions (terrorism) Initial hypotheses concerning threat perceptions (terrorism)

React: History repeats itself Proact: Scenarios, Gaming and Simulation Worst – case ”Most preferred aggression” Intelligence assessments React: History repeats itself Proact: Scenarios, Gaming and Simulation Worst – case ”Most preferred aggression” Intelligence assessments

Threat assessments and countermeasures (terrorism). Observations Threat assessments and countermeasures (terrorism). Observations

Policy guidelines only on a high level (ESS from 2003) There is an EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator but without real power (budgetary, legal …) Intelligence assessments are used but only for short- term Scenarios are used by some (EUMS, DG Environment) but not coordinated Policy guidelines only on a high level (ESS from 2003) There is an EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator but without real power (budgetary, legal …) Intelligence assessments are used but only for short- term Scenarios are used by some (EUMS, DG Environment) but not coordinated

Continue… Continue…

Protection against terrorism is important for many parts of EU. No common threat perception (ESS is an exception) Every part of EU has its own perspective (protection of international operation, protection

• f critical infrastructure, protection of citizens,

legal cooperation …) To avoid recurrence of recent incidents is a major concern. Priorities are not set in a transparent manner. Protection against terrorism is important for many parts of EU. No common threat perception (ESS is an exception) Every part of EU has its own perspective (protection of international operation, protection

• f critical infrastructure, protection of citizens,

legal cooperation …) To avoid recurrence of recent incidents is a major concern. Priorities are not set in a transparent manner.

Threat Perceptions (Terrorism) – EU Threat Perceptions (Terrorism) – EU

Scenarios etc. Long.-term threat assessment Threat Perceptions (Terrorism)

• EU

M S d i f f e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e s . ” F r

• m

U K t

• F

i n l a n d ” ( I R A , E T A , R A F … ) I n t e l l i g e n c e ( i n f

• r

m a t i

• n

a n d a s s e s s m e n t f r

• m

M S : s ) Important incidents (9/11, Madrid, London) EU:s ”counterterrorism” before 9/11. TREVI, Maastricht, Europol … Impact from the USA after 9/11 ”The National Security Strategy” (2002) ESS (2003) Catastrophic terrorism (WMD), containers..

• EU. How to have an impact on EU
• EU. How to have an impact on EU

Impact on the EU. Observations Impact on the EU. Observations

Threat Assessments

In general more difficult to influence perceptions of threats than counter-measures Threats which for some reasons are established, could be given complementary points of view (e.g. critical infrastructure, bio, container…) New threats and priorities between threats seem to be difficult to have an impact on.

Threat Assessments

In general more difficult to influence perceptions of threats than counter-measures Threats which for some reasons are established, could be given complementary points of view (e.g. critical infrastructure, bio, container…) New threats and priorities between threats seem to be difficult to have an impact on.

Continue… Continue…

Countermeasures

Ideas concerning countermeasures to ”established threats” seem to be welcome (esp. In areas where there are EU-units with responsibility (critical infrastructure protection, legal cooperation, industrial procucts…) Analysis of vulnerabilities (without a specific threats) could have an impact.

Countermeasures

Ideas concerning countermeasures to ”established threats” seem to be welcome (esp. In areas where there are EU-units with responsibility (critical infrastructure protection, legal cooperation, industrial procucts…) Analysis of vulnerabilities (without a specific threats) could have an impact.

• EU. EU – a typical large
• rganization?
• EU. EU – a typical large
• rganization?

Observations Observations

Many conditions in EU are similiar to those of large organization in general. There are tensions between politicians and officials and between different units. (Unclear responsibilities, power game concerning influence etc.). Complex decision making processes make the organization less agile, but with a broader political support. It takes time, and often incidents/crises, to change policies and means. Many conditions in EU are similiar to those of large organization in general. There are tensions between politicians and officials and between different units. (Unclear responsibilities, power game concerning influence etc.). Complex decision making processes make the organization less agile, but with a broader political support. It takes time, and often incidents/crises, to change policies and means.

Continue… Continue…

What makes EU more complicated than most

• rganizations are the following conditions,

There are many MS:s with different opinions. There is not one dominating MS. There is an in-built tension between the council and the commission.

What makes EU more complicated than most

• rganizations are the following conditions,

There are many MS:s with different opinions. There is not one dominating MS. There is an in-built tension between the council and the commission.