Human Cooperation Dr David Rand Associate Professor of Psychology, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Human Cooperation Dr David Rand Associate Professor of Psychology, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science public lecture Human Cooperation Dr David Rand Associate Professor of Psychology, Economics, and Management, Yale University Director of Human Cooperation Laboratory, Yale University Dr


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Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science public lecture

Human Cooperation

Dr David Rand

Associate Professor of Psychology, Economics, and Management, Yale University Director of Human Cooperation Laboratory, Yale University Hashtag for Twitter users: #LSERand

Dr Bradley Franks

Chair, LSE

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Human cooperation

David G. Rand

Associate professor of Psychology, Economics, and Management, Yale University London School of Economics, December 8 2016

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Cooperation is essential

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…but cooperation is a challenge

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Why do people cooperate?

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Cooperation pays off (in the long run)

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“Strategic” cooperation

Review: Dal Bo & Frechette 2016 JEL

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“Strategic” cooperation

Review: Nowak & Sigmund 2005 Nature

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Review: Perc & Szolnoki 2010 Biosystems

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Review: Perc & Szolnoki 2010 Biosystems

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Ra

Rand et al 2011 PNAS

N=430 Mturkers

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Milinski et al 2002 Nature, Rand et al 2009 Science

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Yoeli Hoffman Rand Nowak 2013 PNAS

N=1408 CA residents

Erez Yoeli

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$25 incentive had no sig effect Observability 7x more effective

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$25 incentive had no sig effect Observability 7x more effective

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Coordination: Cooperation payoff- maximizing if other also cooperative Social dilemma: Not (objective) payoff- maximizing to cooperate

Pure Strategic

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What explains Pure cooperation?

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Dual-process perspective

Sloman 1996, Stanovich & West 1998 Kahneman 2003, Evans 2008

Deliberation vs Intuition

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Rational self-control of greedy impulses? Intuitively cooperative, rationally selfish?

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Social Heuristics Hypothesis Typically long-run optimal behavior

Internalized as intuitive default “social heuristic”

Rand et al 2014 Nature Comm

Deliberation can override in atypical situations

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Deliberation = defection Intuition = cooperation

Bear Rand 2016 PNAS

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Testable Predictions

Pure cooperation: Deliberation undermines cooperation Strategic cooperation: Deliberation supports cooperation

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Experimental evidence

Random effects meta-analysis

Pay $ cost to give $ benefit to other(s) → Pure: partner can’t respond → Strategic: partner can respond Intuition vs deliberation manipulated → Time pressure/delay, cognitive load, ego depletion, intuition induction 67 studies from 26 groups, total N=17,647 → No publication bias (Eggers or p-curve)

Rand 2016

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Pure cooperation: 17.3% more cooperation when intuition is promoted relative to deliberation (ITT=13.5%) Strategic cooperation: No meaningful difference (1.0%) between intuition and deliberation, p=.76

Experimental evidence

Random effects meta-analysis

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Intuition = generalized response (less sensitive to incentives)

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Intuitive cooperation in the field

Artavia-Mora et al. 2016 EER

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Intuitive cooperation in the field

Artavia-Mora et al. 2016 EER

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Intuitive cooperation in the field

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Intuitive heroism?

Rand Epstein 2014 PLoS ONE

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Intuitive heroism?

51 hero statements rated by 312 Ss

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Intuitive heroism?

‘‘I’m thankful I was able to act and not think about it” “I just did what I felt like I needed to do.” Same relationship among Heroes estimated to have had at least 1 minute to act

51 hero statements rated by 312 Ss

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Cooperation pays off Cooperation internalized Good institutions

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Building cooperative cultures

Stage 1: 3-player 10 round Public Goods Game → 140 unit endowment, contributions x1.2 Manipulate institutional quality: Stage 2: Split money with novel recipient (Dictator Game) N=516 Mturkers

Stagnaro Arechar Rand 2016 SSRN

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Building cooperative cultures

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Signaling trustworthiness

Intuition → Insensitive to strategic situation “Uncalculating” cooperation in situation A → Likely to cooperate in situation B Decision process gives information above and beyond actual choice Pizarro et al 2003, Critcher et al 2013 Uncalculating cooperation used to signal trustworthiness

Jordan et al 2016 PNAS Jillian Jordan

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(c unknown)

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N=361 p<.001 p=.08 Interaction: p<.001 N=365 p<.001 p<.001 Interaction: p<.001

Player B perceives decision process as signal

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N=595 N=140 p<.001 p=.718 Interaction: p=.031 N=624 N=113 p=.021 p=.486 Interaction: p=.019 [Controlling for reading speed]

Decision process is signal of Player A trustworthiness

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N=735 p=.002 N=737 p=.014

Player A uses decision process as a signal

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Future consequences make cooperation pay off People cooperation even in 1-shot situations Intuition = easy/fast but inflexible, shaped by typical interactions For our subjects, intuition favors cooperation (pure and strategic) Deliberation undermines pure cooperation, but supports strategic cooperation Good institutions can create habits of prosociality Uncalculating cooperation is not only about cognitive ease – also reputation motives

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Rand Nowak (2013) Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17, 413-435

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Cooperators

Paul Bloom Nicholas Christakis Anna Dreber Kyle Dillon Tony Evans Drew Fudenberg Josh Greene Moshe Hoffman Martin Nowak Alex Peysakhovich Erez Yoeli

1. Rand et al. (2011) Dynamic networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans. PNAS. 2. Rand et al. (2012) Spontaneous giving and calculated greed. Nature. 3. Rand Nowak (2013) Human cooperation. TiCS. 4. Yoeli et al. (2013) Powering up with indirect reciprocity in a large-scale field experiment. PNAS 5. Rand et al. (2014) Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation. Nature Comm. 6. Rand Epstein (2014) Risking your life without a second though. PLoS ONE. 7. Bear Rand (2016) Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation. PNAS. 8. Rand (2016) Cooperation, fast and slow: Meta-analytic evidence for social heuristics & self-interested

  • deliberation. Psychological Science.

9. Stagnaro et al (2016) From good institutions to good norms. SSRN working paper.

  • 10. Jordan et al (2016) Uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness. PNAS.
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Discussed during question period

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Cooperation versus altruism

Cooperation: possibility for mutual benefit → Pays off in repeated interactions Altruism (e.g. unilateral cash transfers) → Only pays off if required by social norms

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Intuitive altruism?

Prediction: altruism typically advantageous (and therefore intuitive) only to people for whom social norms require altruistic behavior → Women expected to be communal, men agentic; women punished if insufficiently communal Eagley, 1987; Heilman & Okimoto, 2007 Meta-analysis of 22 studies (N=4,366) → Dictator game: zero-sum unilateral $ transfer → Manipulating cognitive processing → 13 new studies, 9 previously published

Rand et al 2016 JEP:General

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Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science public lecture

Human Cooperation

Dr David Rand

Associate Professor of Psychology, Economics, and Management, Yale University Director of Human Cooperation Laboratory, Yale University Hashtag for Twitter users: #LSERand

Dr Bradley Franks

Chair, LSE