How to choose among choice functions Seamus Bradley Munich Centre - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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How to choose among choice functions Seamus Bradley Munich Centre - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

How to choose among choice functions Seamus Bradley Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy 20 July 2015 Core idea We are interested in rational decision making where the agent is represented as having a set of probability functions P for her


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How to choose among choice functions

Seamus Bradley

Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy

20 July 2015

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Core idea

We are interested in rational decision making where the agent is represented as having a set of probability functions P for her degrees of beliefs, or credences. The main question is: what can we say about rational choices?

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Core idea

We are interested in rational decision making where the agent is represented as having a set of probability functions P for her degrees of beliefs, or credences. The main question is: what can we say about rational choices? We describe some popular “choice functions”, explore what properties they have, and whether these properties are rationally

  • compelling. We also explore the question of how to interpret the

choice function.

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Basics

◮ We have a (finite) state space Ω. ◮ We have a set of gambles Φ which are functions from Ω to R. ◮ For p ∈ R let pϕ + (1 − p)ψ be the “mixed act” defined

pointwise, and let pϕ + (1 − p)A be the set of acts in A mixed with ϕ.

◮ A∗ is the set of mixed acts over acts in A. ◮ The agent has a set of probability functions P from Ω to

[0, 1].

◮ Expectations for pr ∈ P defined by

Ep(ϕ) =

ω∈Ω pr(ω)ϕ(ω). ◮ Expectations for imprecise agents: E(ϕ) = {Epr(ϕ), pr ∈ P}. ◮ Summary functions P(X) = inf P(X) and P(X) = sup P(X)

likewise for E.

◮ For A ⊆ Φ let C(A) be the set of choiceworthy acts.

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Interpreting C

Strong ϕ ∈ C(A) means ϕ is among the best and exactly as good as all other ψ ∈ C(A).

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Interpreting C

Strong ϕ ∈ C(A) means ϕ is among the best and exactly as good as all other ψ ∈ C(A). Weak ϕ ∈ C(A) means ϕ is better than all acts not in C(A).

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Interpreting C

Strong ϕ ∈ C(A) means ϕ is among the best and exactly as good as all other ψ ∈ C(A). Weak ϕ ∈ C(A) means ϕ is better than all acts not in C(A). Very Weak All we can say is that the best act is among the ϕ ∈ C(A).

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Maximality

The maximal set for a relation is M: M(A) = {ϕ ∈ A : ¬∃ψ ∈ A, ψ ≻ ϕ}

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Expectation relations

We define the following two relations: ϕ Epr ψ iff Epr(ϕ) ≥ Epr(ψ) Dom=

  • P

Epr

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Choice functions

Maximin ME

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Choice functions

Maximin ME Maximality MDom

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Choice functions

Maximin ME Maximality MDom E-admissibility L(A) =

pr∈P MEpr(A)

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Properties of choice

Nondomination C satisfies Dom. Contraction Consistency C(A ∪ B) ⊆ C(A) ∪ C(B). (Sen’s alpha) Independence C(pA + (1 − p)ϕ) = p C(A)(1 − p)ϕ Union Consistency C(A) ∩ C(B) ⊆ C(A ∪ B). (Sen’s gamma) All-or-Nothing If ϕ ∈ C(A) but ϕ / ∈ C(B) then, for all ψ ∈ C(A) we have ψ / ∈ C(B). (Sen’s beta) Mixing C(A) ⊆ C(A∗). Convexity C(A)∗ ∩ A = C(A).

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Conclusions

◮ Maximin (ME) violates Independence and Nondomination

(though it never chooses strictly dominated acts).

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Conclusions

◮ Maximin (ME) violates Independence and Nondomination

(though it never chooses strictly dominated acts).

◮ Maximality (MDom) violates All-or-Nothing, Mixing and

Convexity.

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Conclusions

◮ Maximin (ME) violates Independence and Nondomination

(though it never chooses strictly dominated acts).

◮ Maximality (MDom) violates All-or-Nothing, Mixing and

Convexity.

◮ E-admissibility (L) violates Nondomination, Union

Consistency, All-or-Nothing and Convexity.

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Conclusions

◮ Maximin (ME) violates Independence and Nondomination

(though it never chooses strictly dominated acts).

◮ Maximality (MDom) violates All-or-Nothing, Mixing and

Convexity.

◮ E-admissibility (L) violates Nondomination, Union

Consistency, All-or-Nothing and Convexity.

◮ Levi’s two-tiered security conscious choice rule ME ◦L violates

Nondomination, Independence, Contraction Consistency and Union Consistency.

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Conclusions

◮ Maximin (ME) violates Independence and Nondomination

(though it never chooses strictly dominated acts).

◮ Maximality (MDom) violates All-or-Nothing, Mixing and

Convexity.

◮ E-admissibility (L) violates Nondomination, Union

Consistency, All-or-Nothing and Convexity.

◮ Levi’s two-tiered security conscious choice rule ME ◦L violates

Nondomination, Independence, Contraction Consistency and Union Consistency.

◮ One can compose E-admissibility and Maxmin with

Maximality to avoid nondomination, but all the other problems remain.

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Further work

◮ Sequential choice?

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Further work

◮ Sequential choice? ◮ Value of information?

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Further work

◮ Sequential choice? ◮ Value of information? ◮ A “regret-based” rule?