_ How can Game Theory be used in Moral Philosophy? 2 What we - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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G ame Theory for Morality Amir Ahmad Habibi | April 2019 _ How can Game Theory be used in Moral Philosophy? 2 What we are going to discuss [0] Some History [1] Functionalism [2] Contractarianism [3] Evolutionary GT 3 Some History 4

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Game Theory

Amir Ahmad Habibi | April 2019

for Morality

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How can Game Theory be used in Moral Philosophy?

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[0] Some History [1] Functionalism [2] Contractarianism [3] Evolutionary GT

What we are going to discuss

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Some History

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Richard B. Braithwaite

“Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher” 1955

Some History

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Some History

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  • R. B. Braithwaite

John F. Nash Von Neumann & Morgenstern

“Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher” 1955 “The bargaining problem” 1950 1944 “Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour”

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Some History

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Cool GT Timeline:

http://euler.fd.cvut.cz/pred mety/teorie_her/histf.html

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David

Hume

1711 - 1776

Thomas

Hobbes

1588 - 1679

Some History

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Some History

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Richard B. Braithwaite His prediction hasn’t yet happened :(

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Some History

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Bruno Verbeek 2002

[1] Functionalism [2] Contractarianism [3] Evolutionary GT

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1st approach

Functionalism

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Edna Ullmann-Margalit

1977 The Emergence of Norms

moral norms enable agents to cooperate and coordinate their actions in situations where the pursuit of self-interest prevents this.

  • 1. Functionalism

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Edna Ullmann-Margalit

The Emergence of Norms 1977

  • 1. Functionalism

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Artillerist #2

stay flee stay 2 3 2 flee 1 3 1

Artillerist #1

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Edna Ullmann-Margalit

The Emergence of Norms 1977

  • 1. Functionalism

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The solution?

  • Chain each other to the guns

Morality commits agents to avoid Pareto-inefficient

  • r sub-optimal outcomes.
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The Problems:

  • 1. Functionalism

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  • It does not explain the emergence

and persistence of morality

  • We don’t know if morality coincides

with the Pareto-superior outcomes.

  • It assumes the conflict of morality

with individual rationality

Bruno Verbeek 2002

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  • 2. Contractarianism
  • 3. Evolutionary GT

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  • 1. Functionalism

Bruno Verbeek 2002

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2nd approach

Contractarianism

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Rational agents in a suitably idealised bargaining situation will agree on a specific distribution of benefits

  • f cooperation.
  • 2. Contractarianism

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Morality as a Bargaining Process:

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  • 2. Contractarianism

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The Artillerists Bargaining

Bargaining area

Utility #1 Utility #2 (3,0) (0,3) (1,1) (2,2)

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What would the distribution be?

  • Cooperative game theory
  • Non-cooperative game theory
  • 2. Contractarianism

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Morals by Agreement 1986

Tries to answer “why be Moral?”

  • 2. Contractarianism

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David Gauthier

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  • 2. Contractarianism

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1986 Morals by Agreement

  • Constrained maximisation
  • Disposition to cooperate

with other cooperators

David Gauthier

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3rd approach

Evolutionary- gametheorianism

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Differences:

  • Morality is a side-effect of

interactions of agents

  • It emerges from repeated

interactions of small groups

  • Not assuming full information

and full rationality

  • 3. EvoGTanism

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Jean-Jacques Rousseau

  • 3. EvoGTanism

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1754

Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes

A Discourse Upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality Among Mankind

> Stag Hunt <

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Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Stag Hunt 1754

  • 3. EvoGTanism

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#2

Stag Hare Stag 3 2 3 Hare 2 2 2

#1

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Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Stag Hunt 1754

  • 3. EvoGTanism

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#2

Stag Hare Stag 3 2 3 Hare 2 2 2

#1

Par-efen But te

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According to EvoGT:

Since most of our actual norms are often stable, they might be Pareto-inefficient unlike Contractarian norms.

  • 3. EvoGTanism

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  • Explains the emergence &

persistence of moral norms

  • Has recovered many

existing moral norms

  • Provides an answer

to “Why be moral?”

  • 3. EvoGTanism

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Achievements:

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  • Focus on explanation

but not justifications

  • Immoral norms!
  • Moral skepticism
  • 3. EvoGTanism

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Drawback:

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Epilogue

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Moral theorists are against

This rather

  • ne-dimensional

picture of rational man.

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1982 Reputation and Imperfect Information

Kreps & Wilson

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“It has been said that man is a rational animal. All my life I have been searching for evidence which could support this.”

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Bertrand Russell

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Future work

Synthesis of the traditional Contractarian and the recent EvoGT approaches

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Questions?

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