Heterogeneity and the Business Cycle
Advances in Macroeconomic Modelling Vincent SterkUCL,CfM,CEPR
Tinbergen Today: Challenges for Macroeconomic Modelling
Heterogeneity and the Business Cycle Advances in Macroeconomic - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Heterogeneity and the Business Cycle Advances in Macroeconomic Modelling Vincent Sterk UCL , CfM , CEPR Tinbergen Today: Challenges for Macroeconomic Modelling DNB, November 2019 Heterogeneity & Business Cycle Models Since 1980s: strong
Tinbergen Today: Challenges for Macroeconomic Modelling
◮ Lucas critique,“conquest of inflation”, etc.
◮ greatly simplifies computational complexity (distributions not a state) ⋆ estimation, forecasting, quantitative policy analysis, etc.
◮ Lucas critique,“conquest of inflation”, etc.
◮ greatly simplifies computational complexity (distributions not a state) ⋆ estimation, forecasting, quantitative policy analysis, etc.
◮ Lucas critique,“conquest of inflation”, etc.
◮ greatly simplifies computational complexity (distributions not a state) ⋆ estimation, forecasting, quantitative policy analysis, etc.
◮ inequality in household income, wealth and consumption ◮ differences in firm size, productivity and markups, measures of “misallocation”
◮ households: interest rate sensitivities, marginal propensities to consume,
◮ firms: lumpy investment and hiring, etc.
◮ by age, ownership status, balance sheet characteristics, etc.
◮ inequality in household income, wealth and consumption ◮ differences in firm size, productivity and markups, measures of “misallocation”
◮ households: interest rate sensitivities, marginal propensities to consume,
◮ firms: lumpy investment and hiring, etc.
◮ by age, ownership status, balance sheet characteristics, etc.
◮ inequality in household income, wealth and consumption ◮ differences in firm size, productivity and markups, measures of “misallocation”
◮ households: interest rate sensitivities, marginal propensities to consume,
◮ firms: lumpy investment and hiring, etc.
◮ by age, ownership status, balance sheet characteristics, etc.
◮ inequality in household income, wealth and consumption ◮ differences in firm size, productivity and markups, measures of “misallocation”
◮ households: interest rate sensitivities, marginal propensities to consume,
◮ firms: lumpy investment and hiring, etc.
◮ by age, ownership status, balance sheet characteristics, etc.
◮ inequality in household income, wealth and consumption ◮ differences in firm size, productivity and markups, measures of “misallocation”
◮ households: interest rate sensitivities, marginal propensities to consume,
◮ firms: lumpy investment and hiring, etc.
◮ by age, ownership status, balance sheet characteristics, etc.
◮ typically calibrated towards cross-sectional distributions
◮ Approximate aggregation: assume agents keep track only of certain moments
◮ Reiter (2009) method: solve model using perturbation, approximate
◮ “MIT” shocks: one-time unanticipated shock, solve by computing perfect
◮ typically calibrated towards cross-sectional distributions
◮ Approximate aggregation: assume agents keep track only of certain moments
◮ Reiter (2009) method: solve model using perturbation, approximate
◮ “MIT” shocks: one-time unanticipated shock, solve by computing perfect
◮ typically calibrated towards cross-sectional distributions
◮ Approximate aggregation: assume agents keep track only of certain moments
◮ Reiter (2009) method: solve model using perturbation, approximate
◮ “MIT” shocks: one-time unanticipated shock, solve by computing perfect
◮ Which cross-sectional patterns to match?
◮ potentially complex equilibrium feedbacks
◮ breakdown of Ricardian equivalence ◮ seemingly innocuous assumptions on the distribution of factor payments may
◮ Which cross-sectional patterns to match?
◮ potentially complex equilibrium feedbacks
◮ breakdown of Ricardian equivalence ◮ seemingly innocuous assumptions on the distribution of factor payments may
◮ Which cross-sectional patterns to match?
◮ potentially complex equilibrium feedbacks
◮ breakdown of Ricardian equivalence ◮ seemingly innocuous assumptions on the distribution of factor payments may
◮ idiosyncratic income risk + incomplete insurance ⇒ heterogeneity
◮ idiosyncratic income risk + incomplete insurance ⇒ heterogeneity
◮ idiosyncratic income risk + incomplete insurance ⇒ heterogeneity
◮ face idiosyncratic unemployment risk ⋆ employed: choose labour supply, lose their job with probability peu ⋆ unemployed: receive benefit ϑ, find job with probability pue ◮ save in nominal bonds subject to no-borrowing limit: Bt(i) ≥ 0,
◮ produce, set prices subject to adjustment cost
◮ set nominal interest rate according to rule
◮ face idiosyncratic unemployment risk ⋆ employed: choose labour supply, lose their job with probability peu ⋆ unemployed: receive benefit ϑ, find job with probability pue ◮ save in nominal bonds subject to no-borrowing limit: Bt(i) ≥ 0,
◮ produce, set prices subject to adjustment cost
◮ set nominal interest rate according to rule
◮ face idiosyncratic unemployment risk ⋆ employed: choose labour supply, lose their job with probability peu ⋆ unemployed: receive benefit ϑ, find job with probability pue ◮ save in nominal bonds subject to no-borrowing limit: Bt(i) ≥ 0,
◮ produce, set prices subject to adjustment cost
◮ set nominal interest rate according to rule
◮ face idiosyncratic unemployment risk ⋆ employed: choose labour supply, lose their job with probability peu ⋆ unemployed: receive benefit ϑ, find job with probability pue ◮ save in nominal bonds subject to no-borrowing limit: Bt(i) ≥ 0,
◮ produce, set prices subject to adjustment cost
◮ set nominal interest rate according to rule
◮ Representative Agent (RANK) version
◮ “extreme market incompleteness” ◮ all agents hold zero wealth in equilibrium ◮ unemployed are “hand to mouth”, employed are on Euler equation, but
◮ analytically tractable (Ravn & Sterk, 2016)
◮ Representative Agent (RANK) version
◮ “extreme market incompleteness” ◮ all agents hold zero wealth in equilibrium ◮ unemployed are “hand to mouth”, employed are on Euler equation, but
◮ analytically tractable (Ravn & Sterk, 2016)
◮ Representative Agent (RANK) version
◮ “extreme market incompleteness” ◮ all agents hold zero wealth in equilibrium ◮ unemployed are “hand to mouth”, employed are on Euler equation, but
◮ analytically tractable (Ravn & Sterk, 2016)
◮ Representative Agent (RANK) version
◮ “extreme market incompleteness” ◮ all agents hold zero wealth in equilibrium ◮ unemployed are “hand to mouth”, employed are on Euler equation, but
◮ analytically tractable (Ravn & Sterk, 2016)
◮ Representative Agent (RANK) version
◮ “extreme market incompleteness” ◮ all agents hold zero wealth in equilibrium ◮ unemployed are “hand to mouth”, employed are on Euler equation, but
◮ analytically tractable (Ravn & Sterk, 2016)
−σ
t
t+1
ϕ+σ ϕ
t
ϕ
−σ
t
t+1
ϕ+σ ϕ
t
ϕ
−σ
t
t+1
ϕ+σ ϕ
t
ϕ
∞
◮ alleviates the “Forward Guidance Puzzle” (McKay, Nakamura, Steinsson,
∞
◮ alleviates the “Forward Guidance Puzzle” (McKay, Nakamura, Steinsson,
∞
◮ alleviates the “Forward Guidance Puzzle” (McKay, Nakamura, Steinsson,
−σ
t
t+1
−σ
t
t+1
−σ
t
t+1
◮ Wages, are procyclical ◮ larger income fall upon job loss during a boom ◮ procyclical unemployment risk ◮ stronger precautionary saving motive during booms ⇒ lower aggregate demand ⋆ dampening relative to RANK
◮ Benefits move with wages ◮ time invariant income fall upon job loss during a boom ⇒ constant
◮ time invariant precautionary saving motive ⋆ neither amplification nor dampening
◮ Wages, are procyclical ◮ larger income fall upon job loss during a boom ◮ procyclical unemployment risk ◮ stronger precautionary saving motive during booms ⇒ lower aggregate demand ⋆ dampening relative to RANK
◮ Benefits move with wages ◮ time invariant income fall upon job loss during a boom ⇒ constant
◮ time invariant precautionary saving motive ⋆ neither amplification nor dampening
◮ Wages, are procyclical ◮ larger income fall upon job loss during a boom ◮ procyclical unemployment risk ◮ stronger precautionary saving motive during booms ⇒ lower aggregate demand ⋆ dampening relative to RANK
◮ Benefits move with wages ◮ time invariant income fall upon job loss during a boom ⇒ constant
◮ time invariant precautionary saving motive ⋆ neither amplification nor dampening
◮ Wages, are procyclical ◮ larger income fall upon job loss during a boom ◮ procyclical unemployment risk ◮ stronger precautionary saving motive during booms ⇒ lower aggregate demand ⋆ dampening relative to RANK
◮ Benefits move with wages ◮ time invariant income fall upon job loss during a boom ⇒ constant
◮ time invariant precautionary saving motive ⋆ neither amplification nor dampening
◮ Wages, are procyclical ◮ larger income fall upon job loss during a boom ◮ procyclical unemployment risk ◮ stronger precautionary saving motive during booms ⇒ lower aggregate demand ⋆ dampening relative to RANK
◮ Benefits move with wages ◮ time invariant income fall upon job loss during a boom ⇒ constant
◮ time invariant precautionary saving motive ⋆ neither amplification nor dampening
◮ Wages, are procyclical ◮ larger income fall upon job loss during a boom ◮ procyclical unemployment risk ◮ stronger precautionary saving motive during booms ⇒ lower aggregate demand ⋆ dampening relative to RANK
◮ Benefits move with wages ◮ time invariant income fall upon job loss during a boom ⇒ constant
◮ time invariant precautionary saving motive ⋆ neither amplification nor dampening
◮ Wages, are procyclical ◮ larger income fall upon job loss during a boom ◮ procyclical unemployment risk ◮ stronger precautionary saving motive during booms ⇒ lower aggregate demand ⋆ dampening relative to RANK
◮ Benefits move with wages ◮ time invariant income fall upon job loss during a boom ⇒ constant
◮ time invariant precautionary saving motive ⋆ neither amplification nor dampening
◮ Wages, are procyclical ◮ larger income fall upon job loss during a boom ◮ procyclical unemployment risk ◮ stronger precautionary saving motive during booms ⇒ lower aggregate demand ⋆ dampening relative to RANK
◮ Benefits move with wages ◮ time invariant income fall upon job loss during a boom ⇒ constant
◮ time invariant precautionary saving motive ⋆ neither amplification nor dampening
◮ Wages, are procyclical ◮ larger income fall upon job loss during a boom ◮ procyclical unemployment risk ◮ stronger precautionary saving motive during booms ⇒ lower aggregate demand ⋆ dampening relative to RANK
◮ Benefits move with wages ◮ time invariant income fall upon job loss during a boom ⇒ constant
◮ time invariant precautionary saving motive ⋆ neither amplification nor dampening
determinacy region
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Taylor rule coefficient ( )
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
EE discount
determinacy indeterminacy
10 20 30
quarter
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
% Output (Y)
10 20 30
quarter
% Inflation (PI)
10 20 30
quarter
0.5 1 1.5
% TFP (A)
ZL-HANK RANK
10 20 30
quarter
% Output (Y)
10 20 30
quarter
% Inflation (PI)
10 20 30
quarter
0.5 1 1.5
% policy shock (zR)
ZL-HANK RANK
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
10 20 30
quarter
0.05 0.1
% Output (Y)
10 20 30
quarter
0.05 0.1
% Inflation (PI)
10 20 30
quarter
0.05 0.1
% of s.s. output Tax on employed (T)
ZL-HANK RANK
10 20 30
quarter
0.05 0.1
% Output (Y)
10 20 30
quarter
0.05 0.1
% Inflation (PI)
10 20 30
quarter
0.05 0.1
% of s.s. output Tax on employed (T)
ZL-HANK RANK
10 20 30
quarter
0.05 0.1
% Output (Y)
10 20 30
quarter
0.05 0.1
% Inflation (PI)
10 20 30
quarter
0.05 0.1
% of s.s. output Tax on employed (T)
ZL-HANK RANK
10 20 30
quarter
0.05 0.1
% Output (Y)
10 20 30
quarter
0.05 0.1
% Inflation (PI)
10 20 30
quarter
0.05 0.1
% of s.s. output Tax on employed (T)
ZL-HANK RANK
t
◮ re-calibrate to target the same steady-state interest rate
◮ re-calibrate to target the same steady-state interest rate
◮ re-calibrate to target the same steady-state interest rate
5 10 15
quarter
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
% Output (Y)
5 10 15
quarter
% Inflation (PI)
5 10 15
quarter
0.5 1 1.5
% TFP (A)
B=0 B=0.02 B=0.04 B=0.06 B=0.08 B=0.10 B=0.12 B=0.14
5 10 15
quarter
% Output (Y)
5 10 15
quarter
% Inflation (PI)
5 10 15
quarter
0.5 1 1.5
% policy shock (zR)
B=0 B=0.02 B=0.04 B=0.06 B=0.08 B=0.10 B=0.12 B=0.14
◮ firms, housing, mortgages, banks, etc..
◮ countercyclical idiosyncratic risk / precautionary saving ◮ redistributional effects
◮ firms, housing, mortgages, banks, etc..
◮ countercyclical idiosyncratic risk / precautionary saving ◮ redistributional effects