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15-251 Great Theoretical Ideas in Computer Science Introduction to Computational Complexity II February 5th, 2015 Kurt Friedrich Gdel (1906-1978) Logician, mathematician, philosopher. Considered to be one of the most important logicians in


  1. 15-251 Great Theoretical Ideas in Computer Science Introduction to Computational Complexity II February 5th, 2015

  2. Kurt Friedrich Gödel (1906-1978) Logician, mathematician, philosopher. Considered to be one of the most important logicians in history. Great contributions to foundations of mathematics. Incompleteness Theorems. Completeness Theorem.

  3. John von Neumann (1903-1957) - Mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics - Founded the field of game theory in mathematics. - Created some of the first general-purpose computers.

  4. Gödel’s letter to von Neumann (1956) One can obviously easily construct a Turing machine, which for every formula F in first order predicate logic and every natural number n, allows one to decide if there is a proof of F of length n (length = number of symbols). Let ψ (F,n) be the number of steps the machine requires for this and let φ (n) = maxF ψ (F,n). The question is how fast φ (n) grows for an optimal machine. One can show that φ (n) ≥ k ⋅ n. If there really were a machine with φ (n) ∼ k ⋅ n (or even ∼ k ⋅ n 2 ), this would have consequences of the greatest importance. Namely, it would obviously mean that in spite of the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem, the mental work of a mathematician concerning Yes-or-No questions could be completely replaced by a machine. After all, one would simply have to choose the natural number n so large that when the machine does not deliver a result, it makes no sense to think more about the problem. Now it seems to me, however, to be completely within the realm of possibility that φ (n) grows that slowly.

  5. Gödel’s letter to von Neumann (1956) One can obviously easily construct a Turing machine, which for every formula F in first order predicate logic and every natural number n, allows one to decide if there is a proof of F of length n (length = number of symbols). Let ψ (F,n) be the number of steps the machine requires for this and let φ (n) = maxF ψ (F,n). The question is how fast φ (n) grows for an optimal machine. One can show that φ (n) ≥ k ⋅ n. If there really were a machine with φ (n) ∼ k ⋅ n (or even ∼ k ⋅ n 2 ), this would have consequences of the greatest importance. Namely, it would obviously mean that in spite of the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem, the mental work of a mathematician concerning Yes-or-No questions could be completely replaced by a machine. After all, one would simply have to choose the natural number n so large that when the machine does not deliver a result, it makes no sense to think more about the problem. Now it seems to me, however, to be completely within the realm of possibility that φ (n) grows that slowly.

  6. Gödel’s letter to von Neumann A computational problem Input: A FOL formula F, and m Output: YES if there is a proof F of length m NO otherwise Clearly this is decidable. Can do Brute Force Search.

  7. Gödel’s letter to von Neumann (1956) One can obviously easily construct a Turing machine, which for every formula F in first order predicate logic and every natural number n, allows one to decide if there is a proof of F of length n (length = number of symbols). Let ψ (F,n) be the number of steps the machine requires for this and let φ (n) = maxF ψ (F,n). The question is how fast φ (n) grows for an optimal machine. One can show that φ (n) ≥ k ⋅ n. If there really were a machine with φ (n) ∼ k ⋅ n (or even ∼ k ⋅ n 2 ), this would have consequences of the greatest importance. Namely, it would obviously mean that in spite of the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem, the mental work of a mathematician concerning Yes-or-No questions could be completely replaced by a machine. After all, one would simply have to choose the natural number n so large that when the machine does not deliver a result, it makes no sense to think more about the problem. Now it seems to me, however, to be completely within the realm of possibility that φ (n) grows that slowly.

  8. Gödel’s letter to von Neumann = the number of steps required for input ( F, m ) Ψ ( F, m ) (a worst-case notion of ϕ ( m ) = max Ψ ( F, m ) F running time) Question: How fast does for an optimal machine? ϕ ( m )

  9. Gödel’s letter to von Neumann (1956) One can obviously easily construct a Turing machine, which for every formula F in first order predicate logic and every natural number n, allows one to decide if there is a proof of F of length n (length = number of symbols). Let ψ (F,n) be the number of steps the machine requires for this and let φ (n) = maxF ψ (F,n). The question is how fast φ (n) grows for an optimal machine. One can show that φ (n) ≥ k ⋅ n. If there really were a machine with φ (n) ∼ k ⋅ n (or even ∼ k ⋅ n 2 ), this would have consequences of the greatest importance. Namely, it would obviously mean that in spite of the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem, the mental work of a mathematician concerning Yes-or-No questions could be completely replaced by a machine. After all, one would simply have to choose the natural number n so large that when the machine does not deliver a result, it makes no sense to think more about the problem. Now it seems to me, however, to be completely within the realm of possibility that φ (n) grows that slowly.

  10. Gödel’s letter to von Neumann = the number of steps required for input ( F, m ) Ψ ( F, m ) (a worst-case notion of ϕ ( m ) = max Ψ ( F, m ) F running time) Question: How fast does for an optimal machine? ϕ ( m ) He claims (a lower bound) ϕ ( m ) ≥ k · m If or even ϕ ( m ) ∼ k · m 2 ϕ ( m ) ∼ k · m (if we could really beat Brute Force Search) “this would have consequences of the greatest importance”

  11. Gödel’s letter to von Neumann (1956) One can obviously easily construct a Turing machine, which for every formula F in first order predicate logic and every natural number n, allows one to decide if there is a proof of F of length n (length = number of symbols). Let ψ (F,n) be the number of steps the machine requires for this and let φ (n) = maxF ψ (F,n). The question is how fast φ (n) grows for an optimal machine. One can show that φ (n) ≥ k ⋅ n. If there really were a machine with φ (n) ∼ k ⋅ n (or even ∼ k ⋅ n 2 ), this would have consequences of the greatest importance. Namely, it would obviously mean that in spite of the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem, the mental work of a mathematician concerning Yes-or-No questions could be completely replaced by a machine. After all, one would simply have to choose the natural number n so large that when the machine does not deliver a result, it makes no sense to think more about the problem. Now it seems to me, however, to be completely within the realm of possibility that φ (n) grows that slowly.

  12. Gödel’s letter to von Neumann (1956) One can obviously easily construct a Turing machine, which for every formula F in first order predicate logic and every natural number n, allows one to decide if there is a proof of F of length n (length = number of symbols). Let ψ (F,n) be the number of steps the machine requires for this and let φ (n) = maxF ψ (F,n). The question is how fast φ (n) grows for an optimal machine. One can show that φ (n) ≥ k ⋅ n. If there really were a machine with φ (n) ∼ k ⋅ n (or even ∼ k ⋅ n 2 ), this would have consequences of the greatest importance. Namely, it would obviously mean that in spite of the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem, the mental work of a mathematician concerning Yes-or-No questions could be completely replaced by a machine. After all, one would simply have to choose the natural number n so large that when the machine does not deliver a result, it makes no sense to think more about the problem. Now it seems to me, however, to be completely within the realm of possibility that φ (n) grows that slowly.

  13. Running time analysis: Dealing with summations Dealing with recursion

  14. Dealing with summations 1. Rough bounding 2. Exact computation 3. Induction 4. Telescoping series 5. Comparison with an integral

  15. Dealing with summations 1. Rough bounding n X i = 1 + 2 + 3 + · · · + n i =1 ≤ n + n + n + · · · + n = n 2 n n X X i i ≥ i =1 i = n/ 2 ≥ n 2 + n 2 + · · · + n 2 = n 2 Θ ( n 2 ) 4

  16. Dealing with summations 2. Exact computation n n 2 n ( n + 1) 2 + n + 1 X = i = 2 2 i =1 n x n +1 − 1 x i = X x − 1 i =0 If : | x | < 1 ∞ 1 X x i = 1 − x i =0

  17. Dealing with summations 2. Exact computation n x n +1 − 1 x i = X x − 1 i =0 If : | x | < 1 ∞ 1 X x i = 1 − x i =0 ∞ ∞ x 1 ix i = X X ix i − 1 = (1 − x ) 2 (1 − x ) 2 i =0 i =0

  18. Dealing with summations 3. Induction n X 3 i C · 3 n ≤ i =0 Prove by induction on n .

  19. Dealing with summations 4. Telescoping series n n 1 ✓ 1 ◆ 1 X X = i − i ( i + 1) i + 1 i =1 i =1 ✓ 1 ✓ 1 ◆ ✓ 1 ◆ ✓ 1 ◆ ◆ 1 − 1 2 − 1 3 − 1 1 = + + + · · · + n − 2 3 4 n + 1 1 = 1 − n + 1

  20. Dealing with summations 5. Comparison with an integral Z n n X f ( i ) f ( x ) dx ≈ x =1 i =1 Z n n 1 1 X xdx = ln( n ) ≈ i x =1 i =1 1 x Z n n 1 1 1 X 1 + xdx ≤ i x =1 i =1 1 + ln( n ) ≤ 1 2 3 n

  21. Dealing with summations 5. Comparison with an integral Z n n X f ( i ) f ( x ) dx ≈ x =1 i =1 Z n n 1 1 X xdx = ln( n ) ≈ i x =1 i =1 1 Z n x + 1 n 1 1 1 X x + 1 dx ≥ i x =0 i =1 = ln( n + 1) 1 2 3 n

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