Flow Rate Fairness: Dismantling a Religion Bob Briscoe presented by - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

flow rate fairness dismantling a religion
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

Flow Rate Fairness: Dismantling a Religion Bob Briscoe presented by - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Flow Rate Fairness: Dismantling a Religion Bob Briscoe presented by Brighten Godfrey 1 Fairness in networks Flow rate equality! 911 Easily circumvented Doesnt even optimize for any metric of interest hotornot.com Fig. 1:


slide-1
SLIDE 1

Flow Rate Fairness: Dismantling a Religion

Bob Briscoe presented by Brighten Godfrey

1

slide-2
SLIDE 2

Fairness in networks

  • Flow rate equality!
  • Easily circumvented
  • Doesn’t even optimize for

any metric of interest

  • Fig. 1: Poppycock.

hotornot.com 911

2

slide-3
SLIDE 3

Fairness in real life

  • Plentiful resources: use as

much as you want

  • e.g. air, advisor’s grant

money

  • Scarce resources: pay for

what you want

  • price set by market
  • result (under assumptions):

socially optimal allocation

  • Fig. 2. Invisible hand
  • f the market.

3

slide-4
SLIDE 4

Four main points

  • Flow rate fairness is not useful
  • Cost fairness is useful
  • Flow rate fairness is hard to enforce
  • Cost fairness is feasible to enforce

4

slide-5
SLIDE 5

FRF is not meaningful or useful

  • It doesn’t measure benefits
  • e.g., SMS message vs. a

packet of a video stream

  • It doesn’t measure costs
  • e.g., “parking lot” network:

long flow causes significant congestion but is given equal rate by fair queueing

  • Therefore, doesn’t equalize cost
  • r benefit

5

slide-6
SLIDE 6

FRF is not meaningful or useful

  • Myopic: no notion of fairness

across time

  • Example: “TCP-fair” flows
  • Defined to get same aggregate

rate as TCP across time

  • But can be smoother
  • So they use less bandwidth

when resources are plentiful (t1) and more when resources are scarce (t2) –– hardly “fair”!

flow rate, x(t) time, t congestion, p(t) congestion responses TCP-compatible ‘TCP-fair’ t1 t2

6

slide-7
SLIDE 7

FRF is not meaningful or useful

  • In summary, FRF does not
  • ptimize utility (except for

strange definitions of utility)

  • So, even cooperating entities

should not want to use it!

7

slide-8
SLIDE 8

Cost fairness is useful

  • Economic entities pay for the costs they incur
  • Note this is “fair” (in a real-world sense), not “equal”––and that’s fine
  • In other words, networks charge packets for the congestion they cause
  • Networks can easily lie about congestion!
  • So it’s really a market price, not exactly congestion
  • Result: senders want to maximize utility; since they are charged, they will seek

to balance benefit with cost (utility = benefit - cost)

8

slide-9
SLIDE 9

Cost fairness is provably useful

  • [Frank Kelly 1997]: Cost fairness maximizes aggregate utility
  • i.e.: any different outcome results in suboptimal utility
  • Why won’t anyone listen to Kelly? Hello??! ... where did everybody go?

9

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Cost fairness is useful: example [Briscoe ’09]

F)*;(4*. *)1.

Z23$4)(Z"-UX"+,4()3?

/)?,*"2+4?. ,.4B>"2+4?. [

*,(#**/)3?",.4B> 2+4?.

F)*;(4*. *)1.

3? *,(#**/

A.)?,*.E""-UX"+,4()3? *)1. (.B.4/.E 0#3?.+*)#3 F)*;(4*. *)1. N

Key point: Benefit per bit his high for light flow and low for heavy flow.

10

slide-11
SLIDE 11

Four main points

  • Flow rate fairness is not useful
  • Cost fairness is useful
  • Flow rate fairness is hard to enforce
  • Cost fairness is feasible to enforce

11

slide-12
SLIDE 12

FRF is hard to enforce

  • Just run your flow longer
  • Create more flows (sybil attack)
  • More TCP flows between same

source/destination (web browsers)

  • Spoof source IP / MAC address
  • Multiple flows to other destinations

(BitTorrent)

  • 12
slide-13
SLIDE 13

Cost fairness is feasible to enforce

  • You send me a packet; I handle delivery

and charge you for it

  • How much do I charge? Depends on

cost on entire remainder of path!

  • The next hop I send it to is going to

charge me, so I need to know how much, so I can cover my cost with your payment

  • Not the only way of arranging payments,

but it is convenient (payments between neighbors that already have an economic relationship You (src.) Me $$ $$ $$ Dest.

13

slide-14
SLIDE 14

Implementation: Re-Feedback [SIGCOMM’05]

  • Key property: every hop knows total congestion along downstream path

100 100 50 49 49 51 51 1

First packet Second packet $ $

14

slide-15
SLIDE 15

Other issues

  • What about other notions of fairness used simultaneously?
  • That’s fine, but in the end someone pays
  • User interface
  • Price may be changing quickly
  • Can be fixed by paying for a block of “congestion credits

for a month (say)

15

slide-16
SLIDE 16

Conclusion

  • “It just isn’t realistic to create a system the size of the Internet and define

fairness within the system without reference to fairness outside the system.”

  • Cost fairness optimizes aggregate utility and is feasible to enforce
  • Flow rate fairness does not optimize utility and is not feasible to enforce
  • Cease publication on the topic and stop teaching it in undergraduate

courses

16

slide-17
SLIDE 17

Discussion

  • In light of this paper, what use is (weighted) fair queueing?
  • If you were redesigning the Internet, would you use this general approach?
  • Security implications?
  • Bots may now effectively have access to micropayments

17