Fast leakage assessment
Oscar Reparaz Benedikt Gierlichs Ingrid Verbauwhede
COSIC / KU Leuven CHES 2017 Taipei (Taiwan) 2017-09-26
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Fast leakage assessment Oscar Reparaz COSIC / KU Leuven Benedikt - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Fast leakage assessment Oscar Reparaz COSIC / KU Leuven Benedikt Gierlichs CHES 2017 Taipei (Taiwan) 2017-09-26 Ingrid Verbauwhede 1 an empirical approach to test device security Enumerate all attacks, check if any is successful
Oscar Reparaz Benedikt Gierlichs Ingrid Verbauwhede
COSIC / KU Leuven CHES 2017 Taipei (Taiwan) 2017-09-26
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“Enumerate all attacks, check if any is successful” ✅ very concrete view on the security level provided ❌ a bit slow ❌ difficult to be comprehensive not all attacks are public, time is finite, …
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measurement setup input structure intermediate targeted distinguisher power random plaintext round 1 after sbox 1 single bit EM at coordinate (x,y) fix first column round 1 after sbox 2 CPA with HW EM at different place … CPA with HD round 1 after MC 1 CPA + linear regression
measurement setup input structure intermediate targeted distinguisher power random plaintext round 1 after sbox 1 single bit EM at coordinate (x,y) fix first column round 1 after sbox 2 CPA with HW EM at different place … CPA with HD round 1 after MC 1 CPA + linear regression
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measurement setup input structure intermediate targeted distinguisher power random plaintext round 1 after sbox 1 single bit EM at coordinate (x,y) fix first column round 1 after sbox 2 CPA with HW EM at different place … CPA with HD round 1 after MC 1 CPA + linear regression
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Can an adversary extract the key? key recovery “pragmatic” security notion
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≈ DPA
k=k1 k=k2 Can an adversary tell the two devices apart?
Can an adversary extract the key? key recovery (in)distinguishability “stronger” security notion “pragmatic” security notion
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≈ DPA ≈ leakage assessment
mean, variances, skewness, kurtosis, …
statistical test distribution statistic measurement setup
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FC 2000
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measurement setup input structure intermediate targeted distinguisher power random plaintext EM at coordinate (x,y) fix first column EM at different place
means
t = ¯ x1 − ¯ x2 q
s2
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n1 + s2
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n2
Generalization: higher-order tests (useful when targeting masked implementations) (=non-specific first-order test)
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touches HDD (bottleneck)
well, reliable
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samples samples statistics densities
formulae [Schneider—Moradi]
statistics
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samples samples statistics densities
formulae [Schneider—Moradi]
statistics
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samples statistics samples statistics densities
(complicated) formulae, per each trace [Schneider—Moradi] [Reparaz—Gierlichs] trivial,
trivial,
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samples statistics densities
[Reparaz—Gierlichs] trivial also trivial Our method:
hist[s]++
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200 400 600 800 1000 1200 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 50 100 150 200 250 200 400 600 800
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200 400 600 800 1000 1200 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 50 100 150 200 250 200 400 600 800
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200 400 600 800 1000 1200 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 50 100 150 200 250 200 400 600 800
most 4 billion measurements without overflowing.
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just fits on L2 cache
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Embarrassingly parallel
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Floating point vs integer arithmetic!
no effect whatsoever.
parameters, do not need to take new traces
combined with kernels
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Q
effort.
500x to 800x
used almost every day to evaluate our designs
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